Posts by Cassius

To the extent a diagram like that is showing pleasure and pain to be on an opposite axis then it would be consistent and helpful to explain that the presence of one is the absence of the other.

However to the extent that the diagram implies that "excitement" is on a scale of its own that is unrelated to describing pleasure and pain, it probably detracts from the ultimate philosophical point that if a person is conscious and aware at all, he is feeling either pleasure or pain with no zero / neutral point.

Of course if you follow the descriptions around the circle the point is to read them together and you don't get confused.

I'd say that there's not only no 0,0 point, but none of the points at all marked by the vertical line. If the two lines are "X" and "Y" there's no 0,Y point up and down the circle.

Quote from Godfrey

This aligns with my intuition. But it's difficult to intuit the idea that the absence of pain is the greatest pleasure. It’s logically correct, but when I really dig into it, it's hard to wrap my head around. At first it makes sense at the macro level, but Eoghan Gardiner 's anecdote is at the macro level. After a while it makes my head spin!

Of course, what Cicero loved to do was to find rabbit holes and dig away...

And yep this is the issue, but (1) there is good reason to believe that the Torquatus portion was coming straight from Epicurean textbooks, and (2) it's essential to point out that the criticism that this perspective is a rabbit hole is the Ciceronian anti-Epicurean position.

It seems to me the key decision that every reader has to make is to choose from one of these two positions. Either: (1) Torquatus' formulation is a thorough misstatement of Epicurean philosophy, or (2) Torquatus' formulation is correct but appears foreign to our ears because Cicero does not allow Torquatus to include the full explanation of how "absence of pain is the greatest pleasure" arises from a necessary logical deduction, given the inverse relationship of pleasure and pain.

Somebody's going to do a better job than my chart here, but hammering this point is going to be necessary to stop one's head from spinning on what Torquatus is saying.

Words mean something. When you accept (1) that if you are aware of anything at all then what you are aware of is either pleasure or pain, and (2) someone has said that their life is "free from pain," then (3) the realization that what they have said is that they are at maximum pleasure follows like night follows day.

In Eoghan's case I see him following Cicero's wording, which I would discourage, if the implication is that pleasure is associated with excitement / stimulation alone. The wider perspective is that excitement / stimulation is not a required component of pleasure, so it is an incorrect deduction to hold that the level of excitement/stimulation has any relationship to the total percentage of pleasure being experienced.

Quote from Pacatus

I remain unconvinced that Epicurus thought that being a good Epicurean meant always refraining from political activity, or that he did not recognize the dependency of a society (the polis; Latin civitas) in which the Garden could flourish on politics. Although, Kalosyni's cautions on the matter are well-taken.

Pacatus I think you will be very pleased with the vigorous way Dr. Boeri argues the thesis of his book in our upcoming podcast with him. May be a few more days but should be released "soon."

Quote from Eoghan Gardiner

I had this acutely after having a small procedure I was in basically a non state but then I remembered there is no non state it's always either pleasure or pain so the very absence of any pleasure DESPITE being completely pain free ended up being painful to me.

Eoghan I think I understand what you are saying, and I agree with your ultimate conclusion, but I wanted to throw this out there fore consideration: As I am reading Torquatus now, unless you are saying that you were "unconcious" in the condition you were in, I don't think the Torquatus interpretation of pleasure would allow someone to say that they were "completely free of pain" and not then - by virtue of those words - concluding that such a person was in a state of pleasure -- in fact, the highest state. Maybe you are saying you were unconscious, or numb (which is painful) but as I am reading the words now -- such as the quote which is currently at the top of the forum - it seems to me that the Epicureans were being rigorously logical in their word use: IF it is stated that a person is painfree, THEN - without any further need for information or deliberation - then that person is defined to be in pleasure, and in fact the greatest pleasure possible, since you are stating that they are "pain free."

I know this type of analysis is striking some people as impractical and unusual, and that's in fact exactly how Cicero was describing it to Torquatus. But if we take Torquatus at his word, and I think we can, then this seems to be the way the Epicureans were thinking. Cicero's crimes against Epicurus come mostly in the omission of important explanations, but in my view when he places a clear statement in the mouth of an Epicurean - and in this case he does this with Torquatus over and over and over again - I think it can be trusted that this in fact was the Epicurean position.

Not too bad an intro, and in my experience if they indeed have an interest in Nietzsche they will not go too far astray toward excessive asceticism (but that's the direction I would expect them to take anyway). Will be interesting to hear your take on the program.

Welcome to Episode 198 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Books One and Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted to Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition

We are using the Reid edition, so check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

As we proceed we will keep track of Cicero's arguments and outline them here:

Cicero's Objections to Epicurean Philosophy

Last week we continued in Book 2 at Section IV and this week we will pick up at the same place.

Tonight at 8pm, we will cover Vatican Saying 38 and 39.

Please join us. (Post here in this thread if you have never attended one of these sessions as we do have a vetting process for new participants.)

VS38. He is a little man in all respects who has many good reasons for quitting life.

VS39. He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the former barters kindly feeling for a practical return, and the latter destroys the hope of good in the future.

Tonight at 8pm, we will cover Vatican Saying 36 and 37. We will also have a special discussion led by Fernando on our upcoming interview of Dr. Boeri from South America.

Please join us. (Post here in this thread if you have never attended one of these sessions as we do have a vetting process for new participants.)

VS36. Epicurus’ life, when compared to other men’s in respect of gentleness and self-sufficiency, might be thought a mere legend.

VS37. Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains.

Quote from Cassius

Not only does "static" imply absolutely unmoving, it's also in the modern world a synonym for "interference" or "disrupted receipt of a signal " or "no signal" - all of which are the opposite of what should be the focus as smooth operation or smooth signal.

It occurs to me to say this too, in fairness to Sedley and "the academics." The academics aren't in the business of trying to explain how to put Epicurean philosophy to practical use for normal people. The academic writers are often just talking to each other. We have a different goal here, and so we don't have to stick to the academic wording. We have to be accurate and fair to the texts and the overall situation but we aren't bound by established usages any more than Epicurus was required to use terms in the same was as Plato or the others.

Not only does "static" imply absolutely unmoving, it's also in the modern world a synonym for "interference" or "disrupted receipt of a signal " or "no signal" - all of which are the opposite of what should be the focus as smooth operation or smooth signal.

[I will probably re-edit the title of this thread much of the rest of it too, but Kalosyni's post on mixed feelings makes me think I need to work on this point further.]

I would suggest that we can usefully apply David Sedley's comment about Epicurus being opposed to atomic reductionism to our discussion of pleasure. His statement was: "that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

I would apply Sedley's perspective to discussion of key issues in pleasure this way:

So it seems to me essential to point out these differing perspectives are both "true," just as in regard to the atomic level.

"Nothing exists except atoms and void" becomes skepticism and nihilism in Democritus' hands, but in Epicurus' hands when seen in its proper context it supports confidence and enthusiasm for life, because: "there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; [and] the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but ...neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

The same is true in the discussion of pleasure. Unless you keep both perspectives in focus and remember that both are true, it is easy to get confused and think "absence of pain" means nothingness and that variation is totally undesirable. In truth the case is very different: "absence of pain" really just means "every experience/feeling in life that is not painful" (which means "pleasure"), and "variation" is seen to refer to pleasures of day to day life are not only desirable but essential.

In a very general way it seems to me that these separate contexts are what Cicero is using to make his argument effective. He is switching contexts back and forth, and he is not allowing Torquatus to explain how these contexts are different and how they interrelate.

I would suggest that we can usefully apply David Sedley's comment about Epicurus being opposed to atomic reductionism to our discussion of pleasure. His statement was: "that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

I would apply Sedley's perspective to discussion of key issues in pleasure this way:

So it seems to me essential to point out these differing perspectives are both "true," just as in regard to the atomic level.

"Nothing exists except atoms and void" becomes skepticism and nihilism in Democritus' hands, but in Epicurus' hands when seen in its proper context it supports confidence and enthusiasm for life, because: "there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; [and] the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but ...neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

The same is true in the discussion of pleasure. Unless you keep both perspectives in focus and remember that both are true, it is easy to get confused and think "absence of pain" means nothingness and that variation is totally undesirable. In truth the case is very different: "absence of pain" really just means "every experience/feeling in life that is not painful" (which means "pleasure"), and "variation" is seen to refer to pleasures of day to day life are not only desirable but essential.

In a very general way it seems to me that these separate contexts are what Cicero is using to make his argument effective. He is switching contexts back and forth, and he is not allowing Torquatus to explain how these contexts are different and how they interrelate.

This is a good line and is consistent with pleasure and absence of pain being interchangeable terms:

Quote

Pleasure, that is, consists not in mere lack of pain, but in perceiving in a painless way.

I would say also that "absence of pain" requires "perceiving"

Ok as much as I like Sedley let me comment on one of the early paragraphs:

Quote

In Epicurean doctrine pleasures are divided into two kinds, the bodily and the mental; and within each of those two domains there are short-term “kinetic” pleasures, which lie primarily in hedonic processes such as eating or learning, and static (or “katastematic”) pleasures, which consist in the longer-term state of painlessness. Counter-intuitively, and notoriously, Epicureans insist that when all pain has gone and static pleasure has replaced it, the height of pleasure has already been reached. The added kinetic pleasures typically associated with luxurious living can, as they put it, ‘vary’ the static pleasure, but cannot increase it.

As Lucretius says in his second proem (2.16–19), “there is nothing else that nature barks out for than that pain should be absent from the body, and that the mind should enjoy pleasurable sensation while insulated from anxiety and fear.”

The heart of our recent discussions is the probability that "pleasure" and "painlessness" are being used by the Epicureans interchangeably, with no difference in meaning other than when referencing the situation that when all pain is gone then you are at 100% pleasure. The second sentence of PD03 confirms the basic point that when you have "absence of one" you have "presence of the other," and Torquatus hammers this point unmistakeably.

If so there is no reason to switch words from pleasure to painlessness in the first sentence quoted above. Even under Sedley's terms, kinetic refers to short-term pleasures, while katastematic refers to long-term pleasures, and the issue is duration, not a difference between "pleasure" and "something else."

Then Sedley uses "static" which most all of us agree is a poor choice of words to refer to normal healthy operation of body and mind.

It's this switching of words without being absolutely clear about the context that creates the ambiguity and resulting confusion.

I would suggest the paragraph would be more clear and correct worded this way:

In Epicurean doctrine pleasures are divided into two kinds, the bodily and the mental; and within each of those two domains there are short-term “kinetic” pleasures, which lie primarily in processes of stimulation such as eating or learning, and longer-term (or “katastematic”) pleasures which lie primarily in operation of the organism not involving short-term stimulation, such as regular healthy operation of body or mind. In a very logical and common sense way, Epicureans insist that when all pain has gone and been replaced by pleasure, the full and complete pleasure of the organism (the height of pleasure) has been reached. The added kinetic pleasures typically associated with luxurious living can, as they put it, ‘vary’ the condition of full and complete pleasure, but cannot increase it.

Quote from Godfrey

VS11: For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied.

I agree that this sounds like it could be related to the same topic in which the wise man can find pleasure in varying speeds of activity.

The overriding goal here ought to be to understand first what Epicurus is advising and then we will have plenty of time to decide how or if it helps to talk in terms of K/K distinctions.

I post this almost as an aside rather than for the K/K reference: I am just not familiar enough with Plutarch but the name "Theon" jumps out. I guess this may well relate to the name Theon in "A Few Days In Athens...."

Last excerpt: As I read it, this is as close as Gosling & Taylor get to a clear conclusion:

While I think Gosling & Taylor are the gold standard on this question, they have a habit of writing in ways that require care. For example it appears that they write a long paragraph about views with which they disagree and expect the reader to understand that they disagree solely because they start the paragraph off with "Notoriously."

After a page they do get around to describing the kind of view that they "oppose," and their position becomes more clear because they have described the "notorious" view as "awkward," and in the end they become much more clear. But it takes dedicated reading to pull out their conclusion.

I need to dig into the full chapter that Gosling and Taylor devote to the K/K issue, but here is Nikolsky speaking in a way I think all of us are in agreement with:

Quote from TauPhi

First of all, #196 is really, really good. Well done Cassius, Joshua and Kalosyni. I smiled to myself several times during the podcast. The pleasure issues you're discussing and the points you're making are top-notch.

Thank you TauPhi. I have to apologize to Martin. He was there too, but he joined late and I was so wrapped up in the conversation that I did not notice so I did not call on him at the end.

It is maddening that the Principal Doctrines do not include in their top statements - or at all! - the simple positive statement that "pleasure is desirable."

I am sure there are more, but I can see two main possible explanations for this:

(1) Epicurus was treating his letter to Menoeceus, or some other document where he does say this, as a preliminary statement even more fundamental than the list contained in the Principal Doctrines.

(2) Epicurus was being "in your face" again (like "the sun it is the size it appears to be") and taking a rigorously logical position that it is not necessary to say what is not necessary to say. This *might* be what Torquatus is alluding to at line 30 of On Ends Book One:

[30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts.

Given our recent discussions, anyone want to suggest other possibilities?

Quote from Diogenes Laertius

[136] Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only that which consists in motion. But Epicurus admits both kinds both in the soul and in the body, as he says in the work on Choice and Avoidance and in the book on The Ends of Life and in the first book On Lives and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Similarly, Diogenes in the 17th book of Miscellanies and Metrodorus in the Timocrates speak thus: ‘Pleasure can be thought of both as consisting in motion and as static.’ And Epicurus in the work on Choice speaks as follows: ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion. '

When your mind is not being excited, but is operating at its normal speed and doing its normal things, is that something that can be well conveyed in English using the word "static"?

When your body is not being stimulated through massage or in any other ways that moves the senses from their standard state of good health and operation, can that condition be conveyed using the word word "static"?

Even more so, an untranslated Greek word does not convey what is sought to be conveyed. To be clear, the untranslated word has to immediately be explained, or else you are left with an impasse with the Ciceros of the world, and the normal reasonable man is going to agree with Cicero. Just as Cicero said, this is not a dark subject where use of technical language can be excused. This calls for clarity, and I feel sure that Epicurus gave the explanation with clarity, and that our problem arises because the clear and detailed explanation did not survive, not that he or his later heads of the school refused to give one.

To be fair, part of the problem may be that it *does* survive but we do not see it due to translation issues and our own prejudices. Statements like PD08 that no pleasure is a bad thing in itself may be intended to show in the negative that all pleasure is desirable, and that we are to treat these statements as logical axioms which allow of no exceptions and have to be carried to their logical extremes.

So whether we are talking about "defining katastematic" or just being clear in the first place, the challenge is the same - we need to convey what is being discussed in plain English. Healthy operation of body and healthy operation of mind are not *that* hard to designate clearly, and we need to find better ways to do so.

It isn't a full explanation to say "Absence of pain is pleasure, and that the greatest pleasure" which is basically all Cicero allows Torquatus to do in answer to Cicero's questioning.

I will admit that I am getting the idea that there is a deeper mystery here. How did it ever get to the point in 50BC that Cicero could make a colorable argument that the relationship between pleasure and absence of pain was not being explained satisfactorily even by the Epicureans themselves? It's almost as if (A) the Emperor Julian in celebrating the disappearance of the texts, and (B) Cicero saying that no one but Epicureans read the Epicurean texts (I think that was Cicero, wasn't it?), and (C) Cicero warning Torquatus not to argue that the Epicureans didn't enjoy literature, because Epicurus never argued that, and (D) Philodemus complaining about people who were oversimplifying ---- are all pointing us toward a problem that was developing in the decades between Epicurus and Cicero.

How could it get to the point where Cicero could make this argument that Epicurus was unclear and hope to be taken seriously? Was our problem of lack of transmission of texts already beginning then?

I think that's something else we need to explore.