Posts by Cassius

If I could think of a way I would bookmark this discussion under "cautions to think about when reading Torquatus.". Maybe all of us don't come to the same conclusion DeWitt does as to life rather than pleasure being the "highest good," but Torquatus himself labels his own view as not totally in accord with Epicurus, so we need to continue to question whether the way he sets up the dialogue (an inquiry into the highest good) is really the way Epicurus approached things at all. Maybe Dewitt started the ball rolling in questioning Torquatus but didn't go far enough.

I am getting more and more comfortable that it is Lucretius rather than Torquatus who is the more orthodox Epicurean, and I think we are better off looking to Lucretius' format (start with looking at what drives all of Nature) rather than launching off in a Platonic-style dialog on "what is the highest good" before answering all sorts of other questions first.

Starting the discussion in the middle of a complex semantic debate over the meaning of words seems to be very much what Epicurus' warned against.

Several good recent posts there, and I want to think more about what Todd is saying but I think he's got an interesting approach. We have talked regularly about it being more appropriate to talk about pleasure as the "Guide" rather than "the good" - along the lines of Lucretius' "Dia voluptus, dux vitae" / divine pleasure GUIDE of life. I think Todd may be sensing the same issue.

Quote from Todd

Pleasure isn't just a good. You can't even talk about goods until you have a standard to determine what is a good anyway.

Yes. Pleasure is more than anything else one of the two FEELINGS. A feeling has both aspects at least in the way we think of it, as both a guide and good in itself. If you abstract it too far into some "definition" of the good it looses its meaning.

I also want to memorialize a couple of thoughts on earlier posts, primarily, the issue Todd raised about whether pointing to babies is the most sound argument, and then Charles saying that we really need to be looking at this in terms of what is persuasive.

I continue to think that we should look at Lucretius' poem as not just "physics" but what we call it in the intro to the podcast, something like "the only surviving complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world." (Caveat - I still want to explore Emily Austin's suggestion that there was a final section of the original plague of athens story that is missing and would have made a great finale.)

Whether Torquatus has his statement about Epicurus refusing o look to elaborate logical argument or not, it does seem pretty clear that he preferred arguments that go directly to the senses in a "seeing is believing sense." The best and most persuasive argument is "Look at what is right there in front of you."

And if we look at Lucretius I think it is easy to see the "hymn to venus" as not some flight of poetic fancy, but exactly such a "look there" argument. Lucretius never gives an elaborate logical argument for pleasure as the guide of life. But he does start off at the very beginning of his poem with what is essentially a "Look there!" --

Quote from Lucretius - Brown Translation

MOTHER of Rome, Delight of Men and Gods, Sweet Venus; who with vital power does fill the sea bearing the ships, the fruitful Earth, all things beneath the rolling signs of Heaven; for it is by Thee that creatures of every kind conceive, rise into life, and view the Sun’s bright beams. Thee, Goddess, Thee the winds avoid; the clouds fly Thee and Thy approach. With various art the Earth, for Thee, affords her sweetest flowers; for Thee the sea’s rough waves put on their smiles, and the smooth sky shines with diffused light. For when the buxom Spring leads on the year, and genial gales of western winds blow fresh, unlocked from Winter’s cold, the airy birds first feel Thee, Goddess, and express thy power. Thy active flame strikes through their very souls. And then the savage beasts, with wanton play, frisk over the cheerful fields, and swim the rapid streams. So pleased with thy sweetness, so transported by thy soft charms, all living Nature strives, with sharp desire, to follow Thee, her Guide, where Thou art pleased to lead. In short, Thy power, inspiring every breast with tender love, drives every creature on with eager heat, in seas, in mountains, in swiftest floods, in leafy forests, and in verdant plains, to propagate their kind from age to age. [21] Since Thou, alone, doest govern Nature’s laws, and nothing, without Thee, can rise to light, without Thee nothing can look gay or lovely;

And I have one more thing to say about babies. Todd points out that it is questionable to look *only* at babies for data. We've also discussed that no could credibly suggest that we want to go back to an infantile state of existence in general, totally dependent on others and with very little ability to judge how to successfully avoid pain and pursue pleasure.

But there *is* one aspect of babies and the young of all species that I do think that Epicurus would have endorsed, and that is the absolute lack of doubt in the mind of infants that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the prime directive of nature. The "perversion" or "corruption" after that which is referenced in Torquatus is obviously not in *every respect*. As our minds mature we gain the ability to judge better and successfully pursue pleausure and avoid pain. But the way in which we often *do* get corrupted and perverted is that we are seduced by priests and supernatural religion and false philosophers who talk of "true worlds" beyond this one. We are infected by their poison and we lose our confidence in nature as providing the clear standard of feeling as the only way to ultimately base our decisions on as to what to choose and avoid.

So at the very least I do think that Epicurus would have compared the single-mindedness of new-born youth against the corruption that comes from religion and false philosophic influences that are primarily external and that turn us away from confidence that nature has provided pleasure and pain as our guides.

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Quote from Todd

If I once did, it was before I had any interest in Epicurus. I guess I will have to remedy this deficiency before I take up more of your time.

No, no, don't let that hold you back at all -- I always see something new in them eveytime I read i, so I am just letting you know that there's a lot more controversy where the part you've already quoted comes from!

Quote from Todd

Well, I haven't been thinking about it in terms of the highest good, but that's a good idea.

It's interesting that you seem not to have read the full or main part of the Torquatus dialog. Probably you'll have much more to say when you do!

Quote from Todd

Hmm...maybe that's all that's necessary?

I might agree with you on that, but I think Epicurus would say that ultimately it is important to take a stand on what is "objectively" the highest good, and not just rely on what you or others think personally to be the case. I would say that is probably why we are having the debate about how to tie this opinion to Nature.

And how do YOU arrive at the conclusion that pleasure is the highest good?

Todd can you clarify for me what your own current views are as to whether "pleasure" is the highest good, and the role of "reason" in the establishment of truth?

If we were clear on those things that might help light the way toward making some progress.

Why do you see looking to the newborn as rotten and pessimistic?

At least several days (or maybe a week or so) I changed the banner headline for page one to a fragment that seems to me directly applicable as another illustration of Epicurus' approach to base identification of "the good" on feeling rather than abstract analysis:

“That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about, prating meaninglessly about the good.” Epicurus, as cited in Usener Fragment U423

It's been an interesting thread and whether it is over or just starting, it is an important question. I take it your ultimate question is probably "Why" should we look to nature at all, regardless of whether we look at children or any other phase of life?

Why does "is" give rise to "ought"? And you definitely have another step in that process in getting from is to ought.

Of the alternatives in Torquatus it seems to me that "anticipations" makes some sense to look to as a foundation of pleasure, but why does pleasure exist at all for us to follow?

I think we're on very important territory here and the resolution comes very close to (paraphrasing Nietsche) whether we choose to say "yes" to nature or "no". Nature allows us to do either and it is ultimately up to us to decide and pay the price / reap the consequences for our decisions.

Regardless of what we as individuals decide, Epicurus seems clearly to have chosen to say "yes" to a view of nature based on sensation/ feeling, rather than abstract logic, as the standard of a proper human life.

So how would you restate your concern Todd, that looking to examples of people who have not had the time or exposure to ground their actions on "abstract reasoning" is a poor idea for getting at examples of the calling of Nature?

Why is that a poor way of looking at the question? Because they are not "educated" in some goal other than the one they were born with?

So as to the question of whether the cradle argument is reasoning, we have the cradle argument being a form of " direction of attention" rather than "proof and formal argument."

".. no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?"

just so we have the text in front of us:

[30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?

[31] There are however some of our own school, who want to state these principles with greater refinement, and who say that it is not enough to leave the question of good or evil to the decision of sense, but that thought and reasoning also enable us to understand both that pleasure in itself is matter for desire and that pain is in itself matter for aversion. So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is t for us to seek, the other to reject. Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too condent about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings

I think the best presentation of this issues is going to be in the section of DeWittt's book starting here, although it is covered in a lot of other places in the book too. I am not citing this to say "you should believe it because Dewitt said it" but as a starting point for anyone lurking who might want to follow the argument.

Quote from Todd

Hmm...disagree, but not sure how to proceed beyond this point.

Is reason fallible, of course. But it's our only tool for judging, and that's what is being done here.

Yep it is difficult or impossible to bridge that divide, and it seems to me that the issue of the proper place of "reason" led to much of the revolt of Epicurus against the positions of Plato and Aristotle.

Quote from Todd

the cradle argument takes a particular part of nature, and elevates it above the rest.

Yes, the part of nature before human reasoning, with its potential for error, has weighed in with its first opinion - that its own opinion itself can supply a guide to life superior to the feelings of pleasure and pain.

Quote from Todd

Right, but if that it is the only issue, then you could look to the "uneducated" for ethical guidance.

Indeed so, as Thomas Jefferson said to Peter Carr in 1787, and as I read it Epicurus would agree with this:

Moral Philosophy. I think it lost time to attend lectures on this branch. He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, &c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.

I would say that the 'nature as the norm' position is foundational to Epicurus position, so I agree with your comment here that we have to look to the question of whether we should look to Nature or not.

Quote from Todd

To give a (hopefully) non-controversial example, one of the assumptions in any kind of "look to nature" argument is that nature is the right place to look. I don't think I've ever heard anyone explain why nature is the right place to look. It's taken for granted. I'm fine with that, because nature IS usually a good place to look, and there aren't too many alternatives.

If we conclude through our observations and Epicurean reasoning that there is no world of forms or essences or "true world" beyond this one, and that all knowledge is based on the evidence of the senses, then what other foundation would support a conclusion of looking anywhere else for the norrm? Because we have the capacity to revolt against nature, does that mean that we should? It's certainly possible to argue that we should, but on what foundation? Not on a foundation of gods or abstract logic, surely?

Quote from Todd

My problem is with the implicit assumption that any deviation from the original state of nature is necessarily for the worse.

I would say that is not implicit Epicurus' position at all. He was certainly in favor of living in civilization and seems to have enjoyed a good life under the Athenian system, which is not at all a state of nature.

If the point is that pleasure and pain are the only faculties that Nature has given for ultimate determination of what to choose and what to avoid, what other or higher faculty would you suggest? Certainly not "reason" because why would anyone choose reason if it did not bring pleasure?

If you want an "anti-life" or "anti-nature" argument it seems to me that there is nothing more pure than that men can invent for themselves a faculty of choice better than what nature has provided.

I sure am glad we split this off into a new thread!