Posts by Cassius

Dionysius of Lamptrai - Scholarch (3rd): (c. 280 – 205 BCE) from 219/8 to 205 BCE Wikipedia

Dionysius of Lamptrai (Ancient Greek: Διονύσιος; fl. 3rd century BC) was an Epicurean philosopher, who succeeded Polystratus as the head (scholarch) of the Epicurean school at Athens c. 219 BC. He died c. 205 BC and was succeeded by Basilides.^[1][2]

References

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1. ^ Laërtius, Diogenes (1925). "Epicurus" . Lives of the Eminent Philosophers. Vol. 2:10. Translated by Hicks, Robert Drew (Two volume ed.). Loeb Classical Library. § 25.
2. ^ Dorandi, Tiziano (1999). "Chapter 2: Chronology". In Algra, Keimpe; et al. (eds.). The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 52. ISBN 9780521250283.

Polystratus - Scholarch (2nd): (c. 300 – 219/8 BCE) from 250 to 219/8 BCE. Polystratus (Greek: Πολύστρατος; fl. 3rd century BC) ; died 219/18 BCE) was an Epicurean philosopher, and head (scholarch) of the Epicurean school in Athens. He succeeded Hermarchus as head of the sect c. 250 BC, and was himself succeeded by Dionysius of Lamptrai when he died 219 or 218 BC. Valerius Maximus relates that Polystratus and Hippoclides were born on the same day, followed the sect of the same master Epicurus, shared their patrimony in common, and supported the school together, and at last died at the same moment in extreme old age. Fragments of two of his works survive among the scrolls found at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum. The first is On Irrational Contempt, which is a polemic directed "against those who irrationally despise popular beliefs." His opponents in the work may be the Cynics or the Skeptics. The second preserved work is entitled On Philosophy, of which only broken fragments can be deciphered. Wikipedia

"There was also Polyaenus, son of Athenodorus, of Lampsacus, a modest and friendly man, as Philodemus and his followers say.' [ Diogenes Laertius 24] Polyaenus was the son of Athenodorus. His friendship with Epicurus started after the latter's escape from Mytilene in 307 or 306 BC when he opened a philosophical school at Lampsacus associating himself with other citizens of the town, like Pythocles, Colotes, and Idomeneus. With these fellow citizens he moved to Athens, where they founded a school of philosophy with Epicurus as head, or hegemon, while Polyaenus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus were kathegemones. A man of mild and friendly manners, as Philodemus refers, he adopted fully the philosophical system of his friend, and, although he had previously acquired great reputation as a mathematician, he now maintained with Epicurus the worthlessness of geometry.[1][2] But the statement may be at least doubted, since it is certain Polyaenus wrote a mathematical work called Puzzles (Greek: Aπoριαι) in which the validity of geometry is maintained. It was against this treatise that another Epicurean, Demetrius Lacon, wrote Unsolved questions of Polyaenus (Greek: Πρὸς τὰς Πoλυαίνoυ ἀπoρίας) in the 2nd century BCE. Like Epicurus, a considerable number of spurious works seem to have been assigned to him; one of these was Against the Orators, whose authenticity was attacked both by Zeno of Sidon and his pupil Philodemus. The works attributed to Polyaenus include: On Definitions, On Philosophy, Against Aristo, Puzzles (Aporiai), On the Moon, Against the Orators, His collected Letters. Wikipedia.

Hermarchus - Scholarch (1st): (c. 325 – 250 BCE) Scholarch from 270 to 250 BCE. "Also Hermarchus, Epicurus’ successor, son of Agemortus, of Mytilene, the son of a poor father, and at first a student of rhetoric. His best books are said to be these twenty-two essays in the form of letters On Empedocles. On Science. Against Plato. Against Aristotle. He was a good man and died of paralysis." [ Diogenes Laertius 25]

"Epicurus had many disciples, but among the most distinguished was first Metrodorus, son of Athenaeus (or Timocrates) and Sande, of Lampsacus. From the time when he first came to know Epicurus he never left him, except when he went to his native city for six months, and then he came back. [23] He was a good man in all respects, as Epicurus too bears witness in prologues to his writings and in the third book of his Timocrates. Such was his character: his sister Batis he married to Idomeneus, and had for his own mistress Leontion the Athenian hetaera. He was imperturbable in the face of trouble and of death, as Epicurus says in the first book of his Metrodorus. They say that he died at the age of fifty-two, seven years before Epicurus, and of this Epicurus gives evidence, since in the will already quoted he makes provision for the care of his children, implying that he had already died. [He had also as a disciple Timocrates, Metrodorus’ brother, who has been mentioned already, an aimless person.] [24] Metrodorus’ writings were as follows: Three books Against the Physicians. About Sensations. To Timocrates. Concerning Magnanimity. About Epicurus’ Ill Health. Against the Logicians. Nine books Against the Sophists. Concerning the Path To Wisdom. Concerning Change. Concerning Wealth. Against Democritus. Concerning Nobility of Birth." [Diogenes Laertius 22-24]

"Epicurus, son of Neocles and Chaerestrata, was an Athenian of the deme of Gargettus, and the family of the Philaidae, as Metrodorus says in his work on Nobility of Birth. Heraclides in his epitome of Sotion and others say that the Athenians having colonized Samos, Epicurus was brought up there. In his eighteenth year, as they say, he came to Athens, when Xenocrates was at the Academy and Aristotle was living in Chalcis. After the death of Alexander of Macedon, when the Athenians were driven out of Samos by Perdiccas, he went to join his father in Colophon. Having stayed there some time and gathered disciples he returned again to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates. For a while he joined with others in the study of philosophy, but later taught independently, when he had founded the school called after him. He tells us himself that he first made acquaintance with philosophy at the age of fourteen. Apollodorus the Epicurean in the first book of his Life of Epicurus says that he took to philosophy because he despised the teachers of literature, since they were not able to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod. Hermippus says that Epicurus was at one time a schoolmaster and then after he met with the writings of Democritus, he took eagerly to philosophy." [Diogenes Laertius 01-02]

I think your observations are spot on, Titus. If we were to try to really put our fingers on the issue, I think it would be that "Humanism" is essentially Platonic-Aristotelian-Stoic in presuming that there is an ideal form of "the good" somewhere which they can identify and then conform to. And that's where Epicurus takes the fundamentally different position that no such thing exists, and that instead nature gives us only the feelings of pleasure and pain from which to determine what to choose and what to avoid.

Humanists certainly want to be "happy" too, but they have a fundamentally different view of the universe and think that they can identify a single "good" to which they can (and everyone should) conform. Ultimately I don't think the philosophy issue is any more complicated than that.

But on the social level there is an inbuilt absolutism in Platonism - Arostotelianism - Stoicism - Humanism which, when the chips are down, would not make them friendly to Epicurean perspectives.

Most of us are lucky enough to live at a time and place where we can pick and choose our friends and go our own way relatively easily. However I don't think that will remain the case forever. The tensions of the world that we won't discuss due to the politics rule have placed "censorship" issues front and center, and pressures that may be used today for purposes we find agreeable can very easily grow into pressures that can be used against anyone who dissents from the "party line."

And I think one deduction you can make about Epicurean philosophy is that it attracts people who do not adhere to party lines and encourages their independence..

Is that a fatal flaw that doomed organized Epicureanism in the ancient world and dooms to always be like herding cats in the shadows? I don't think so. I think we can reinforce the non political center of the philosophy and form a non political team that can survive even in the face of organized censorship from the opposing schools.

It's probable that certain tactics we associate with opponents of Epicurus, such as organized meetings and support structures, will be needed. But Epicurus built into the philosophy an inherent bias against radical skepticism and radical reductionism, and I think those enable us to find a common ground of core viewpoints that can bring a group of people together at least as well as Humanism or other social organizations.

This is likely to be a short thread because after thinking about it I am not sure the thought is very useful. However it might spur some thought that will be more productive.

We find justice pleasurable, do we not? So justice is a pleasure (?) What if we applied the reasoning about justice in PD33-38 to pleasure by substituting "pleasure" for "justice" and making just enough modification in the rest of the text to make sense. Would we see any useful parallels in terms of how both justice and pleasure are valuable and desirable but not measurable in absolute terms that apply across numbers of people?

I am not really satisfied with the following construction but this is a first draft of such an attempt:

33. Pleasure never is anything in itself, but in the experience of men, alone or with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of agreeable feeling.

34. Pain is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape unendurable pain.

35. It is not possible for one who disregards the nature of pain (that pain is light if long, short if sharp, and escapable by death) to be confident of living pleasurably, even if, at present, he escapes unendurable pain a thousand times. For up to the time of death he cannot be certain that he will indeed escape unendurable pain.

36. In its general aspect, pleasure is the same for all, for it is a kind of agreeable feeling in the experience of men; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a man, or a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be pleasurable for all.

37. Among actions which are sanctioned by the feeling of pleasure, that which is proved, on examination, to lead to more pleasure than pain has the guarantee of pleasure, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man chooses an action, and it does not turn out to lead to more pleasure than pain, then it no longer has the essential nature of pleasure. And even if the dominance of pleasurable result over painful result shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the dominance of pleasure, it is nonetheless pleasurable for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered pleasurable have been shown not to lead to more pleasure than pain in actual practice, then they are not to be chosen. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which produced more pleasure than pain no longer lead to that result, those actions were to be chosen at the time, when they were of advantage in producing more pleasure than pain, but subsequently they are no longer to be chosen, when no longer productive of more pain than pleasure.

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Does the analogy hold up at all? If so what might it help clarify? If it doesn't hold up, why not? -- Seeing why it does or does not hold up might itself lead to a helpful observations about both justice and pleasure.

That looks great Nate! I don't see a button where a printed version can be purchased but I presume that you are working on that?

I think it could be fruitful to look at the words being translated as "intensity" to see if they might perhaps be more related to issues of quantity or limit rather than what we might term "sharpness" or "depth of feeling."

I see, for example, that one of the phrases currently on the top of the forum uses the word intensity:

On Ends Book 2, III - Rackham / Loeb

Cicero: Still, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?" Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible."

But according to the Rackham Loeb edition, the Latin word there is "maxima" .....

... and given our discussions lately I think we need to be careful about how we are interpreting what "maximum pleasure" refers to.

It seems to me that it is easy to understand that if we are talking about "all our awareness" then if 100% of our awareness is engaged in feeling pleasure, then that would be the limit of pleasure.

However (and this of course the point we are discussing now) if there are various types of pleasure, and we aren't specifying whether 100% of our awareness is occupied with fingernail clipping or joy of mind in conversing with our friends, then we need to be aware that there might be varying types of maximum pleasure.

Again this is easy to see I think in regard to thinking about the example that Epicurus on his last day was experiencing both pleasure (of mind) and pain (of body) and offsetting one against the other. We're constantly in day to day life offsetting pleasures against pain. There is no 'salvation' or "sum of it all" moment in which everything gets added up to a "final" tally. it seems to me that there is no "Total absence of pain" except as a thought construction that doesn't happen unless you sit around thinking about your life in summary, and doesn't exist except in your conceptualization of it.

So if Epicurus was equating "absence of pain" with "pleasure" he was likely referring at least as much to everyday discrete experiences as he was to some theoretical summary of a person's life (if indeed he ever thought in those terms at all).

If all or a significant part of this reasoning is true, then I think that when we do choose to talk about 100% pleasure = total absence of pain we should be talking about discrete "slices of life," and that would mean that "absence of pain," even though described as 100% and therefore at a maximum of quantity, is saying nothing regarding the quality of what I think most of us mean when we use the word "intensity."

At the hazard of this being a tangent I am reminded of color controls on a televison (at least old style CRT TVs I grew up with). Televisions have controls for Color/Hue, Saturation and Brightness. Is there a possible analogy that "pure pleasure" is like "pure yellow" in that it is 100% yellow? The yellow control may be set at 100% yellow, yet the various settings of "saturation" and "brightness" of the yellow make the different settings readily distinguishable. So my question to throw out there would be:

When PD09 refers to "intensity," location, and duration, are we talking about how pleasures differ from one another and how saying "absence of pain = 100% pleasure" does not tell us all we need to know about which pleasure to choose?

PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another. [3]

Edit: I am saying several things in this post so let me separate them:

(1) I am doubting that "intensity" is the best word for us to use in saying that "the total absence of pain is the most intense pleasure." Most people don't translate PD03 as saying "the most intense pleasure is the absence of pain," they say "limit of quantity of pleasure." Seems to me that the more likely analogy is that "the total absence of pain is the "purest" pleasure, and whether we perceive it to be the most "intense feeling " needs to be a subject of discussion over what "intense" really means. I doubt most people consider "intense" feeling to be the same as the most "pure" feeling.

(2) The related point is that when the Epicureans were making statements to the effect that "the highest pleasure is the total absence of pain" that word "highest" is not meant to imply that there is an absolute scale of pleasure that everyone experiences in the same way. What is highest for one person may be totally different for another person, and whether we are talking about "ataraxia" or "the highest pleasure" status for even a single person may be different for that same person at different times and circumstances (and therefore we should act accordingly to distinguish and pursue the type we feel to be most pleasurable to us).

Maybe this all resolves down to the question: "Is 'the limit of pleasure' the same experience for everyone?" Maybe the answer to that is clearly no, and I am simply feeling the need to make the issue clear because I am under the continuing influence of the religious and romantic and egalitarian idea that everyone has access to the same type of "salvation experience" basking in the presence of god." At this point in my efforts to apply Epicurus' views consistently, I cannot imagine that he held that to be the case, but the issue seems so important that this conclusion should not be left to implication.

I was not aware that there was a major Greek movie dramatizing the story of Iphigenia. I have not watched it so I cannot recommend it, but I thought I would create a thread about it and see if anyone has (or takes) the time to see it.

Might be an in interesting way to internalize a major scene from De Rerum Natura.

Greek language with English subtitles:

Quote from Don

Those feelings are going to be either pleasurable or painful (positive or negative).

But within "pleasurable" and "painful" are there not obviously degrees or pleasurable or painful? And are we not going to choose those pleasures which we find to be more pleasurable than others?

Saying that 100% pleasure is the height of pleasure is one thing, but is "height" the same for everyone in all circumstances? 100% is, yes, but what if two vessels that are 100% full are different sizes? Are the different sizes and therefore quantities and qualities of pleasures they contain of no relevance?

Quote from Pacatus

I forgot this, and just wanted to say that, although Utilitarianism influenced neoclassical economics (efficient choice based on “marginal utility”), the notion of cardinal utility (“utils”) was dropped. Constrained choice, based on relative preference, became the model. And in no way am I advocating for that former utilitarian position.

I haven't read far enough into this to know the history, and I am not sure that I have the time to go there. But you're not stating why the notion of "cardinal utility" was dropped, and I suspect I am in agreement that "cardinal utility" is indeed something worthy of discussion that should not be dropped. If "relative preference" is a reference to how "other people" view pleasure and that leads to "the greatest good for the greatest number," then I would say that is the erroneous track, and the right track is to indeed analyze what "for you" brings you the greatest pleasure.

I think we're still on the same initial question. Some pleasures are more pleasing to me/you/everyone than others, correct, and should we not discuss the reasoning as to why that is the case?

Yes, that's exactly my read and reaction too Don. The writer of the handout was taking the position that the Epicurean response to attacks on "pleasure" was to redefine pleasure as painlessness/tranquility/ataraxia. That's the prevailing view, which we have seen many places, that the only purpose of kinetic pleasure is to achieve katastematic pleasure, because of course it is, because painlessness can't mean ordinary pleasure, can it? That would fly in the face of our stoic-friendly view of Epicurus that all we want in life is tranquility!

Yikes:

I don't think that's the Epicurean response at all! But presuming that this comment reflect's the writer's opinion (I am unclear about that) I do think this illustrates the dangers of the modern anti-Epicurean / pro Cicero position very well!

As background material on one of the issues raised today, the following is a collection of material from Cicero that gives background to the "animality" objection he is raising against Epicurus. This is a handout I received many years ago, and I gather that it was written by someone not supportive of Epicurus, and I don't endorse the commentary in it. For example: "Cicero portrays the Epicurean account of pleasure as a dialectically unsatisfying and empirically problematic muddle. Cicero thinks that Epicureanism is fully committed to denying intrinsic value to everything other than painlessness, and he objects to this in two ways. In both respects, Cicero's critique seems entirely fair and plausible.") Saying that I don't endorse the commentary is an understatement!

But it's an excellent collection of quotes and does a good job of bringing together Cicero's argument against looking to the infants, which will help us as we do our own analysis.

Today's episode contains some very challenging material, but the final result should be worthwhile. We're covering a section where Cicero lays out various options on what the goal of life could be (1 - pleasure, 2- virtue, 3 - absence of pain) and how those options might be chosen singly or combined with one or more of the others. Cicero also brings up Epicurus' argument that we should look to young living things for help in making this decision, and whether pleasure is a "primary natural endowment." Once we release the episode we'll see the need to bring more clarity to some of these issues, and we'll want to discuss here in the thread what we think Cicero really means. We'll be appreciative of your comments - I will get this edited and posted over the next several days and we'll have lots to talk about.

Yep now we are getting to the reasons why this needs to be discussed.

Quote from Don

. Once your start down pain and pleasure "units" - dolors and hedons - you've left Epicurean philosophy and are talking Utilitarian philosophy. Which is one reason I'm reluctant to wholeheartedly endorse Godfrey 's location, intensity, duration formulation.

I think you're correctly connecting the issues, and I don't like "the greatest good for the greatest number," but I am not ready to throw out efforts to quantify pleasure as inherently inappropriate. Yes that seems to be with what the Benthamites were struggling with, but i don't know enough of their texts to say whether they got it wrong or not.

This issue of choosing among pleasures has to be articulated in some way other than saying "more pleasant" or "less pleasant" if we are to communicate to people what we are talking about. Because I can't conceive that anyone would say that "all pleasures are equal in every respect." If they are not equal in *every* respect, then do we not need to explore and articulate the differences?

Quote from Don

Regardless of the possible bread and water interpretation, I think this *is* what Epicurus taught. Know - at a gut level - what you absolutely need to live a self-sufficient, pleasurable life of well-being. Then you *know* if everything else was tragically taken from you, IF all other sources of (kinetic) pleasure were removed from you, you would still be able to lead a life of pleasure without pain on that. BUT he also taught to ENJOY the varieties of pleasure available to us here and now.

I think this is where France Wright was correct in framing the argument between Zeno and Epicurus, and Cicero was showing his intelligence by picking out the same issue: the question is "Does Epicurean philosophy leave the door wide open to *whatever* interpretation of pleasure one desires to make?"

Would indeed Epicurean philosophy have nothing to say between Lucretius at a young age (1) deciding to spend his life shepherding sheep on a hillside vs (2) deciding to become an epic poet and spending his life composing "On The Nature of Things?"

We can pose the question pretty easily: Lucretius as a lifelong shepherd living without pain would be at the exact same height of pleasure as Lucretius the Epic Poet living without pain. We can say that easily because our definitions of the hypothetical make them both "without pain" and therefore "at the height of pleasure."

What in Epicurean philosophy provides the guidance to the young Lucretius to tell him to pursue the life of the epic poet vs the life of the shepherd.

(I have nothing against shepherds -- just using them as a convenient paradigm example.)

I would say that even if we say that both lives are "without pain" and therefore the height of pleasure, we could say that one choice or the other would be "more pleasurable" in the specific case of Lucretius. If we can say that, we ought to be able to explain how, and why that choice would be appropriate for him, even though any pains involved in the life of an epic poet would be quite different from the pains confronting a shepherd.

If we simply say 'one option is more pleasurable and you simply have to figure it out for yourself" - that might be a viable answer. I am asking "Is that the best we can do to explain the choice?"

My opening post was far too wordy but that quick take makes it easier to focus. My comments in red:

Here's my quick take:

1. Pleasure feels good. That's what makes it pleasure and not pain. Comment:  No controversy there.
2. Choiceworthiness is determined by consequences, both to oneself and how one is perceived by one's community and friends. Comment:  Not much controversy there, though I would say that "how one is perceived by one's community and friends" ultimately resolves to being significant because it will lead to a consequence to oneself.
3. "Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether a pleasure might bring some disturbance." Yes. Comment: This is where I think more explanation is required, and my question may not be worded in an optimum way. The "some" was intended to be a reference to measure. The question might be better stated as "Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether choosing one pleasure might produce one unit of pain, while another pleasure might produce zero units of pain?" The real point of the question is whether "any amount of pain" is sufficient to make one choose one pleasure over another, or whether you have to quantify BOTH the amount of pleasure and the amount of pain in order to make a decision.
4. "Can one pleasure be so much more pleasing than another that it is worth choosing?" That's just another way of asking "What are the consequences of this pleasure vs that pleasure?" Comment: Yes I agree that's another way of asking the same question, the answer which I think is "Yes." Agreed?
5. I continue to soapbox that we can have more confidence in accessing some pleasures than others (the infamous katastematic vs "kinetic" discussion). Comment: In this context I will say that "availability of access" is probably not a key factor in dealing with this issue. Yes accessing some pleasures will be easier (involve less pain) than others. But I don't think "involving less pain to access" is the full answer to the question of which pleasures to pursue. If it were, then the rest of the discussion would be resolved in favor of a rule that "Pursue first and foremost those pleasures which are easiest to access" and that would be fairly interpretable, standing alone, as "live in a cave on bread and water."

How about short classic Epicurean phrases:

Death is nothing to us.

Nothing comes from nothing or goes to nothing (or some version of that)

and other similar short sentences as a start in both Latin and Greek

Quote from Joshua

The Gettysburg Address for example is rather well known, and if you already know the words you can work out the Greek letters without much trouble.

That seems like a VERY good idea. Take a passage you know by heart and express it in Greek lettering.

What about word order in Greek? Do we have the same issues of order and use of inflection that we have in Latin? Did the Greeks write long sentences and intentionally make you wait to the end of the sentence to find out what it is about like the Romans did?