Posts by Cassius

So that would be an example of someone using ataraxia in a general sense, because he is saying that the Stoics could achieve their tranquility better through Epicurean views than through their own views. But doesn't that mean that ataraxia is being used as a generic term to refer to a general "peace of mind" rather than to a term that is uniquely Epicurean?

The point of my question here is that I can see a lot of reason why "ataraxia" can be translated into a generic "peace of mind" or "absence of disturbance" that could apply to most anyone of any philosophy or religion at any particular moment. In contrast, I don't see it to be a good idea to consider that "ataraxia" has a specifically Epicurean meaning that justifies elevating it in the way that many writers today tend to elevate it. It's that elevation that I think we see over and over and is what I would expect would be behind the statement by Luc Schneider:

In fairness to Luc I think this is the way you will often see the term ataraxia used, which would be consistent with the analogy you used to the effect of "once wise always wise." Is ataraxia something that which, once achieved, is not lost?

Or is ataraxia some particular point of achievement, like snatching a prize at the end of the race, that if achieved for a single moment, is worth all the other time and effort spent pursuing it?

I would see Epicurus' statement as targeted toward those such as Socrates who effect to be unwise in their discussion and I would not see wisdom as something that "once achieved" cannot be lost. Do not wise men often act unwisely, even if only by mistake?

And of course to bring this back to topic, I wouldn't think I would judge whether I wanted to be Epicurus or the shepherd for a week according to whether either one of them "had achieved ataraxia." Would you see that (whether the person as "achieved ataraxia" as a reasonable way to make that decision?

Edit: "Or is ataraxia some particular point of achievement, like snatching a prize at the end of the race, that if achieved for a single moment, is worth all the other time and effort spent pursuing it?" << I like this way of framing the question as I think this presumption is getting closer to the real issue.

Quote from Don

Ataraxia is experienced as a mind untroubled by fear of the gods, anxiety about death, trust in that you are treating people justly and can expect the same in return.

Ok so it does in fact seem you are using ataraxia to describe a specific type of being untroubled (about gods and death primarily, but maybe including a few other things), and that you don't include the trouble of the sharp pain of advanced kidney disease to be within the scope of the word.

Are you saying also that this was specifically Epicurus' use of the word, or that this use applies every time the word ataraxia occurs in ancient Greek?

In the case of the gods it seems we have specific statements from Epicurus that show he was using a modified definition of a common term. Do we have similar statements in ancient Greek? I gather that there is evidence the word was used by the Stoics and perhaps Pyrrhonists, so this would be another word where Epicurus had a specific definition?

It would be helpful if it were but I gather that ataraxia is not the word used here(?)

[22] When he was on the point of death he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus: ‘On this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you. Do you, as I might expect from your devotion from boyhood to me and to philosophy, take good care of the children of Metrodorus.’ Such then was his will.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Ι, ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ

What is the difference between a remedy and a truth? Are there untrue remedies? Or unremedial truths?

Well I was about to say a separate thread, but as I think about it (and as the Facebook comment implies) the question is probably tightly tied to ones idea of how to spend ones time in the best way, so let's say here.

Godfrey: I would think the part of bady affected is a distinguishing factors in pleasures so I am not sure how long the list of differences should be.

Don: unless ataraxia is limited to "mental" disturbance I cannot see how Epicurus experienced ataraxia during his last week, given his pain , and I am not sure I would say he did experience ataraxia at that time even if the definition of ataraxia were limited to mental issues, just as I think aponia is not limited to bodily pains.

This would be an important part of the discussion to develop.

I would see human ataraxia as denoting real experience delimited in time and not a lifetime sum.

Quote from Don

Given that definition, Epicurus undoubtedly experienced ataraxia.

To drill down on this, was Epicurus experiencing ataraxia during that last week of his life?

Back to the topic for a moment for a post at Facebook:

"As Epicurus, because we don't know whether the uneducated shepherd has achieved ataraxia."

My responsive question:

Just asking out loud as to this comment: My question would be "Was Epicurus experiencing ataraxia during his last week?"

What do you guys think about this?

As we begin today's episode we can review the objections raised by Cicero in the opening. They get much more elaborate after Torquatus speaks, but for the time being this is what Cicero has set up as objections for Torquatus to discuss:

1. As To Physics:
   1. Epicurus Borrowed from Democritus while at the same time reviling him;
   2. I:VI:20 As to the swerve and downward movement of atoms (which leads to Democritus' determinism);
   3. I:VI:20 As to Epicurus' rejection of infinite divisibility;
   4. I:VI:20 As to Democritus' view of the size of the sun (which leads to Democritus' skepticism) [Note: Cicero notes that the issue of images by which we see but also think comes from Democritus];
2. As To Canonics / Epistemology / Logic:
   1. Epicurus does away with the process of division;
   2. Epicurus says nothing about subdivision and partition;
   3. Epiciurus gives no method for constructing an argument;
   4. Epicurus does not show how to unriddle fallacies or clarify ambiguities;
   5. Epicurus places his criteria of objective truth in the senses and thinks that it destroys the senses to admit for a moment that they might err in any way;
3. As to Ethics:
   1. The pursuit of pleasure as the goal belongs to Aristippus and was better and more frankly advocated by the Cyreniacs
   2. The Epicurean system is of such a character that no system is more unworthy of the human race, as “Nature has created and shaped us for higher aims.”
   3. The Torquatii did not look for bodily enjoyment or any pleasure when the ancestor wrenched the necklet from his foe, or punished his son.
   4. Cicero alleges that Epicureans do not value mental pleasure. [“What pleasure do you, Torquatus, or what does our friend Triarius here derive from literature, from records and the investigation of historical facts, from conning the poets, from learning by heart so laboriously so many lines? And do not say to me “Why, these very actions bring me pleasure, as theirs did to the Torquati." Never indeed did Epicurus or Metrodorus or any one possessed of any wisdom or any knowledge of the tenets of your school ever maintain such a position by such arguments. And when the question is asked, as it often is, why Epicureans are so numerous, I answer that there are no doubt other motives, but the motive which especially fascinates the crowd is this; they believe their chief to declare that all upright and honorable actions are in themselves productive of delight, or rather pleasure.”]

This post by Don and the exchange there with Nate is of significance to this thread:

Post

RE: Would You Rather Live For A Week As (1) Epicurus During the Last Week of His Life or (2) An Anonymous Shepherd Laying In The Grass In The Summertime With No Pain At All?

In going back to @Nate 's compilation and looking at the Greek construction of the "if" clauses, I think Hicks gives the proper paraphrase:

[…]

It seems to me (check my Greek, please!) that the specific construction of PD09 falls under the unreal present as defined in that Wikipedia article and elsewhere:

Present unreal conditions

Unreal (counterfactual) conditions referring to present time are made with εἰ (ei) followed by the imperfect indicative in the protasis, and the imperfect…

Don

September 10, 2023 at 5:25 AM

I think everyone here is aware of this passage but I posted it over at Facebook this morning and will repeat that post here for consistency as people read this thread in the future:

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I am not posting this to imply that it provides a "best" answer to the hypothetical, but because a significant number of readers don't know that the Epicurean spokesman in Cicero's 'On Ends" had this to say about Epicurus' views:

[55] XVII. I will concisely explain what are the corollaries of these sure and well grounded opinions. People make no mistake about the standards of good and evil themselves, that is about pleasure or pain, but err in these matters through ignorance of the means by which these results are to be brought about. Now we admit that mental pleasures and pains spring from bodily pleasures and pains; so I allow what you alleged just now, that any of our school who differ from this opinion are out of court; and indeed I see there are many such, but unskilled thinkers. I grant that although mental pleasure brings us joy and mental pain brings us trouble, yet each feeling takes its rise in the body and is dependent on the body, though it does not follow that the pleasures and pains of the mind do not greatly surpass those of the body. With the body indeed we can perceive only what is present to us at the moment, but with the mind the past and future also. For granting that we feel just as great pain when our body is in pain, still mental pain may be very greatly intensified if we imagine some everlasting and unbounded evil to be menacing us. And we may apply the same argument to pleasure, so that it is increased by the absence of such fears.

[56] By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain.

[57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory.

Poll Question

The following post is one of a series so that we can get our collection of the main list of Principal Doctrines under the "Texts" section in better shape. Although this thread will include a "poll" in the next post, what we are really looking for is the "best" combination of faithfulness to the original combined with clarity in modern English. I will get with a collection of the Level 3 participants here to work on editing the final list, but the full discussion should be open to everyone to consider, so that's what we will do here. The results of the poll won't control what is featured on the text page but will definitely influence in and probably at least result in a footnote to this thread.

The English translation of PD09 currently featured here in our Texts section is our normal Cyril Bailey from his Extant Remains:

PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another. ^[3]

We have access (thanks to Nate's full collection) to many different variations including:

EΙ ΚATEΠΥΚΝΟΥTΟ ΠAΣA ΗΔΟΝΗ ΚAΙ ΧΡΟΝῼ ΚAΙ ΠEΡΙ ΟΛΟΝ TΟ AΘΡΟΙΣΜA ΥΠΗΡΧEΝ Η TA ΚΥΡΙΩTATA ΜEΡΗ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΟΥΚ AΝ ΠΟTE ΔΙEΦEΡΟΝ AΛΛΗΛΩΝ AΙ ΗΔΟΝAΙ.

“If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.” Yonge (1853)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, if this had gone on not only in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man's nature, there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now is.” Hicks (1910)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,—if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.” Hicks (1925)

“If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)

“If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)

“If every pleasure were cumulative, and if this were the case both in time and in regard to the whole or the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would not differ from each other.” Geer (1964)

“If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“If every pleasure were condensed and existed for a long time throughout the entire organism or its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another.” O'Connor (1993)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present, both in time and in the whole compound [body and soul] or in the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If every pleasure could be prolonged to endure in both body or mind, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Anderson (2004)

“If all pleasures could be added together consecutively with respect to space and duration, and across the entire span over which they had all existed, or at least across the principal parts of human nature <which are naturally susceptible to pleasures:> then, pleasures would not be different from each other in any respect.” Makridis (2005)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If all pleasures could be compressed in time and intensity, and were characteristic of the whole man or his more important aspects, the various pleasures would not differ from each other.” Strodach (2012)

“If all pleasure were condensed in space and time, and pervaded the whole aggregate, or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ, one from another.” Mensch (2018)

“If every pleasure were concentrated in place and time and affected our whole aggregate or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” White (2021)

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Which of the above, or which with changes you would suggest, should be featured here in the main list? In the interest of space the poll will not include every option, so please add a comment in the thread if you would suggest a variation not listed.

I don't know why Bailey didn't follow Hicks' construction and I am tempted just to replace Bailey's with Hicks, since Hicks is so much more clear, but for now I added Hicks as a footnote on our page here of the PD's. We have a lot of Bailey's critical apparatus so maybe there is an answer.

(But I see that the guys at the Epicurus Wiki did not follow hicks) http://wiki.epicurism.info/Principal_Doctrine_9/

(All of which reminds me to get back to that project of reviewing each one for changes to our list - We stopped right before we got to 9!)

Principal Doctrines

Edit: I now see NONE of the other translators Nate collected follow Hicks. Are they all presuming that we know that this construction implies the added "but it doesn't"? Or is there possibility of error in the WIkipedia analysis?

To make the podcast more visible and easier to find we will upload select episodes and series to YouTube. If you get a chance a "like" will be appreciated and should contribute to visibility.

With an assist from TauPhi I have started with posting the series we did on the Letter To Menoeceus, and we will follow with others.

With the format we will probably continue to use, the viewer on Youtube can go directly to any episode in the playlist by clicking on the start time in the description. (That navigation is not visible here at EF as it is necessary to open the comments to see the list.)

Let us know if you have suggestions or comments, and thanks to the podcasters for their contributions.

Thanks for writing Rocco! I suspect based on what you've written I can predict somewhat what you will like and what you will dislike as you read into Epicurus, but it's better to let things develop over time. We have a lot of people here with backgrounds similar to yours so you'll get lots of opinions!

While you correctly detect that the purpose of the forum is focused on rediscovering the core teachings of Epicurus, which can be surprisingly difficult to determine, we are first and foremost a discussion forum, so take your time and comment as you see fit.

Good to have you.

Quote from Don

I still have problems with the assumption of the "uneducated" shepherd. It makes them sound ignorant. They may not be formally educated, but that doesn't mean they weren't knowledgeable about their craft.

But is he knowledgeable about philosophy? Can someone be happy without philosophy? Is happiness also relative? As the saying goes, "If ignorance is bliss is the shepherd living in a constant state of ecstacy?"

Quote

Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come. We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it.

Quote

PD12. A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.

Today we updated the Archive.org listing so that all episodes from 1 to 190 are now available there.

The Lucretius Today Podcast : EpicureanFriends.com : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

The Lucretius Today Podcast, sponsored by EpicureanFriends.com

archive.org

It's quite large (9 GB download), but Archive.org makes it possible to download the full set of episodes in a single zip file, so feel free to download your own set for backup purposes.

The "die" has been cast into the river of Facebook:

I see for the literate among us I should have written " Alea iacta est"

Quote from Don

It's always tricky when trying to compare what texts mean when different words are used: pleasure vs happiness.

Tricky and a major hazard. Understandably, people at different levels of perspective on Epicurus tend to use the word that they "think" should fit best, and that breaks the chain of accuracy.

Optimum is to learn the Greek like Don or the Latin, but that's not going to happen for most people. Over time I'd like to see us able to access the line-by-line Greek much more easily, because then we can at least be aware of word switches so as a person has the time they can dig deeper. As it is, without easy access to compare the Greek word when reading a translation, you're flying blind with the translators.

That's a major benefit of the epicurism.info format for the key texts:

I'd like to see our format in the "Texts" section here at Epicureanfriends become more like that in the future.

As to CIcero's reasoning, here are some relevant references:

Cicero, Fin. 2.109

Quare aliud aliquod,Torquate, hominis summum bonum reperiendum est, voluptatem bestiis

concedamus.

Therefore,Torquatus, some other supreme good must be found for a human being. Let

us leave pleasure to the nonhuman animals.

T2 Cicero, Fin. 2.111

Nec tamen ullo modo summum pecudis bonum et hominis idem mihi videri potest.

I cannot in any way think that humans and livestock have the same supreme good.

T3 Aristotle, EN I .5 I 095bI9-20 (Cf. Heraclitus frr. 4 and 29, and Plato, flej?_. 586a-b)

oi piv oov 110XX01 TIONTEXCOc Co.lOpomoOthbEtc tpocivorrat 1300"Kilp&TWV rov

irpooupoOpEvot...

Most entirely slavish people clearly choose the life of cattle...

Cicero, Fin. 2.40

Animality Hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem

Objection ad duos res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et <ad> agendum esse natum quasi mortalem

deum, controque ut tardam aliquam et languidam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi

voluptatem hoc divinum animal ortum esse voluerunt, quo nihil mihi videtur absurdius.

They [viz.,Aristippus and the Cyrenaics] did not see that just as a horse is born for

running, an ox for ploughing, and a dog for hunting, so a human is born for two things, as

Aristotle says, for thinking and for acting, as if a mortal god.They, by contrast, wanted this

divine animal to be born for grazing and the pleasure of procreating, like a slow and lazy

sheep. Nothing seems to me more absurd than this.

Cicero, Fin. 2.110-1 I I

Et homini, qui ceteris animantibus plurimum proestot, praecipui a nature nihil datum esse

dicemus? Nos vero, si quidem in voluptate sunt omnia, lenge multumque superomur a bestiis,

quibus ipso terra Pundit ex sese pastus varies atque abundantes nihil laborantibus, nobis autem

out vix out ne vix quidem suppetunt multo labore quaerentibus. Nec tamen ullo modo summum

pecudis bonum et hominis idem mihi videri potest.

Shall we say that the human being, which far surpasses other living things, has been

endowed by nature with no preferred thing? In truth, if everything is in pleasure, then we

are far and away surpassed by the nonhuman animals, for whom the earth itself pours

out various and abundant provisions, with no work on their part, whereas we are able to

supply our wants scarcely or not at all, and with great difficulty. However, I cannot in any

way think that humans and livestock have the same supreme good.