Posts by Cassius

Another reason I find this interesting is that Torquatus clearly says exactly what Don is saying -- that Epicurus finds the highest good to be in pleasure. That seems clear and does make sense and Cicero does not object on that point.

But Torquatus does not seem to be as clear and successful in explaining Chrysippus' hand or the equation of pleasure as the absence of pain in a way that Cicero finds persuasive. (And I think most of us agree that for some reason - Cicero with his finger on the scale? - the point is not being made clearly.)

But whatever the reason, the "failure to communicate" seems to revolve around this very issue -- clarity and agreement in identifying simply "living, existing, being alive" as being pleasure.

Since my view on this is evolving I will extend this a little further:

Quote from Don

But more than that, calling living, existing, being alive, "the greatest good" doesn't get us anywhere.

See this is where I think affirmatively identifying life with pleasure does get you somewhere. When you start identifying "living, existing, being alive" tightly with pleasure, and you don't insist that the word pleasure applies only to the "tickling" of the senses, then "living, existing, being alive" does become a legitimate way to state your objective, pretty much as Maecenus is saying in his poem. Give me life because so long as I have life I can offset the pleasure of being alive against the pains he is listing.

That 's not the way we normally speak that our goal is just to remain alive, but seeing past the way we normally speak seems to be exactly a trademark Epicurean approach. The pleasure of simply "living, existing, being alive" (unless perchance we are experiencing some specific pain) is an essential part of the big picture as to why we want to continue to live.

Is calling "life" the "greatest good" the best way to get to the point were people have a proper and full understanding of all that is included in the term "Pleasure." I doubt it is, but the very discussion we're having now helps drive home the point that "pleasure" isn't limited to "tickling."

Quote from Don

But, one can't answer the question "Why do you do what you do?" by saying "Life" or "I do everything because I'm alive."

If you equate in your mind the normal state of "life" or "because I am alive" to "pleasure," then you do get pretty close to answering those questions that way.

I'd have to think further about it but saying (1) "Life is pleasure" is not much less clear or acceptable as saying (2) "pleasure is the absence of pain."

I can understand (2) as correct only because i know the background explanation that there are only two feelings. I could probably understand (1) as correct just as firmly by knowing the background explanation that life is the one pleasure that is essential to all others.

If we wanted we could discuss this parallel even further by discussing the analogies between pleasure and health / saving vs pain and disease / destruction. >> VS37. Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains.

Quote from Don

Life isn't the "greatest good", but...

Having stated that...

Live is everything to us because life

I think you and I will have to disagree on that one. When I say something is "everything" to me i pretty much mean to myself that it is the most important thing that I have, and I have no issues with thinking that the most important thing i have is my "greatest good." And when i identify life as pleasurable when I am not in pain, I have no problems seeing 'pleasure' as meaning 'life." It all depends on the context in which you are speaking. My goal is to pleasure can be said as my goal is to live pleasurably. If we are using constructs like 'pleasure is the absence of pain" which requires thought to understand since it is not our normal usage, it's not much different to consider "life" as a placeholder for "pleasure." But we can agree to disagree because I don't think it's particularly important to state it that way - it is more clear to us to say "pleasure is the goal" or "pleasure is the greatest good."

I am also very interested in your comment on whether Vatican Collection 42 is being emended by translators. We may have covered it already but I don't recall.

Do we already have Maecaenus in our list of later Epicureans? If we don't I am wondering if we shouldn't, because the more I read the more Epicurean he sounds. And I would bet that some people are denying that he is Epicurean because of his preference for luxury, and the ascetic-version of Epicurean philosophy (which I think is wrong) prevents them from accepting that he was in fact pursuing Epicurean philosophy as he thought appropriate under his circumstances, somewhat like Atticus.

EDIT: Yes i see Nate has him listed - good work Eikadistes!

Introduction

Maecenas, a descendant of Etruscan kings and a friend of Emperor Augustus, was a leading figure in both the late Roman Republic and the early Empire. During the civil wars that followed Julius Caesar’s death, he acted as a diplomat, a close adviser to the future Augustus, and for a time was even in charge (with Agrippa) of the government of Rome and Italy. He is also believed to have played a major role in the emergence of the imperial regime. Although rarely present on the battlefield, he is often seen as Caesar the Younger’s right-hand man. Above all, from the late 40s BCE, he was the patron of some of the most famous Latin poets. He symbolized from very early on the golden age of literary patronage and it is mainly to this activity that he still owes his fame today: for example, Virgil’s Georgics and Aeneid, Horace’s Odes or Propertius’s Elegies were composed under his aegis. He also left behind the image of a bon vivant with an unusual, one might even say eccentric, personality, and of an epicurean who preferred staying in the shadows to the limelight. The very limited and scattered data from ancient sources (even his date of birth is uncertain) derives in part from opponents who did not appreciate the fact that a simple knight, who had refused to be a magistrate and privileged his personal relationship with Caesar the Younger, played a leading role in Rome at a time when the city was in the throes of transformation. The singularity of his behavior, in a very normative society, accentuated certain misunderstandings. Thus, Maecenas left a controversial image which is still widely debated today. In all likelihood, if he became involved in Roman politics, alongside the future Augustus during the civil wars, it was out of duty, as he was probably convinced that troubled times required action. After Caesar the Younger’s victory over Antony and Cleopatra, in 31–30 BCE, he felt the need to regain his freedom and, at the end of what was a political epiphany (Maecenas remained in the political limelight for only a few years), only retain his role as a discrete personal advisor. He also continued to spearhead a movement to turn Rome not only into a political and military power, but also a cultural one. The death of this faithful and loyal companion in 8 BCE was experienced by Augustus, his friend, as an irreparable loss.

General Overviews

The political and cultural context explains to a large extent, despite Maecenas’s oddities, the modalities of his political action and cultural work. Rome changed profoundly at the time of Augustus’s Principate and, even though a political culture endured, institutions and society underwent transformations that distinguished it in part from Republican Rome. In this framework, the personality of the prince, Augustus, friend of Maecenas and man of literature, was pivotal (Le Doze 2020). Because of his authority and the accumulation of powers, all eyes were on him. His reformist policies, including their traditionalist dimension that should not be overlooked, shaped a new Rome after the civil wars (Hurlet and Mineo 2009, Rivière 2012). However, others than the prince contributed to the transformation of the empire’s capital (Morrell, et al. 2019) and to the profound developments of this period, which are not limited to institutional changes (Galinsky 1996, Galinsky 2005, and Wallace-Hadrill 2008). The triumviral period (Osgood 2006, Pina Polo 2020), which preceded the establishment of the Principate, generated a lot of anxiety, and created a context that influenced poetic production. Zanker 1988 is an excellent introduction to the debates that surround Maecenas, for the author studies how the values advocated by the Augustan regime permeated Roman society through images: similarly, historians have often suggested that Maecenas exploited poets to serve Augustus’s interests.

Quote from Joshua

How do we square these considerations with VS47? "47. I have anticipated you, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all your secret attacks. And we will not give ourselves up as captives to you or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who here vainly cling to it, we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well."

Joshua:

I would square it this way:

"When it is time for us to go" means (1) when we have no other choice or possibility, or (2) when our pain is truly so much that we can no longer outweigh it by pleasure, and a life of unremitting intolerable pain is certain.

When we have no other choice or possibility would be that we see that we are caught in some situation that is going to kill us and we have no way to stop it.

When we are facing unremitting overwhelming pain for either bodily reasons or mental reasons (and this is where we would give our life for a friend if failing to do so would cause us such pain afterwards that we could not live with ourselves).

Thus "...spitting contempt on life and on those who here vainly cling to it..." refers to those situations listed above, and when we have exhausted our options we spit contempt on those who fail to be willing to die, because they do not understand that death is nothing to us and that there is nothing to fear in death. And in a way that is one of our last acts of pleasure for ourselves, because we are as in Lucretius Book 2 taking pleasure in not being subject to the fear and anxiety that others suffer from when they fail to understand the nature of things.

So from these perspectives I don't think squaring is too difficult. So long as we have the strength of mind to balance mental pleasure against physical pain we will hold out because the balance is still pleasurable. Once the pain is so great and no remedy is possible it would then be appropriate to "exit the theatre when the play has ceased to please us." But we would certainly not want to be a "small man" and give in to the suffering and exit until we were certain that the balance had irredeemably shifted.

This would be why it is so important to see these issues in terms of constant balancing of discrete pleasurable experiences and discrete painful experiences as we have been doing in recent discussions. Some people (Buddhists?) tend to want to think that "being in pain" is all you need to know, but the real issue is "What is the duration, intensity, and location of your pain, and is it manageable and offsetable by pleasures of greater duration, intensity, and location?"

You train yourself not to be a snowflake and give in to pain at its first emergence, you work as hard as you can to achieve a balance of pleasure over pain. Some people are going to say "That sounds like a Stoic attitude!' and I would say to them in reply that I am a proud Epicurean who takes his life extremely seriously, and that they need not insult me as being a Stoic because:

I have anticipated you, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all your secret attacks. And I will not give myself up as captive to you or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for me to go because I can no longer find enough pleasure to remain in life, I will spit contempt on the idea of staying longer, and on those who vainly cling to life under such circumstances, and because I have no fear or death I will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that I have lived well.

Given that poem and this history, you have to speculate that Maecenus was in fact Epicurean himself, and that poem is in fact a statement of the Epicurean viewpoint on the value of life. I could see that being true especially since as Epicurus indicates the wise man is going to generally be able to find more reason for pleasure than pain except only in the most extreme of circumstances:

Gaius Maecenas - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I don't see that poem as asking for those pains, as Seneca seems to say, but rather simply saying that he can put up with an awful lot so long as he remains alive to savor the pleasures available to him. Is that not what Epicurus was doing in his final days?

We need a translation of that Maeceanas text! Unfortunately only the latin is here:

Two Kinds of Crux, neither of them Christian (Maecenas, Fr. 4.4) | Curculio – Michael Hendry

Here's the Perseus Latin, but i never can easily find how to flip to the English (or whether it exists at Perseus);

Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Seneca Lucilio suo salutem

Finally!

Ad Lucilium epistulae morales : Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, ca. 4 B.C.-65 A.D : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Includes bibliographical references (v. 1, p. xiv-xv) and indexes

archive.org

Once Don takes a look at Vatican Saying 42 I will probably revise - or at least annotate with DeWitt's opinion - the Bailey version included as the current forum title. I agree with DeWitt that Bailey's rendering (if that is the one DeWitt is referring to) makes no sense:

VS 42 - The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment.

From DeWitt's "Summum Bonum Fallacy" (December 1950). DeWitt is not using precisely the reasoning we are discussing in this thread, but I think his observations are helpful regardless of the "greatest" question, because what woul arguably support "life is greatest" would also support "life is everything."

The rest of this post is a quote from the article:

Recognition of life as "the greatest good" is on record in Vatican Collection 42: "The same span of time embraces both beginning and end of the greatest good." The meaning of this is not obscure. It marks life as limited by birth and death. It denies both pre-existence and survival of the soul, and is a contradiction of Plato, who sponsored both these doctrines. Editors, however, misled by the summum bonum fallacy, feel bound that "the greatest good" shall be pleasure, and consequently emend the text, producing a sentence genuinely obscure, which need not concern us.

Other confirmatory passages are citable. The "desirability of life" is mentioned as a reason for placing a higher value upon old age as against youth,' contrary to a prevailing opinion. The same feeling motivates the scorn expressed for a dictum of Theognis : "A good thing it is never to have been born or, being born, to have passed with all speed through the gates of Hades." The supreme value placed upon life determines also the attitude toward suicide (Vatican Collection 38) : "Small is the man from every point of view who discovers many plausible reasons for taking leave of life."

This doctrine of Epicurus furnished philosophy with a perennial topic. He thought of life as a voyage14 or a journey'5 in which the wise man should always find a balance of pleasure over pain.'6 Suicide in his opinion was not a dereliction of duty, but the abandonment of an opportunity to enjoy happiness to the fullest degree.

In the second of his books On Lives he is reported as saying: "But even if deprived of his sight, [the wise man] will not turn aside from the journey of life." It is from this point that Cicero discusses the topic, and that too with specific mention of Epicurus, in the Tusculan Disputations,' where he extends it to include loss of hearing.

Once the ball had been started to roll the temptation presented itself to go on through the list of deprivations, as in the sorites syllogism, and this is exactly what happened. Life being the greatest good, the question takes the shape, At what stage of deprivation would it lose all value? The answer came from Maecenas:

debilem facito manu, debilem pede coxo,

tuber adstrue gibberum, lubricos quate dentes,

vita dum superest, bene est; hanc mihi vel acuta

si sedeam cruce, sustine.

The beginning of the poem is lacking; only the lines that horrified Seneca are quoted. It may be assumed that Maecenas ran through the list of deprivations, working his way up to a climax.

Don and several of us have been discussing the implications of PD02 and we should open this to everyone. Don has pointed out that we should consider the wording:

Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness (ἀναισθητεῖ), and what lacks awareness (ἀναισθητεῖ) is nothing to us.

ἀναισθητεῖ is simply a negated form of αἴσθησις which means:

1. Perception from the senses, feeling, hearing, seeing
2. Perception by the intellect as well as the senses
3. That which is perceived: scent
4. Ability to perceive: discernment

We have discussed many times that hypotheticals can be dangerous, but to go down a rabbit hole, the mirror universe positive version of PD2 may be something like:

"Life is everything to us, for what perceives the senses, feelings, and perceptions of the intellect is everything to us."

Let's consider that "mirror universe positive version" of PD02 and discuss whether we think this would be true statement of Epicurean doctrine.

In this case I will go forward and state my own opinion. As it now appears to me to be justified to hold that it is core Epicurean doctrine that all experiences in life which are not painful are pleasurable, then Epicurus would indeed support this mirror image. Epicurus is identifying the normal state of life as pleasurable unless pain intervenes, and given that Epicurus has explicitly stated that pleasure is the alpha and omega of the blessed life, viewing life itself in its normal state to be a pleasure would justify holding that "life is everything to us."

So to repeat I would say that I think Epicurus embraced this view on these grounds:

If death is nothing to us then life is everything to us because we identify all non-painful experiences as pleasurable. Life is desirable, and the default Epicurean position is that to be alive is understood to be pleasurable unless some specific pain intervenes. "Q]uod dolore caret id in voluptate est." (Torquatus / Cicero - On Ends - Book One XI - 39) [T]hat which is free from pain is in a state of pleasure. (Parker)

I also think this is a clear meaning of On Ends 1:56: "We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed grief immediately ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of pleasure...."

i think it is fair to interpret that as meaning that the presumption is that life is a series of pleasures, both stimulating and normal, and that the norm of life is (or can be for a person living prudently) a succession of pleasures unless specifically interrupted by some non-normal pain. "Effort" - such as he effort of breathing - is not painful in and of itself but is instead normal and pleasurable. The hand in its normal state of existence may not be being stimulated at a particular moment, but unless it is for some specific reason experiencing a pain it is experiencing pleasure.

Further from the letter to Menoeceus; "And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality."

That is a statement that because the wise man understands and views life as desirable and pleasurable, the "normal" state is itself desirable and pleasurable.

And given that nothing is desirable in and of itself unless it is pleasurable, this following wording too supports the same conclusion:

"And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well."

Let's discuss. I think it is time (for those of us who haven't already) to endorse the view that "life is everything to us" is in fact the corollary that death is nothing to us. Whereas in the past we may have drawn back from doing so because we would have preferred to say "Pleasure is everything to us," the identification of the normal state of life as pleasurable supports the conclusion that "Life is everything to us." This may not be wording that we find normal and familiar, but it is up to an Epicurean to be able to explain the proper relationship of "pleasure" and "life" just as an Epicurean explains a proper view of "gods" and of "virtue."

---

Reference Note: A search of the forum here for "life is everything" indicates this issue previously came up in at least two places:

Discussion of Article: "On Pleasure, Pain and Happiness"

• Cassius
• Jul 13th 2019
• The Feelings / Passions / Internal Sensations: Pleasure and Pain

Post

…y I think it is conveying that we have no concerns after we are dead because there is no sensation that would drive a concern. And one of the most important results of "death is nothing to us" properly understand is something very close to "life is everything to us." As I remember DeWitt saying somewhere, pain and pleasure "have meaning only to the living." Does that explanation help bridge our issue, or make my viewpoint more confusing? (Quote from Elayne) On this issue I am attempting to consi…

Doubt is Unpleasant, But It's Not Your Worst Enemy

• Cassius
• Dec 20th 2015
• General Discussion And Navigation

Post

…in, this summary obscures the deeper issues. Of course there's no need to fear anything about the state of being dead, because we feel nothing after we cease to live. But just as it is true that "death is nothing to us" it is also true that life is everything to us because only while we are living are we able to experience pleasure. And it is quite legitimate - in fact the height of wisdom - to be careful about the way you live your life so that your happiness can extend as long as possible. If …

Quote from Peter Konstans

A culture of modesty in politicians such as that enforced by the ancient Roman censors would be beneficial.

I fully agree and this reminds me of the story about the person whispering in the ear of the general in the triumph that he is only a mortal.

Quote from Peter Konstans

So for reasons rooted in Epicurean ethics, any action and attitude that could conceivably diminish the benevolent disposition of individuals towards the group (for example extreme wealth inequality or jailing people for trivial matters like drug possession for personal use or treating poor foreigners equally or better than the poorest natives) must be seen as unjust because it invites the violent forces of destruction.

I generally agree here, but the details are tricky. Cassius Longinus did not think that force / violence (presumably only in extreme circumstances) was off limits, and I do not consider him to be a bad Epicurean for so engaging. Or, at the very least, I don't have enough information to be comfortable concluding as to the extremity of the situation whether he was or was not correct in his choices. In any case I don't think there can be a "bright line" on these issues. I would see the following references as allowing for force or physical violence in the proper circumstances, and I suspect that there are others that could be drawn to the same conclusion with these simply being among the most prominent:

PD06. In order that men might not fear one another, there was a natural benefit to be had from government and kingship, provided that they are able to bring about this result.

PD07. Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature.

PD14. The most unalloyed source of protection from men, which is secured to some extent by a certain force of expulsion, is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life, and retirement from the world.

PD39. The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself, and the rest at least not alien; but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus.

PD40. As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbors, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and, after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.

Torquatus in On Ends Book One -XVI: Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation. Men of sound natures, therefore, are summoned by the voice of true reason to justice, equity, and honesty. For one without eloquence or resources dishonesty is not good policy, since it is difficult for such a man to succeed in his designs, or to make good his success when once achieved.

This is a subject in which it is very difficult to talk without summoning up modern partisan political examples, but I think it's both important that we discuss this in generic terms as we are now doing, and also important to keep those modern hot-button examples at bay so that the discussion can be truly exhaustive. Once we flesh out the principles we can let people apply those principles to their personal situations as they see fit.

Edit: Cassius mentions in his letter to Cicero of January, 45 BC, that another general fighting on the same side as Cassius -- Panza -- was also a follower of Pleasure. ("Consequently Pansa, who follows pleasure, keeps his hold on virtue, and those also whom you call pleasure-lovers are lovers of what is good and lovers of justice, and cultivate and keep all the virtues."} And of course I have not listed in the above cites Torqatus' defense of his ancestors who fought enemies barehanded and even had members of their family executed for failing to obey military rules of order in explicitly Epicurean terms.

Welcome to Episode 195 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Books One and Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted to Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

This week we continue with Book Two. Last week we made a few preliminary comments about it, and this week we will be starting it in earnest at the very end of section II, right before the beginning of section III, on page 32 of the Reid edition, as Cicero claims that Epicurus himself is unsure what pleasure is:

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition

We are using the Reid edition, so check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

As we proceed we will keep track of Cicero's arguments and outline them here:

Cicero's Objections to Epicurean Philosophy

Here's a passage that is frequently troublesome and is guaranteed to bring out the inner Stoic / Ascetic / Buddhist in anyone who does not consider all non-painful experiences to be pleasurable.

Quote from Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus [128]

The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and (the soul’s) freedom from disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness. For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing, and to look for some other thing by which he can fulfill the good of the soul and the good of the body. *For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; (but when we do not feel pain), we no longer need pleasure."

I would say rather than a call to asceticism, the better interpretation of this passage is that once we have filled our experience with pleasures we have no further need for additional pleasures because all pain has been eliminated. That does not mean that we no longer have need for the pleasures which we accumulated in order to fill our experience, it simply means that we need no further additional pleasures beyond those which we already have.

Those who suggest that we have no need of pleasure after our life is full of pleasures are saying something similar to that we have no need of life after our life is full of life. That would be a perverse reading of the passage and writes the word "pleasure" completely out of Epicurean philosophy.

When you recognize all experience that is not painful is pleasurable, such an interpretation becomes impossible. Painlessness is then seen, not as a particular type of pleasure that replaces pleasure, but as a life full of pleasures from which pains have been eliminated. Painlessness then no longer swallows up the category of pleasure, but becomes simply the recognition that filling your experience up to 100% pleasure is all that is possible. And "disturbance" is simply one way of looking at the pains (or category of pains) that need to be minimized or eliminated in order to reach as close to 100% pleasure as you can. You can't reach the desired goal of 100% pleasure if you have mental disturbances that amount to pains.

Painlessness seen as 100% pleasure (the terms are interchangeable) becomes the objective at all times in the same way that the objective of straining the wine to remove impurities is to produce the best quality wine. At the end of the straining process we do not discard the wine, we experience it no matter how many fine impurities might be remaining. The purpose of the exercise is to experience the wine -- in no way are you straining the wine in order to discard it and then drink water!

Going further:

What would be the implications of holding that *all* nonpainful experiences in life are pleasureable? Here are my thoughts on some, and I am sure there are many more:

First, this perspective makes it much easier to be confident in identifying "Pleasure" as your goal. Since you are including every non-painful activity of life within pleasure, you are in no way limiting yourself to "sex, drugs and rock'n roll." You are not phased at all by the Highbrow / Blueblood argument that you are failing to include the "higher" things in life in your overall goal. If the higher things bring pleasure, you as an Epicurean want those "higher things" even more firmly than do other people, because you understand truly *why* you want them. You gain confidence that this is a true philosophy that really has merit, and you grow ever more immune to false philosophic and religious alternatives.

Another major implication is that there would be no drive toward asceticism or minimalism any more than an obsession with opulence and luxury. You would see your best life not as that which contained the least absolute amount of pain, but the life in which pleasure most predominates over pain. Given any particular set of real life pains, a larger amount of pleasure offsets those pains more than does a smaller amount of pleasure. The effort involved in writing a monumental poem that is likely to win you affection and friendship and preserve your favorite philosophy for the ages, or the effort of setting up a school to wage intellectual war against the world of existing priests and philosophers, fades into insignificance compared to the pleasure of realizing what your hard work has accomplished.

A man who suffers from normal types of back pain would want to remedy it completely if he could, but not to the exclusion of all the other benefits of life. In many cases he does not have the ability to completely end the back pain short of suicide, and he knows that his best life involves much more than spending every waking moment pursuing a totally pain-free back. (Again, we're talking normal amounts of back pain.) Such a man would be better served by taking reasonable steps to alleviate his pain and then "drown out" the rest of his pain with experiences of pleasure, by adding activities which bring more pleasure than pain, than he would by reducing his total engagement with life to a mere minimum. This is because in relative terms the back pain is more likely to be offset by the pleasure of ten interactions with ten friends than the pleasure of one interaction with a single friend. While in this example we can use "friendship" as the activity because that is a pleasure that is easier to see as more heavily predominant in pleasure, in truth the individual circumstances will determine which activities involve the most benefit of pleasure (considering here duration, intensity, and location) at the least cost in pain. And in general, less engagement in life is going to result in the relative magnification of such pains as do exist than would more engagement in life. This increasing predominance of pleasure over pain would be true whatsoever activities you engage in so long as they bring more pleasure than pain.

And there is *no* disposition to read "engagement in life" as something that is painful. Rather the opposite is true - all experiences of life are pleasurable unless they involve some specific pain. It is not the norm of life's most important activities that they necessarily bring undue pain. Through the use of prudence you can normally live a pleasurable life that is full and complete while still keeping pain to a reasonable minimum.

Quote from Don

If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts...

But every pleasure cannot be condensed.

I did not pick that out initially but I think Godfrey is right on that point. I would extend that sentence to say "But every pleasure cannot be condensed so much as to occupy the whole organism." A pleasure can be intensified, but not so much as to consume all our experience, at least for very long.

I gather that other than that sentence Don and Godfrey (and I) would be in agreement with what Don wrote.

Quote from Godfrey

clarifying this PD as well. It's describing the individual components of pleasures, and at the same time saying that it's pretty unlikely that a person can experience 100% pleasure.

It certainly does seem to be based on the assumption that we are talking about individual pleasures being the norm, and speculating what would happen if any one of them were expanded in duration, intensity, and location to consume our full experience.

The premise of the whole statement seems to be that the pleasures are not normally so expansive, and that normal state of affairs is that the individual pleasures (and pains) occupy many separate parts of our experience at any one time.

A life of pleasure would seem to be a life composed of many individual pleasures predominating over the many individual pains. This is more attainable for an Epicurean because he or she doesn't have to face the fear of death or gods, he is trained to pursue those activities that are going to bring more pleasure than pain, and he is trained to appreciate that life is short and therefore any part of his mental or physical experience which is not painful is pleasurable.

Quote from Godfrey

At which point I become totally befuddled, and I realize why Epicurus didn't give mathematicians and geometricians any credence: math and geometry aren't very useful for describing biological phenomena. But the quote above is quite concise in describing the relationship of pleasure and pain.

Godfrey here I would cite Sedley as saying something important as to the limitations of biology and even psychology in understanding what Epicurus is saying as a philosopher, especially the underlined parts:

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34 DAVID SEDLEY - EPICURUS' REJECTION OF DETERMINISM:

Epicurus’ response to this is perhaps the least appreciated aspect of his thought. It was to reject reductionist atomism. Almost uniquely among Greek philosophers he arrived at what is nowadays the unreflective assumption of almost anyone with a smattering of science, that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter; but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth. (The truth that sugar is sweet is not straightforwardly reducible to the truth that it has such and such a molecular structure, even though the latter truth may be required in order to explain the former). By establishing that cognitive scepticism, the direct outcome of reductionist atomism, is self-refuting and untenable in practice, Epicurus justifies his non-reductionist alternative, according to which sensations are true and there are therefore hona fide truths at the phenomenal level accessible through them. The same will apply to the nétflrj, which Epicurus also held to be veridical. Pleasure, for example, is a direct datum of experience. It is commonly assumed that Epicurus must have equated pleasure with such and such a kind of movement of soul atoms; but although he will have taken it to have some explanation at the atomic level, I know of no evidence that he, any more than most moral philosophers or psychologists, would have held that an adequate analysis of it could be found at that level. Physics are strikingly absent from Epicurus’ ethical writings, and it is curious that interpreters are so much readier to import them there than they are when it comes to the moral philosophy of Plato or Aristotle.“

I don't think you can get to where Epicurus is going solely through biology or psychology any more than you can get there solely through mathematics or geometry or dialectical logic.

Here's another point on whether this is just the discretion of looking at the glass as half full or half empty:

I don't know about you, but looking at something as half empty and drained is a painful experience, and looking at something as half full with plenty of good experience left to go is a pleasurable experience.

And while the measure of the liquid in terms of quantity may be exactly the same, I can sure as heck feel the pleasure of saying "half full!" as different from the pain of saying "half empty'!"

It's not just a word game. In the end I don't care what the precise measure of liquid really is. What I care about is whether I am living a pleasurable or a painful life.

I expanded these comments in talking with Titus and I am going to take the liberty of inserting them here as they assist in the conversation.

TITUS:

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Quote from Cassius "That which is free from pain is in a state of pleasure."

I definitely agree. Can you describe more precisely what you mean? Does this change anything for you?

Personally, I experienced phases with chronic pain and I can simply enjoy freedom from pain. The fixed vessel gets filled by so many beautiful impressions that there is no need for a hunt for especial amusement.

CASSIUS:

Please comment as you can cause I think this is a very important issue.

Yes, the review of how Torquatus is explaining this to Cicero is changing my perspective. In other words, if you take the position that ALL experiences in life which are not explicitly painful are pleasurable, then your sitting in your chair or whatever else you are doing (if you are not in physical pain) and your thinking about whatever you are thinking (so long as you are not thinking about anything painful) means - without any more information at all - that you are in a state of pleasure. And if you are stating to me flatly that in your present condition of body and mind while sitting in your chair you are feeling no mixture of specific pains, then you are not only in a state of pleasure, you are at the LIMIT of pleasure in your current condition.

There is no way in my mind to understand Torquatus' explanation of Epicurus, especially as to Chrysippus hand or the host pouring wine for the guest analogy, in any other way.

As DeWitt says, Epicurus is defining the "normal" state of everyday pain-free life - no matter what you are doing - as the height of pleasure. The only reason that anyone can ever be designated as not at the height of pleasure is if they are feeling specific pains of mind or body that they can identify as painful.

It is the identification of the "normal" state - such as Chrysippus' hand - as being pleasurable that allows you to say that unless some specific pain is included in the mix you are at the height of pleasure. Nothing mysterious, nothing exotic, just the simple logic that is involved in observing that if you are feeling anything at all you are feeling either pain or pleasure. Take that to its logical conclusion and you have the realization that every activity which is not painful is pleasurable, and the height or limit of pleasure is just your personal combination of experiences so long as none of those are painful. It is ideal to hit 100% pleasures if you can, but even when you are in bad circumstances you just shoot for as high a percentage of pleasures as you can. Nothing hard to understand at all.

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Quote from Titus Personally, I experienced phases with chronic pain and I can simply enjoy freedom from pain. The fixed vessel gets filled by so many beautiful impressions that there is no need for a hunt for especial amusement.

Yes that is absolutely true, but there is something missing from the statement when people simply focus on "escape from pain" as the reason for making the statement. The basis for any statement describing your condition is that life itself is a pleasure to experience, no matter what you are doing, so long as it isn't painful. It is desirable to remove the pain down to the last drop, but the focus and emphasis is on the pleasure of living, not the irritation of the pain. It is "Pleasure" that is the focus of Epicurus and what makes life worth living, not any aspect of "Pain."

Some are going to say that this is like insisting on saying that the glass is half full rather than half empty, but I do believe that is what Epicurus is doing.

Quote from “Epicurus And His Philosophy” page 240 - Norman DeWitt (emphasis added)

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing."

This is all very simple and common sense, but when people obsess over "katastematic pleasure" or "ataraxia" or otherwise fail to make very clear what they are saying, then most normal people are going to conclude that "absence of pain" is some kind of woo-woo experience of mystical exaltation that "isn't pleasure at all." That's what they keep saying either explicitly or implicitly -- they are using various words for saying that this goal of "painlessness is "not pleasure at all, but the real reason for existence!" What a total inversion of the real meaning!! And it is all because they - like Cicero - refuse to accept the designation that life itself - whenever you are not suffering from some specific pain - is pleasurable!!

From the perspective I am describing, how much more clear can this quote be?

We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain.

These jokers who are saying that you don't experience true pleasure or the real goal of life unless you've removed 100% of pain keep looking for "katastematic pleasure" or "ataraxia" or "aponia" as if it some high-priced drug, when all Torquatus / Epicurus is really saying is that when you aren't for some specific reason in pain, whatever you are doing with your body or thinking with your mind constitutes pleasure!. Rather than having to go looking for some experience that no one can really explain, he's simply saying that however you choose to live your life, unless you're experiencing some specific pain - is an experience of pleasure!

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TITUS:

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Quote from Cassius That's what they keep saying either explicitly or implicitly -- that this goal of "painlessness is "not pleasure at all, but the real reason for existence! What at total inversion of the real meaning -- and it is all because they refuse to accept that life itself - when you are not suffering from some specific pain - is pleasurable!!

I think there is a comment in the forum from me or I wrote an essay on this topic: When another group e.g. the Buddhists experience their system of thought sometimes working, it's just because they come across the calm ocean of Epicurean Philosophy. Some of other philosophies strategies and habits may coincide with the happy life. Their main mistake is heading for alien/otherworldly experiences instead of to what Nature provides, which will finally keep them unsatisfied.

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CASSIUS:

Yes I agree. Life when you are not in pain is in fact pleasurable, even if you are only sitting crosslegged on the floor staring at a candle and chanting a single word over and over.

But why in the world would you ever LIMIT yourself to that!!! If you like reading - read! If you like biking, bike! If you like cooking, cook! If you like playing football, play football! But good God man you've only got a brief time to live - don't be afraid to use it! Why not experience all the innumerable pleasures that are open to you so long as they bring more pleasure than pain!

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TITUS:

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Quote from Cassius Why not experience all the innumerable pleasures that are open to you so long as they aren't more painful than they are worth!

I would always start with eliminating pain as far as possible and then moving on according to the pleasure/pain calculus. I'm a relatively frugal, hence in my case it's rather about an openness towards my sensual experience which I gather "by the way" than being excited about exceptionalities.

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CASSIUS:

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Quote from Titus I would always start with eliminating pain as far as possible and then moving on according to the pleasure/pain calculus. I'm a relatively frugal, hence in my case it's rather about an openness towards my sensual experience which I gather "by the way" than being excited about exceptionalities.

Now there I would say that the "I would always" is a personal preference. Everyone is different and has different priorities and preferences. That takes us back to the "week as Epicurus in pain or week as an uneducated shepherd" hypothetical. Both choices are "legitimate" in that no god or Nature cares which one you choose, but different people are going to make different choices. For the sake of honesty it is essential to respect that the universe doesn't care, and not fall into the mistake of believing that our own choice is a categorical imperative for the universe of all people at large. Only you can decide what is most important to you and what you're going to conclude is the best way to spend your life.

I'd like to use this as a starting point to ask a new question:

Quote from Godfrey

Basically I'm toying with the idea that k/k may not deserve the amount of attention that it gets. My thinking is that k/k is really just a way of describing duration, and we don't have any existing texts from Epicurus to which would give it any more importance.

An existing text that we do have is PD09. I'm currently interpreting it as defining the three components of pleasure as intensity, duration and location. The more I think on it, the more useful these seem to be for working with maximizing one’s pleasure. And if I'm interpreting PD09 correctly, which is open to debate, then to my mind it has more relevance than the texts dealing with k/k, as it is directly attributed to Epicurus.

So I'm suggesting that the three components of pleasure as described in PD09 are a more valuable topic of study than katastematic and kinetic pleasure. As far as I can tell, PD09 has been pretty much ignored, possibly due to its confusing wording, while k/k is the subject of endless, and endlessly open-ended, discussion. And I'm wondering if the focus on k/k is more useful to opponents of Epicurus than to practicing Epicureans.

Regardless of whether the topic of k/k pleasure is a blessing or a curse, I would like to put that aside for the moment and address what I think is a more basic question.

It seems to me that we are often not very clear when we are discussing "pleasure" as to whether what we are referring to is (1) any number of individual discrete experiences that occur at the same time (such as my being aware that my tooth is hurting at the same time I am aware that I am pleased to be talking with a friend) or (2) some kind of a "sum" of all experiences lumped together into one statement.

I think that people are often talking about pleasure as if it is (2) when they should first be examining the issue under the framework of (1).

I ask this because I would suggest we evaluate the quote currently at the top of the forum (Torquatus' "whatever is free from pain is in pleasure"), and compare it to a statement most people seem to agree is authentic Epicurus (Diogenes Laertius 22): "The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you."

I find it impossible to interpret this statement in his letter to Idomeneus as anything other than a statement by Epicurus that he is able to walk and chew gum at the same time: he is able to feel pain in one part of his experience (his abdomen) at the same time that he is able to feel plessure in another part of his experience (his mind). Is this not a statement that what Epicurus is doing is offsetting one against the other that he is both feeling simultaneously?

I do not think that this conflicts with PD03 ("Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.") because he is not saying that either his mind or his abdomen experience both pain and pleasure at the same location at the same time. These are different locations and sources of pain/pleasure - the "wherever" - and the overall common sense context that we can feel numbers of different things simultaneously explains why both can be going on at the same time.

Likewise, Torquatus says: "Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain," (On Ends Book 1:38) Torquatus further says "Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains." Torquatus continues in the same balancing vein with: And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation. (On Ends Book 1:62)

Do these passages not establish clearly that the Epicureans are presuming that life is continually a combination of pleasurable feelings and painful feelings, often occurring simultaneously in different parts of a person's full experience, and that through philosophy our goal should be to continually produce a preponderance of pleasure over pain?

Most of us will agree (I believe) that Epicurus would say that having 100% of our experience composed of pleasures would be desirable. Most of us I again believe would agree with that proposition as being a theoretical limit to how good life could be. I doubt many of us would argue that life should be 200% pleasure -- and I doubt that even entertaining that proposition would make any sense at all.

What does make sense is that like Epicurus, sometimes we can find mental pleasures to offset physical pains, and sometimes we can find physical pleasures to offset mental pains, not to mention physical pleasures offsetting physical pains and mental pleasures offsetting mental pains. Is that not our common experience as human beings?

If all that is the case does not "absence of pain" really means "absence of any experiences of pains - meaning discrete experiences of pain?"

And whether we refer to painlessness as aponia or ataraxia or any other word we choose, does not "pure pleasure" or "100% pleasure" simply mean "all my experiences over the time period being considered are pleasurable."

If these propositions are correct, I think they support the conclusion that in referring to "the limit of pleasure" Epicurus was in no way referring to a unique experience that everyone experiences in the same way. Is Epicurus not more likely to be saying that 100% pleasure (which is the same as saying 0% pain) is not different in kind or type from the experience of 99% pleasure, and the difference exists only in the 1% degree of pain that still remains, whatever that pain (or pains) might be?

Is there any reason to think that there is a "big bang" when that last 1% is finally eliminated? Is there any reason to think that looking for a "total elimination of pain" serves as more than a theoretical limit that helps us target how to get from where we are to a better place of even more pleasures and fewer pains? I would say "No." The perfect is not the enemy of the good, and there is nothing magical at all about getting from 99% pleasures to 100% pleasures.

Eliminating that extra 1% is desirable, but by no means is obsessing over the final 1% the exclusive object of Epicurus' advice. Nor is eliminating that final 1% in any way a justification for pursuing a life of asceticism or minimalism. If you yourself judge that the particular combination of 99% experiences that you believe worth pursuing is worth the cost of that 1% of your life encumbered by pains, then why not take what you can get and be satisfied that you have lived a great life even if it had a few irritations?

Just as we should be weighing "pleasure" in terms of duration, location, and intensity, as Godfrey's post (I think rightly) suggests, we should then move to the next step of the evaluation: All sorts of feelings of varying duration, location, and intensity are registering in our lives at any particular moment (or over our lifetime).

The most logical and common sense way of understanding what Epicurus is saying is that in the same way that there's no god in heaven writing a report card and giving us a "pass" or "fail" grade on the sum of our lives, there's also no mystical or difficult-to-understand experience that only he as a Greek intellectual was able to capture in words that the rest of the world finds difficult to comprehend.

Over every time period we can consider, we can personally add up our experiences of pleasure and experiences of pain and talk about which ones predominated. If we wish, we can assign a tag name such as "happy" to describe those periods when pleasures predominates over pains. But we're never doing anything except comparing our pleasurable experiences to our painful experiences and doing our best to increase the predominance of pleasures over pains.

We talk a lot about Epicurus having a "calculus of pleasure" without going much further. I think it would help if we start first with the basic arithmetic and get more familiar with comparing our pleasures to our pains. If we see pleasures and pains as discrete, as Epicurus weighed them against each other on his last day, I think we then see a very practical and easy-to-understand philosophy. The natural goal is to maximize the predominance of pleasures over pains. No one but us can ultimately judge whether we have done that well because no one else feels what we feel. And as our lives near their ends, no one's opinion about how we spent our lives matters but our own, and we have to be prepared to justify to ourselves - and not to gods or to anyone else - that we have lived well.