There are LOTS of changes, to say the least, that we will need to work through.
One immediate downside especially for Eikadistes is that it looks like we lost the "BOOKMARK" function. I am still exploring whether we can get that back Nate!
We also lost the FAQ formatting from the older version. Until we can set that up again, the old FAQ material is available in a separate page.
Yes posts made before the upgrade goes through may be lost. We should be back to full operation for new posts by noon at the latest. As soon as the upgrade is complete I will remove the "maintenance" notice from the top of the page.
Thank you for reposting that Martin!
Yesterday we had a failed attempt to upgrade to the latest software package that runs the forum, and unfortunately several posts were lost. We're back up now and running normally, and this time I will take additional precautions to schedule this at a time of low usage and to ensure data is not in jeopardy.
Apologies to anyone who lost data - if you see any additional impact from the incident please post in this thread.
Aren't emergent properties a form of randomness? Or do they fall under the idea of "if we knew enough about everything, we would see how they actually emerged"?
That would *not* be my understanding Godfrey. Emergent qualities would arise from the attributes of the atoms and void which make them up in a mechanistic way. There is no function assigned to the swerve of the atom other than free will and bringing atoms together to form worlds in the first place. Sedley thinks the swerve was only developed later in response to the need to respond to the hard determinists.
It's been a long time since I read it but I always recommend the Long article on this -- Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism, the basic thrust of which is to argue that virtually everything in the Epicurean universe IS determined except for the free will of intelligent animals, which is the one place that the swerve "breaks through" into observability. If the swerve were constantly making many things random then the whole basis of atomism would implode because atomism would not be able to explain the regularity that we do see.
Or also, if what matters is practical life for ordinary people, then would it be valid for us to accept things like biases just because we feel it although they are unjustified?
If when you say "bias" what you are talking about is "stereotypes" or "generalities" then I have had several discussions about this subject recently.
I personally relate this to issues of "statistics."
The nature of a generality is that it is "generally" true, even if exceptions exist. Working with them it is essential to recognize that generalities are "statistically more likely" while at the very same time you are affirming that "exceptions do exist."
Does the fact that exceptions exist nullify the beneficial uses of generalities? I would say clearly "no!" Generally speaking, we can expect the sun to rise in the east tomorrow. Does our firm conviction that the sun will one day explode (or something else bad will happen) mean that we should not plan to get up tomorrow morning? No.
In the case of free will, Epicurus is being very clear that some things are determined while others are not. Both are affirmed to be true. Depending on what you choose to look at, the fact may be that *most* things are determined in some way, and what we have firm control over is a much smaller subset. But it can still be true that both categories exist, and I don't see that we should let one overwhelm the other, any more than we should let the perfect be the enemy of the good. 
OK now finished and finally after far too long I am in position to place a fix on where this book fits in with a general study of Epicurus. Here's my summary:
David Sedley is probably one of the top five scholars of Epicurus alive today, and he might be at the very top. Everything he writes is full of good information about Epicurus. His speculations are always based on lots of evidence and I'd go with his speculation on something before most anyone else's.
I think I put of reading this book so long because I was unsure what to make of the title. Now after reading it I'd say the title could be "translated" into something more like this:
"The Story of How Lucretius decided to follow the example of Empedocles and write a poem on physics, How Epicurus took much of the order of his "On Nature" by responding to Theoprastus' physics, How these observations allow us to reconstruct the Table of Contents in On Nature, and How, from those starting points, we can decode the way Lucretius reworked the order of Epicurus' arguments in "On Nature" to create a poem with more OOMPH than if he had followed Epicurus' own order of topics."
As such, there's not a lot of ethical insight that most of our readers here won't already be familiar with, but the book provides a good framework for why Lucretius started the poem off with the "hymn to Venus" that seems to some people to be so out of place. Dr Sedley says that aspect arises from Lucretius' apparent decision to mimic the opening of Empedocles' poem, which started in a similar way, but to totally rearrange Empedocles' view of nature to conform to Epicurean philosophy.
Dr. Sedley also does a good job of taking on the question of the ending of the poem, and his conclusion is that Lucretius simply had not finished reworking the final books of the poem before he died. He doesn't go in Emily Austin's direction of noting that Lucretius failed to include what the original plague narrative had said about the citizens of Athens learning the lessons of how short life can be, but rather he argues that Lucretius intended a significant recap of Principle Doctrine 4 to explain how even pain like that of the plague comes under the scope of Epicurus' advice about the manageability of pain.
So there's a tremendous amount of good material here and I wish I had read this long ago. It's not however what I would call the best place to start for a newer reader, but it will really fascinate anyone who wants to dive into an analysis of Lucretius or get a better idea of what was likely included in Epicurus' own "On Nature."
Over the holidays I am going to remedy my slackness and read this book in full. I have started the first two chapters and I can echo what Godfrey wrote as to Empedocles with this additional comment:
I don't think the observation really changes a whole lot as to how to interpret what Lucretius is saying in the opening "hymn to Venus," but it probably does help explain why he was motivated to start with imagery of Venus and then her interaction with Mars. Sedley is saying that Empedocles' poem on physics is lost, but that there is good reason to believe that it started with a similar poetic analogy to Venus / Aphrodite. Sedley's theory is that Empedocles' poem on nature inspired Lucretius to open his poem with analogous imagery, but that Lucretius almost immediately started deviating from Empedocles to restate what Empedocles had presented in (dramatically different) Epicurean terms.
[btn='Empedocles in Wikipedia','wikipedia-w']https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empedocles[/btn]
Is it then wise for me to offer the Epicurean evidence and thinking or is it more prudent to just let it be?
Ok I see that question as particularly important. "Offering it" brings to mind the issues of Lucian's "Alexander the Oracle Monger" where the Epicurean almost got stoned to death and Lucian criticizes him for being foolhardy.
I see the question more as one of electing whom to live among ... And that would be a very individual decision. Certainly Epicurus recommends living among friends, and being a closer friend is going to involve shared views. But as for the calculation of how to do that and where to compromise, that's very hard to say.
What seems to me *not" hard to say is (1) you only live once, (2) life is short, and (3) you get no credit after death for doing things that did not bring you pleasure. So to me these questions come down to what you personally find desirable into getting the most you can out of life. In my own situation I am as cordial and nice to everyone as I can be when I come into contact with them, but I also organize my time to spend as much of it as possible with people I share the closest friendships.
There are many people with whom I come into casual contact who I try to be nice to, but who end up having no clue that I have any interest in philosophy at all.
I think one of the sayings is that you should run risks for friendship, and I think that plays into the answer too. If someone is so clearly not a candidate for discussing the most important things in life with you, then that person would seem to be a poor candidate to want to devote much time to.
If the wellbeing of the whole society (and individuals) depends on how well individuals understand and accept the covenant, isn't it easier to have the majority believe in a simple fairy tale (punishment after death and the all seeing eye of god)?
If "the wellbeing of the society" were indeed the ultimate Epicurean goal, then that argument would at least be entertainable. But the great weight of the evidence in the texts is that "the wellbeing of the society" is *NOT* the ultimate Epicurean goal, so using such a presumption would not carry much weight with an Epicurean.
isn't it easier to have the majority believe in a simple fairy tale (punishment after death and the all seeing eye of god)?
And that might be true too if you're content for the society to be composed of people who are ignorant of natural science, but there's no evidence that an Epicuran would be content with such a thing.
And as far as the relative hardness of convincing people to believe in 'virtue' for it's own sake (and I would say this also applies to trying to people who have studied natural science to believe in a god:
"For it is hard to convince men that "the good is to be chosen for its own sake"; but that pleasure and tranquility of mind is acquired by virtue, justice, and the good is both true and demonstrable. " --
Cassius to Cicero, [15.19] [Brundisium, latter half of January, 45 B.C.]
as individuals some may choose the truth, while others would prefer comfortable ignorance.
And those individuals who would choose "comfortable ignorance" rather than truth would not be following Epicurean philosophy. Choosing "comfortable ignorance" would not be consistent with choosing wisdom, and as Torquatus put it:
[46] XIV. But if we see that all human life is agitated by confusion and ignorance, and that wisdom alone can redeem us from the violence of our lusts and from the menace of our fears, and alone can teach us to endure humbly even the outrages of fortune, and alone can guide us into every path which leads to peace and calm, why should we hesitate to say that wisdom is desirable in view of pleasures, and unwisdom to be shunned on account of annoyances?
EDIT: I had to add the *NOT* early in the post above to correct a typo/admission that changed the meaning of my sentence. Hopefully the mistake was obvious, but it is corrected now 
Episode 207 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we address Cicero's contention that Epicurean philosophy leads to injustice.
(I'm using infallible here to mean "a reliable source of information".
Yes that's the key - my fingers were prepared for a comment til you clarified that - I was going to say that yes they all share the same level of infallibility - zero! (In the sense of their being correct *opinion*).
Yes to the post in general but as to this part:
There are an innumerable but not infinite number of particles that make up the universe, constantly being reused and recycled into new bodies.
Slight tweak: Isn't it an infinite *number* of individual atoms but not an infinite number of *types* (or sizes)- in that an infinite number of atoms is needed to offset the infinite extent of the void?
With the limit on number of sizes required because there can't be atoms that are infinitely large (or that would itself take up all the space in the universe)?
In preparing for the podcast today I see this quote from Chapter 7 of A Few Days In Athens, which also seems relevant to recent posts in this discussion:
Some few generations, when the amiable virtues of Epicurus, and the sublime excellence of Zeno, shall live no longer in remembrance or tradition, the fierce or ambitious bigots of some new sect may alike calumniate both; proclaim the one for a libertine, and the other for a hypocrite. But I will allow that I am more open to detraction than Zeno: that while your school shall be abandoned, mine shall more probably be disgraced. But it will be the same cause that produces the two effects. It will be equally the degeneracy of man that shall cause the discarding of your doctrines, and the perversion of mine. Why then should the prospect of the future disturb Epicurus more than Zeno? The fault will not lie with me any more than you: but with the vices of my followers, and the ignorance of my judges. I follow my course, guided by what I believe to be wisdom; with the good of man at my heart, adapting my advice to his situation, his disposition, and his capacities. My efforts may be unsuccessful, my intentions maybe calumniated; but as I know these to be benevolent, so I shall continue those, unterrified and unruffled by reproaches, unchilled by occasional ingratitude and frequent disappointment.”
This episode will be a good occasion to remember what Frances Wright has Epicurus say in his confrontation with Zeno (Chapter 7 of A Few Days In Athens). This is Epicurus answering Zeno's charge that Epicurean philosophy leaves an open door to vice:
“Zeno, in his present speech, has rested much of the truth of his system on its expediency; I, therefore, shall do the same by mine. The door to my gardens is ever open, and my books are in the hands of the public; to enter, therefore, here, into the detail or the expounding of the principles of my philosophy, were equally out of place and out of season. ‘Tell us not that that is right which admits of evil construction; that that is virtue which leaves an open gate to vice.’ This is the thrust which Zeno now makes at Epicurus; and did it hit, I grant it were a mortal one. From the flavour, we pronounce of the fruit; from the beauty and the fragrance, of the flower; and in a system of morals, or of philosophy, or of whatever else, what tends to produce good we pronounce to be good, what to produce evil, we pronounce to be evil. I might indeed support the argument, that our opinion with regard to the first principles of morals has nought to do with our practice; — that whether I stand my virtue upon prudence, or propriety, or justice, or benevolence, or self-love, that my virtue is still one and the same; that the dispute is not about the end, but the origin; that of all the thousands who have yielded homage to virtue, hardly one has thought of inspecting the pedestal she stands upon; that as the mariner is guided by the tides, though ignorant of their causes, so does a man obey the rules of virtue, though ignorant of the principles on which those rules are founded: and that the knowledge of those principles would affect the conduct of the man, no more than acquaintance with the causes of the tides would affect the conduct of the mariner. But this I shall not argue; in doing so I might seem but to fight you flying. I shall meet your objection in the face. And I say — that allowing the most powerful effects to spring from the first grounds of a moral system; — the worst or the best, — that mine, if the best, is to be so judged by the good it does and the evil it prevents, must be ranked among the best.
If, as you say, and I partly believe, the iron and the golden ages are past, the youth and the manhood of the world, and that the weakness of old age is creeping on us — then, as you also say, our youth, dandled on the lap of indulgence, shall turn with sickened ears from the severe moral of Zeno; and then I say, that in the gardens, and in the gardens only, shall they find a food, innocent, yet adapted to their sickly palates; an armor, not of iron fortitude, but of silken persuasion, that shall resist the progress of their degeneracy, or throw a beauty even over their ruin. But, perhaps, though Zeno should allow this last effect of my philosophy to be probable, he will not approve it: his severe eye looks with scorn, not pity, on the follies and vices of the world. He would annihilate them, change them to their opposite virtues, or he would leave them to their full and natural sweep. ‘Be perfect, or be as you are. I allow of no degrees of virtue, so care not for the degrees of vice. Your ruin, if it must be, let it be in all its horrors, in all its vileness; let it attract no pity, no sympathy; let it be seen in all its naked deformity, and excite the full measure of its merited abhorrence and disgust.’Thus says the sublime Zeno, who sees only man as he should be. Thus says the mild Epicurus, who sees man as he is: — With all his weakness, all his errors, all his sins, still owning fellowship with him, still rejoicing in his welfare, and sighing over his misfortunes; I call from my gardens to the thoughtless, the headstrong, and the idle — ‘Where do ye wander, and what do ye seek? Is it pleasure? Behold it here. Is it ease? Enter and repose.’ Thus do I court them from the table of drunkenness and the bed of licentiousness: I gently awaken their sleeping faculties, and draw the veil from their understandings: — ‘My sons! do you seek pleasure? I seek her also. Let us make the search together. You have tried wine, you have tried love; you have sought amusement in reveling, and forgetfulness in indolence. You tell me you are disappointed: that your passions grew, even while you gratified them; your weariness increased even while you slept. Let us try again. Let us quiet our passions, not by gratifying, but subduing them; let us conquer our weariness, not by rest, but by exertion.’ Thus do I win their ears and their confidence. Step by step I lead them on. I lay open the mysteries of science; I expose the beauties of art; I call the graces and the muses to my aid; the song, the lyre, and the dance. Temperance presides at the repast; innocence at the festival; disgust is changed to satisfaction; listlessness to curiosity; brutality to elegance; lust gives place to love; Bacchanalian hilarity to friendship. Tell me not, Zeno, that the teacher is vicious who washes depravity from the youthful heart; who lays the storm of its passions, and turns all its sensibilities to good.
I grant that I do not look to make men great, but to make men happy. To teach them, that in the discharge of their duties as sons, as husbands, as fathers, as citizens, lies their pleasure and their interest; — and when the sublime motives of Zeno shall cease to affect an enervated generation, the gentle persuasions of Epicurus shall still be heard and obeyed. But you warn me that I shall be slandered, my doctrines misinterpreted, and my school and my name disgraced. I doubt it not. What teacher is safe from malevolence, what system from misconstruction? And does Zeno really think himself and his doctrines secure? He knows not then man’s ignorance and man’s folly. Some few generations, when the amiable virtues of Epicurus, and the sublime excellence of Zeno, shall live no longer in remembrance or tradition, the fierce or ambitious bigots of some new sect may alike calumniate both; proclaim the one for a libertine, and the other for a hypocrite. But I will allow that I am more open to detraction than Zeno: that while your school shall be abandoned, mine shall more probably be disgraced. But it will be the same cause that produces the two effects. It will be equally the degeneracy of man that shall cause the discarding of your doctrines, and the perversion of mine. Why then should the prospect of the future disturb Epicurus more than Zeno? The fault will not lie with me any more than you: but with the vices of my followers, and the ignorance of my judges. I follow my course, guided by what I believe to be wisdom; with the good of man at my heart, adapting my advice to his situation, his disposition, and his capacities. My efforts may be unsuccessful, my intentions maybe calumniated; but as I know these to be benevolent, so I shall continue those, unterrified and unruffled by reproaches, unchilled by occasional ingratitude and frequent disappointment.”
When it is put so simply, it is easy to simply disagree with it.
Ultimately, Einstein throws away the void, and his "vacuum" is affected by gravity.
It's early in the morning and I am exhausted from the pace of Don's first video as i read this
But rather than just pass over that I'm not sure of the final impact of post 3, I want to be sure I grasp it since you took the trouble to edit it 10 times
Are (1) the illustration of dropping the penny from the train and (2) Einstein in this context, correct, or incorrect?
I mentioned in the episode that I would link to sections of Wagner's "Tannhauser" where the lead character sings that beauty should be touched and embraced rather than simply admired from afar in a "Platonic love" kind of way.
Here are the excerpts I posted in the past. I will update this post with the minute mark for where to find the specific part.
I have two clips - this first one is a "best of Defense of Pleasure" which focuses on the key defense of Venus /Pleasure arguments (and more up-tempo music).
In this clip, the discussion of embracing beauty starts around 3:40, but this shorter clip doesn't give the "Platonic" side to which he is reacting:
And in enjoyment alone do I recognize love!
This second is significantly longer and contains most of the dialogue that sets up the background issues of the conflict with Pleasure/Venus. Start at 14:38 and you will get the setup, including the "platonic" singers praising beauty but saying that it cannot be touched. Wolfram von Essenbach summarizes the "glamor" of virtue.... and then the second pro-virtue singer nails the "keep your distance" part.
Thank you for the great graphic and thank you for all your great work this year Kalosyni!
Just for reference in this episode I see that one sentence from Cicero is:
Pray do you think, Torquatus, that old Imperiosus, if he were listening to our talk, would find greater pleasure in giving ear to your speech about himself, or to mine, in which I stated that he had done nothing from regard for himself, but everything in the interest of the commonwealth; while on the contrary you said he had done nothing but what he did out of regard to himself?
I had to look up "Imperiosus" --- and I see that's one of he names given to one of Torquatus' ancestors:
Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus
It's certainly hard to disagree with the view that in fact people often make a mess of things! No doubt even if the Epicurean wave had continued to build after Cicero's time (and maybe in fact it did) lots of people would have found a way water it down for their own lesser goals. But I think we ought to also appreciate the approach of Diogenes of Oinoanda in erecting his wall and speaking publicly in favor of a future time when more people saw that Epicurean philosophy can help them reconcile their apparently-conflicting interests.
I analogize this in my own mind to the function of the Epicurean gods and the respect to be paid to people who are truly wise. The Epicurean gods couldn't care less about us, and the same goes for Epicurus and the other Epicureans we read who are now long dead and can't receive our appreciation.
But visualize the life of a blessed being helps us to work toward that ourselves, and thinking about what Epicurus would do or say if he were watching us also helps to improve our actions. And likewise I'd submit that visualizing a world in which the name of Epicurus doesn't evoke blank stares, but comes to be seen as a central part of Western traditions that everyone knows about, also helps us think about how we can move in the right direction in our own lives and with our own circles of friends.
