Posts by Cassius

1. Epicurus to Menoeceus: And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away.
2. VS14: We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination, and each one of us dies while occupied.
3. VS30: Some men, throughout their lives, spend their time gathering together the means of life, for they do not see that the draught swallowed by all of us at birth is a draught of death.

1. Epicurus to Menoeceus: We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come.
2. VS33. The flesh cries out to be saved from hunger, thirst, and cold. For if a man possess this safety, and hope to possess it, he might rival even Zeus in happiness.

1. VS52: Friendship dances around the world, bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness.
2. Diogenes of Oinoanda: Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted. Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep) moreover, [it is] right to help [also] generations to come (for they too belong to us, though they are still unborn) and, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. Now, since the remedies of the inscription reach a larger number of people, I wished to use this stoa to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test; for we have dispelled the fears [that grip] us without justification, and, as for pains, those that are groundless we have completely excised, while those that are natural we have reduced to an absolute minimum, making their magnitude minute. ... So (to reiterate what I was saying) observing that these people are in this predicament, I bewailed their behaviour and wept over the wasting of their lives, and I considered it the responsibility of a good man to give [benevolent] assistance, to the utmost of one's ability, to those of them who are well-constituted. [This] is the first reason [for the inscription].

1. PD12: A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.
2. PD13: There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men, if things above, and things beneath the earth, and indeed all in the boundless universe, remain matters of suspicion.
3. VS34. It is not so much our friends' help that helps us, as it is the confidence of their help.
4. PD04: As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbors, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and, after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.
5. Epicurus to Herotodus [83]: Here, Herodotus, is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy. I think that, even if one were unable to proceed to all the detailed particulars of the system, he would from this obtain an unrivaled strength compared with other men. For indeed he will clear up for himself many of the detailed points by reference to our general system, and these very principles, if he stores them in his mind, will constantly aid him. For such is their character that even those who are at present engaged in working out the details to a considerable degree, or even completely, will be able to carry out the greater part of their investigations into the nature of the whole by conducting their analysis in reference to such a survey as this. And as for all who are not fully among those on the way to being perfected, some of them can from this summary obtain a hasty view of the most important matters without oral instruction so as to secure peace of mind.

1. VS29: For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many.
2. VS54: We must not pretend to study philosophy, but study it in reality, for it is not the appearance of health that we need, but real health.
3. Diogenes Laertius : When once a man has attained wisdom, he no longer has any tendency contrary to it or willingly pretends that he has.

Diogenes Laertius X - 122: They hold that ... courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage.

Epicurus to Herotodus 83: Here, Herodotus, is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy. I think that, even if one were unable to proceed to all the detailed particulars of the system, he would from this obtain an unrivaled strength compared with other men. For indeed he will clear up for himself many of the detailed points by reference to our general system, and these very principles, if he stores them in his mind, will constantly aid him. For such is their character that even those who are at present engaged in working out the details to a considerable degree, or even completely, will be able to carry out the greater part of their investigations into the nature of the whole by conducting their analysis in reference to such a survey as this. And as for all who are not fully among those on the way to being perfected, some of them can from this summary obtain a hasty view of the most important matters without oral instruction so as to secure peace of mind.

Cicero's Torquatus in On Ends Book 1 - XV: The same principle will be found to hold good with respect to courage. For the discharge of labours and the endurance of pain are neither of them intrinsically tempting; nor is patience, nor diligence, nor watchfulness, nor industry which is so much extolled, nor even courage itself: but we cultivate these habits in order that we may live without care and fear, and may be able, as far as is in our power, to release our minds and bodies from annoyance. For as the whole condition of tranquil life is thrown into confusion by the fear of death, and as it is a miserable thing to yield to pain and to bear it with a humble and imbecile mind; and as on account of that weakness of mind many men have ruined their parents, many men their friends, some their country, and very many indeed have utterly undone themselves; so a vigorous and lofty mind is free from all care and pain, since it despises death, which only places those who encounter it in [pg 116] the same condition as that in which they were before they were born; and it is so prepared for pain that it recollects that the very greatest are terminated by death, and that slight pains have many intervals of rest, and that we can master moderate ones, so as to bear them if they are tolerable, and if not, we can depart with equanimity out of life, just as out of a theatre, when it no longer pleases us. By all which considerations it is understood that cowardice and idleness are not blamed, and that courage and patience are not praised, for their own sakes; but that the one line of conduct is rejected as the parent of pain, and the other desired as the author of pleasure.

PD31. The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed.

PD32. For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another, or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise, too, for all tribes of men which have been unable, or unwilling, to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.

PD33. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.

PD34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

PD35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

PD36. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

PD37. Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

PD38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

1. Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus: Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them.
2. Cicero's Torquatus in On Ends Book 1 - XII: For as the chief annoyances to human life proceed from ignorance of what things are good and what bad, and as by reason of that mistake men are often deprived of the greatest pleasures, and tortured by the most bitter grief of mind, we have need to exercise wisdom, which, by removing groundless alarms and vain desires, and by banishing the rashness of all erroneous [pg 114] opinions, offers herself to us as the surest guide to pleasure. For it is wisdom alone which expels sorrow from our minds, and prevents our shuddering with fear: she is the instructress who enables us to live in tranquility, by extinguishing in us all vehemence of desire. For desires are insatiable, and ruin not only individuals but entire families, and often overturn the whole state. From desires arise hatred, dissensions, quarrels, seditions, wars. Nor is it only out of doors that these passions vent themselves, nor is it only against others that they run with blind violence; but they are often shut up, as it were, in the mind, and throw that into confusion with their disagreements.
3. Cicero's Torquatus in On Ends Book 1 XIV. But if we see that the whole life of man is into disorder by error and ignorance; and that wisdom is the only thing which can relieve us from the sway of the passions and the fear of danger, and which can teach us to bear the injuries of fortune itself with moderation, and which shows us all the ways which lead to tranquility and peace; what reason is there that we should hesitate to say that wisdom is to be sought for the sake of pleasure, and that folly is to be avoided on account of its annoyances?

1. Diogenes of Oinoanda Fragment 5: Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

2. More to come....

1. PD03: "The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."
2. Diogenes Laertius: Epicurus held there to be only two states of feeling, pleasure and pain.
3. On Ends Book One, 30: "Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
4. On Ends Book One, 38: Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension."
5. On Ends Booke One, 39: For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
6. On Ends Book Two, V-16: "This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?"

• VS17. It is not the young man who should be thought happy, but the old man who has lived a good life. For the young man at the height of his powers is unstable, and is carried this way and that by fortune, like a headlong stream. But the old man has come to anchor in old age, as though in port, and the good things for which before he hardly hoped he has brought into safe harbor in his grateful recollections.
• VS55. We must heal our misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been, and by the recognition that it is impossible to undo that which has been done.
• VS67. A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without servility to mobs or monarchs, yet it possesses all things in unfailing abundance; and if by chance it obtains many possessions, it is easy to distribute them so as to win the gratitude of neighbors.
• VS69. The ungrateful greed of the soul makes the creature everlastingly desire varieties in its lifestyle.
• VS75. The saying, “look to the end of a long life,” shows ungratefulness for past good fortune.
• U469 - Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XVII.23: “Thanks be to blessed Nature because she has made what is necessary easy to supply, and what is not easy unnecessary.”

Yes, I think most of us will agree that driving drunk at 120 mph would generally expected to be an un-Epicurean thing to do.

You'd have to stretch pretty hard to come up with circumstances where that would be the prudent thing to do.

But having said that, I am sure some of our active minds here could probably come up with hypotheticals to show that even "Don't drive drunk at 120 mph" isn't handed down by god or written in the great list of Platonic ideals in the sky!

Of course once again there's the problem with hypotheticals..... practical minds don't enjoy them and they quickly get insufferable.

1. Epicurus PD03 : ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“
2. Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus : ”By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.“
3. Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
4. On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
5. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
6. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
7. On Ends Book One, 56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
8. On Ends Book One, 62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future.

Some targeted comments:

Quote from Don

While I remain unconvinced and skeptical of much of these alleged connections among Epicureanism, Judaism, and Christianity, I also don't see why it should be important other than for historical curiosity. It's not as if we who find value in Epicurus's philosophy will suddenly see the light, so to speak, and convert to Christian or Jewish practice.

I agree with Don that the interest is not at all something that should motivate us to be more embracing of Christianity or Judaism, any more than those cults embrace Epicurus. But this is one of those areas where people differ, and I would include myself in the list of those who was so indoctrinated into Christianity at an early age that it remains fascinating, even later in life, to explore the parallels. And as as manner of exploring the learning about Epicurus, these parallels are going to be of interest to many, and probably a majority, of people who investigate Epicurus, as they provide familiar landmarks during the exploration.

Quote from Don

I would quibble with the formulation "living your life to the fullest," although I realize that's a popular way of phrasing it. From my perspective, Epicurus's philosophy is about experiencing the available pleasure at every moment of our lives, every moment of our existence.

I see nothing contradictory between those two sentences, but the twist probably comes with the word "available." I don't think Don suggests that you just sit and wait to see what pleasure falls in your lap, but unless you make clear that it is indeed appropriate to go out and seek pleasure, then many people will misunderstand this as a Buddhist-sounding call to retreat inward.

Quote from Don

"Living life to the fullest" sounds too much like the skydiving, popular culture "carpe diem" "fear of missing out" "you only live once" idea. While those experiences may be part of Epicurus's philosophy, it's not the primary message.

This is where the contradiction comes in. I do think "you only live once" when properly understood is Epicurean, and I do think it is pretty much the primary message.

Quote from Peter Konstans

When the ancient Epicureans rejected luxury they automatically and unambiguously rejected political ambition since you didn't get to have the one without the other. If you oppose luxury you have to embrace minimalism and if you are skeptical toward political ambitions you have to embrace the modesty of a life with limited public exposure within the confines of a small community of friends.

Now here I have to part with Peter somewhat. I don't think the Epicureans reject luxury and embrace minimalism per se, and I think that is a huge mistake of modern Epicureans to imply that minimalism should be the norm. I think the message is that you cultivate your surroundings and adapt to circumstances. You work the fields in the summer and feast in the fall. You intelligently embrace luxury where it can be enjoyed without pain that outweighs the benefits of it. You savor the little that you may have when luxury is not available, but you never aim at either minimalism or luxury as ends in themselves. There is no other word that describes the end of life given by Nature other than "Pleasure."

As to pleasure being the only description of the end: ("Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?")

As to not targeting minimalism or luxury: ([130] Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good. And again independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. And so plain savours bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed; and bread and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips. [131] To grow accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless of fortune.)

Those cause me no disturbance at all!

How can you be at 100% pleasure if you are still anxious about something? So I agree with that!

But the goal is not simply to be tranquil, the goal is rather to combine tranquility with other pleasures of mind and body to come as close to a life of 100% pleasure as I can. This would include those mental activities where we are well pleased that we are not subject to the shipwrecks of those who fear death and hell and the gods, and where we also engage in other such bodily and mental activities as bring more pleasure than pain.

I can readily recognize that the "perfect" would be a life of 100% pleasure, while at the same time "the good enough" for me that is within my capacity would be a life in which pleasure predominates, even in those rare times when i am required to be conversant in Greek!

I should add to the mix of issues that we are discussing that I do not agree that it is a correct statement to say that Epicurus thinks the greatest pleasure is tranquility, or that it is a correct statement that the ultimate goal of life is tranquility.

In both cases I think the correct statement is to keep the focus on pleasure:

The greatest pleasure (the limit of pleasure) is not tranquility, but the experience of 100% pleasure and 0% pain, which means the total absence of any painful experiences, as stated in PD03,

and

The ultimate goal of life (the highest good) is not Tranquility, but Pleasure, which is as stated by Torquatus in the opening of his defense of Epicurus.

I think Don and I are largely in agreement with the exception of this point in dispute:

Quote from Don

The Tetrapharmakos is an authentic memory aide used by ancient Epicureans and documented by a classical Epicurean scholar .

I do not agree that the contextual evidence we have supports this conclusion. The fragmentary nature of the text in which this is preserved (issues which we have posted about at length here and here and in many other threads) in a work in which Philodemus is complaining about Epicureans who do not pay sufficient attention to the texts is good reason in my view to question the authenticity of this as an accurate statement of Epicurean doctrine. Only if additional parts of this scroll are deciphered which allow us to know for sure what Philodemus had in mind (if indeed the transcribers who examined the original even transcribed it correctly) would I expect to change my view on that. My view is that if it in fact does appear in the text in the way it is translated - and for now I concede it does - I think the odds are at least as great that Philodemus was being critical of it rather than supportive.

Instead, I would say that I think a lot of the issues I complain about arise from a natural sequence of events spanning 2000 years after the Epicurean texts and teachers faded away.

Rather than meaning to complain about anybody else's interpretations, I mean the thrust of my point to be this:

Consideration of all non-painful experiences to be pleasurable is so foreign to the most way people think that virtually no one is going to understand this unless you hit them in the face with a proverbial 2x4. Unless this sweeping view of pleasure as the default is explained clearly, most everyone is going to presume that like some religious cultist Epicurus is peddling some hitherto-undiscovered type of pleasure. Maybe I alone have been misreading the commentaries of the last 50 years, but my take-away from most all of them is that they agree with the academic consensus that Epicurus is talking about some weird kind of pleasure involving asceticism that makes little sense to anyone is not dedicating their lives to fleeing from the pains of the world.

My preferred interpretation at this point is not that Epicurus discovered some new type of pleasure, but he instead developed a new way of looking at all experiences of life as inherently pleasurable whenever those experiences are not painful. This re-identification makes it easy to understand the references to absence of pain being the highest pleasure, because it's just the same kind of viewpoint as contrasting atoms and void. Our lives are full of atoms of pleasure, interrupted by voids of pain, and our goal is to gather together in our lives as many atoms of pleasure together uninterrupted by pains as we can. The two - atoms and void / pleasure and pain - coexist but never lose their natures. Where you have one you have the other, and vice versa, but nothing else exists to make up the experiences of life other than pain and pleasure. Once you see what he is doing, everything else falls into place. When you once see the picture you can't "un-see" it, but until you do see it you can stare at the picture for years on end and you'll keep looking in vain for some kind of mysterious pleasure that you will never find because it isn't there.

The rest of any disagreement that Don and I have is reconcilable by my agreement that the tetrapharmakon and katastematic/kinetic discussions do in the end prove useful to those who are willing to really dig into the question. Without something like them to get you started you lose scent of the track of explaining the non-standard view of pleasure stated in the Letter to Menoeceus. I don't see the tetrapharmakon as the kind of memory aid that I would advocate anyone using, because I don't want anyone to think that I consider their troubles to be easy to endure, or their legitimate desires in life to be easy to get. But as it is the tetrapharmakon does stir emotions in us, sort of like "death is nothing to us" is an in your face formulation, and it does get people talking. And that's a good thing.

The chain of reasoning being discussed in this thread allows me to state my issues with the "tetrapharmakon" and "the katastematic-kinetic" distinction with greater clarity.

Once you accept the premise that whatever is not painful is pleasurable (or any of the other ways of phrasing it by the various translators), you have a premise that is as unalterable and important as saying "nothing exists except atoms and void." You take that premise all the way to the end, and you never allow any deviation from its implications. The final result is that you unalterably take the position that if you are alive and experiencing anything, what you are experiencing is pleasure unless you experience it as pain. You can string as many "What about X?" questions as you like for an eternity, and you will never find an example of something that is desirable in itself which does not fall under the umbrella of the term "pleasure." The height of pleasure is then easy to understand as 100% pleasure and 0% pain. This is the approach that we see in Torquatus in On Ends.

Nothing in the letter to Menoeceus contradicts this. Considered in combination with PDO3, which everyone also accepts to be authentic Epicurus, the interpretation asserted by Torquatus is visible in Menoeceus as well. No doubt the same view was stated by Epicurus many times in texts we no longer have, but thanks to Cicero's Torquatus we have the proposition stated clearly in unmistakeable terms. Epicurean ethics makes no sense unless all types of pleasure - mental and physical - are included under the umbrella of pleasure, and no presentation of Epicurean philosophy is complete without emphasizing this point.

One problem with the tetrapharmakon is that "What is good is easy to get" conveys none of this. Even if we take a charitable view that this is a down-the-line conclusion for those who understand the chain of reasoning that gets you there, the layman is simply not going to understand this. The layman is legitimately going to conclude that Epicurus has some weird definition of "the good" that defies the layman's own understanding of what a struggle is generally involved in life. More likely, and worse when combined with "What is terrible is easy to endure" (I am using the Wikipedia versions that the vast majority of the world is seeing), the layman is going to dismiss Epicurus as hopelessly out of touch with reality.

And even if the layman perseveres past the tetrapharmakon and decides to study further, what is he to think when he is confronted with the endless debating over the "katastematic-kinetic" distinction? What is he to understand from the refusal to translate these terms into the understandable language he speaks today? The whole key to understanding involves explaining that the normal state of life without pain should justly be considered pleasurable. Fixation on untranslated Greek words like "katastematic" or "ataraxia" are treated so mysteriously that the reasonable layman is going to be bewildered. Most of them are going to carry forward their preexisting understanding of the word "pleasure" as limited to "stimulation of the senses," and they are going to conclude that Epicurus has put his finger on some kind of esoteric stimulation of the senses that is so otherworldy that only an ancient Greek can understand it accurately. Yes, some people (primarily academics), find the contemplation of this mystery to be entertaining, but the reasonable layman is not going to think so, and he is going to fully discard Epicurus at that point.

In contrast I would say that Cicero and Cassius Longinus were both correct: Epicurean philosophy in its broad outline is easy to understand. No, there are no supernatural gods telling us what to do. No, there are no ideal forms or essences that tell us what to do. Instead, Nature shows us through the feelings of pleasure and pain what is desirable and what is not. Nature does not give us a fully formed mind, however, and it is up to us to learn to understand that life itself in all its non-painful experiences is pleasurable, and that unless we are suffering some specific pain then we are experiencing pleasure. The wise man will then understand that he has access to all sorts of pleasures, some mental and some physical, that are attainable in all but the most extreme situations of life. While all of these pleasures feel good, the wise man will decide which pleasures to pursue and which to avoid by evaluating the full result of his actions. When all non-painful experiences are placed in the balance of life against the painful experiences, the wise man will see that pleasures can readily be made to predominate over pain, and thus a life of continuous pleasure is possible. Pleasure is not limited only to the rich or fortunate whose circumstances allow them access to luxury and thrills most of their lives, but it remains a valid framework by which even the poor and less fortunate can organize their lives.

The observation that the highest pleasure is experienced when all pain is gone is simply an obvious result of the first premise that the sum total of pleasure is measurable by the absence of pain. If you identify the goal of your life as "Pleasure," and you understand that everything that is not painful is pleasurable, you can never heighten the experience of pleasure no matter how many extra years you might live. Time is always desirable, but the extra pleasure obtained through extra time is just a variation of the pleasures already experienced, and the extra time does not improve the perspective that pleasure cannot be improved once all pain is gone. This also is not to say that you should limit yourself to simple pleasures or pleasures of the mind, but only that when you are evaluating a goal for your life, it is conceptually and understandably valid for everyone to see that in the broadest terms, a life from which all pain is eliminated as a way of measuring the ultimate goal, whether you are an oyster or a cow or a sailor or a general or a philosopher.

None of this is conveyed to laymen by repeating "what's good is easy to get" or stating something like "Epicurus held katastematic / restful / stable / abiding pleasure to be the authentic type of pleasure which is the true goal of life." When academics focus on stating those propositions over, the result may be an increase of their reputation among their academic peers, but they not only fail to bring healing but in fact drive away the legions of ordinary people who would otherwise benefit from Epicurean philosophy.

Thank you again Don for your cite to this paper. There is so much buried in Sedley's work that is of use. If we had the ability to send someone back in time who could intelligently question Epicurus and relate back to us more accurately what Epicurus was really saying, David Sedley is the person I would nominate. When Sedley finally leaves us we are going to lose probably the number one interpreter of Epicurus alive today. I cannot imagine who else might approach his depth of scholarship.

I have pulled out some particularly interesting quotes, most of which are relevant to our discussion of Epicurus' view of definitions. I have not had time to clean up this text (especially as to the Greek lettering) but hopefully this will still be useful:

• - throughout our text we see the fundamental principle of the naturalist that to apply a name to an object is to express an opinion, and that language can represent' true or false opinion.
• - epicurus has no doctrine comparable to that discussed in the crat ylus and taken up by the stoics, that the name of a thing is an abbreviated list of its properties. His naturalism lies rather, as we shall see below, in the belief that within a language each name -c an only be correctly used to denote the one particular class of object with which it was associated in its natural origin.
• - on the other hand, epicurus himself is no great defender of predication as a tool of the philosopher. He wants concepts to be clarifi ed by referenee to the data of perceptions and feelings, not through mere verbal predication. Thus he shows strong doubts about the usefulness of defi nitions, 109 and, when dealing with the special case of the concept of time, he specifically rejects the view that anything else should 'be predicated of it as sharing the same essence as it '
• - if epicurus were to regard memory as an event purely internal to the mind, the whole empirical foundation of knowledge would crumble, since our ' memories ' might be nothing more than our own inventions. The objectivity of memory is superficially rescued by the assurance 136 that the mind, like the sense-organs, draws its images from outside.
• - besides, if we are to go beyond epicurus' own writings and pin so much faith on doxographical tradition, we cannot ignore a passage of aetius 117 which contradicts bailey's account: ' leucippus, democritus and epicurus say that both perception and thought work through the entry of (I think the Greek here is "images"). From outside, since neither can concentrate (e: tt&: aacv) on anything independently of the doooaov which makes contact '.
• - perceptions and feelings are the -only incontrovertible sources of data about the world, but since they are irrational 168 a process of reasoning is necessary whereby they can be systematised into a rational pattern of knowledge. L69 epicurus has no time for the logical categorisation of processes of inference, but nevertheless recognises the importance to the philosopher of reasoning in general (aoy'ofl6, , ouuoyoo flo ), of the kind of reasoning that provides an under standing of the data supplied by the sensations ( emaoy'afl6, ), and of the kind of reasoning that uses this understanding as a basis for speculation about that which is beyond perception (&vo: ), oytop.6). For the sake of brevity, in what foiiows i translate naoycrp .6 with phrases like ' empirical reasoning ', ' empirical calculation ', although a more accurate expression would be some thing like 'reasoning based on empirical data '
• - ' nevertheless, since nothing is in itself universally commendable or blameworthy, but becomes commendable insofar as it conforms to 'the end of the good, and blameworthy insofar as it conforms to the end of the bad, the man who has not by an empirical calculation obtained this knowledge will not be able to use it as a standard of reference for analysing that which is under consideration for commendation .. . ".
• ' some epicureans are said to employ, as evidence that poverty is an evil, empirical arguments of the following kind: epicurus says that poverty is an evil for many reasons, but especially because it is unendurable when combined with these other afflictions (sc. D-c uxat r; ; ? ) ... '
• - similarly in the de ira philodemus quotes three arguments which he believes prove that a moderate degree of anger is permissible in a wise man. He terms them bn), oytcr p. O 184 or a6yc. T bnaoytcr 'cvx. O 185 and once again they take the form of appeals to experience: the first 186 argues from the fact that wise men are grateful for good turns; the second 187 from the fact that even wise men get -drunk; and the third,188 if i have understood it correctly, from the fact that people are only angered by what they already believe to be had, however enraged they may become.
• Diogenes of oenoanda tells us that for most people the superiority of mental to physical feelings is- hard to appreciate by etttaoytcrt j-6t; ; 195 because they never occur simultaneously in their most intense forms and direct comparison is therefore impossible.
• - philodemus, 208 defending the epicurean method of analogical inference against the stoic objection that some arguments by analogy patently do not work, replies that one cannot make inferences about the invisible from chance similarities in the visible world, but only from similarities which occur with total consistency throughout the whole range of our experience. It is invalid to argue that because there are figs within our experience there must be fi gs outside it, for our knowledge of the world tells us that vegetation varies from region to region. Thus the stoic argument is ' easily refuted, contradicted by the facts, and not even based on empirical study of the actual similarities and differences that exist in the things which we perceive ':
• - [philodemus] ' for there are certain cases where the method by similarity is not always admissible; and we make a proper empirical study of similarities, since it is wrong to make inferences about simply anything on the basis of chance common properties. " later 2ll he rejects the stoic claim that the existence of a similarity (e. G. That in respect of mortality all men resemble men within our experience) can only be affirmed in the conclusion of an argument if it is also stated among its premises, and explains": through empirical assessment of phenomena i shall reach the conclusion that similarity must exist also in this respect. For since men in our experience possess this characteristic, i shall deem all men in general to hold it, by concluding through empirical reasoning that also in this respect similarity must exist '.
• - ' the man who infers correctly will, insofar as things which lie beyond our perception are different, allow them to be different ; nor, insofar as they resemble what we perceive, will he deny them this resemblance '.
• - ' therefore in respect of some characteristics the man who makes the correct empirical. Assessment will grant differences from what we perceive, but in respect of others, without which the very nature of fi re is inconceivable, he will maintain the resemblance to what we perceive'.

Peter I want to say as an aside that it is going to take some time for me to read and follow what you just wrote. Sometimes I am finding what you write agreeable to me, sometimes less so, but I can say with confidence that your contributions are very stimulating and I appreciate the time you are taking in making them.