Posts by Cassius

Here is the latin from the LatinLibrary.com:

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[40] Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus nullo dolore nec impediente nec inpendente, quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus dicere? inesse enim necesse est in eo, qui ita sit affectus, et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur. [41] Ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quod melius sit, accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus, quanti in hominem maximi cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita fore levius aliquando, nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec expectata voluptate, quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? quodsi vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore, cui sententiae consentaneum est ultimum esse bonorum eum voluptate vivere. nec enim habet nostra mens quicquam, ubi consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla, quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere. [42] Praeterea et appetendi et refugiendi et omnino rerum gerendarum initia proficiscuntur aut a voluptate aut a dolore. quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est omnis rectas res atque laudabilis eo referri, ut cum voluptate vivatur. quoniam autem id est vel summum bonorum vel ultimum vel extremum -- quod Graeci telos nominant --, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes, fatendum est summum esse bonum iucunde vivere.

This may be our most plain and simple detailed statement of the most desirable life left from the ancient Epicurean writings:

Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus nullo dolore nec impediente nec inpendente,

To me, a drive for clarity (or to banish improper connotations) is an embodiment of VS46 -

VS46. Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits, as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm.

Improper inferences from words like "tranquility" (and of "easy" in 3 and 4 of the T) have long done us great harm!

So we don't need to jettison them completely, just be clear in our use of them.

I don't think I use the word "precision" twice in a year, but I see that Dewitt uses the word at least 39 times in his book, such as:

(and the word "precise" 29 more times)

So a better choice of words for 2 (firmness might work too, but steadfastness works):

1. Set as your goal that of living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain
2. Work to possess steadfastness of mind,
3. Work to understand that death means complete unconsciousness,
4. Work to understand that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity.
5. Work to possess no dread of any supernatural power;
6. Work to never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection.

Yes firmitatem is an interesting word choice -- not "strength" of mind in the sense of "virtus" but the words Don suggests, indicating steadfastness, stability, constancy.

Words that very much play into our analogies to bodies of water, except that the point clearly would seem to me to imply "undivertable motion toward a goal" like the powerful Mississippi River flowing downstream, rather than just a small current in a tiny stream which is easy for beavers to divert.

(How's that for mixing metaphors from recent discussions?)

Quote from waterholic

Great list, like very much the six, except the "strength of mind". I don't understand why, but it "sounds stoic".

Agreed that it sounds Stoic to me too, but this might be an overreaction on our part.

Just because the Stoics may say the sun rises in the east that doesn't make it false

It looks to me like "Firmitatem animi" is a key phrase:

Again thinking that "strength of mind" is worth emphasizing for its own role as the means to the goal (which is indeed how I would see "tranquility," as a part of the means to to the goal of Pleasure, and not the goal in itself):

1. Set as your goal that of living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain
2. Work to possess strength of mind,
3. Work to understand that death means complete unconsciousness,
4. Work to understand that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity.
5. Work to possess no dread of any supernatural power;
6. Work to never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection.

Thinking back to Don's "strength of mind" emphasis, here's back to Six -

1. Set as your goal that of living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain
2. Work to possess a strength of mind that is proof against (resistant to?) all fear,
3. Work to understand that death means complete unconsciousness,
4. Work to understand that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity.
5. Work to possess no dread of any supernatural power;
6. Work to never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection.

If we wanted to stick to four, that's easily done as well:

1. Set as your goal that of living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain
2. Work to possess a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain by understanding that death means complete unconsciousness, and pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity.
3. Work to possess no dread of any supernatural power;
4. Work to never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection.

As usual there is lots of room for varying the wording of the translation from the Latin:

No we are not done at all, but in the meantime Don has inspired another thread:

Thread

Five Doses That Trump Four Every Time - The "Five-Part Cure"

[Edit: Originally posted as "Six-Part" Cure, consolidated to five for reasons stated in post 16 below.]

My issues with the tetrapharmokon have been frequently stated. What would I suggest is a much better summary that is better documented in the texts? Instead of the "four-part cure" I think we can look to a much better-stated "Six-part cure" as stated by Torquatus in "On Ends" (which means it was taken from the best handbooks available in about 50 BC by Cicero, who also had access to the…

Cassius

February 9, 2023 at 9:04 AM

[Edit: Originally posted as "Six-Part" Cure, consolidated to five for reasons stated in post 16 below.]

My issues with the tetrapharmokon have been frequently stated. What would I suggest is a much better summary that is better documented in the texts? Instead of the "four-part cure" I think we can look to a much better-stated "Six-part cure" as stated by Torquatus in "On Ends" (which means it was taken from the best handbooks available in about 50 BC by Cicero, who also had access to the best Epicurean teachers of his time, and who was subject to the sanction of some of his best friends if he got it wrong).

I need to look further at the Latin and variations of the translations, but lets take this from Rackham as a starting point:

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The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.

I can see it dividing this way:

1. Set as your goal that of living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain
2. Work to possess a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain;
3. Work to understand that death means complete unconsciousness,
4. Work to understand that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity.
5. Work to possess no dread of any supernatural power;
6. Work to never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection.

Some may divide it differently, and suggestions are welcome.

This post is just my first thought on the subject, but it covers the same points as the first two of the "T" while stating the other key fundamental points of the philosophy in much more clear fashion. Someone might want to say that point one is not a "dose" but the definition of health, but I think it's probably essential to keep it in the list given that the absence of such a statement is a major contributor to the ambiguities of the "T"

And this is a list that comes with some of the best possible documentation from the ancient world, not from a fragment of Greek of which we have next to no context with which to judge its subtleties, and about which we really do not even know for sure that Philodemus endorsed.

(Thanks to Don for inspiring this post.)

Aside from this cite which indicates something other than "calmness" (can you sing along a glorious triumph-song calmly?) , is there not another about the wise man WILL cry out while on the rack?

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VS47. I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and I have closed off every one of your devious entrances. And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who cling to it maundering, we will leave from life singing aloud a glorious triumph-song on how nicely we lived.

Here it is from Diogenes Laertius:

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And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy. Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence. Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament.

So there is my explicit license from the texts: When I am on the rack I will not "keep calm and carry on" like nothing significant is happening!

As Don said at the start I don't think he and i are far apart at all.

We are in agreement that ataraxia / tranqulity is not THE goal that supercedes all others, and that is virtually the entire thrust of my point.

What i think is perhaps worth talking about further is this point which I am not sure i have seen Don make before:

Quote from Don

but it is pleasure that is always available to us

Quote from Don

I continue to "soapbox" that my reading of katastematic pleasures, including ataraxia, are those that arise from within ourselves and that these are the only pleasures in life that we can be confident of at all times.

Frankly that is a new assertion to me and i am not sure that I am aware of textual citations to support it, nor do i think it is obvious that this is true. Are not examples such as waterholic referenced, such as grief at the death of a child, not an example of why that is not "always" available, or even appropriate?

If there is any difference between Don and I it is that as he says, I want to banish every last drop of any implication of "passivity" or "acceptance of things which could be changed" as a connotation of "ataraxia" or "tranquility." I perceive Don to be= focusing on the "strength of mind" aspect with which I surely agree.

"Strength of mind" is certainly something I would always cultivate and hope to have, and arguably might be always availeble, but as to whether the word "tranquility" is a term that we should cultivate so as to have in every situation, i see that as a horse of a different stripe.

And in the end that is a large part of what we are talking about here: the best word to describe what we think Epicurus would be describing as highly valuable. "Strength of mind" - absolutely yes ----- but that is not the primary definition of tranquility as I understand the use of the word.

Strength of mind to keep one's mind focused on what needs to be done at all times - even in times of peril - is surely a top priority of Epicurus. But is "calmness" a complete synonym for that? I would not say so.

I know the Brits like to "keep calm and carry on" but that slogan has never impressed me as the best way to look at things. The "stiff upper lip" seems to go along with Stoicism to me.

Quote from Nate

Here, I think Epicurus is explicitly referring to the technical stimulation of sensory organs (or, rather, the lack thereof).

Nate do you agree that he means to include within these words everything that we might consider ourselves to be "conscious" of? Is this an implication that there is nothing going on in our experiences in life that is not brought within this category of the sensory organs?

Because if we can experience pain and pleasure apart from the sensory organs (at least in the way we are talking about it here), then PD2 doesn't give nearly the protection against fear of death as it would otherwise.

I am thinking that however this is interpreted, the end result must be in a way that is consistent with lack of sensation including all consciousness whatsoever. Pleasure absent sensation would imply pain without sensation and if those exist then the whole argument about death being the end of sensation would miss the mark that seems clearly intended for it.

Quote from A_Gardner

My current understanding is that it is more of a "fruit" that comes from following the tree of pleasure and Epicurean teachings.

Yes, a fruit, or a side benefit, or just one of many other aspects of how pleasure can be enjoyed in life. Most certainly not some special state, the achievement of which everything in life, and every other goal in life, is subordinate.

Once again it's a matter of whether the term is being used as normal people might use it. I have no issues with it in a broad or loose way, in regular conversation, or even in a technical sense if someone wants to define the best life as a jar of beans in which every last pain bean has been removed and replaced with a pleasure bean (which is what I think "the limit of pleasure" really was intended to reference). But the problem is the sense in which it is batted around in much discussion of Epicurus by professional commentators, as the be-all and end-all of life, which gives rise to the kind of question you ask such as:

"How can I do X if it will be disturbing?"

The answer to which, I would suggest, is just the way Epicurus said, that you sometimes choose pain (even the pain of disturbance) in order to achieve a greater PLEASURE. If there were no greater way to look at pleasure than "absence of disturbance" then I would agree, and why would you ever get out of bed in the morning at all?

And if someone says "But I have to get out of bed because if i don't go to work I'll be disturbed even more!" Then I would say to them "If 'being calm and undisturbed' is the best way you can think of to spend your 75 years on earth, I feel very sorry for you. You are surely a natural-born Stoic."

I think we have hinted at this in the discussion already, but we need to confront it directly:

I think everyone understands that the intent of PD02 is to provide a complete and total immunity defense to fear of pain after death (or hope for reward after death).

If that is accepted, then whatever word(s) are being used by Epicurus to refer to "sense" are intended to be global and sweeping, and not leave open the possibility that we can feel pain or pleasure after those "senses" are gone. Agreed?

Don or others, any thoughts on how the wording used in PD02 helps us with this question of whether pain and pleasure can be experienced separately and apart from "the senses"?

Is it not safe to presume that (just like with "atoms") Epicurus might not be using the same words we would use today (we might use "consciousness" or "experience" or "feeling" (in a general sense)), but that he is intending to include within a broad designation of "feeling" every possible experience of the mind and body? Should we consider that this may in part the use of the "images," as a theory of how the brain processes thoughts physically so that "touch" is not limited to the outer skin?

Welcome @Terry Long !

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All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

In this episode we spend a significant amount of time talking about how Epicurus stands apart from both (1) empiricism and (2) the "blank slate" theory that is associated with both Aristotle and (more recently) John Locke.

In regard to (2), during the episode I referenced the book entitled "Dialogues on Innate Principles" written in the late 1700's in response and in contradiction to the blank slate theory. (The major point of that book is that "ideas" and "principles" - or "principles of operation" are two very different things. John Locke argues against being born with innate ideas - which is true - but which does not go far enough in addressing the real issue: are we born with innate "principles of operation" in the way our minds and bodies work. Barwis makes deistic references which will need to be disregarded, but I think makes an excellent argument that - in my view - is compatible with Epicurus and gives us potent arguments against the "blank slate" from a more philosophic perspective that I would say remain valid today.

Here is a key part of the argument that stands alone, but the full book (which is short, and written in an entertaining dialogue form) gives many others:

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When I take a general view of the arguments adduced by Mr. Locke against innate moral principles; and when I see what he produces as the most indisputable innate principles, “if any be so,” I am inclined to think there must have been some very great mistake as to the true nature of the things in question: for he lays down certain propositions (no matter whether moral or scientific, so they be but true), and then proves that such propositions, considered merely as propositions formed by our rational faculty, after due consideration of things, as all true propositions must be, are not innate. Nothing more obvious! But surely those whom he opposes must, or ought to have meant, (though I cannot say I have read their arguments, nor do I mean to answer for anyone but myself) not that the propositions themselves were innate, but that the conscious internal sentiments on which such moral propositions are founded were innate.

He looked on me, interrogatively.

I said it might be so, and that I saw a great difference in those things.

Or perhaps, continued he, the mistake may have arisen from following too closely the mode, in which it is necessary to proceed, in order to acquire a knowledge of certain sciences, as in geometry: that is, by laying down some clear and self-evident axioms or rational propositions. But even here it should be remembered that, in the natures of things, there were principles which had existence anterior to the formation of these axioms or propositions, and on which they are founded, and on which they depend for their existence: as, extension and solidity.

I gave an assenting inclination of the head.

I cannot, therefore, conceive, added he, that what we ought to understand by innate moral principles, can by any means, when fairly explained, be imagined to bear any similitude to such propositions as Mr. Locke advances as bidding fairest to be innate, nor to any other propositions. That is, I cannot conceive that our innate moral principles, our natural sentiments, or internal conscious feelings, (name them how you please) which we derive, and which result, from our very nature as creatures morally relative, are at all like unto any propositions whatever. Who can discover any similitude to any conscious sentiment of the soul in these strangely irrelative propositions:

“Whatever is, is.”

“It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be?”

Nobody.

The innate principles of the soul, continued he, cannot, any more than those of the body, be propositions. They must be in us antecedently to all our reasonings about them, or they could never be in us at all: for we cannot, by reasoning, create any thing, the principles of which did not exist antecedently. We can, indeed, describe our innate sentiments and perceptions to each other; we can reason, and we can make propositions about them; but our reasonings neither are, nor can create in us, moral principles. They exist prior to, and independently of, all reasoning, and all propositions about them.

When we are told that benevolence is pleasing; that malevolence is painful; we are not convinced of these truths by reasoning, nor by forming them into propositions: but by an appeal to the innate internal affections of our souls: and if on such an appeal, we could not feel within the sentiment of benevolence, and the peculiar pleasure attending it; and that of malevolence and its concomitant pain, not all the reasoning in the world could ever make us sensible of them, or enable us to understand their nature.

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Dialogues On Innate Principles - Jackson Barwis

This thread has become something of a show note thread in itself, so I am linking it here.

Post

RE: As To The Three Legs Of The Canon (Sensations, Feelings, Anticipations) Is it Possible to Experience (Receive Data?) From One Without The Others?

I am editing our podcast episode 160 where we stumbled through the beginnings of this issue, and much of it is going to end up on the cutting room floor due to the stumbling. However one observation that Joshua made that ought to be part of this discussion is that even if you consider "relief from pain" to be a pleasure that is not associated directly with one of the five senses (that itself would be a question) it would still probably be proper to consider that relief from pain to be a…

Cassius

February 7, 2023 at 6:01 AM

However that thread stands alone and beyond this episode, so we will eventually move it to the Canonics section. Please make comments about this episode specifically here.