Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

how thorny of a problem it is trying to translate ideas across languages using a single word.

I can't help thinking that this is the reason why Lucretius seems to me to be saying the same thing over and over in various passages, just using different words, as if that's not just poetry but the way to triangulate on precise meanings:

For example four ways of saying atoms: "These we are accustomed in explaining their reason to call matter and begetting bodies of things and to name seeds of things and also to tern first bodies, because from them as first elements all things are."

I think it does make sense when explaining things to say it multiple ways.

Happy Birthday Pacatus!

I think I agree with everything there Don, and even the choice of words, with the possible exception of the very last word "content."

In describing what we would feel if we were running into a building to certain death to save our child, I don't know that I would describe it as "content" without more, but the meaning would be more like "confident that I had made the best choice among the agreeable (or less disagreeable) available alternatives." (With 'best" defined not in terms of "virtue" or "duties" or "goodness" or "piety" or "holiness" or "logic" but in terms of the dominance of pleasure over pain that I would anticipate experiencing depending upon the choice I decide to take.)

In evaluating why I say that, I think my concern is the one I always have in evaluating flatly-stated terms like content / satisfied / calm / tranquil. I see those terms as overused in the philosophical world by people who are attitudinally more Buddhist or Stoic and who base their perspectives on acceptance of fate and passivity in the face of forces they feel unable to control or influence, or duty-bound to follow. I don't think that is an Epicurean attitude, and I see that attitude as destructive to identifying the attitude toward life that led to the success of the ancient Epicureans.

If I were Epicurus running into the burning building I would not use any of those words to describe the emotions I would be experiencing at the many aspects of the situation. Very likely I would be hot with anger I might have against the circumstances that placed all of us in that position of needing to run into the building, especially if those circumstances were caused maliciously or recklessly by someone who acted improperly. (In many cases the circumstances could be purely accidental or other factors would change the situation, but we should not ignore the real possibility that the situation was caused by malicious forces deserving of anger.)

I wouldn't be content or calm or satisfied or tranquil while I was running to certain death in those circumstances, but for the very reasons that you state, "find[ing] - even in their imagination - the prospect of not doing everything to protect their child unbearable" - I would be "confident that I had made the best choice among the agreeable (or less disagreeable) available alternatives." I can make peace with using "content" in that context as part of the overall picture ("I am content that I did the best I could to choose among the available alternatives"), but I think in the current intellectual environment it probably makes sense to be clear about the full meaning of "content."

Happy Birthday to Pacatus! Learn more about Pacatus and say happy birthday on Pacatus's timeline: Pacatus

A_Gardner reminded me of something else that I wanted to be sure to add to this thread, on the issue of whether Epicurus would consider the term "psychological hedonism" as something he would use to promote his own philosophy.

As I think was noted by Fernando in our discussion in a Wednesday Zoom, there is quite a difference between saying "all living things do pursue what they consider to lead to their greatest pleasure," as against "all living things should pursue what they find pleasurable to them." The latter is closer to Epirucus, but even that has something else that in my view overshadows the whole issue:

Even more important in my view is that I don't think that Epicurus made the observation that living things "do" pursue pleasure except in the case of "the young of all species" which he clearly delimited by saying "before they become corrupted."

Quote from On Ends Book One

[30] "Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions."

It strikes me essential to remember that it is core and crucial Epicureanism that intelligent beings like humans have the power of free will, and we can become corrupted and choose NOT to follow Nature and NOT to pursue pleasure -- our decisions can be perverted and biased and affected by other considerations, such as pursuing "virtue" or pursuing "the will of the gods."

As far as I am concerned the jury is still out on when and where discussion of a term like "psychological hedonism" may be helpful. But I am convinced that discussion of that term without discussing Epicurus' real position -- that humans DO NOT always pursue pleasure as their supreme good and DO NOT always recoil from pain as their supreme evil.

The sources of corruption in human affairs are very strong, and it would be perverse to ignore that those sources of corruption often do lead people to pursue other goals which are not in fact their own greater pleasure. If Epicurus had not thought that were true, there would have been no reason at all for his philosophy.

I also note this commentary at the end by "Guido Santini," which appears to be either Latin or Italian. it would be good to get a translation of this:

Thanks Don! I've been continuing to think about this today, and I think it's definitely going to be worth discussing Raimondi's position about the wise man not being happy while on the rack. I think the rest of Raimondi's letter shows he is well in tune with Epicurus, so this is a good launching pad for coming up with a written explanation of how both Raimondi and Diogenes Laertius are correct about Epicurus, even though they are translated as saying diametrically opposite things.

This will prove to be a good illustration in the future of how important it is to drill down on the subtleties of meaning of the key words.

... and the confrontation between Zeno and Epicurus in "A Few Days In Athens," where Frances Wright weighs in on this question of "what would be the result of following Epicurus on pleasure?" is found in Chapter 7 here:

Chapter Seven - A Few Days In Athens

Welcome to Episode 226 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Now that we have finished the Epicurean sections of "On Ends," we will now move to the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods."

This week's episode will serve as a bridge between our discussion of "On Ends" and this new examination of Cicero, as we focus on what Cicero says about the contemporary state of views about the nature of the gods, and how Cicero came to prepare the current text.

Today we will go quickly through the first seven sections of Book 1, and then we will turn next week to Velleius' elaboration of the Epicurean view.

On the Nature of the Gods Book Ons

I. There are many things in philosophy, my dear Brutus, which are not as yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know) that most obscure and difficult question concerning the Nature of the Gods, so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind and the practice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men are so various, and so different from each other, as to lead strongly to the inference that ignorance is the cause, or origin, of philosophy, and that the Academic philosophers have been prudent in refusing their assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming to a wise man than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of the gravity and stability of a philosopher as either to maintain false opinions, or, without the least hesitation, to support and defend what he has not thoroughly examined and does not clearly comprehend?

In the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by nature led to suppose, namely, that there are Gods. Protagoras doubted whether there were any. Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of Cyrene entirely believed there were no such beings. But they who have affirmed that there are Gods, have expressed such a variety of sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so great, that it would be tiresome to enumerate their opinions; for they give us many statements respecting the forms of the Gods, and their places of abode, and the employment of their lives. And these are matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding earnestness. But the most considerable part of the dispute is, whether they are wholly inactive, totally unemployed, and free from all care and administration of affairs; or, on the contrary, whether all things were made and constituted by them from the beginning; and whether they will continue to be actuated and governed by them to eternity. This is one of the greatest points in debate; and unless this is decided, mankind must necessarily remain in the greatest of errors, and ignorant of what is most important to be known.

II. For there are some philosophers, both ancient and modern, who have conceived that the Gods take not the least cognizance of human affairs. But if their doctrine be true, of what avail is piety, sanctity, or religion? for these are feelings and marks of devotion which are offered to the Gods by men with uprightness and holiness, on the ground that men are the objects of the attention of the Gods, and that many benefits are conferred by the immortal Gods on the human race. But if the Gods have neither the power nor the inclination to help us; if they take no care of us, and pay no regard to our actions; and if there is no single advantage which can possibly accrue to the life of man; then what reason can we have to pay any adoration, or any honors, or to prefer any prayers to them? Piety, like the other virtues, cannot have any connection with vain show or dissimulation; and without piety, neither sanctity nor religion can be supported; the total subversion of which must be attended with great confusion and disturbance in life.

I do not even know, if we cast off piety towards the Gods, but that faith, and all the associations of human life, and that most excellent of all virtues, justice, may perish with it.

There are other philosophers, and those, too, very great and illustrious men, who conceive the whole world to be directed and governed by the will and wisdom of the Gods; nor do they stop here, but conceive likewise that the Deities consult and provide for the preservation of mankind. For they think that the fruits, and the produce of the earth, and the seasons, and the variety of weather, and the change of climates, by which all the productions of the earth are brought to maturity, are designed by the immortal Gods for the use of man. They instance many other things, which shall be related in these books; and which would almost induce us to believe that the immortal Gods had made them all expressly and solely for the benefit and advantage of men. Against these opinions Carneades has advanced so much that what he has said should excite a desire in men who are not naturally slothful to search after truth; for there is no subject on which the learned as well as the unlearned differ so strenuously as in this; and since their opinions are so various, and so repugnant one to another, it is possible that none of them may be, and absolutely impossible that more than one should be, right.

III. Now, in a cause like this, I may be able to pacify well-meaning opposers, and to confute invidious censurers, so as to induce the latter to repent of their unreasonable contradiction, and the former to be glad to learn; for they who admonish one in a friendly spirit should be instructed, they who attack one like enemies should be repelled. But I observe that the several books which I have lately published have occasioned much noise and various discourse about them; some people wondering what the reason has been why I have applied myself so suddenly to the study of philosophy, and others desirous of knowing what my opinion is on such subjects. I likewise perceive that many people wonder at my following that philosophy chiefly which seems to take away the light, and to bury and envelop things in a kind of artificial night, and that I should so unexpectedly have taken up the defense of a school that has been long neglected and forsaken. But it is a mistake to suppose that this application to philosophical studies has been sudden on my part. I have applied myself to them from my youth, at no small expense of time and trouble; and I have been in the habit of philosophizing a great deal when I least seemed to think about it; for the truth of which I appeal to my orations, which are filled with quotations from philosophers, and to my intimacy with those very learned men who frequented my house and conversed daily with me, particularly Diodorus, Philo, Antiochus, and Posidonius, under whom I was bred; and if all the precepts of philosophy are to have reference to the conduct of life, I am inclined to think that I have advanced, both in public and private affairs, only such principles as may be supported by reason and authority.

IV. But if any one should ask what has induced me, in the decline of life, to write on these subjects, nothing is more easily answered; for when I found myself entirely disengaged from business, and the commonwealth reduced to the necessity of being governed by the direction and care of one man,77 I thought it becoming, for the sake of the public, to instruct my countrymen in philosophy, and that it would be of importance, and much to the honor and commendation of our city, to have such great and excellent subjects introduced in the Latin tongue. I the less repent of my undertaking, since I plainly see that I have excited in many a desire, not only of learning, but of writing; for we have had several Romans well grounded in the learning of the Greeks who were unable to communicate to their countrymen what they had learned, because they looked upon it as impossible to express that in Latin which they had received from the Greeks. In this point I think I have succeeded so well that what I have done is not, even in copiousness of expression, inferior to that language.

Another inducement to it was a melancholy disposition of mind, and the great and heavy oppression of fortune that was upon me; from which, if I could have found any surer remedy, I would not have sought relief in this pursuit. But I could procure ease by no means better than by not only applying myself to books, but by devoting myself to the examination of the whole body of philosophy. And every part and branch of this is readily discovered when every question is propounded in writing; for there is such an admirable continuation and series of things that each seems connected with the other, and all appear linked together and united.

V. Now, those men who desire to know my own private opinion on every particular subject have more curiosity than is necessary. For the force of reason in disputation is to be sought after rather than authority, since the authority of the teacher is often a disadvantage to those who are willing to learn; as they refuse to use their own judgment, and rely implicitly on him whom they make choice of for a preceptor. Nor could I ever approve this custom of the Pythagoreans, who, when they affirmed anything in disputation, and were asked why it was so, used to give this answer: “He himself has said it;” and this “he himself,” it seems, was Pythagoras. Such was the force of prejudice and opinion that his authority was to prevail even without argument or reason.

They who wonder at my being a follower of this sect in particular may find a satisfactory answer in my four books of Academical Questions. But I deny that I have undertaken the protection of what is neglected and forsaken; for the opinions of men do not die with them, though they may perhaps want the author’s explanation. This manner of philosophizing, of disputing all things and assuming nothing certainly, was begun by Socrates, revived by Arcesilaus, confirmed by Carneades, and has descended, with all its power, even to the present age; but I am informed that it is now almost exploded even in Greece. However, I do not impute that to any fault in the institution of the Academy, but to the negligence of mankind. If it is difficult to know all the doctrines of any one sect, how much more is it to know those of every sect! which, however, must necessarily be known to those who resolve, for the sake of discovering truth, to dispute for or against all philosophers without partiality.

I do not profess myself to be master of this difficult and noble faculty; but I do assert that I have endeavored to make myself so; and it is impossible that they who choose this manner of philosophizing should not meet at least with something worthy their pursuit. I have spoken more fully on this head in another place. But as some are too slow of apprehension, and some too careless, men stand in perpetual need of caution. For we are not people who believe that there is nothing whatever which is true; but we say that some falsehoods are so blended with all truths, and have so great a resemblance to them, that there is no certain rule for judging of or assenting to propositions; from which this maxim also follows, that many things are probable, which, though they are not evident to the senses, have still so persuasive and beautiful an aspect that a wise man chooses to direct his conduct by them.

VI. Now, to free myself from the reproach of partiality, I propose to lay before you the opinions of various philosophers concerning the nature of the Gods, by which means all men may judge which of them are consistent with truth; and if all agree together, or if any one shall be found to have discovered what may be absolutely called truth, I will then give up the Academy as vain and arrogant. So I may cry out, in the words of Statius, in the Synephebi,

Ye Gods, I call upon, require, pray, beseech, entreat, and implore the attention of my countrymen all, both young and old;

yet not on so trifling an occasion as when the person in the play complains that,

In this city we have discovered a most flagrant iniquity: here is a professed courtesan, who refuses money from her lover;

but that they may attend, know, and consider what sentiments they ought to preserve concerning religion, piety, sanctity, ceremonies, faith, oaths, temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices; what they ought to think of the auspices over which I preside;78 for all these have relation to the present question. The manifest disagreement among the most learned on this subject creates doubts in those who imagine they have some certain knowledge of the subject.

Which fact I have often taken notice of elsewhere, and I did so more especially at the discussion that was held at my friend C. Cotta’s concerning the immortal Gods, and which was carried on with the greatest care, accuracy, and precision; for coming to him at the time of the Latin holidays,79 according to his own invitation and message from him, I found him sitting in his study,80 and in a discourse with C. Velleius, the senator, who was then reputed by the Epicureans the ablest of our countrymen. Q. Lucilius Balbus was likewise there, a great proficient in the doctrine of the Stoics, and esteemed equal to the most eminent of the Greeks in that part of knowledge. As soon as Cotta saw me, You are come, says he, very seasonably; for I am having a dispute with Velleius on an important subject, which, considering the nature of your studies, is not improper for you to join in.

VII. Indeed, says I, I think I am come very seasonably, as you say; for here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. If M. Piso was present, no sect of philosophy that is in any esteem would want an advocate. If Antiochus’s book, replies Cotta, which he lately sent to Balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend Piso; for Antiochus is of the opinion that the Stoics do not differ from the Peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and I should be glad to know what you think of that book, Balbus? Says he, I wonder that Antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what a vast difference there is between the Stoics, who distinguish the honest and the profitable, not only in name, but absolutely in kind, and the Peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such a manner that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in kind. This is not a little difference in words, but a great one in things; but of this hereafter. Now, if you think fit, let us return to what we began with.

With all my heart, says Cotta. But that this visitor (looking at me), who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, I will inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the Gods; concerning which, as it is a subject that always appeared very obscure to me, I prevailed on Velleius to give us the sentiments of Epicurus. Therefore, continues he, if it is not troublesome, Velleius, repeat what you have already stated to us. I will, says he, though this new-comer will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both, adds he, with a smile, learned from the same Philo to be certain of nothing. What we have learned from him, replied I, Cotta will discover; but I would not have you think I am come as an assistant to him, but as an auditor, with an impartial and unbiased mind, and not bound by any obligation to defend any particular principle, whether I like or dislike it.

For the text as we go forward, we will likely use the last public domain translation in the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham. A copy of that can be found here:

Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Cicero - On The Nature of The Gods - Academica

archive.org

Links to Additional versions:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty - https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cicero-…ure-of-the-gods
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham) - https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman…/1A*.html#note1
• PDF 0f Loeb Edition at Archive.org - https://archive.org/details/denatu…age/n5/mode/2up
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Natura_Deorum

Of relevance to this Episode:

Hercules at the crossroads - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Also the following paragraph - at first glance he tends to prefer "felicitate:"

It looks like Cosma Raimondi is using Felicitas and beatus (fourth paragraph):

Relevant to this thread is something we discussed in the 20th Zoom tonight -- use of the Latin "Felix," as shown in this highly relevant comment from Virgil:

Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas - Wikipedia

We have a long discussion spawned by Cosma Raimondi's statement that a man on the rack cannot truly be said to be "happy" at this location:

Post

Explaining In Summary Form How A Man In Extreme Pain Can Be Said To Be "Happy"

Admin Edit: This thread was branched off from the Cosma Raimondi discussion at the link below. The purpose of this thread will be to discuss how to summarize the proper way to describe the wise man who is in the midst of torturing pain, and to come up with a summary to get people started on the distinction suitable for referencing on the front page of the forum.

epicureanfriends.com/thread/?postID=25725#post25725

One interesting aspect of Cosma Raimondi's letter is that it appears that he…

Cassius

April 20, 2024 at 5:38 AM

Let's post on that topic there and keep this thread on other issues involving Raimondi.

Here are several points that demand to be addressed in any summary of "E-happiness." (I think I will use E-happiness for a while to stand in for whatever the concept is that as Epicurus spoke of it. Is Cicero correct, here in section 27 of book two, that Epicurus would agree that :

1. That E-happiness is entirely within the wise man's own control? "E-happiness, if only it exists at all, ought to lie entirely within the wise man's own control"?
2. That E-happiness is something that we have no cause for worry about losing? " For if the life of happiness may cease to be so, then it cannot be really happy. Who indeed has any faith that a thing which is perishable and fleeting will in his own case always continue solid and strong? But he who feels no confidence in the permanence of the blessings he possesses, must needs apprehend that he will some time or other be wretched, if he loses them. Now no one can be happy while in alarm about his most important possessions; no one then can possibly be happy"

3. That E-happiness is something permanent? "For happiness is usually spoken of not with reference to some period of time, but to permanence, nor do we talk of the life of happiness at all, unless that life be rounded off and complete, nor can a man be happy at one time, and wretched at another; since any man who judges that he can become wretched will never be happy. For when happiness has been once entered on, it is as durable as wisdom herself, who is the creator of the life of happiness,

4. That it is not something which we need wait to assess after the person has died? "nor does it await the last days of life, as Herodotus writes that Solon enjoined upon Croesus.:

Quote

XXVII. But we dwell too long upon very simple matters. When we have once concluded and demonstrated that if every- thing is judged by the standard of pleasure, no room is left for either virtues or friendships, there is nothing besides on which- we need greatly insist. And yet, lest it should be thought that any passage is left without reply, I will now also say a few words in answer to the remainder of your speech. Well then, whereas the whole importance of philosophy lies in its bearing on happiness, and it is from a desire for happiness alone that men have devoted themselves to this pursuit, and whereas some place happiness in one thing, some in another, while you place it in pleasure, and similarly on the other side all wretchedness you place in pain, let us first examine the nature of happiness as you conceive it. Now you will grant me this, I suppose, that happiness, if only it exists at all, ought to lie entirely within the wise man’s own control. For if the life of happiness may cease to be so, then it cannot be really happy. Who indeed has any faith that a thing which is perishable and fleeting will in his own case always continue solid and strong? But he who feels no confidence in the permanence of the blessings he possesses, must needs apprehend that he will some time or other be wretched, if he loses them. Now no one can be happy while in alarm about his most important possessions; no one then can possibly be happy. For happiness is usually spoken of not with reference to some period of time, but to permanence, nor do we talk of the life of happiness at all, unless that life be rounded off and complete, nor can a man be happy at one time, and wretched at another; since any man who judges that he can become wretched will never be happy. For when happiness has been once entered on, it is as durable as wisdom herself, who is the creator of the life of happiness, nor does it await the last days of life, as Herodotus writes that Solon enjoined upon Croesus.

Relating this to what Diogenes of Oinanda and Torquatus said, in equating a life of happiness to a life of pleasure, we have all sorts of reference to a life of happiness being a life of PLEASURE, including:

Cicero, quoted from above: "Well then, whereas the whole importance of philosophy lies in its bearing on happiness, and it is from a desire for happiness alone that men have devoted themselves to this pursuit, and whereas some place happiness in one thing, some in another, while you place it in pleasure, and similarly on the other side all wretchedness you place in pain, let us first examine the nature of happiness as you conceive it."

Torquatus at Book 1:54 (XVI)

RACKHAM - If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

REID: But if the encomium passed even on the virtues themselves, over which the eloquence of all other philosophers especially runs riot, can nd no vent unless it be referred to pleasure, and pleasure is the only thing which invites us to the pursuit of itself, and attracts us by reason of its own nature, then there can be no doubt that of all things good it is the supreme and ultimate good, and that a life of happiness means nothing else but a life attended by pleasure .

Diogenes of Oinoanda Fr. 32 … [the latter] being as malicious as the former. I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now. If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.

I can name several prominent names that I would probably see as "negative indicators" on this topic (probably including Bailey), but I would definitely like to see if we can find some material on what DeWitt, David Sedley, and perhaps AA Long or other similar "luminaries" have to say about this topic.

There ought to be significant commentary out there on what we're talking about, which I think is pretty different from the general focus on "absence of pain," but more a comparison of this question of how can a man be "happy" while under torture / in great physical pain.

I don't mean to go round and round and round on the same topic!

Consistent with our goal here of not just "discussing" Epicurean philosophy but also promoting and trying to assist in reigniting interest in it, this seems to be one of those issues, right up there with explaining Epicurus' view of the meaning of "pleasure," for which we need something on the front page of the forum to illuminate the issue and prevent people from getting confused by the seeming implausibility that Cosma Raimondi is describing.

I think we're making headway on that with "pleasure," and "happiness" needs to be treated similarly.

Just like with "death is nothing to us" and "For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision."

We can help things a lot by working on a couple of sentences on happiness, so let's try to see what we can do on that. I am thinking this deserves an extended back and forth with many iterations before we can come up with something brief, then we can link to a longer discussion beyond that.

Quote from Bryan

My view is not that Diogenes Laertius is misleading but, as Don and Kalosyni have stated recently, that eudaimonia is not "happiness" but instead "(an enduring sense of) mental well-being."

So then the problem is in fact in the tendency of most all translators to use "happiness."

But Cosma Raimondi, depending on the Latin he is using, is not seeing the need to explain this terminology either, and everyone who reads these descriptions of happiness is totally afloat in a sea of ambiguity as to what is really being discussed, because I would agree with Cosma Raimondi that while in the process of being roasted I would not be feeling an "enduring sense of mental well-being" at that moment either.

I think we have a lot more to do to communicate the relationship between the feelings at any particular moment vs a term that appears to subjectively evaluate a conceptual sum of total experiences past, present, and future.

"Blessed" would probably still need much more explanation, but would seem less off-base to me at this point, because again, the issue that is being described is going to be something that may indeed apply in some way, but which is not going to prevent us from crying out in pain while we're undergoing the experience of the moment.

The whole ball game here is communicating the relationship between this evaluative term, whatever it is, and the pleasures and pains of the particular moment.

And I, for one, would not want to volunteer to undergo the wrack as an experiment to figure it out in real time! At this point I am much more comfortable taking an inventory of all my mental and bodily pleasures and pains at any particular moment and doing the best I can to maximize the pleasure and minimize the pain.

Then if some philosopher wants to tell me that they have a different point to make when they are discussing the term "happiness," I will smile and nod and find it enjoyable to hear the discussion, but not for a moment accept that their evaluation overrides my own feelings.

Here is one place this is referenced in On Ends Book 2. Cicero is not letting Torquatus get in a word here, but the tone of the attack seems to indicate that in some way something is being maintained that would justify Laertius' statement -- though possibly not with "happy"

So is this an area where we think Diogenes Laertius is misleading? I seem to recall that this very conversation takes place with Torquatus in "On Ends" as well, so I need to compare that.