Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

I can come up with all kinds of complications!

I knew the Don we all know and love as to hypotheticals would not be long in coming!

An interesting aspect of Don's question is that it points out to me that it is more important to know "the truth" of what Epicurus was talking about than to think that I already know what the "most pleasant" of those alternative weeks would be.

I do not think that I (speaking only for me) have an adequate grasp of what Epicurus was really advising to presume that 'it would be more fun to be with Epicurus in the good times' is the right answer.

It might be more "fun" or even 'pleasant" to be with him in some of the earlier times, but i would want to know his mature thoughts or else i would not be so sure I had made the correct choice.

For me that one is easier I think - I would want to be able to question Epicurus in his most mature and advanced stage of life, so I would say "being with Epicurus during the last week of his life" to ask him where he eventually came down on many of these same issues we are discussing.

And i would probably include the exact question we are discussing from post one of this thread.

Agreed Nate.

So how would a non-idealist non-essentialist person like Epicurus view discussions where "Pleasure" is compared from one person to another or at different times and places?

Is there a standard of "pleasure" that exists for everyone that allows an explicit one-to-one comparison?

We have heard many times that accepting "Pleasure" as a standard turns us into cows (or worse)?

If that is not the case, why is it not the case?

Or are we in fact aiming at exactly the same pleasure of a cow grazing in the grass?

Is one person's "height of pleasure" the same as another person's?

And on the topic of being a student of Epicurus for any time period, here is something I think is related that any student of Epicurus should consider:

Q: "What is your understanding of Platonic Idealism and Aristotelian Essentialism and how they may or may not relate to Epicurus' view of Pleasure? Does considering that relationship (if any) indicate anything as to how you would answer the question being posed?"

An issue with any hypothetical is trying to exclude all the issues that people with think to add in that are outside the hypothetical. In this case the fact that Epicurus died after his last week needs to be excluded from the terms so that we can focus on the issue of their relative pains and pleasures while alive.

But also as with any hypothetical, explaining the caveats also helps with the main purpose, which is to get people thinking about the overall question.

Yes actually I do not see the "death at the end of the week" as being a major factor in making the hypothetical work.

The intent is generally that of:

1 - Being Epicurus for a week (with all that that implies) but in pain from kidneystones; vs

2 - Being a random shepherd for a week who is experiencing no specific pain but knows nothing about philosophy and doing nothing in particular but minding his own business living the live of a shepherd in the mountains .

Before posting to Facebook I will probably use these descriptions.

Thanks to all who have answered so far! This is going to provide some great food for thought over at Facebook too. I'll probably wait til the weekend to post it to give more time for consideration.

The quirky option of referring the issue to Siro or Philodemus comes from On Ends Book Two:

Quote from Cicero - On Ends Book Two

When I had thus spoken, Triarius said, ‘I have friends to whom I can refer these questions, and although I might have made some answer myself, still I would rather look to men better equipped than myself.’ ‘I believe you mean our friends Siro and Philodemus, not only excellent men, but men of very great learning. ‘You understand me rightly,’ said he. ‘Agreed, then,’ said I, ‘ but it were fairer that Triarius should give some verdict about our disagreement.’ ‘I reject him on affidavit,’ said Torquatus with a smile, ‘as prejudiced, at all events on this subject, since you handle these topics with some gentleness, while he persecutes us after the fashion of the Stoics.' Then Triarius remarked: ‘At least I shall do so hereafter with greater confidence. For I shall be ready with the doctrines I have just listened to; though I shall not attack you until I see that you have been primed by the friends you mention.' This said, we put an end at once to our walk and our debate.

Quote from Godfrey

Which would Epicurus choose?

That is a very good follow on question to help articulate the answer to the first and main question: Would Epicurus himself have traded places for the week that is under discussion?

I think this poll should be very interesting and after we see some commentary and look for fine tuning I am going to put it on the Facebook group!

The Poll Question is as stated in the header. Please reply, and state your reasoning, with any cites you think are applicable, in the thread below!

Started September 6, 2023:

Quisquis enim sentit quemadmodum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore.

[A]ny one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain.

- Torquatus in Cicero's "On Ends" Book One XI:38 (Reid)

Also on this point, from very early in the thread:

Quote from Don

This line caught me by surprise! Is Epicurus endorsing the idea of "neutral states" in addition to pleasure and pain?! As always, back to the books!

Another clear statement that Epicurus held there to be no third or neutral state between pleasure and pain -- at least as to those who are conscious. This is the position we see being hammered over and over and over by Torquatus and explicitly falling on Cicero's deaf (or stubborn) ears:

Quote from Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends, Book One, Section XI

For just as the mere removal of annoyance brings with it the realization of pleasure, whenever hunger and thirst have been banished by food and drink, so in every case the banishment of pain ensures its replacement by pleasure. Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain.

Quote from Don

Edit: see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accident_…%29?wprov=sfla1

Now, this being said, I think Cassius 's primary issue with "accident" as a translation being problematic is that it could be misunderstood by the casual reader to imply chance, luck, or fortune as in common parlance. I do think that could be an issue. It is a philosophical jargon word per that Wikipedia article.

Yes that is exactly the point.

In the mechanical aspects of the universe, things are not "accidental/fortuitous" in the sense that the exact same combinations of the same atoms in the same way at the same places will accidentally/fortuitously produce different results - they produce repeatable and reliable results, and that is why we see the regularity in the universe. The word "accident" can imply that the result could be otherwise for unknowable factors, and I would say that that is why Lucretius uses the word "eventum," "Event" at least today has more of an expected quality to it than does accidental. "Today's events will include and eclipse of the sun" means something different than "Today there will accidentally be an eclipse of the sun." It is not at all an accident that there will be an eclipse today, and based on what Epicurus says in the letter to Herodotus things like eclipses have been mechanically set in motion since the time the "world" came into being. Now no doubt there are also some truly "accidental" things, but those are more where the swerve ends up allowing for free will in living things, not in the billiard-ball functioning of much of the universe. If the swerve made all things totally unpredictable and if that is what we infer from the word "accidental" then the whole physics would be destroyed because nothing could ever be predicted. This aspect of the difference between words like chance and fortune etc is discussed in detail in the AA Long article I swear by on this topic: "Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism."

And relevant to our recent discussions of Cicero, Long points out that of all of CIcero's many criticisms of Epicurus, Cicero never argued that the swerve destroys the regularity of the physics. From the absence of this argument Long concludes that Cicero declined to include it because everyone (including Cicero) understood that Epicurus did not consider the workings of the universe to be "accidental." The universe isn't "intentional" or "intelligent" but it's not "accidental" either.

This is the frequently out-of-tune Bailey using "accident"

Quote

[B-1:449] For all things that have a name, you will find either properties linked to these two things or you will see them to be their accidents. That is a property which in no case can be sundered or separated without the fatal disunion of the thing, as is weight to rocks, heat to fire, moisture to water, touch to all bodies, intangibility to the void. On the other hand, slavery, poverty, riches, liberty, war, concord, and other things by whose coming and going the nature of things abides untouched, these we are used, as is natural, to call accidents. Even so time exists not by itself, but from actual things comes a feeling, what was brought to a close in time past, then what is present now, and further what is going to be hereafter. And it must be avowed that no man feels time by itself apart from the motion or quiet rest of things.

This is Brown 1743 wavering but clearly preferring "event":

Quote

[449] All other things you'll find essential conjuncts, or else the events or accidents of these. I call essential conjunct what's so joined to a thing that it cannot, without fatal violence, be forced or parted from it; is weight to stones, to fire heat, moisture to the Sea, touch to all bodies, and not to be touched essential is to void. But, on the contrary, Bondage, Liberty, Riches, Poverty, War, Concord, or the like, which not affect the nature of the thing, but when they come or go, the thing remains entire; these, as it is fit we should, we call Events. Time, likewise, of itself is nothing; our sense collects from things themselves what has been done long since, the thing that present is, and what's to come. For no one, we must own, ever thought of Time distinct from things in motion or at rest.

And this is Lucretius' Latin using "eventa":

Nam quae cumque cluent, aut his coniuncta duabus
rebus ea invenies aut horum eventa videbis. 450
coniunctum est id quod nusquam sine permitiali
discidio potis est seiungi seque gregari,
pondus uti saxis, calor ignis, liquor aquai,
tactus corporibus cunctis, intactus inani.
servitium contra paupertas divitiaeque, 455
libertas bellum concordia cetera quorum
adventu manet incolumis natura abituque,
haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare.
tempus item per se non est, sed rebus ab ipsis
consequitur sensus, transactum quid sit in aevo, 460
tum quae res instet, quid porro deinde sequatur;
nec per se quemquam tempus sentire fatendumst
semotum ab rerum motu placidaque quiete.

I gather the word "accidens" exists too and maybe it appears in some other parts of the texts, but here where the key issue is being discussed the word appears to be eventum.

Also, given Brown 1743's word choice here, this is why I like to check that translation for comparisons, because this edition arguably seems to me to be sometimes more "in tune" with tone or word choice that Epicurus might have used given a broad view of all the texts.

I am with the "quality ofqualities" interpetation, so far. If I recall we often see "accident of accidents" but I dislike that term "accident" as it implies things that I do not think are consistent with what Epicurus is saying. The "eventum" in Lucretius sounds better to me, and would imply an "event of events" which like "quality of qualities" seems to make more sense to me, just like you can combine colors (which I think are qualities) and get new colors (which would seem like qualities of qualities).

I think I remember (?) Lucretius going on about void having no other qualities whatsoever except the ability to yield/give place to matter. Now it's the combination of matter and void that produces bodies and motion, but I can't see void alone giving rise to anything else.

In a sense I see all bodies as being qualities, and bodies coming into larger bodies is the chain all the way up from molecules to mountains. So "qualities of qualities" might not be something unusual, but might actually be the normal expression.

It seems to me the related difficult issue is the "properties" question,m where they say that for example you can't separate wetness from water. It makes sense to me to label things we interact with as qualities of bodies and qualities of qualities, but the question of where to draw the line between properties and non-properties probably requires further explanation as to how it relates to words. Probably as to physical things like water it is a distinction founded in a physical phenomena that doesn't matter what word we use to describe it.

From Epicurus and His Philosophy:

Page 67 - Epicurus was in revolt also against the teachings of Democritus, Socrates, Plato, and the rest concerning the function of philosophy. The Phi Beta Kappa idea that "Philosophy is the guide of life" was already commonplace, but no one was interpreting it very practically, To the great atomist Leucippus, Epicurus even denied right to the name of philosopher, because he concerned himself with physics to the exclusion of ethics. The ground upon which this was denied was neatly expressed: "Vain is the word of that philosopher by which no malady of mankind is healed." This position was arrived at by way of the analogy with medicine, itself an inert commonplace in the then current philosophies. He proposed to put life into it: "For just as there is no profit in medicine unless it expels the diseases of the body, so there is none in philosophy either unless it expels the malady of the soul." With Democritus himself Epicurus was impatient became or his implicit skepticism, which to him was a sort of pessimism paralyzing to action.

page 175 - Concurrently with the labors of the tragedians over the problem of fate and freedom the physicists had been busy erecting an edifice of thought of which the end result was a kind of fatalism even more shocking to the sensibilities of Epicurus. We still possess his pronouncement upon the topic: "It were better to follow the myths concerning the gods than' to be a slave to the Necessity of the physicists, for the former presumes some hope of appeasement through worship of the gods while the latter presumes an inexorable Necessity." The crime of the physicists, in his judgment, had been their failure to deal with the problem of freedom, and their offense was at its worst in the case of the atomists, who found the sole cause of motion and change in the universe to be the motion of the atoms. On this point the feelings of Epicurus were so intense that he denied to Leucippus even the name of philosopher.

page 306 - The first impulse to genuine love of mankind seems to have had its source neither in philosophy nor political theorizing but in Hippocratic medicine. One of its sayings is well known: "Where there is love of mankind there will be love of healing," That the inspiration of Epicurus came to him by this avenue there can hardly be a minimum of doubt. His own mission was conceived to be one of healing: "Vain is the word of that philosopher by which no malady of mankind is healed, for just as there is no benefit in the art of medicine unless it expels the diseases of men's bodies, so there is none in philosophy either unless it expels the malady of the soul." It is on this principle that he denied to Leucippus the right to the name of philosopher and chiefly on the same ground that he broke with Democritus, who seemed in the opinion of his great disciple to impose upon men a paralyzing law of physical necessity.

So are gods totally real to us in the same way that color and time are totally real to us? (If so, is that deriving from (a) dreams of them (b) anticipations of them, or (c) both? Because Epicurus said that we need to consider dreams as "real," if I remember correctly, and presumably anticipations are "real" in this sense too?)

I cannot help but think about these issues in the context of David Sedley's comments on Epicurus being against radical atomic reductionism. I need to find those comments again. (Here they are)

Quote from Don

passiveness and impassibility, movement and repose, are equally comprised in time.

Don why would Epicurus not simply be talking about the movement of the atoms (either in isolation or in bodies, bodies being the big deal), with no reference to human feeling at that point. If the point of time is that the atoms are changing place, that might make sense (?)

I guess we have Yonge and Mench to compare let me see when I get to a computer

I agree first search is of the Greek words so I look forward to what you find.

If needed as a second thought, I might suggest that since the topic is awareness of time, it would make sense to point out that time does not stop just because we are unconscious of it, and some variation of unconsciousness might be viewed as "neutral."