Posts by Cassius

The questions involved in this thread came up tonight in our "First Monday / New Member" meeting. To some extent the question comes down to:

Is it useful at all -- is it possible at all - to think in terms of a "total experience" or "net experience" and then break down that experience into discrete pleasures and pains that fall one one side of the balance vs. the other side?

I think most of us agree that it is impossible "mathematically" or "in precise quantity" to "measure" individual pleasures and pains.

On the other hand, I think most of us would also admit that there is a sense in which we are continually doing exactly that: we are looking at situations and deciding what to choose and what to avoid based on what we expect to happen in terms of more pains or more pleasures.

So I post this to suggest that we have more work to do so that people on both sides of these issues can bridge the gap between what we do in real life (where we do weigh pleasures against pains) vs the limitations of a mathematical model.

How do we sufficiently explain the limits of such a model while also getting the benefits that should come in visualizing the practical choices we have to make in life?

December 6, 2023 - Agenda - Wednesday Night Zoom - VS 50 & 51

• Please join us. (Post here in this thread if you have never attended one of these sessions, as we do have a vetting process for new participants.)
  Vatican Sayings 50 and 51
• VS50. No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.
• VS51. You tell me that the stimulus of the flesh makes you too prone to the pleasures of love. Provided that you do not break the laws, or good customs, and do not distress any of your neighbors, or do harm to your body, or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please. Yet it is impossible not to come up against one or other of these barriers, for the pleasures of love never profited a man and he is lucky if they do him no harm.

• Old Matters from last week
• New Matters for Agenda this week or next week.

Quote from Bryan

(Voula Tsouna trans.) "…for otherwise it would be of no use that the good should be limited but impossible or difficult for us to attain..."

Makes perfect sense -- thank you!

Quote from Kalosyni

..this is a deep and long practice, that takes time

The kind of thing to have a list to remind yourself daily to think about.

Quote from Don

I forgot I had put that list together. I was literally thinking today that I needed to do it for this thread.

Glad I was able to find it.

This time for this thread too let's examine the question of:

"Should we generally see "ataraxia" as meaning pain of mind and "aponia" meaning pain of body?"

If not, what is the relationship between these words when referring to body and mind?

Can we have "ataraxia" of the body? Can we have "aponia" of the mind?

And since Epicurus does regularly use words in a different way, I suppose the question breaks down into:

1 - In what way did the Greeks "in general" use these two words? and

2 - In what way did Epicurus use them?

Still focusing I think on being clear about this distinction:

Does ataraxia always refer to the mind and does aponia always refer to the body? Can we have "ataraxia" of the body? Can we have "aponia" of the mind?

Quote from Don

[Column 4] [Epicurus teaches us that good is easy for us to procure] and that evil is [not] only limited by precisely because it is useless to have defined the good (τἀγαθόν), if it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to attain, nor to have fixed limits to evil, if it is difficult to bear because of its long duration. This knowledge has the effect of prohibiting both the pursuit of any [good] which is not by nature capable of eliminating pain (ἀλγηδόνα) - such are, most of the time, the [goods] which have motivated a search eager in humans -, and let none be discarded which does not prevent having pleasure -- that is how one must [conceive] most of [those which are acquired] gradually.

Don the part where I underlined there -- should that be "desired" rather than "defined"?

From a prior post by Don:

Feb 19th 2023

#3

ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ (Eudaimonia and related terms. There are not as many variants of eudaimonia as ataraxia, but all present will be accounted for in this entry)

From εὐδαίμων (eudaímōn, “fortunate”) +‎ -ίᾱ (-íā, “feminine abstract substantive”); eu "good/well" + daimon "in-dwelling spirit; daemon". While δαίμων was sometimes used interchangeably with θεός (theós), when used together in a context, a δαίμων is usually a lower god than a θεός (theós).

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h…4.0057:entry=eu)daimoni/a

NOTE: This is a placeholder entry for occurrences of eudaimonia in the texts ... more to come.

From a prior post by Don:

Feb 19th 2023

#2

ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ (Ataraxia and related terms: Note that αταραξια is literally "ataraksia" even though the usual English spelling is "ataraxia." Therefore, words that have atarak- are directly related.

From ἀ- (a-, “not”) +‎ ταράσσω (tarássō, “trouble, disturb”) +‎ -ῐ́ᾱ (-íā); Antonyms: τᾰρᾰχή (tarakhḗ)

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀτα^ρ-αξία

PD17 One who acts aright is utterly steady and serene, whereas one who goes astray is full of trouble and confusion. (Peter Saint-Andre)

ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δʼ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γήμων.

NOTE: ἀταρακτότατος means "utterly without disturbance" and by extension steady or serene, whereas πλείστης ταραχῆς means full of trouble, disorder, or tumult (expanded here to "full of trouble and confusion"; see also PD22

***

VS79 He who is as peace within himself also causes no trouble for others. (Peter Saint-Andre)

ὁ ἀτάραχος ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀόχλητος.

***

Fragment 519. The greatest fruit of justice is serenity.

δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.

***

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus (DL 10.53; Hicks via Perseus): "Again, we must believe that smelling,81 like hearing, would produce no sensation, were there not particles conveyed from the object which are of the proper sort for exciting the organ of smelling, some of one sort, some of another, some exciting it confusedly and strangely, others quietly and agreeably.

"Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν ὀσμὴν νομιστέον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὐθὲν πάθος ἐργάσασθαι, εἰ μὴ ὄγκοι τινὲς ἦσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀποφερόμενοι σύμμετροι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθητήριον κινεῖν, οἱ μὲν τοῖοι τεταραγμένως καὶ ἀλλοτρίως, οἱ δὲ τοῖοι ἀταράχως καὶ οἰκείως ἔχοντες.

***

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus (DL 10.80; Hicks via Perseus): [80] we must not suppose that our treatment of these matters fails of accuracy, so far as it is needful to ensure our tranquillity and happiness (Don Note: lit. blessedness "makarion" - same word used for the gods). When, therefore, we investigate the causes of celestial and atmospheric phenomena, as of all that is unknown, we must take into account the variety of ways in which analogous occurrences happen within our experience ; while as for those who do not recognize the difference between what is or comes about from a single cause and that which may be the effect of any one of several causes, overlooking the fact that the objects are only seen at a distance, and are moreover ignorant of the conditions that render, or do not render, peace of mind impossible --all such persons we must treat with contempt. If then we think that an event could happen in one or other particular way out of several, we shall be as tranquil when we recognize that it actually comes about in more ways than one as if we knew that it happens in this particular way.

[80] οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων χρείαν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ἀπειληφέναι, ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν συντείνει. ὥστε παραθεωροῦντας ποσαχῶς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν τὸ ὅμοιον γίνεται, αἰτιολογητέον ὑπέρ τε τῶν μετεώρων καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ἀδήλου, καταφρονοῦντας τῶν οὔτε τὸ μοναχῶς ἔχον ἢ γινόμενον γνωριζόντων οὔτε τὸ πλεοναχῶς συμβαῖνον, τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀποστημάτων φαντασίαν παριδόντων,121 ἔτι τε ἀγνοούντων καὶ ἐν ποίοις οὐκ ἐστιν ἀταρακτῆσαι <καὶ ἐν ποίοις ὁμοίως ἀταρακτῆσαι.>122 ἂν οὖν οἰώμεθα καὶ ὡδί πως ἐνδεχόμενον αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι, αὐτὸ τὸ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς γίνεται γνωρίζοντες, ὥσπερ κἂν ὅτι ὡδί πως γίνεται εἴδωμεν, ἀταρακτήσομεν.

***

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus (DL 10.82; Hicks via Perseus): [82] But mental tranquillity means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.

[82] ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελύσθαι καὶ συνεχῆ μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κυριωτάτων.

***

Epicurs, Letter to Pythocles (DL 10.85; Hicks via Perseus): "In the first place, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial phenomena, whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than peace of mind and firm conviction.

"Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετεώρων γνώσεως εἴτε κατὰ συναφὴν λεγομένων εἴτε αὐτοτελῶς νομίζειν εἶναι ἤπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν.

***

Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles (DL 10.96; Hicks via Perseus): [96] For in all the celestial phenomena such a line of research is not to be abandoned ; for, if you fight against clear evidence, you never can enjoy genuine peace of mind.

[96] ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ τῶν μετεώρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἴχνευσιν152 οὐ προετέον. ἢν γάρ τις ᾖ μαχόμενος τοῖς ἐναργήμασιν, οὐδέποτε δυνήσεται ἀταραξίας γνησίου μεταλαβεῖν.

***

Epicurus, On Choices and Avoidances (DL10.136; Hicks revised slightly by Don to be more literal, via Perseus): And Epicurus in his work On Choice states in this manner: "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."

***

Epicurus, Letter to Menoikeus 128 ( Don translation):

[128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind* since this is the goal of a blessed life.

[128] τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν <τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος.

*NOTE: I added the parenthetical phrase "that is for our physical and our mental existence," at this point in my translation to clarify and paraphrase the previous phrases.

***

I would also include citations to γαληνίζω (galēnizō) and related terms as synonyms for ataraxia:

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus (DL 10.37): [37] "Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this"

37] "Ὅθεν δὴ πᾶσι χρησίμης οὔσης τοῖς ᾠκειωμένοις φυσιολογίᾳ τῆς τοιαύτης ὁδοῦ, παρεγγυῶν τὸ συνεχὲς ἐνέργημα ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἐγγαληνίζων τῷ βίῳ ἐποίησά σοι ...

ἐγγαληνίζω τῷ βίῳ, "spend life calmly" from γαληνίζω

A.calm, still, esp. waves or winds, Hp.Vict.3.71, E.Fr.1079.

2. intr., become calm, prob. in Hp. Morb.Sacr.13; to be calm or tranquil, Alex.178.6, Ph.1.354; “τὸ γαληνίζον τῆς θαλάττης” Arist.Pr.936a5:—so in Med., Xenocr. ap. Orib.2.58.98.

***

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus (DL 10.83, last line of the letter):

"It is of such a sort that those who are already tolerably, or even perfectly, well acquainted with the details can, by analysis of what they know into such elementary perceptions as these, best prosecute their researches in physical science as a whole ; while those, on the other hand, who are not altogether entitled to rank as mature students can in silent fashion and as quick as thought run over the doctrines most important for their peace of mind."

"Τοιαῦτα γάρ ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἤδη ἐξακριβοῦντας ἱκανῶς ἢ καὶ τελείως, εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀναλύοντας ἐπιβολάς, τὰς πλείστας τῶν περιοδειῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως ποιεῖσθαι: ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντελῶς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἰσίν, ἐκ τούτων καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄνευ φθόγγων τρόπον τὴν ἅμα νοήματι περίοδον τῶν κυριωτάτων πρὸς γαληνισμὸν ποιοῦνται."

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, γα^λην-ισμός

***

It would also be instructive to include variations on the word ταραχή (tarakhē; "trouble", "disorder", or "tumult") since that forms the root of ataraxia ("no trouble", "no disorder", or "no tumult")

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, τα^ρα^χή

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus. (DL 10.77): [77] For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one's neighbours. Nor, again, must we hold that things which are no more than globular masses of fire, being at the same time endowed with bliss, assume these motions at will. Nay, in every term we use we must hold fast to all the majesty which attaches to such notions as bliss and immortality, lest the terms should generate opinions inconsistent with this majesty. Otherwise such inconsistency will of itself suffice to produce the worst disturbance in our minds. Hence, where we find phenomena invariably recurring, the invariableness of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original interception and conglomeration of atoms whereby the world was formed.

[77] ἀφθαρσίας ῾οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα γίγνεταἰ, μήτε αὖ πυρὸς ἀνάμματα συνεστραμμένου τὴν μακαριότητα κεκτημένα κατὰ βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις ταύτας λαμβάνειν: ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ σέμνωμα τηρεῖν, κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα φερόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐννοίας, ἵνα μηδ᾽ ὑπεναντίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν <γένωνται> τῷ σεμνώματι δόξαι: εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπεναντιότης παρασκευάσει. ὅθεν δὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναπολήψεις τῶν συστροφῶν τούτων ἐν τῇ τοῦ κόσμου γενέσει δεῖ δοξάζειν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην ταύτην καὶ περίοδον συντελεῖσθαι.

***

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus. (DL 10.78):

"Ἔτι τε οὐ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύσει τῶν διάκρισιν ὑποβαλλόντων ἢ τάραχον μηθέν: καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς εἶναι.

"Further, we must recognize on such points as this no plurality of causes or contingency, but must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature. And the mind can grasp the absolute truth of this.

***

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus. (DL 10.81): [81] "There is yet one more point to seize, namely, that the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief ; and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us ; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague.

[81] "Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ὅλως ἅπασιν ἐκεῖνο δεῖ κατανοεῖν, ὅτι τάραχος ὁ κυριώτατος ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς γίνεται ἐν τῷ ταῦτά τε μακάρια δοξάζειν <εἶναι> καὶ ἄφθαρτα, καὶ ὑπεναντίας ἔχειν τούτῳ βουλήσεις ἅμα καὶ πράξεις καὶ αἰτίας, καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰώνιόν τι δεινὸν ἀεὶ προσδοκᾶν ἢ ὑποπτεύειν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους εἴ τε καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὴν ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι φοβουμένους ὥσπερ οὖσαν κατ᾽ αὐτούς, καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ δόξαις ταῦτα πάσχειν ἀλλ᾽ ἀλόγῳ γέ τινι παραστάσει, ὅθεν μὴ ὁρίζοντας τὸ δεινὸν τὴν ἴσην ἢ καὶ ἐπιτεταμένην ταραχὴν λαμβάνειν τῷ εἰκαίως δοξάζοντι ταῦτα:

(NOTE: This directly precedes section DL 10.82 cited above and below.)

***

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus. (DL 10.82): For by studying them we shall rightly trace to its cause and banish the source of disturbance and dread, accounting for celestial phenomena and for all other things which from time to time befall us and cause the utmost alarm to the rest of mankind.

ἂν γὰρ τούτοις προσέχωμεν, τὸ ὅθεν ὁ τάραχος καὶ ὁ φόβος ἐγίνετο ἐξαιτιολογήσομεν ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀπολύσομεν, ὑπέρ τε μετεώρων αἰτιολογοῦντες καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἀεὶ παρεμπιπτόντων, ὅσα φοβεῖ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐσχάτως.

***

Epicurus, Letter to Menoikeus, (DL 10.131, Don translation):

Therefore, whenever we say repeatedly that "pleasure is the τέλος," we do not say the pleasure of those who are prodigal like those who are ignorant, those who don't agree with us, or those who believe wrongly; but we mean that which neither pains the body nor troubles the mind.

Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν, ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν·

***

PD22 (Peter Saint-Andre) You must reflect on the fundamental goal and everything that is clear, to which opinions are referred; if you do not, all will be full of trouble and confusion.

τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς δεῖ τέλος ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ἐφʼ ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ πάντα ἀκρισίας καὶ ταραχῆς ἔσται μεστά.

NOTE: Here the translated phrase "trouble and confusion" reflects the Greek words ἀκρισία (literally "indistinctness") and ταραχή (literally "trouble", "disorder", or "tumult"); see also Principal Doctrine #17 and the note thereto.

***

NOTE: This is not necessarily an exhaustive list as the writings of Philodemus and Metrodorus may yield more citations, but they are not as readily searched as the sources above.

"Eudaemonia" is a key term in Epicurean philosophy. What exactly does it mean? There seems to be a consensus that it translates to "good spirit," but is this a reference to happiness, or to something else? This thread is for discussion of the meaning of "Ataraxia," including citations to reference where the term appears in Epicurean texts.

For the time being - Elli's vocabulary list -- which is excellent - but which unfortunately we cannot expect most new people to have access to:

"Ataraxia" is a key term in Epicurean philosophy. What exactly does it mean? There seems to be a consensus that it translates to "absence of disturbance," but is this a reference to bodily disturbance, to mental disturbance, to both, or with other connotations? How is "disturbance" different from "pain?" This thread is for discussion of the meaning of "Ataraxia," including citations to reference where the term appears in Epicurean texts.

ἀταραξία - Ancient Greek (LSJ)

Ion. ἀταραξίη, ἡ, impassiveness, calmness, ataraxia, unperturbedness, imperturbability, equanimity, tranquility Democr. ap. Stob.2.7.3i, Hp.Ep.12, Epicur.Ep.1p.30U., Phld.Oec.p.63 J., Cic.Fam.15.19.2, Hero Bel.71.2, Plu.2.101b, Plot. 1.4.1, etc.; prob. f.l. for ἀταξία in Hp.Praec.14.

For the time being - Elli's vocabulary list -- which is excellent - but which unfortunately we cannot expect most new people to have access to:

"Aponia" is a key term in Epicurean philosophy. What exactly does it mean? There seems to be a consensus that it translates to "absence of pain," but is this a reference to bodily pain, to mental pain, to both, or with other connotations? This thread is for discussion of the meaning of "Aponia," including citations to reference where the term appears in Epicurean texts.

ἀπονία - Ancient Greek (LSJ)

ἡ, (ἄπονος)
A non-exertion, laziness, X.Cyr.2.2.25, Arist.Rh. 1370a14(pl.); exemption from toil, of women, Id.GA775a37, cf. Plu. Rom.6.
II freedom from pain, Epicur.Fr.2, Chrysipp.Stoic.3.33, Dsc.Eup.1.67, Aret.SA2.1, etc.

For the time being - Elli's vocabulary list -- which is excellent - but which unfortunately we cannot expect most new people to have access to:

Aside - Waterholic is the thread name change ok?

Quote from waterholic

To be clear, I don't believe such mathematics in practical life would be of any value or use - we are far better equipped to do the mental "maths" between pleasure and pain by default.

Yes I agree, but I DO think that plotting out some kind of graphical picture DOES help with a high-level understanding of the relationships between plain and pleasure, and so I think this is very worthwhile. There's simply too much muddy thinking out there to take anything for granted.

Quote from waterholic

I have to think about this. The stimuli here refers to any stimulation of our brain.

And I gather that Cicero's discussion is focusing on "stimulation of the senses." Does all awareness come through the senses? I'd say probably not, and maybe the precise issue they were debating is whether pleasure must be confined to actions of "the senses" or whether pleasure can be experienced (mentally) without the *present* stimulation of the senses. The relationship between "experience" and "sense" is pretty tricky and I am not sure how to best express it.

Quote from waterholic

The middle white area is our daily life. When pain is brought down to the minimum (close to 0) we experience maximum pleasure, no matter how much pleasure stimuli we actually receive at that moment

Also: Don especially:

I wonder if the "stimuli we receive" phrasing (which is inherent in a lot of common discussion, and not just in this thread) is part of the problem. Is not Epicurus saying that the normal condition pleasures are not "stimuli" that are "received" at all, but self-generated through the minds appreciation of the true facts of life? The "received" part is especially a problem if that word implies that they just fall in your lap without effort, which I gather is pretty clear they do not (or at least they are not always seen to be pleasure without proper philosophy).

As one more aside, I see that in some of our recent Cicero reading that the wording is "life accompanied by pleasure" and "life accompanied by pain" as the way the issue is being described. While the "life" part is probably something to be clearly presumed, I wonder if in our current state of world corruption that the "life" part needs to be added back in to take account of the fact that pleasure and pain do not occur except for the living. And would that also not make clear why we would sometime choose death rather than "life accompanied by total pain."

I am not at all sure of that but one of the recent sections in Book 1 or 2 did seem to use (at least Reid translated it as) "life accompanied by" --- and that *might* be significant.

EDIT:

Book 2 ==

XII. Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance. When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better? Imagine on the other hand a man worn by the greatest mental and bodily pains which can befall a human being, with no hope before him that his lot will ever be lighter, and moreover destitute of pleasure either actual or probable; what more pitiable object can be mentioned or imagined? But if a life replete with pains is above all things to be shunned, then assuredly the supreme evil is life accompanied by pain; and from this view it is a consistent inference that the climax of things good is life accompanied by pleasure.

Just for the sake of thought, not to disagree with your points:

1. the state of no pain is the absolute pleasure (or is it "the highest" pleasure? and should we add for completeness that the state of no pleasure is the highest pain?)
2. pain and pleasure cannot be mixed (I see no issues there, unless it helps to say that they can "coexist in separate parts of the experience, but not mix")
3. even at rest and without intense stimuli we can feel pleasure (given that pleasure is not defined as requiring stimuli at all, but as "agreeable feeling")
4. weak pain can be endured, intense pain is not permanent (there is limit to absolute pain). (to "the highest" pain?)

Thank you for the time putting all that together!

Quote from waterholic

Once again, this is just a model of the way I understand Epicurus for the moment. Any thoughts on whether I am missing something?

I am going to have to take some time to absorb it all.

Perhaps labeling (at least on the main chart) the directions of greater pleasure / lesser pleasure and greater pain / lesser pain?

It probably should be obvious but not on first glance, at least to a non-mathematician like me.

Also, why does the numbering jump from 5.50 to 1000, and from 1.10 to 1000?

Also: Is there a narrative explanation of what the "arctan" function does? Why are the charts not simple arithmetic?

And last, on the "over time" chart, where do the input values come from per day. Presuming that you are just taking random numbers, could that be stated so as to make the chart more clear?

Welcome to Episode 204 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week we move on through Section XIII, starting roughly here:

... Well, this is directed against Aristippus, who accounts that pleasure which all of us alone call pleasure, to be not only the highest but the only form of pleasure; while your school holds different doctrine. But he, as I have said, is in fault; since neither the shape of the human body nor reason, preeminent among man’s mental endowments, gives any indication that man came into existence for the sole purpose of enjoying pleasures. Nor indeed must we listen to Hieronymus, whose supreme good is the same as that on which your school sometimes or rather very often insists, absence of pain. For if pain is an evil it does not follow that to be free from that evil suffices to produce the life of happiness. Let Ennius rather speak thus: he has a vast amount of good who has no ill; let us estimate happiness not by the banishment of evil, but by the acquisition of good, and let us not seek this in inactivity, whether of a joyous kind, like that of Aristippus, or marked by absence of pain, like that of our philosopher, but in action of some sort and reflection. Now these arguments may be advanced in the same form against the Carneadean view of the supreme good, though he proposed it not so much with the purpose of securing approval as with the intention of combating the Stoics, against whom he waged war; his supreme good is however of such a nature that when joined to virtue it seems likely to exert influence and to furnish forth abundantly the life of happiness, with which subject our whole inquiry is concerned. Those indeed who join to virtue either pleasure, the thing of all others which virtue holds in least esteem, or the absence of pain, which though it is unassociated with evil, still is not the supreme good, make an addition which is not very plausible, yet I do not under- stand why they should carry out the idea in such a niggardly and narrow manner. For, as though they had to pay for anything which they join with virtue, they in the first place unite with her the cheapest articles, next they would rather add things singly than combine with morality all those objects to which nature had primarily given her sanction. And because these objects were held worthless by Pyrrho and Aristo, so that they said there was absolutely no distinction of value between the best possible health and the most serious illness, people have quite rightly ceased long ago to argue against these philosophers. For by determining that on virtue alone everything so entirely depends, that they robbed her of free selection from among these objects, and allowed her neither starting point nor foothold, they abolished that very virtue of which they were enamoured. Erillus again by assigning all importance to know- ledge, kept in view a single kind of good, but not the best kind nor one by whose aid life can possibly be steered. So he too was long ago cast into oblivion, for since the time of Chrysippus there have certainly been no discussions about him.

Great post, thank you! I remember that DeWitt discussed Ecclesiastes relatively at length, but I'll have to go back and recall the references. Seems definitely worthwhile from my point of view.

Quote from Pacatus

But, re the Khayyam quote, I always thought Epicurus might have quipped: "Why are you in a wilderness? Are their no civilized gardens around?"

That reminds me of this:

Quote from Thus Spake Zarathustra

Here, however, did Zarathustra interrupt the foaming fool, and shut his mouth.—

Stop this at once! called out Zarathustra, long have thy speech and thy species disgusted me!

Why didst thou live so long by the swamp, that thou thyself hadst to become a frog and a toad?

Floweth there not a tainted, frothy, swamp-blood in thine own veins, when thou hast thus learned to croak and revile?

Why wentest thou not into the forest? Or why didst thou not till the ground? Is the sea not full of green islands?