Posts by Cassius

Just for the sake of thought, not to disagree with your points:

1. the state of no pain is the absolute pleasure (or is it "the highest" pleasure? and should we add for completeness that the state of no pleasure is the highest pain?)
2. pain and pleasure cannot be mixed (I see no issues there, unless it helps to say that they can "coexist in separate parts of the experience, but not mix")
3. even at rest and without intense stimuli we can feel pleasure (given that pleasure is not defined as requiring stimuli at all, but as "agreeable feeling")
4. weak pain can be endured, intense pain is not permanent (there is limit to absolute pain). (to "the highest" pain?)

Thank you for the time putting all that together!

Quote from waterholic

Once again, this is just a model of the way I understand Epicurus for the moment. Any thoughts on whether I am missing something?

I am going to have to take some time to absorb it all.

Perhaps labeling (at least on the main chart) the directions of greater pleasure / lesser pleasure and greater pain / lesser pain?

It probably should be obvious but not on first glance, at least to a non-mathematician like me.

Also, why does the numbering jump from 5.50 to 1000, and from 1.10 to 1000?

Also: Is there a narrative explanation of what the "arctan" function does? Why are the charts not simple arithmetic?

And last, on the "over time" chart, where do the input values come from per day. Presuming that you are just taking random numbers, could that be stated so as to make the chart more clear?

Welcome to Episode 204 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week we move on through Section XIII, starting roughly here:

... Well, this is directed against Aristippus, who accounts that pleasure which all of us alone call pleasure, to be not only the highest but the only form of pleasure; while your school holds different doctrine. But he, as I have said, is in fault; since neither the shape of the human body nor reason, preeminent among man’s mental endowments, gives any indication that man came into existence for the sole purpose of enjoying pleasures. Nor indeed must we listen to Hieronymus, whose supreme good is the same as that on which your school sometimes or rather very often insists, absence of pain. For if pain is an evil it does not follow that to be free from that evil suffices to produce the life of happiness. Let Ennius rather speak thus: he has a vast amount of good who has no ill; let us estimate happiness not by the banishment of evil, but by the acquisition of good, and let us not seek this in inactivity, whether of a joyous kind, like that of Aristippus, or marked by absence of pain, like that of our philosopher, but in action of some sort and reflection. Now these arguments may be advanced in the same form against the Carneadean view of the supreme good, though he proposed it not so much with the purpose of securing approval as with the intention of combating the Stoics, against whom he waged war; his supreme good is however of such a nature that when joined to virtue it seems likely to exert influence and to furnish forth abundantly the life of happiness, with which subject our whole inquiry is concerned. Those indeed who join to virtue either pleasure, the thing of all others which virtue holds in least esteem, or the absence of pain, which though it is unassociated with evil, still is not the supreme good, make an addition which is not very plausible, yet I do not under- stand why they should carry out the idea in such a niggardly and narrow manner. For, as though they had to pay for anything which they join with virtue, they in the first place unite with her the cheapest articles, next they would rather add things singly than combine with morality all those objects to which nature had primarily given her sanction. And because these objects were held worthless by Pyrrho and Aristo, so that they said there was absolutely no distinction of value between the best possible health and the most serious illness, people have quite rightly ceased long ago to argue against these philosophers. For by determining that on virtue alone everything so entirely depends, that they robbed her of free selection from among these objects, and allowed her neither starting point nor foothold, they abolished that very virtue of which they were enamoured. Erillus again by assigning all importance to know- ledge, kept in view a single kind of good, but not the best kind nor one by whose aid life can possibly be steered. So he too was long ago cast into oblivion, for since the time of Chrysippus there have certainly been no discussions about him.

Great post, thank you! I remember that DeWitt discussed Ecclesiastes relatively at length, but I'll have to go back and recall the references. Seems definitely worthwhile from my point of view.

Quote from Pacatus

But, re the Khayyam quote, I always thought Epicurus might have quipped: "Why are you in a wilderness? Are their no civilized gardens around?"

That reminds me of this:

Quote from Thus Spake Zarathustra

Here, however, did Zarathustra interrupt the foaming fool, and shut his mouth.—

Stop this at once! called out Zarathustra, long have thy speech and thy species disgusted me!

Why didst thou live so long by the swamp, that thou thyself hadst to become a frog and a toad?

Floweth there not a tainted, frothy, swamp-blood in thine own veins, when thou hast thus learned to croak and revile?

Why wentest thou not into the forest? Or why didst thou not till the ground? Is the sea not full of green islands?

Episode 203 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is Now Available! After all the pre-release discussion and buildup I hope our audience will not be disappointed! At least I can say this: if it lacks anything in quality, it makes it up in length! There's a lot to think about in this episode that we may come back to in our next podcast, including:

1 - When Cicero says that Epicurus looks to "the senses" for his proof that pleasure is the good, is he stating Epicurus correctly? Did Epicurus in fact look to "the senses" or to the *separate* "faculty of feeling pleasure and pain?"

2 - In this episode I thought we generally did a reasonable job in remembering to include the prolepsis and the feeling of pleasure and pain when we discussed what tools Epicurus used to "look to" or "observe" Nature in coming to his conclusions. However I think we may need to hit that point even harder. When we look to "reality" for our standards, Epicurus seems to be including prolepsis and the feelings of pleasure and pain as just as real as the things we see or hear or touch, and that's a point that really deserves to be highlighted when we contrast the method of Epicurus against the method of Cicero (and the other philosophers of the world).

Marking another point we will want to discuss after Episode 203 is released:

Joshua does an excellent job of relating the Lucretian observation that eyes were not made for seeing (etc) to how this same reasoning would apply to refute what Cicero attributes to Aristotle -- that men were made for thought and action.

I didn't follow up Joshua's observations there firmly enough, and moved the discussion over to an "is-ought" issue -- but I just want to note that many times you see this section of Lucretius cited for its impact on or relationship to later evolutionary thought in biology, but you don't often see it applied to refuting the standard Platonic/Aristotelian position that we can derive that man is the "rational animal," or that men are made for "thought and action," from the supposition that things things were made for men by a designing / creating god.

Just wanted to mark this down for later discussion as it is an excellent point.

Quote from Don

That said, I realize you want the textual citations to back you up, but putting the ideas there "in everyday language" might be better for a general audience?

That's always part of the issue, isn't it:

Simplify or paraphrase too much on controversial material and it's easy to dismiss the paraphrase as arbitrary opinion about what Epicurus said. Even the material here, which ought to be basic, is where all the interpretation battles take place.

Include the full original text (especially with explanation) and things turn into a wall of words (which apparently didn't stop Diogenes of Oinoanda!)

It's going to take creativity to come up with a good mix, and like you said Don probably need one presentation for new students and one for regulars. This one sort of comes down in the middle of those two.

All these experiments hopefully will help us think of new and better presentations.

I am going to edit the subtitles, so if you turn on the closed captions that might be of help. All of this is experimental, especially the captioning!

I took a detour from editing the podcast because I have been wanting to put together a presentation on pleasure using a pie chart format.

Here's a first draft of that. Not nearly what it should be, but maybe it will inspire someone to do better:

Please turn on close captions for best effect.

The latter "interview" part looks like a repackaging, but the opening sections look new (at least to me). thanks!

Quote from Don

minimize pains of all kinds...right?

Yes my typing remains terrible. Will fix.

Here's another way of looking at this too:

I strongly suspect that almost all of our regular posters here on this forum are approaching Epicurus in about the same common-sense way:

We are doing what we can to maximize pleasures of all kinds, and we are doing what we can to minimize pains of all kinds, and we're trying to go about it prudently including analyzing what we spend our time on and what we set as our goals. And we don't worry about life after death because we're convinced there is none. We don't worry about fearing or pleasing "gods" because either they don't exist at all, or they exist and look at us (if at all) like we look at ants, or some combination of the two. We don't really worry past a certain age that we haven't lived long enough, because we begin to see that it truly is just variation of what we've seen before, and as our bodies and minds naturally age we get more tired and less in need of newness in general.

I strongly suspect that the ancient Epicureans were doing the same thing.

The more academic and complicated definitions and arguments are useful for keeping our minds sharp and giving us confidence that we are on the right path -- that we don't have to doubt that what we're doing is all wrong from beginning to end.

So if we're all doing it about the same, as I think we are, what is the issue? I think "the issue" is that the way Epicurean philosophy has come to be viewed that you don't get from the starting point to where we are as easily as you should, because the standard interpretation of the letter to Menoeceus in particular has warped it into a manifesto of Stoic/Buddhist/Ascetic Minimalism. I think I can say that "we" aren't in danger of that kind of interpretation, anymore for a variety of reasons, but not everyone can take the time to read through all the discussions we have to find out that that "standard" interpretations are grossly oversimplified.

Over at Facebook (I don't think I mentioned this) someone recently posted that they wished that some "scholar" would go through and produce an easy-to-understand paraphrase of the Principal Doctrines and use it to print a pamphlet.

That has probably been done already, and there are many ways to do it, but the interesting thing to me is that as far as they go, it's not like the Principal Doctrines need to be "simplified." The language in them now is already direct. The issue is more that the Doctrines are presuming an Epicurean understanding of so many key terms and concepts, and without that background understanding the simple words are generally taken to mean something much different than intended. It's not "simplification" of wording that is needed, it's more "additional" wording that explains the use of the terms.

Improving the roadway from the starting point of the Letter to Menoeceus and the Principal Doctrine to where most of us are now through regular study and reading is what I think is so important. Because when these issues become second nature and fade into the background it becomes much easier to simply and practically focus on achieving a predominance of pleasures over pains.

And of course trying to use "indolence" as part of the explanation probably just points out how bad the problem is.

Like Don, Jefferson's probably finding Cicero's word choice interesting, but no one in 2000 years has probably found the word "indolence" remotely attractive.

Of course maybe it had much different connotations in 50 BC.

To say that Cicero "coined" it probably needs to be hedged that maybe he picked it up from the Epicureans and we simply don't know who first started it, but in the "surviving" literature all we have to go on is Cicero.

I am more in the middle of thinking than I am stating any conclusions, but while I am more convinced than ever that it is very appropriate in Epicurean terms to say things like:

"Absence of pain" means "pleasure."

"Absence of pain" is an identical term with "pleasure."

"Total absence of pain is the highest pleasure."

If someone tells me they are feeling no pain, either in some part of their body or in the sum of their experience, I can reply to them that they are feeling the purest and most intense pleasure, either in that part of their body or in the sum of their experience (respectively).

I am also more sure than ever that stating these things to the "average person" -- without some very elaborate explanation - is almost inevitably going to result in bewilderment, misunderstanding, shock, rejection, or some combination of them all.

And I think that my last sentence there was only slightly less true in 300 BC Athens or 50 BC Rome than in 2023 in any advanced modern country (it's going to be worse in the "less advanced" parts).

So what were the Epicureans in 300 BC Athens or 50 BC Rome doing to bridge that gap between in speaking to non-Epicureans.

Does the Torquatus presentation represent the latest in advancement up to that time?

Is the Torquatus presentation consistent with Lucretius' presentation, or are there any contradictions (I don't really think there are any), but if there were how would that reflect on what the "state of the art" was in 50 BC?

My personal view is that the words Cicero gave to Torquatus are not warped or misrepresentative in themselves, but they are missing this **additional** explanation which is necessary.

What does all this say about how modern Epicureans should approach this problem, because if anything the misunderstandings are getting worse rather than better. At least in 50 BC it looks like the Epicureans were in fact making broad inroads into the "regular people" world. I don't think they could have done so if they didn't have these "additional explanations" that we are talking about in threads like this one.

Quote from Don

So, Cicero asks "num propterea idem voluptas est ut ita indolentia?" "Is pleasure (voluptas) the same as "freedom from pain" (indolentia)?" Interestingly enough, indolentia, according to Lewis & Short (*the* Latin dictionary) is a word coined by Cicero!

If I recall correctly Thomas Jefferson picked up that line and put it in his outline:

Yep:

Good points.

It's the regular equation of freedom from pain as "not only" the same thing as "pleasure" but relating it to "the most intense pleasure possible" that I think causes the most potential for confusion.

Quote

Cicero: "...[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'" Torquatus: "Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be." ... Cicero: Still, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?" Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible." CIcero - "On Ends" Book 2:iii:9 and 2:iii:11 (Rackham)

I don't see this as something that Cicero has manufactured to be confusing, and I see it has inherent in a superficial reading of the Letter to Menoeceus, which is why I am fixated upon it.

If we were to say "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain" then a strictly literal reading of that sentence leads to "you can't have pleasure until pain is totally absent" and that leads to the creation of "absence of pain" as some kind of highly unusual state that is divorced from standard reality.

Seems to me that potential ambiguity in the presentation is what Cicero is picking up and running with for all he is worth.

I think it's reconcilable and explainable, but takes effort beyond just reading that passage from Menoeceus over and over.

In English "pleasure" can go up and down in intensity, duration, location (at least).

To say that "absence of pain" is "the same as" pleasure" would imply that it too can go up and down.

But to then state that "absence of pain" is "the highest" or "most intense" pleasure indicates that it is at a fixed position (at least to my way of reading).

It's not really any unusual use of the terminology by you Don that is causing me to think this can be made more clear, but dividing up what are two apparently separate things (varying pleasure) and (pleasure at the highest notch) that I think needs to be made more clear.

I am presuming that the Epicureans saw this as one issue -- pleasure can vary, and can only go so high, but the same thing is being measured all the way up and down the scale.

Uses of these terms "ataraxia," "aponia," "highest good" etc would seem to imply that there is something different at that top notch location.

I do NOT think Epicurus saw anything uniquely different about the top notch vs the lower readings (especially for example 99.9%) but using the terms loosely can be read to imply to casual readers that you don't have anything unless you're at 100%.

It's that issue -- that you want the highest but will take what you can get - that I sense needs to be made more clear in order for the terminology and the system to be made as clear as possible.

Those are good points.

I do see two issues. There is the "foreign word" issue which adds to the complexity, but I am not sure that is really my number one concern. If the foreign word has a clear equivalent that might or might not resolve all the questions.

Rather than the issue being the exact term used, the thing that bothers me more is the implication that there is an "all or nothing" aspect to the discussion.

"Are there degrees of ataraxia and aponia?" Might be the same question.

I am thinking that real life is always a net sum of pleasures and pains, and -almost as with the issues of the gods- we have an "ideal goal" vs a "real thing" issue.

Is ataraxia and aponia and "highest good" something that is attainable in reality for any length of time? If so does a millisecond of doubt spoil the condition?

More so than rather we use Greek or English my question is - do these words indicate separate conditions in themselves, or do they represent ideal objectives which are important to consider (as with " the gods" ) but which in real life are lived one sum of pleasures and pains at a time?

Because if the answer is one sum of pleasures and pains at a time, then the use of the words clearly does not designate something unique that would be the focus of our primary concern - our primary concern always being simply states as the largest predominance of pleasures over pains.

Quote from Joshua

The problem is unsolvable in Hume's terms, not just for Epicurus but for everyone

Also on the same point here's something else I'd like to come back to in the future. I don't know to what extent Bentham agreed with Hume on this issue, and of course my next question would be how (if at all) Frances Wright dealt with it in "A Few Days In Athens." I suspect I don't have enough time in this lifetime to launch off into study of Bentham and Hume and Mill on this issue, but it would make a good project to look into how far the Utilitarians got into this question and how they related it to their interest in Epicurus. I can think of aspects of "A Few Days In Athens" that seem to be touching on it, but I don't recall anything that jumps out at me as how she dealt with it (or communicated that it didn't need to be dealt with.

I've included this from Chapter 15 as an example, but it's not determinative. Chapter 15 is really deep and deserves a lot of consideration on its own:

Quote

Until we occupy ourselves in examining, observing, and ascertaining, and not in explaining, we are idly and childishly employed. — With every truth we may discover we shall mix a thousand errors; and, for one matter of fact, we shall charge our brain with a thousand fancies. To this leading misconception of the real, and only possible object of philosophical inquiry, I incline to attribute all the modes and forms of human superstition. The vague idea that some mysterious cause not merely precedes but produces the effect we behold, occasions us to wander from the real object in search of an imaginary one. We see the sun rise in the east: instead of confining our curiosity to the discovery of the time and manner of its rising, and of its course in the heavens, we ask also — why does it rise? What makes it move? The more ignorant immediately conceive some Being spurring it through the heavens, with fiery steeds, on wheels of gold, while the more learned tell us of laws of motion, decreed by an almighty fiat, and sustained by an almighty will. Imagine the truth of both suppositions: in the one case, we should see the application of what we call physical power in the driver and the steeds followed by the motion of the sun, and in the other, an almighty volition followed by the motion of the sun. But, in either case, should we understand why the sun moved? — why or how its motion followed what we call the impulse of the propelling power, or the propelling volition? All that we could then know, more than we now know, would be, that the occurrence of the motion of the sun was preceded by another occurrence; and if we afterwards frequently observed the same sequence of occurrences, they would become associated in our mind as necessary precedent and consequent — as cause and effect: and we might give to them the appellation of law of nature, or any other appellation; but they would still constitute merely a truth — that is a fact, and envelope no other mystery, than that involved in every occurrence and every existence.”

Yes it seems I am always struggling with potential implications of "the perfect' being the enemy of "the good." If a particular phrasing seems to create the implication that only "the perfect" is good enough, then I think that such a construction almost has to be clarified, or explained, or even simply isn't an appropriate deduction to draw from what Epicurus was saying.