Posts by Cassius

Here Gosling and Taylor introduce katastematic and kinetic, which they then devote a separate chapter later to explaining why they are both pleasure and katastematic is not the ultimate goal. But for now:

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18.1.5. When it comes to assessing various degrees of pleasantness, Epicurus seems to have thought that pleasures are of two sorts, those of change (kinetic) and those of stable condition (katastematic) and perhaps that either sort could be primarily bodily or mental. (DL X.136, 144). Those associated with motion seem to be those which accompany a change from pain to its removal, whereas those of a stable state are those of conditions where pain is absent, and with it any cause of change (DL X.128-9). Quite generally, pleasures cannot increase in degree beyond the point of removal of pain (PD 3; DL X.139). With bodily pleasures this limit is reached when the need that is causing pain is removed. Mental pain is largely caused by such things as grief and fear, and so is only to be removed by reflections on the sources of these emotions (PD 18; DL X.144). In either case there is no possibility of increase past the point of the removal of pain, only of variation. There is no need, therefore, to get into complexities of comparative intensities or other methods of assessing the comparative pleasantness of different activities. A life free from pain ipso facto wins over one not so free.

Time for some Gosling & Taylor. I think this is consistent with most all of what we have said in this thread so far:

Page 347

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18.1.4 In other words, the experience of pleasure is experience of its goodness. Indeed for consistency with his theory of knowledge Epieurus must be able to give a perceptual basis for judgments of value if he is to claim that they can be known. This is sometimes construed as though pleasure were a feeling attached to a perception. The word ‘pathos’ which Epicurus uses to categorize pleasure and pain, means, rather, a way of being affected.

Thus according to Diogenes '(X.34), the Epicureans say that there are two pathe that occur with every living thing, pleasure and pain. One might be tempted to think that there are also others, e.g. a Platonic neutral state. But Epicurus allows of no midway between the two: pleasure is defined as the absence of pain. Not, of course, that any absence of pain (e.g. death) is pleasure, but any painless conscious life is a pleasure, where, we must remember, life would not consist simply in being alive, but in living the kind of life characteristic of the species. So with sentient beings there are just two ways in which in their sentient activity they can be affected: painfully or pleasurably, the first being aversive, the second appetitive.

So every perception involves being affected in one or other of these ways and in such perception a sentient being grasps the value or disvalue of being so affected, a grasp that is, at a pre-logical level, constituted by acceptance or aversion. Clearly the whole bias of this way of thinking will be to make the goodness of each particular pleasure obvious in each perception. There will be no temptation to make the value of pleasure maximization over a life obvious to perception.

Nor will any need be felt to appeal to Eudoxan observations as to how human beings argue about the worth of things, what questions they do or do not ask, still less to argue from premisses that suppose that there are other goods than pleasure. If a judgment of worth can be known to be true then it must be possible to refer to some value given in perception to substantiate it, and the only answer can be that it contains pleasures, for anything else can only be judged good in so far as it yields this. If now we are to compare lives it can only be by some comparison of pleasantness, and anyone who makes a judgment about the worth of a life is making ajudgment that can only be substantiated by reference to its pleasantness, which can only be judged in the last resort by the person who lives it. There is room for argument as to what form of life is pleasantest, but no room at all for discussion as to what makes something good.

This sentence, i think, helps with the question of why not sit in the dark staring at a candle: "

"Not, of course, that any absence of pain (e.g. death) is pleasure, but any painless conscious life is a pleasure, where, we must remember, life would not consist simply in being alive, but in living the kind of life characteristic of the species."

To consult DeWitt's perspective on this if we choose to, we are probably talking about the section entitled "Unity of Pleasure" starting page 232, which includes this below, which incorporates the k/k distinction as a reference to "intensity." Dewitt seems to be suggesting that the same type of feeling of pleasure or pain is being considered acute / intense / kinetic if experienced over a short time and is being considered less acute / less intense / katastematic if experienced over a longer time:

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To substantiate this drift of reasoning it is not impossible to quote a text: "The stable condition of well·being in the flesh and the confident hope of its continuance means the most exquisite and infallible of joys for those who are capable of figuring the problem out."'

This passage marks a distinct increase of precision in the analysis of pleasure. Its import will become clear if the line of reasoning already adumbrated be properly extended: let it be granted that the escape from a violent death is the greatest of joys and the inference must follow that the possession of life at other times cannot rank greatly lower.

Similarly, if the recovery from a dangerous illness be a cause for joy, manifestly the possession of health ought to be a joy at other times. Nevertheless the two pleasures differ from one another and it was in recognition of the difference that Epicurus instituted the distinction between kinetic and static pleasures. The difference is one of intensity or, as Epicurus would have said, of condensation. At one time the pleasure is condensed, at another, extended. In other words the same pleasure may be either kinetic or static. If condensed, it is kinetic; if extended, it is static.

There is a catch to this reasoning, however; it holds good only "for those who are capable of figuring the problem out:' This marks Epicurus as a pragmatist, insisting upon the control of experience, including thought. His reasoning about kinetic and static pleasures is sound, but human beings do not automatically reason after this fashion; they fail to reason about the matter at all. Although they would spontaneously admit the keenest joy at recovery from wounds or disease. they forget about the blessing of health at other times. Hence it is that Epicurus insists upon the necessity of being able to reason in this way. Moreover. this reasoning must be confirmed by habituation. The same rule applies here as in the case of "Death is nothing to us:' It is not enough to master the reasons for so believing; it is also necessary to habituate one's self to so believe. This is pragmatism.

Under this view it looks to me like you are definitely acknowledging differences in intensity of pleasures and pains, so you are not being unrealistic and acting as if that difference is not there, but you are mentally conditioning yourself to view them as similar in nature because this mental perspective allows you to appreciate whichever you have under a particular circumstance.

"And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.

[130] Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good. And again independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. And so plain savours bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed; and bread and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips.

[131] To grow accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless of fortune."

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So of course you are going to engage in "sex, drugs, and rocknroll" when you can do so without experiencing more pain than pleasure, but if for any reason you are not able to engage in them without causing yourself more pain than pleasure, you are going to have no reason to regret your choice to decline because you can make up for that declined pleasure by finding compensating pleasure in other activities. The focus of your decisionmaking is always on maximizing the predominance of pleasure over pain in total, and you aren't inherently favoring intense over non-intense or non-intense over intense. You're just picking a mix between the two that under your circumstances will produce the greatest pleasure.

Quote from Godfrey

t would appear that there's no sliding scale of intensity, other than through location and duration, by definition. At least That's what I'm thinking right here, right now. That may change.

Me too as to out for a while. But before I go:

Dropping back for a moment, if there are only two of a thing being discussed, then the presence of one = absence of the other and he highest possible absence of one is the highest possible presence of the other, full stop. That's all you need to know to say that in any such situation that if one is totally absent, the other is totally present. You don't need any information whatsoever about duration, location, or intensity whatsoever if you are told a person is "without pain" to know that he is in "total pleasure." So that intellectual formulation can't be violated and you are going to stick with it with the tenacity of Torquatus and you are never going to admit an exception, because of the way you have defined the terms and held that there are only two possibilities.

At the same time, in real life, no matter what your intellectual classification scheme, the senses are able to pick up differences of duration, location, and intensity of sensation.

Recall that Epicurus himself notes that some feelings are more acute than others in PD04: Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.

You're not going to abandon your classification scheme, in which every experience is deemed pleasurable unless it is painful. But you also aren't going to ignore the different sensory information that the senses are providing. When you are dying with very great kidney pain you aren't going to offset that pain with thinking about how you trimmed your fingernails this morning, but only with a very great pleasure.

So you have to be able to incorporate both levels of perspective in a general theory of pleasure and pain if you're going to be persuasive that your theory has validity.

Quote from Godfrey

There is only the feeling of pleasure/pain, it is a two-way switch, and it varies in magnitude only through location and duration.

At least at the moment I would definitely resist that interpretation. There's no doubt some interesting terminology going on here, and maybe that's one possibility, but it seems intuitive to me that when Epicurus talks about not wanting the longest but "the most pleasant" he is talking about more than "location."

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PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another"

Is it possible that one inference to take from this is that variety in pleasures IS desirable, and that we should not seek to let any of the three factors take over exclusively, even though variety does not take the amount of pleasure past its theoretical limit?

With the final unstated clause not being "but they do" but being instead "and you should not want them to or try to make them."

We seem to presume that Epicurus would disagree with "Variety is the spice of life" but maybe he *would* agree with that, and this PD is embracing variety because Epicurus sees the advantage in all three aspects?

My first suggestion would be consideration of the opening of Lucretius - Pleasure is not just a "reaction to events" but is a guiding and leading and motivating force that is programmed not randomly but in an evolutionary way to improve, and not to accept a minimum when more can be obtained. Else pleasure would never have led living things down the path of evolution to where we are today.

Is a constant drive to greater duration, location and intensity inherent in pleasure itself?

To repeat myself, it must be true that greater duration, location, AND intensity of pleasure are inherently desirable.

The precise apportionment between the three might be a matter of personal preference but the three still have some kind of priority status in the analysis over other considerations.

The phrase from the letter to Meoceus that we don't want the longest life but the "most pleasurable" certainly is relevant, but something has to show that it isn't sufficient to fill 100% of our locations and durations with sitting in a cave staring at the wall. That intuitively is not sufficient but if accepted would make intensity irrelevant - just as expanding any one of the three exclusively would make the other two irrelevant.

Duration, location, and intensity must have some kind of natural status of importance that requires consideration of all three.

Godfrey I don't recall that you commented on "why accept the minimum when more us possible" and I suspect that is key to completing this analysis. There is some aspect to "Intensity" that fits into this puzzle. More intensity has to be obviously desirable just like it is obvious that you want the most duration and locations.

While I am sure that there is a rational explanation that makes all this clear, as I said in the podcast I have to agree with Cicero that there is something going on here with the terminology which is not obvious and requires an explanation. We need to complete the circuit by incorporating duration intensity and location just as you are trying to do in order to complete the "General Theory of Epicurean Pleasure."

Quote from Godfrey

If intensity can increase at the micro level beyond the absence of pain, why can it not increase at the macro level

This sentence I think cannot be correct as to "absence of pain' at the micro level. Describing relative intensity between pleasures requires more qualifiers it seems like, because even though "absence of pain" seems to be identical with pleasure, "absence of pain" seems to always be used to describe a top limit while "pleasure" seems usable in ways that can be more or less strong.

If they are identical terms it would seem that they could be used interchangeably, but apparently not. Maybe there is a clue in "usage" which Cicero starts talking about in the same section as with words referring to variety and gladness

Quote from Godfrey

What's not obvious to me is the role of intensity. If intensity can increase at the micro level beyond the absence of pain, why can it not increase at the macro level

Godfrey I think we crossposted but we were thinking about the same subject. It seems to me that "absence of pain" is not terminology that can be improved at either macro level or when referring to a particular location.

Godfrey to continue on this part of the discussion in an admittedly narrow and technical way rather than making a super important point, I wanted to make another comment on your statement here:

Quote from Godfrey

So, interestingly, the maximum pleasure of the entire organism is the absence of pain, whereas the absence of pain is the minimum of pleasure for any specific location in the organism.

I made a comment on this already, but here is something more about considering any interpretation of "absence of pain" as a "minimum":

From section IV of Book Two (again I am rewording to make it clear who is speaking so check the original:

Torquatus: ‘Can then anything be sweeter than to feel no pain?’

CIcero: "Nay, be it granted that there is nothing better, for I am not yet investigating that question; does it therefore follow that painlessness, so to call it, is identical with pleasure?’

Torquatus: ‘It is quite identical, and is the greatest possible, and no pleasure can be greater.’

Presuming that last sentence is translated correctly, and I have no reason to doubt it, this is another explicit statement that the Epicurean position is that:

1 - "Painlessness"/ "Absence of Pain" is IDENTICAL to pleasure. I interpret that to mean that the two concepts ("absence of pain" and "pleasure") are two separate words being used to describe exactly the same thing, meaning that the two words can be used interchangeably in referring to an individual discrete feeling.

2 - That using the term 'painlessness" or "pleasure" without any modifiers or caveats can also imply that you are referring to pleasure at the "macro" or "whole organism" level and therefore you are referring to "pure pleasure" which by definition means the "greatest pleasure," "no pleasure being greater."

My point in this post is that i am cautious in the wording so we can try to track the Epicurean usage. If you refer to a person, or a person refers to themselves at the moment, as being "painless," then that seems to be the equivalent of saying that they are at the height of pleasure in both body and mind as a full organism. If you refer, on the other hand, to some part of your body as being painless (such as hand or foot or your mind) then you are just referring to a location and saying nothing about the rest of the body or mind, which could be experiencing pain at the same time.

So I am cautious about referring to "painless" as a starting point. A painless foot and hand and adding them up is a good start, yes, but "painlessness" at the macro full organism level is apparently being defined as being 100% full of pleasure and a very great pleasure. Now maybe "variation" can explain this in a way consistent with "starting point," but I'm not sure that's consistent with the texts.

Maybe in the discussion of variation we'll find more to go on as to that aspect.

Welcome to Episode 196 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Books One and Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted to Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition

We are using the Reid edition, so check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

As we proceed we will keep track of Cicero's arguments and outline them here:

Cicero's Objections to Epicurean Philosophy

Last week we started discussion of Section IV and this week we will pick up at the same place and deal with Cicero's argument as he pursues his argument that Epicurus does not know what he means when he talks about pleasure:

Anytime we start talking in terms of a "life" or implying "length of time" is an issue I think we need to remember this from the letter to Menoeceus:

[126] But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another (yearn for it) as a respite from the (evils) in life. (But the wise man neither seeks to escape life) nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

New followup at Facebook:

John Bramwell

On the 9th September Cassius Amicus posed an interesting question wether I would prefer to be an ignorant shepherd lying in the grass or Epicurus in pain both with only a week to live.

There is no easy answer to this poser as there is other factors to be contemplated. Did the young shepherd have an old widowed mother to take care of etc.

But what if the period of time were different and what if they did not know the time frame at all.

Had the shepherd been told of the horrors that might await him, all sorts of things.

I am not going to give an opinion except that I think it is only human beings that have a concept of death and once this “cat” was out of the bag there was no going back.

Perhaps I am being naive but I believe that Epicurus put the cat back in the bag, so to speak.

CASSIUS REPLY:

Hi John. The point in the hypothetical was to compare the life of an educated Epicurean, even with significant physical pain (Epicurus), to the life of an uneducated regular person who spends his or her time without significant physical pain (the hypothetical shepherd). As you say, there are all sorts of unknowns in the hypothetical, but the issue involves assessing what "absence of pain" really means in Epicurean philosophy and how we process that term as the goal of life.

This is a subject on which Cicero criticized Epicurus extensively in Book 2 of Cicero's "On Ends," and that's the subject of our most recent Episode 195 of the Lucretius Today podcast.

Ultimately I think there is no absolute answer to the question of which life is "best" or which "should" be preferred. There are no divine answers or Platonic absolutes which establish which is "better." We all have our own feelings of pleasure and pain as to what is most significant to us, and we can offset pleasures against pains and still find a predominance of pleasure even in situations involving significant pain.

I respect anyone who answers differently from me as having a right to their own opinion, but I know which I personally prefer to choose in my own life. I frequently choose actions which bring some amount of pain in exchange for greater pleasure thereafter, and I do not obsess over avoiding all forms of pain every second of my life.

I think the position we take on what Epicurus is saying on this point is the difference between considering Epicurus to be the greatest philosopher of the western world vs. considering Epicurus to be a ho-hum also-ran.

Note: the podcast post is here:

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Oh, and great discussion in 195! Well done! Looking forward to more Cicero dissection.

Ok I am glad we pass that test, because I am pretty sure we want to add 195 to the list of "most important" episodes.

Quote from Godfrey

A question is "why is absence of pain throughout the organism (macro) the limit of magnitude, whereas a more localized pleasure (micro) can increase beyond mere absence of pain?"

I think we could reword that this way:

A question is "why is absence of pain (which is the definition of pleasure) through the organism (at macro level) the limit of magnitude, whereas a more localized pleasure (at the micro level) can increase?"

If that is saying the same thing, which I think it is, the answer is pretty obvious: a macro level pleasure cannot increase by definition. because it has no more room to increase, while pleasure at any smaller degree than macro level can increase because it still has room to increase.

I am not sure this is any more difficult than remembering "positive, comparative, superlative" as parts of speech.

In "good, better, best" the "good" gives you a description of what you are talking about, the "better" is the comparative form distinguishing one from another, and the "best" is by definition the superlative form which you are saying cannot (again by definition) increase.

I am thinking words like "full" and "complete" and "pure" and "godlike" are meant as superlatives and simply being used to refer to the "best" possible.

And I think these issues we're discussing are the primary and important big picture items to get clear first.

Secondarily we have the kinetic/katastematic issue as Don has interjected I think correctly as "types" or categories of pleasure that are included in the sweeping mix as descriptions that involve manner of experience. As differences involving manner of experience those are useful to consider but i don't see them as words expressing comparatives or superlatives of Pleasure as the general category. You can use and need both. They are types of pleasure like mental vs bodily or hearing vs seeing or long-lasting vs short, but I don't see them as being evaluated as better or best types of Pleasure, which is the big complaint I have against the usual K/K analysis. I would say both are "good" types of pleasure (all types of pleasure being "good") but their relative contribution toward one's total experience can increase and decrease with circumstances as part of making up the total organism over its lifetime. Many types of trees can make up a forest, but what we want to talk about in general terms as a way of evaluating the best way of life (the way we want to set as our goal) is the "forest" level. If we expend our entire conversation on "what about elms?" and "what about poplars?" and "what about oaks?" and "what about pines?" etc etc then we lose our focus on discussing "what about the forest as a whole?"

Quote from Godfrey

So, interestingly, the maximum pleasure of the entire organism is the absence of pain, whereas the absence of pain is the minimum of pleasure for any specific location in the organism

Yes as to the first part before the comma, but I am not sure that our definition of pleasure as absence of pain necessarily leads to the part after the comma. Perhaps this is where the "quantity" issue comes in, with quantity being relevant differently at the macro vs the micro levels. Maybe quantity applies at the macro level but at the micro level that is where you have duration, intensity, and location?

Maybe duration intensity and location are not relevant at the macro / full level? (Maybe I should say the macro/full perspective.)

Does that involve the Diogenes Laertius statement that there are two types of happiness/pleasure, one at the god level and one capable of increase and decrease?

"They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures."

Quote from Godfrey

"In terms of an entire organism, the maximum pleasure is the absence of pain throughout the organism. In any part of the organism, any degree of pleasure removes all pain in that part for as long as it is there, because pleasure is equal to the absence of pain

So to restate my question, I think this is significant advance in explaining what "absence of pain" is intended to mean. But there still remains a "degree" question as to why a baby whose day is 100% pleasure should wish to live another day, much less live to adulthood. There is another aspect of identifying what we mean by "the entire organism" that must explain that point. Something relating to the lifespan and/or natural capacities of the organism.