I would take that that friendship is so important, one can barely conceive of its importance.
A good caution for those who:
1 - Tend to be overly introverted (a common trait here including me!)
2 - Think that Epicurus had nothing to say about social organization ("politics").
Admin Note:
Because I am a fast learner (sarcasm) it has taken me only eight years to discover that the forum software allows footnoting in "Lexicon" entries, but not in normal pages or posts. I am therefore converting the master copies of our Principal Doctrines and Vatican Sayings to Lexicon entries, and the top menu (under texts) now takes you to those locations. No doubt there are other links here on the forum to the existing pages, so I will leave the old ones in place (at least for a while) while we convert links.
I will substitute this version of VS78 for the ones we are discussing in the master list, and also in our separate forum for VS78, and I will move this thread to that location if it is not already there. [Oops it is there - good planning by Onenski!]
Thanks to Onenski again for this observation - had we had it last night we might have further extended the discussion on how this fits with "Are we living like the gods yet?"
For example as to the difference between wisdom and friendship, I can see how wisdom is "understandable" (goes with the territory) but I don't always understand my friends!
Said another way, with friends I consider the pleasure that comes from having friends to be "godlike" even though I don't always understand them!
Well, would you look at that! It was hiding in DeWitt (p. 226) all along!
Looks like Don and DeWitt share some similar goals! 
What do you think Don?
If anyone tracks this reference to Hartel down please let us know. Thanks Onenski! To me that actually would make more sense. Seeing a contrast between moral and immortal is natural, but calling wisdom "mortal" does seem a little hard to follow the meaning.
The reference in the "Temperance" section of Cicero's Pro Caelio apparently refers to this (from Perseus). I gather DeWitt starts out at 18 to provide more context but 40 seems to be the precise reference:
[40] The very records which used to contain accounts of that old fashioned strictness of morals, are worn out and that not only among us, who have adopted this school and system of life in reality more than in words, but also among the Greeks most learned men, who, though they could not act in such a manner were nevertheless at liberty to speak and write honourably and magnificently; when the habits of Greece became changed other precepts arose and prevailed. Therefore some of their wise men said that they did everything for the sake of pleasure; and even learned men were not ashamed of the degradation of uttering such a sentiment.
If I understand you correctly, you're saying katastematic pleasure has a longer "shelf life" whereas kinetic pleasures are of (relatively) shorter duration?
Someone will ask: If duration is the difference between katastematic and kinetic, what is the exact dividing line between the two and how is that line philosophically established? Would the time frame be a second, minute, hour, day, or what?
A series of post originall in this thread have been split into a new thread entitled:
Welcome to Episode 181 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics. We are now in the process of a series of podcasts intended to provide a general overview of Epicurean philosophy based on the organizational structure employed by Norman DeWitt in his book "Epicurus and His Philosophy."
This week we begin our discussion of Chapter 14, entitled "The New Virtues."
(I realize this thread has strayed waaaaay off the original topic
Do you have a suggestion on where it started branching and how to describe the topic? Are you thinking it's a modern psychology heading?
I think it would also be fair to say for Gosling and Taylor that when they say that they don't consider the distinction between kinetic vs katastematic pleasures to be of prime importance, they aren't saying that it is not important to recognize that some types of pleasure last longer than others. The length of time a particular pleasure is available, and how we obtain it, is certainly an important aspect of judging what pleasures to pursue. The controversy seems to be more over whether there is some other quality about katastematic pleasure which elevates it above perception and somehow makes it more desirable than other types of pleasure and actually elevates it to being the "true end" rather than the perception of pleasure itself.
Maybe just as we acknowledge that pleasure means nothing unless we are living, we need to also acknowledge and make clear that pleasure means nothing unless we are perceiving it.
I will take a stab at one aspect of what I think is part of what G&T are saying:
Cicero objected to Epicurus' sweeping definition of pleasure as both (1) the standard active stimulations that we normally associate with pleasure and (2) the healthy painfree functioning of the living organism. Cicero objected because item (2) is not normally included within the standard definition of ordinary people - it is considered neutral. Cicero therefore insisted on considering these two types to be distinct categories and referenced kinetic vs katastematic as the way to do that.
In contrast, Epicurus held all pleasures to be desirable, and Epicurus did not elevate any type of pleasure over another - which he could not do, because if there are better and lower types of pleasures, then mastering the art of distinguishing between these types of pleasure would be more important than pleasure itself. Epicurus therefore considered that unity of all pleasures under the umbrella of 'pleasure' was critical to his analysis, with all kinds of pleasure to be pleasures of perception, while acknowledging also that some pleasures last longer than others. This would explain why Torquatus flatly holds that all who are without pain are in the greatest state of pleasure - you don't need to know any details about what they are doing because you have defined absence of pain - the normal state of life - to be pleasurable. So you can say without knowing any more details as an axiom: "I affirm that all who are without pain are in pleasure, and in that the fullest possible!" - Cicero's On Ends, Book 2 (V)16
You are then left with what Gosling and Taylor say as to Epicurus not considering this kinetic vs katastematic distinction between pleasures to be of prime importance:
"The more one stresses this the less important the distinction comes to look, since any condition, however steady, of a living thing, must according to Epicurus, be a condition of perceiving: but there is no evidence of a special kind of perceiving or object of perception to constitute ataraxia and aponia. Consequently we should be left with steady long-lasting perceptions over against fleeting ones. It seems simplest just to suppose that when the organism is functioning harmoniously it is always having some form of perception; that since the operation is harmonious the perception is pleasant and without pain; and that is just what aponia is. Ataraxia is the condition when, because of correct views, our expectations are undisturbed by fear, our desires do not pursue empty objectives and our memories are pleasant: this leaves us to enjoy our pleasures unanxiously."
I've never been overly enamored of G&T's interpretation anyway IF I remember it correctly.
At least in my case I always have a hard time getting a fix on what G&T's interpretation really is other than for the cites I included above. I suspect they realized that they were throwing a nuclear bomb into the world of standard Epicurean interpretation and that they preferred to do so as gingerly as possible, so they wrap up their own views in layers of "This then that and then the other..."
It would be a good addition to the discussion to try to summarize exactly what the opposing views are.
If in fact Farrington's position reduces to "generated from within" vs "generated from without" that would at least have the virtue of being clear and understandable, whether it's agreeable or not.
I think this portion of the last cite bears a lot of emphasis, because it is important to keep in mind that the standard interpretation of katastematic pleasure being the true goal goes hand in hand with, as Gosling and Taylor say, those who are "baffled by the apparent inconsistency between eulogizing sensory pleasures, and so, presumably, unbridled sensuality, while advocating a life of simple asceticism and lack of disturbance." The underlined part is what I think we agree here that Epicurus did not do.
Don:
I glanced back at the Gosling and Taylor treatment in "The Greeks on Pleasure" and I don't see at first glance any mention of a distinction between "produced by stimulus from without" or "created by itself without external stimulus." So I suppose the question then would be - What evidence does Farrington use to support his contention that this distinction of "produced by stimulus from without" vs "created by itself without outside stimulus" is a distinguishing factor of kinetic vs katastematic?
For example, as Gosling and Taylor come to their conclusion, I see no distinction being made about outside vs self-generated, but rather they are focusing on perception, which might be perception of something from either class:
Do you know the basis of Farrington's reasoning? The bringing into a state you are referring to could be either perception of something from outside, or thoughts of understanding generated by oneself through true philosophy, could it not?
Episode 180 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available!
This episode is in editing stages and should be out by this weekend. We did indeed finish chapter 13, so it may be a little longer than normal.
In the meantime one of the topics covered very briefly (in "Incorruptibility and Virtue starting on page 267) is the issue documented by deWitt from several texts that the gods act to sustain their deathlessness and that they are not by nature immortal. DeWitt provides several cites for this very unexpected notion (but it does make sense if nothing but atoms are eternally the same) to which I would analogize Vatican Saying 37, which might relate to the gods being sustained by their pleasures in the same way that humans are "saved" or sustained by pleasures. It's an interesting thought to consider that the gods' deathlessness may arise from their continuous pleasures rather than that their pleasures simply number among them those that arise from being deathless and how such an idea might explain some of the references Epicurus makes about pleasures.
VS37. Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains.
Right - this is part of why the accusation that Epicurus was a believer in "gods" because he didn't want to be prosecuted like Socrates falls flat. Virtually every aspect of Epicurean philosophy is controversial and goes directly against the grain of establishment society. Epicurus had to know and to accept that he was launching a life of controversy for himself and for his associated philosophers. It would have been much easier to say "Well I respectfully disagree with Plato in some minor ways, but we're all one big happy family so let's all get along and drink some wine."
He didn't do that, and I don't think that anyone who seriously accepts the viewpoint that life is short and nothingness is ahead of us for eternity would for a second want to hurry up the arrival of that nothingness except in extreme circumstances (giving up oneself for the life of a friend, for example). We aren't put here by some malevolent god or universe for the purpose of suffering, we are here to do our best to pursue "pleasure" while we can.
For example, if I ever found myself in a foxhole, I would want a commanding officer who approached the mission with a clear eye and calm mind rather than some screaming, yelling lieutenant.
And as to that statement by Don I would amplify it, and say that those of us who accept the key tenets of the Epicurean worldview are in a foxhole, metaphorically speaking. Every direction you turn the voices are there to tell you to "give up" and "give in" because the fight can't be won.
Epicurus didn't "give up" or "give in" and those of us who are actively engaged should likewise "approach the mission with a clear eye and calm mind!"
As an aside, it is not the "within ourselves" aspect of such an interpretation that would bother me. Nothing wrong with the idea that we generate some of our pleasures internally rather than receiving it from outside our own bodies.
The issue I have is with the modern implications of "tranquility" as being "at rest" or "inactive" or similar words circling the drain of "nothingness."
I don't consider a mind actively exploring the depths of any part of nature to be "inactive" or in any way a negative concept. It is the Buddhist/(apparently Vedantic)/nihilist /Stoic view that tranquility implies detachment and being totally inactive mentally and physically, implicitly frozen in time, that I believe needs to be positively expelled from the interpretation of Epicurus. It is clear that many under the influence of other views are drawn to such an interpretation, and when we open the door to acceptance of that perspective, such a viewpoint undermines and distorts the rest of the philosophy. Why pursue pleasure when it is tranquility in the form of "detachment" that these people are arguing to be the goal?
If we take Epicurus as an example of his own paradigm, I consider Epicurus to be among the most "active" and energetic leaders in history. While much of that activity may have been mental rather than as a soldier or other "physical" way, his mind was not devoted to "rest" or "nothingness," and tranquility in the sense of a status quo unchanging passivity was the furthest thing from his mind.
