Posts by Cassius

Also just a little further down, once again we have a form of "moveo," this time with 'hilarity"

"Everyone uses the Greek word hedone and the Latin voluptas to mean an agreeable and exhilariting stimulation of the sense."

Omnes enim iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece hedone Latine voluptatem vocant."

Omnes enim iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece hedone Latine voluptatem

jucundus, jucunda -um, jucundior -or -us, jucundissimus -a -um pleasant/agreeable/delightful/pleasing; congenial

moveo, movere, movi, motus move, stir, agitate, affect, provoke, disturb

sentio, sentire, sensi, sensus perceive, feel, experience; think, realize, see, understand

hilaro, hilarare, hilaravi, hilaratus cheer, gladden; give cheerful appearance to

graecus, graeca, graecum Greek

hedus, hedi Mkid, young goat; two stars in constellation Auriga,"The Kid"

fero, ferre, tuli, latus bring, bear; tell/speak of; consider; carry off, win, receive, produce; get

voluptas, voluptatis Fpleasure, delight, enjoyment

vocant.

voco, vocare, vocavi, vocatuscall, summon; name; call upon

More as to wording:

Here's Reid's translation of Cicero in Section III:

Quote from Cassius

Cicero:‘Nay, said I, ‘either Epicurus is ignorant or else all human beings who are to be found anywhere are ignorant what pleasure is.’

Torquatus:‘How so?’

Cicero: "Because all pronounce that thing to be pleasure, by the reception of which sense is excited and is pervaded by a certain agreeable feeling.’

Rackham translates that in Loeb as -

"Because the universal opinion is that pleasure is a sensation actively stimulating the percipient sense and diffusing over it a certain agreeable feeling."

Let me get the Latin --

"Quia voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes quam sensus accipiens movetur et iucundiate quadam perfunditur."

voluptas, voluptatis F pleasure, delight, enjoyment

sentio, sentire, sensi, sensusperceive, feel, experience; think, realize, see, understand

accipio, accipere, accepi, acceptustake, grasp, receive, accept, undertake; admit, let in, hear, learn; obey

moveo, movere, movi, motusmove, stir, agitate, affect, provoke, disturb

iucunditate quadam perfunditur.

jucunditas, jucunditatis F charm, agreeableness, pleasing quality; pleasantness/amiability; favors

quidam, quaedam, quoddama certain thing

perfundo, perfundere, perfudi, perfususpour over/through, wet, flood, bathe; overspread, coat, overlay; imbue

Quote from Cassius

Everybody understands that the pleasure of ice cream is different from listening to music, but they don't understand that pleasure includes both "exciting" pleasures and "all normal non-painful experiences of life."

In fact, I am not really sure that all of us here in this thread are agreed on this point. Does anyone not agree that Epicurus is including "all normal non-painful experiences of life" within "pleasure?"

If someone doesn't agree with this (now or even referring to future people who read this thread) we ought to get to the bottom of that.

While we could say "all normal non-painful feelings" instead of "all normal non-painful experiences of life," I would say that wider terminology is important because many are going to say that often they don't feel anything at all, and they are not referring to just when they are unconscious or asleep, they are trying to assert a "neutral" state. As I see it, it is the existence of a neutral state (that of non-feeling, or that of exactly balancing pleasure and pain to get "zero") that is the state being denied by Epicurus. I would say there is no "feeling" labelled "zero" nor is this likely to be a perfectly-matched "zero" sum of pleasures and pains. The latter might be possible, but still that would not be a third alternative beyond pleasure and pain.

For some reason this strikes me as relevant the conversation with Don on exciting vs non-exciting pleasures. Maybe "stir" is another word to add to the pot:

"The mind alone by itself has understanding for itself and rejoices for itself, when no single thing stirs either soul or body."

And the point Socrates is rejecting is exactly what Epicurus is doing in understanding that pleasure has many forms, all of them pleasurable:

But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance,—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!

As we speculated in the podcast, is it possible that the "variation" references in Epicurus are pointing here to Socrates, and affirming that we need to understand that the "types of pleasure" in which pleasure comes includes not only many specific parts of the body and mind but also "exciting" and "normal/non-exciting"? Everybody understands that the pleasure of ice cream is different from listening to music, but they don't understand that pleasure includes both "exciting" pleasures and "all normal non-painful experiences of life."

Thanks Joshua. Here is Bailey same area Line 98 of Book 3:

Quote

Thus often the body, which is clear to see, is sick, when, all the same we feel pleasure in some other hidden part; and contrariwise it happens that the reverse often comes to be in turn, when one wretched in mind feels pleasure in all his body; in no other wise than if, when a sick man’s foot is painful, all the while, may be, his head is in no pain. Moreover, when the limbs are given up to soft sleep, and the heavy body lies slack and senseless, yet there is something else in us, which at that very time is stirred in many ways, and admits within itself all the motions of joy and baseless cares of heart.

Joshua -- On today's recording session you quoted sections from Lucretius and Philebus.

Do you have those in convenient form where you can paste them here, or at least the line citations?

thanks!

Quote from Don

This is not the kinetic/katastematic distinction (I've been burned on making that assumption before!), but it's a distinction that gets discussed in Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Philodemus.

I know you're trying to get at the "pleasure when you're not 'doing' something 'pleasurable'" but there has to be a better way than "non-stimulating."

I am not sure exactly what the 'this' refers to there and that is part of the need for greater clarity.

The distinction that is super-critical is the issue that pleasure includes both (1) pleasures that we consider exciting from the norm of life, and (2) the norm of life which is not exciting, but which needs to be considered as pleasure whenever this "norm" is not receiving some painful input.

The real point is that every moment and every aspect of being alive is to be considered "pleasure" unless that moment or aspect involves receiving pleasure.

THAT"s the distinction and the two elements on which everything else stands. The default experience of life is "pleasure" in every moment and aspect unless some particular pain is intruding.

Do you consider that distinction the K/K distinction?

Because it is exactly this attitude here that is the problem: I know you're trying to get at the "pleasure when you're not 'doing' something 'pleasurable'" but there has to be a better way than "non-stimulating."

This wording accepts the requirement that pleasure requires excitement. The only requirement for labeling some moment of life "pleasure" is that is not "painful."

There are no other labeling options for something you are conscious and aware of other than "pleasure" or "pain."

Are we agreed on that last sentence?

On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain.

I can't really fault Cicero's reading of the "normal" view of pleasure. He's focusing on words like "delight" but especially '"agitation," which isn't being used in the "negative" sense of "agitation" but more in the "my washing machine has an agitator that washes the clothes." It's not really "length of time" that describes the agitation but something else, and I don't think "motion" really captures the issue either. Almost like we are talking about "excited" atomic particles.

On Ends Book Two:

Cicero: To let you know that I do understand, I first declare that by voluptas I mean what he means by hedone. Now though we often search for a Latin word equivalent to a Greek word and conveying the same sense, in this case there was no need to search. No word can possibly be discovered which more exactly represents in Latin the sense of a Greek word than voluptas. All men everywhere who know Latin denote by this word two things, delight existing in the mind and a sweet agreeable agitation in the body. In fact the character in Trabea’s play describes delight as excessive pleasure in the mind, just like the character in Caecilius, who gives out that he is delighted with all delights. But there is this distinction, that voluptas is applied also to the mind (an immoral feeling, as the Stoics think, who deign it as an irrational elevation of the mind when it fancies itself in the enjoyment of some great blessing) while laetitia and gaudium are not used in connexion with the body. But according to the usage of all who speak Latin, pleasure consists in feeling that kind of agreeableness which agitates some one of the senses. This agreeableness too you may apply metaphorically if you please to the mind; for we use the phrase to affect agreeably in both cases, and in connexion with it the word agreeable; if only you understand that midway between the man who says I am enriched with such delight that I am unsteadied and the man who cries now at last is my heart on fire, one of whom is transported with delight, while the other is racked by pain, comes this man’s speech though this our acquaintance is quite recent, for he is neither in a state of delight nor of torture; and also that between him who is master of exquisite bodily pleasures and him who is tormented by the intensest pains comes he who is removed from both states.

Quote from Don

"Non-stimulating" and "not stimulated" sounds like there's no sensation at all.

I agree that that deduction would be something to be avoided.

Quote from Don

The pleasure of floating on a calm sea

But this would be only one such pleasure and we'd likely want to avoid "floating" metaphors as well, unless we are ships, because floating is what ships do. I would say "floating" is going to evoke "mindlessness" or "total inaction" unless we are careful to exclude that. And that's where the kinetic language gets blurry, if for example savoring memories is kinetic.

We're humans, and what we're looking for I think is something the conveys "doing anything and everything that humans do when they are not 'excited' but also not in pain." We're looking for a word that describes all normal activities of life where we aren't "excited" but we are still functioning normally. I would think this is what Torquatus is pointing out as the answer to Chrysippus' hand hypothetical. A hand is which not being stimulated or excited or massaged still falls under "a hand in pleasure" so long as the hand is not in some affirmative pain.

Quote from Don

I also think we need to acknowledge that there is a difference between pain and suffering

At the moment I would emphasize in order of importance:

(1) There are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, which means the presence of one is the absence of the other. Each and every feeling in life which is agreeable falls under pleasure, each and every feeling that is disagreeable falls under pain.

(2) Within "pleasure" and "pain" there are many different particular feelings which vary greatly from one another in terms of how we experience them. The pleasure of ice cream varies from the pleasure of listening to music. The pleasure of Beethoven differs from the pleasure of Wagner. This point two does not contradict point one, it's just a different perspective level.

(3) From a "whole person" perspective, the limit of the quantity of pleasure is the absence of pain. There is no way to improve the quantity of pleasure past 100%, and this understanding gives us the understanding that pleasure has a limit, and therefore it can't be made "better" by living forever. Living longer gives us more time experiencing pleasure, but no matter how long we live life never gets better than 100% pleasure.

Once propositions one and two are accepted then it's fair game to parse individual pleasures and pains any way one prefers to think about them and label them with whatever words seem useful in any language we'd like to use. But until it is accepted that pleasure includes both stimulating and non-stimulating pleasures, it's not possible to stand up against the argument of Cicero and others that Epicurus is using the term "pleasure" in a non-standard way.

Cicero's complaint is correct - Epicurus *is* using the word "pleasure" in a non-standard way, just like he uses "god" in a non-standard way. It seems clear that Epicurean terminology on pleasure differs from normal usage, and that "pleasure" includes two types of pleasures which we can understand in words that mean something to us ( 1 - exciting / stimulating pleasures vs 2 - pleasures of normal living in which we are not stimulated / excited).

The equation of "pleasure = absence of pain" is never going to make sense to a person who insists on sticking to standard terminology. Whatever explanations get us over that hurdle is desirable, and I am sure there are many ways to do it.

Here's a new one for me, from Chapter 6 of the Boeri /Aoiz book:

Quote from Theory and Practice In Epicurean Political Philosophy

Trebatius Testa was one of the most renowned jurists of his time. He began his career under the protection of Cicero, who recommended him to Caesar. Trebatius joined Caesar in Gaul in 54 BC. In a letter from February 53 Cicero tells Trebatius that he knows he has become an Epicurean, and reproaches him that being an Epicurean contradicts his status as a politician and jurist (Fam. 2.12 1).⁷⁰ We do not know how Trebatius replied, but several facts in his biography highlight the arguments by which an Epicurean could have responded to Cicero. Trebatius did not want to pursue a political career (in fact he refused the office of military tribune offered to him by Caesar in 54, which annoyed Cicero). However, he was able to make the most of his talent as a jurist and became Caesar’s adviser and familiaris. Trebatius, as Benferhat points out, got through the civil war without compromising himself or becoming a victim.⁷¹ He was also valued as a jurisconsult by Augustus. It could perhaps be said that Trebatius, without aspiring to power or office, enjoyed fame and prestige, which provided him with security until his death in his eighties. In the aforementioned letter of February 53, Cicero is particularly emphatic in questioning how an Epicurean could devote himself to law. It is one of Cicero’s anti-Epicurean arguments that most clearly reveals his omission of the central tenets of Epicureanism, for, as we have shown, the Epicureans developed a sophisticated defence of justice and law. One of the testimonies of Trebatius’ activity as a jurisconsult reflects just the kind of argument one would expect from an Epicurean jurist: the insistence on the utility of law. When Augustus consulted jurists on whether the use of codicils was in accordance with the ratio iuris, Trebatius convinced the emperor that it was by claiming that, in effect, the codicil was most useful and necessary for the citizens [utilissimum et necessarium hoc civibus esse].

I am reviewing the Boeri / Aioz book (Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy) and came across this passage relevant to our discussion of memory, from their Chapter 5:

In sum, friendship is an indispensable condition for happiness and, like justice, is a powerful means for achieving imperturbability. But friendship is also thought of as a sort of kinetic pleasure: the memory of a dead friend appears to Epicurus ‘sweet’ (Plutarch, Pleasant Life 1105E; Us. 213); it produces joy and ends by being a relief capable of counteracting the body’s pains.

Thanks for those calculations Pacatus!

Quote from Pacatus

Question: Can B1 and B2 also have katastematic qualities? For example, chronic physical pain or clinical depression?

You're pursuing this out of interest and you enjoy it (I feel sure), but to me i would think a newer person would find this to be hazardous if they pursue it before more basic issues are resolved. I don't have a cite ready at hand to back this up, but I am pretty sure that the authorities don't consider "duration" (implied in the word chronic) as "the" key defining aspect of katastematic pleasure, but rather "changeability," which is related but I would say is not the same. Don's concern was (I think rightly) "since memories can be a kinetic pleasure." It's pretty clear that some 'actions' like memories can come and go last longer than others, so it isn't the time element alone or maybe even primarily that distinguishes the two. If someone asserts that it is, where is the dividing line between a long-lasting kinetic pleasure and a katastematic one? A minute? An hour? A day? At what point in time is the dividing line crossed and kinetic become katastematic?

In fact, that's the underlying problem of talking about K/K. It isn't really clear what distinguishes one from the other. Does katastematic really equate to "rest?" How is sustained smooth motion over a long period of time different than "rest?" What is "rest" in the first place in a universe with no "bottom" and composed of never-ceasing-to-move atoms flying through space? I know that some people assert answers to these questions, but authoritative cites explaining these things are not easy to find, and certainly not clear explanations in Epicurean texts. By the time a newer person tries long enough to get to the bottom of it i would wager most of them have created for themselves more intellectual pain than pleasure and gone a long way toward thinking that trying to decode Epicurus is fruitless.

Quote from Cassius

While we know that the position that there are only two feelings and we are experiencing either one or the other is the Epicurean position, for persuasiveness purposes we will still need to hammer the point that Kalosyni is wanting to raise: Can we experience something without an associated feeling?

It's clear we need to go back over this point. WHY is this position seemingly of such importance to Epicurus. I think there are probably several answers but we need to make them clear.

Quote from Joshua

if 6 held that "Any non-painful feeling is a pleasure" it would be a deductive conclusion of 1 and 2.

Good point. Will change most every word "experience" to "feeling." That also will address the points in the remainder of your post I think.....

While I think in normal discussion the word "experience" equates to "feeling," there is no reason to introduce that ambiguity in this list of points. All that was previously stated as "experience" will now be changed to "feeling."

While we know that the position that there are only two feelings and we are experiencing either one or the other is the Epicurean position, for persuasiveness purposes we will still need to hammer the point that Kalosyni is wanting to raise: Can we experience something without an associated feeling?

Cicero says we can, Torquatus/Epicurus says we cannot. As far as I can tell, every single reference to the question in the core texts backs up Torquatus/Epicurus that this is the Epicurean position.

Now as to WHY that is the Epicurean position, that's a separate but highly important question. I would say it is because of Epicurus' philosophic conclusions about life (life is desirable, so life in the absence of pain is pleasurable) but there are probably other ways of reaching the same conclusion. It is a plus (but not determinative of the question) that modern clinical researchers seem to take the same position (a point which Don and Godfrey are all over.) See posts in this subforum and many others which are not linked there as of yet.

One additional point on this from the letter to Menoeceus: "And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality."

I have not previously interpreted it this way, but that underlined portion may be exactly the point: it is the right understanding that death is nothing to us that makes a mortal life enjoyable. It is thinking through these issues philosophically that makes us realize that even when we are not being stimulated, the simple and normal act of living is understood to be pleasurable. If we don't understand this, then we wander in indifference and doubt and question the value of life and we flirt with Stoicism or Nihilism or worse. If we do understand it, then the wise man can experience a constant predominance of pleasure over pain.

I wrote my post #3 in the middle of the night, and when I read Don's post #4 I was half asleep. I failed to really be clear about this part which I would steer away from:

Quote from Don

A = pleasure (pleasurable sensation/positive affect)

B = pain (painful sensation/negative affect)

A1 = "Any experience of agreeable "stimulation"" (ie, kinetic pleasure)

A2 = "normal and healthy experience of life" (ie, katastematic pleasure)

I think the designation of A1 as kinetic and A2 as katastematic would not be helpful. Regardless of different readings of the texts, as I understand the situation the k/k terminology is not nearly as well establishable in the core Epicurus and Lucretius texts as is the discussion of the difference between "stimulation" vs "absence of pain / normal experience of life." The problems that result from this k/k classification include for example exactly the one Don mentions in his post, that the "kinetic/katastematic" distinction does not map directly onto the distinction between stimulation vs normal painfree life.

The summoning up and savoring of memories is mental, and though we don't think of that usually as an "action" experience, it does fall under the category of an action as I understand the authorities. Action is not merely physical change but also includes mental change, and so (again as I understand the authorities) stopping and starting to think about distinct memories is considered kinetic, as is any process that involves "change of state" rather than "static state." Diving into whether the pleasure involved is "changeable" or "static" introduces complexities that are not needed for the overall analysis of whether pleasure predominates over pain.

The big hurdle to get over and the reason for discussion is to understand what "absence of pain" means. Resolving the issue that we should seek the predominance of all types of pleasures over all types of pain resolves the biggest issues in controversy as to what the goal of life is. As I see it, the prime objective should be first is to identify and have confidence on the desired goal. Once we do that, then the question can turn to which individual pleasures to pursue under a particular circumstance. And that's going to be more of a practical fact-specific question than a theoretical issue.

Yes I would agree that this takes us to exactly the same place, if we insist on the accustomed viewpoint of looking at feelings of body and mind separately. That's why I included my note in number one that most people are going to look at them separately, but the issue of whether their activity is pleasure or pain is the same. When you separate those out and refer to them as AI/A2 and B1/B2 you're right we arrive at the same place:

Quote from Don

HP = (A1 + A2) height/fullness of pleasure is just 100% pleasure

HP = C - (B1 + B2) height/fullness of pleasure is the totality of life without any pain of body or mind

And i agree that this is an added complexity that would arise due to ambiguities between the kinetic and katastematic terms:

Quote from Don

But pain in the body B1 is the absence of pleasure in the body but neither A1 nor A2 map neatly onto mind and body since memories can be a kinetic pleasure.

.... problems which i would put aside by considering those questions to be of secondary down-the-road importance, if that. I would leave those problems to those who really want to pursue whether Epicurus himself was concerned with this distinction at all, and I would go with Lucretius' approach and leave that for another book.

The real fundamental help that going through these steps provides under either scenario is that it explains how the term "absence of pain" can be used in a completely clear way. Seen this way, "absence of pain" is tied tightly to pleasure and describes both the ultimate goal of life as well as the sweeping nature of everything that is considered pleasure. No "woo" or mystery or implication of asceticism or devaluing of life, but rather a clear reference that brings within it any experience in life which is not painful.

Please check my math and let me know if you see an error:

Pleasure Arithmetic and "Absence of Pain"

==================================

1. There are only two feelings of body or mind: those which are agreeable (pleasure) and those which are disagreeable (pain). Let's call pleasure "A" and pain "B." (It should not be necessary to say that we are including both "body' and "mind," since we are a single organism, but since many people seem to insist on thinking in those two terms, let's be clear that everything said here refers to both.)

2. If a person is alive and feeling anything, what he is feeling is either "A" pleasure or "B" pain.

3. "All" the feelings of life = "A" + "B." Let's call all the feelings of life "C." A + B = C

4. "All" the feelings of life means 100% of them. There is no logical way to increase "C" past the total of "A" + "B."

5. Any feeling of agreeable "stimulation" is a pleasure. Everyone admits this. Let's call this type of pleasure "A1".

6. Any non-painful feeling is a pleasure. Not everyone admits this, but this is the logical deduction of points 1 and 2. Let's call this type of pleasure "A2". This does not refer to "stimulation," but instead refers to the normal and healthy feeling of life when no pain or disease is present. Neither A1 nor A2 are intrinsically "better" than the other for all people at all times. Both are part of life and both require prudence and activity to sustain.

7. The most pleasure possible in life is when 100% of life ("C") is composed totally of pleasure, which means 100% A (pleasure, either A1 or A2 or both) and 0% B (pain). We can call this type of life "HP" (the "height of pleasure" or "the highest pleasure" or the "limit of pleasure").

8. If C = A + B (all feelings of life = the pleasurable feelings + the painful feelings) then A = C - B. This is another way of saying that the quantity of pleasurable feelings in life is the same as the quantity of feelings in life in which pain is absent. Any feeling of pleasure can therefore be referred to as a feeling of "absence of pain," and any feeling of pain can be referred to as a feeling of "absence of pleasure." This is not a complete description of a particular feeling, any more than the word "pleasure" is a complete description of ice cream or sex. From this perspective, "absence of pain" provides us a single term that describes any and all types of desirable experience, since "absence of pain" includes both A1 (any agreeable stimulation of body or mind + A2 (any non-painful normal experience of body or mind).

9. The most desirable life (which we called "HP" above) is completely pleasure (A1 + A2 with no amount of B), which means a life in which pain is absent. From this perspective, "absence of pain" provides us a single term that describes our goal for life.

10. "Absence of pain" can be used to refer to either "the goal of life" or "any and all types of desirable feelings." Just like the word "Pleasure," which can refer either to "the goal of life" or "any and all types of desirable feeling," the term "absence of pain" has two meanings, depending on which perspective is being discussed.

11. "Absence of pain" does not mean or imply "absence of feeling" or "absence of pleasure." Instead, "absence of pain" refers to any number of pleasurable feelings from a discrete single experience of pleasure all the way up to a total life which is full of pleasures unaccompanied by pains. Therefore when we say that the goal of life is absence of pain, we are not following the gross error of Hieronymous of Rhodes and others who say that the goal of life has nothing to do with pleasure, we are following Epicurus and saying that the goal of life has everything to do with pleasure.

EDIT NOTE: The first version of this post had "experience" in the place of what is now listed as "feeling." This change was made to tighten up the wording - see posts 8 and 9 in this thread below.

Ok - In listening again to Episode 195, I think we had a great conversation. However I think there is a lot more to say, so as we start 196 i expect to take us back over some of the same points, especially:

When we consider the Letter to Menoeceus TOGETHER with PDO3, I would say that we have to be firm both on both the overall organism level and as to individual feelings. We're not talking ONLY about the limit of quantity of pleasure being the absence of pain, but we are talking about any individual desirable feeling as being called by either of the names "pleasure" OR "absence of pain - in other words that the terms are interchangeable.

This latter point is more clear from the letter to Menoeceus: "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.". This is not directed toward the limit of the quantity of pleasure, as in the first sentence of PD03, but to what is said in the second sentence.

Torquatus is hammering this point over and over, but we can't leave it ambiguous:

1 - The theoretical goal is 100% pleasure / 0% pain, because it's obvious nothing can be more complete than 100%. When looking at your whole life "in sum," the logical goal for your life as a whole is 100% pleasure / 0% pain. Of course we know it is canonical Epicurus that we sometimes choose pain when that leads to more pleasure or less overall pain, so the 100% / 0% goal is a "whole organism" perspective, and not an inflexible rule that says at every moment that your "prime directive" is to make sure you never experience a moment of pain. You look to all the consequences and you act accordingly.

AND -

2 - Every step along the way, in any discrete moment / part / feeling / experience of your life, what you are feeling / experiencing is registered as either pleasure or pain, and that there is no "neutral" or third or fourth or any other kind of experience that does not fall under pleasure or pain. If you are not feeling pain, what you are feeling is pleasure, full stop, end of need to look for any other high-level label. Any feeling that we find to be desirable is equally describing as "pleasure" or "absence of pain" at this high level of analysis.

We then to hammer home that analysis and then go back over why the example of Hieronymous of Rhodes illustastes this equivalence through the different positions that the two philosophers are taking.

If anyone has suggestions on ways to illustrate these points we will be glad to incorporate them into the upcoming podcast.

The image at 49:08 in the new press conference video is very impressive!!