I was not aware that there was a major Greek movie dramatizing the story of Iphigenia. I have not watched it so I cannot recommend it, but I thought I would create a thread about it and see if anyone has (or takes) the time to see it.
Might be an in interesting way to internalize a major scene from De Rerum Natura.
Greek language with English subtitles:
Those feelings are going to be either pleasurable or painful (positive or negative).
But within "pleasurable" and "painful" are there not obviously degrees or pleasurable or painful? And are we not going to choose those pleasures which we find to be more pleasurable than others?
Saying that 100% pleasure is the height of pleasure is one thing, but is "height" the same for everyone in all circumstances? 100% is, yes, but what if two vessels that are 100% full are different sizes? Are the different sizes and therefore quantities and qualities of pleasures they contain of no relevance?
I forgot this, and just wanted to say that, although Utilitarianism influenced neoclassical economics (efficient choice based on “marginal utility”), the notion of cardinal utility (“utils”) was dropped. Constrained choice, based on relative preference, became the model. And in no way am I advocating for that former utilitarian position.
I haven't read far enough into this to know the history, and I am not sure that I have the time to go there. But you're not stating why the notion of "cardinal utility" was dropped, and I suspect I am in agreement that "cardinal utility" is indeed something worthy of discussion that should not be dropped. If "relative preference" is a reference to how "other people" view pleasure and that leads to "the greatest good for the greatest number," then I would say that is the erroneous track, and the right track is to indeed analyze what "for you" brings you the greatest pleasure.
I think we're still on the same initial question. Some pleasures are more pleasing to me/you/everyone than others, correct, and should we not discuss the reasoning as to why that is the case?
Yes, that's exactly my read and reaction too Don. The writer of the handout was taking the position that the Epicurean response to attacks on "pleasure" was to redefine pleasure as painlessness/tranquility/ataraxia. That's the prevailing view, which we have seen many places, that the only purpose of kinetic pleasure is to achieve katastematic pleasure, because of course it is, because painlessness can't mean ordinary pleasure, can it? That would fly in the face of our stoic-friendly view of Epicurus that all we want in life is tranquility!
Yikes:
I don't think that's the Epicurean response at all! But presuming that this comment reflect's the writer's opinion (I am unclear about that) I do think this illustrates the dangers of the modern anti-Epicurean / pro Cicero position very well! 
As background material on one of the issues raised today, the following is a collection of material from Cicero that gives background to the "animality" objection he is raising against Epicurus. This is a handout I received many years ago, and I gather that it was written by someone not supportive of Epicurus, and I don't endorse the commentary in it. For example: "Cicero portrays the Epicurean account of pleasure as a dialectically unsatisfying and empirically problematic muddle. Cicero thinks that Epicureanism is fully committed to denying intrinsic value to everything other than painlessness, and he objects to this in two ways. In both respects, Cicero's critique seems entirely fair and plausible.") Saying that I don't endorse the commentary is an understatement!
But it's an excellent collection of quotes and does a good job of bringing together Cicero's argument against looking to the infants, which will help us as we do our own analysis.
Today's episode contains some very challenging material, but the final result should be worthwhile. We're covering a section where Cicero lays out various options on what the goal of life could be (1 - pleasure, 2- virtue, 3 - absence of pain) and how those options might be chosen singly or combined with one or more of the others. Cicero also brings up Epicurus' argument that we should look to young living things for help in making this decision, and whether pleasure is a "primary natural endowment." Once we release the episode we'll see the need to bring more clarity to some of these issues, and we'll want to discuss here in the thread what we think Cicero really means. We'll be appreciative of your comments - I will get this edited and posted over the next several days and we'll have lots to talk about.
Yep now we are getting to the reasons why this needs to be discussed.
. Once your start down pain and pleasure "units" - dolors and hedons - you've left Epicurean philosophy and are talking Utilitarian philosophy. Which is one reason I'm reluctant to wholeheartedly endorse Godfrey 's location, intensity, duration formulation.
I think you're correctly connecting the issues, and I don't like "the greatest good for the greatest number," but I am not ready to throw out efforts to quantify pleasure as inherently inappropriate. Yes that seems to be with what the Benthamites were struggling with, but i don't know enough of their texts to say whether they got it wrong or not.
This issue of choosing among pleasures has to be articulated in some way other than saying "more pleasant" or "less pleasant" if we are to communicate to people what we are talking about. Because I can't conceive that anyone would say that "all pleasures are equal in every respect." If they are not equal in *every* respect, then do we not need to explore and articulate the differences?
Regardless of the possible bread and water interpretation, I think this *is* what Epicurus taught. Know - at a gut level - what you absolutely need to live a self-sufficient, pleasurable life of well-being. Then you *know* if everything else was tragically taken from you, IF all other sources of (kinetic) pleasure were removed from you, you would still be able to lead a life of pleasure without pain on that. BUT he also taught to ENJOY the varieties of pleasure available to us here and now.
I think this is where France Wright was correct in framing the argument between Zeno and Epicurus, and Cicero was showing his intelligence by picking out the same issue: the question is "Does Epicurean philosophy leave the door wide open to *whatever* interpretation of pleasure one desires to make?"
Would indeed Epicurean philosophy have nothing to say between Lucretius at a young age (1) deciding to spend his life shepherding sheep on a hillside vs (2) deciding to become an epic poet and spending his life composing "On The Nature of Things?"
We can pose the question pretty easily: Lucretius as a lifelong shepherd living without pain would be at the exact same height of pleasure as Lucretius the Epic Poet living without pain. We can say that easily because our definitions of the hypothetical make them both "without pain" and therefore "at the height of pleasure."
What in Epicurean philosophy provides the guidance to the young Lucretius to tell him to pursue the life of the epic poet vs the life of the shepherd.
(I have nothing against shepherds -- just using them as a convenient paradigm example.)
I would say that even if we say that both lives are "without pain" and therefore the height of pleasure, we could say that one choice or the other would be "more pleasurable" in the specific case of Lucretius. If we can say that, we ought to be able to explain how, and why that choice would be appropriate for him, even though any pains involved in the life of an epic poet would be quite different from the pains confronting a shepherd.
If we simply say 'one option is more pleasurable and you simply have to figure it out for yourself" - that might be a viable answer. I am asking "Is that the best we can do to explain the choice?"
My opening post was far too wordy but that quick take makes it easier to focus. My comments in red:
Here's my quick take:
How about short classic Epicurean phrases:
Nothing comes from nothing or goes to nothing (or some version of that)
and other similar short sentences as a start in both Latin and Greek
The Gettysburg Address for example is rather well known, and if you already know the words you can work out the Greek letters without much trouble.
That seems like a VERY good idea. Take a passage you know by heart and express it in Greek lettering.
What about word order in Greek? Do we have the same issues of order and use of inflection that we have in Latin? Did the Greeks write long sentences and intentionally make you wait to the end of the sentence to find out what it is about like the Romans did? 
A new participant in the forum posted a graphic today that reminds us of that the word "Ataraxia" is associated with Epicurus. We've discussed that word from many perspectives, but I would like to further the discussion:
Let's resolve to be as obstinate as Torquatus was, and let's say that "absence of pain" *IS* "pleasure." If all absence of pain is pleasure, then the number and types of experiences of human life that fall within the term pleasure are dramatically expanded. That perspective would imply that *every* experience of human life that is not painful is pleasurable. No middle ground; no neutral; no third position. Let's take that perspective as agreed for the moment and consider two examples Torquatus gave.
The hand in its normal condition and not feeling any pain is not only in a state of pleasure, but in the greatest pleasure. What do we presume about this "normal conditon?" Does not the "normal condition" of the hand include not only those hands that are motionless, but also hands being in regular use doing the things hands normally do, from drumming fingernails on a desktop to holding things and squeezing things and on and on and on? I would say that the hand can and does innumerable things in its normal pain-free condition. If so, then the hand is at the height of pleasure whether motionless or whether being massaged by a professional masseuse. In each case the hand is at the height of pleasure. Does that mean it is no concern to me whether the hand is motionless, or is being massaged by a masseuse? Should the hand (if it could think) be equally satisfied in either case and take no notice of the difference?
Another example from Torquatus is this one: A host at a party is pouring wine for a thirsty guest who is drinking it. Both are stipulated to have no pain: the host because he had no pain to begin with, and the guest because his only pain (thirst) is alleviated by the drinking. Both therefore have no pain, and are therefore considered to be at the height of pleasure. Does that mean that it should be of no concern whether we are the host or the guest? Should we view both the experience of pouring and the experience of drinking as exactly the same and never express a preference between the two?
I think Epicurus might answer those questions in this way:
"First of all, both the motionless hand and the massaged hand, and both the pouring host and the drinking guest, are at the height of pleasure because we have stated that they have no pain in their experience. Someone whose life is "full" of pleasure cannot have his quantity of pleasure experienced, because he is already full. But of course the two sets of experiences are not the same in every respect. Only a dolt would say that being massaged is the same as being motionless, or that pouring wine is the same experience as drinking it. I am not a dolt, and you are not a dolt, and you should not think that I am saying that all ways of experiencing pleasure, or "absence of pain," are the same and equally to be chosen. Some experiences of pleasure are to be chosen over other experiences of pleasure, and some ways of experiencing absence of pain are to be preferred over other ways of experiencing absence of pain. No person's life is identical to another person's experience, and you have to decide which way to pursue the goal of absence of pain for yourself. As I told Menoeceus, the wise man chooses not the pleasure that is the longest but that which is most pleasant, and by that you should understand that I know the difference between drinking water and drinking wine - and you should too!"
Would you agree with what I am suggesting Epicurus would say?
After thinking about that, let me ask the question Eoghan asked about "absence pain" in another recent thread. Consider how you would articulate an answer to someone who asks you this question:
"You have said Ataraxia is desirable. Is all Ataraxia the same?" How should I consider any differences in the experience of ataraxia in determining how I am going to live my life? Does the pleasantness of my experiences while I am not disturbed have anything to do with it? Am I supposed to consider the location, duration, and intensity of pleasures, or are all pleasures of equal significance to me so long as I am not disturbed?
How would you articulate the answer to that question to someone?
I think we have made a lot of progress in seeing how "absence of pain" *is* pleasure. Now we need to go back and integrate whether all pleasures are identical, or some are to be chosen over others, and how. Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether a pleasure might bring some disturbance, or can one pleasure be so much more pleasing than another that it is worth choosing, even if choosing that greater pleasure brings some degree of disturbance?
Good to hear from you Shahab and hope you are staying safe.
Your interpretation of Strauss reflects my own understanding. Maybe Strauss was so used to looking for hidden meanings in Plato that he couldn't accept a straightforward meaning of pleasure as pleasure in Epicurus.
Or maybe he was just on Plato's side like Cicero was, and he wanted to make Epicurus incomprehensible. Either way, it's a sad situation but one we have to get past.
For example, right after I closed the thread, Eoghan sent me this:
"My only real hesitancy with mindfulness et al is that it seems it falls into the same trap as modern Stoicism does, which is to say it takes one small part of a larger system. (mindfulness for Buddhism - Ethical living/virtue as the sole good for Stoicism). A lot of Buddhists I know would say that the point of meditation ultimately is to obtain the right view which is to understand the 4 part cure, 8 fold path, Samsara etc... But if it is having discernible benefit for you (helping you live pleasurably) then I think it's good but be very careful as these techniques are hard to separate from their tradition."
I suspect a lot of us have thoughts like that, while others who are more into mediation will feel a lot stronger in support of it. Before we open up that public discussion let me talk to the moderators about it.
Edit:
I also want to comment on this that Eoghan said: "But if it is having discernible benefit for you (helping you live pleasurably) then I think it's good but be very careful as these techniques are hard to separate from their tradition." That's stated well, but it's worth making clear that it would not be sufficient just to consider "meditation" to be a pleasure, because as we all know it is Epicureanism 101 that not all pleasures are to be chosen, and some are to be avoided when they bring more pain than pleasure. Prudence tells us to look into what to expect "all" the ramifications to be, and that's what needs discussion before a section on "meditation" becomes a significant part of this forum.
Now that this thread has come to life again I reviewed it from the beginning and decided to change the title to "Meditation and Epicurean Philosophy (?)."
To my recollection we have never held a close discussion of what "meditation" really means. By raising the point I realize that bringing it up will seem to be an invitation to go there, and I am not even sure that is desirable consistent with our forum goals. One of the main reasons for the existence of this forum is to resist any effort at amalgamation of teachings from schools which have highly different views of the universe and of the goal of life, and a thread which becomes an advertisement for "the benefits of Buddhist meditation" or "the benefits of Stoic mindfulness" is going to skirt close to something that needs to be conducted elsewhere. On the other hand, "the hazards of Buddhist meditation" or "the hazards of Stoic mindfulness" would be more obviously consistent with the purposes of the forum.
As per the Wikipedia page on meditation:
Difficulties in defining meditation
No universally accepted definition
Meditation has proven difficult to define as it covers a wide range of dissimilar practices in different traditions. In popular usage, the word "meditation" and the phrase "meditative practice" are often used imprecisely to designate practices found across many cultures.[19][20] These can include almost anything that is claimed to train the attention of mind or to teach calmness or compassion.[21] There remains no definition of necessary and sufficient criteria for meditation that has achieved universal or widespread acceptance within the modern scientific community. In 1971, Claudio Naranjo noted that "The word 'meditation' has been used to designate a variety of practices that differ enough from one another so that we may find trouble defining what meditation is."[22]: 6 A 2009 study noted a "persistent lack of consensus in the literature" and a "seeming intractability of defining meditation".[23]
Separation of technique from tradition[edit]
Some of the difficulty in precisely defining meditation has been in recognizing the particularities of the many various traditions;[24] and theories and practice can differ within a tradition.[25] Taylor noted that even within a faith such as "Hindu" or "Buddhist", schools and individual teachers may teach distinct types of meditation.[26]: 2 Ornstein noted that "Most techniques of meditation do not exist as solitary practices but are only artificially separable from an entire system of practice and belief."[27]: 143 For instance, while monks meditate as part of their everyday lives, they also engage in the codified rules and live together in monasteries in specific cultural settings that go along with their meditative practices.
I think for the moment I am going to close this thread and refer the issue to a moderator discussion before we proceed further. I feel confident from past experience that some of our core people find mediation of a type helpful (Matt, who started the thread, being a good example.) But we one of the purposes of this forum is to provide direction for people who are new to Epicurus, and we need to first identify to what extent certain variations on "meditation" can be harmful from an Epicurean perspective.
I'll set something up on that and eventually this thread will likely be re-opened, but we at least need a reference somewhere that covers basics on:
I am slow to the Greek game but I am thinking we will probably split out these last comments / hints into a "Can We Persuade Don To Make A "Greek For Beginner's" Presentation?"
My own small contribution is that I just finally discovered if I did a screen shot of a Greek term I could upload it to Google Images and it will provide a translation. This is hugely useful to me because I am regularly cutting and pasting from PDFs of books that have Greek words, but for some reason my PDF program does not pick up the Greek letters and turns it into gibberish. And looking for a Greek keyboard to retype them is very difficult when you're not familiar with the letters. What I've just discovered is that the link below will take an image of the Greek lettering and turn it into Greek text for you.
Welcome to Episode 202 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.
Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.
This week we continue in Section X, moving past the first passage to the next main thought:
X .....
What no one ever called pleasure, he calls so; he rolls two things into one. This active form of pleasure (for thus he describes these sweet and sugared pleasures, so to call them) he sometimes so refines away, that you think Manius Curius is the speaker, while he sometimes so extols it, that he declares himself to be without even an idea of what good is over and above this. When we get to this kind of language, it should be put down, not by some philosopher, but by the censor, for its fault is not a matter of; language only but of morality as well. He finds nothing to blame in sybaritism, if only it be free from unbounded passion and fear.
I am an artist and create, at times, philosophical art posters.
I'll post one on the site relevant to our times with an Epicurean thought.
Looking forward to it!
Ha and now I get to disagree with Pacatus for sure
Yes I agree that Haris' book is good and I recommend it. Haris and I have been on friendly terms for years but I regret not nearly as closely as we should have. I think Haris' viewpoint is largely consistent with what people will read here on this forum from the majority.
As to my older books I really need to pull them from circulation they are so old and in need of updating. At the time I was working with them I was in a pure "compilation" mode and I was mainly experimenting with being sure that the texts i thought were important were easily available in free format. That's now no longer an issue and I really should revise them, but for now I need to prioritize my time and the podcast and our discussions here seem more important in superceding those old epubs.
Thanks for the kind words and I do think we need to expand the reading list. But at least now we can say to those who read Emily Wilson and DeWitt - "Read the forum for further ideas."
I didn't see Godfrey's post 28 before posting my 29. I think our posts are consistent. A variety of mental models are helpful for unwinding the different perspectives.
Because of the innumerable locations and potentially overlapping durations, pleasure is, most likely, always "mixed" overall (unless you're a god...).
That's what I have described as the "whole person" perspective -- there are lots of things going on at one time in separate parts of experience, and the end result of looking at them in total is "mixed." But the individual components are like oil and water, they can be stirred together into a mix but they don't merge into something new.
Pleasure and pain are like opposite ends of a rope on a pulley: as one goes up, the other goes down. There is no neutral state.
Every analogy has its issues but yes I like that too, especially if you can fix your attention on the ropes hanging parallel with each other and not worry about the point at which the rope is at the very "top" of the pulley and going neither up nor down.
Just like the analogies with the balance scales, where the sides are exactly balanced and you have to deal with how to label the pointer (or the balance) being precisely even.
This is where I think you have to go back to being clear about your perspective. From the "whole person" perspective I would say that discrete pains and pleasures can "balance each other out" where it's hard to say which of the two is greater. But from the perspective of placing weights representing pleasure on one side, and weights representing pain on the other, you're always measuring discrete feelings.
The pointer of the dial may indicate dead zero in sum, but what you're measuring is always an accumulation of (1) discrete feelings of pleasure against (2) discrete feelings of pain, and you're never placing on the scale "neithers" or "something else" or "neutrals" or "mixeds."
