I think that "the pictorial views of the mind" (phantastikai epibolai tes dianoias) is just a description of the the "visual stereotypes" (prolepseis), and thus they are used interchangeably.
I agree with the direction of this and given that it appears from Diogenes Laertius that it was not Epicurus himself who elevated the status of this to the level of a criteria, i approach the subject with caution.
I know that there is some material out there which focuses on "casting of the mind" and so forth. Most of what I have seen is combined with discussion of prolepsis. Godfrey is right that Christos Yapijakis has discussed it and I believe DeWitt covers this in is book.
Part of the discussion begins on page 136 or so in relation to empiricim and the discussion of 'phantasia" but I think there is another section that i am not finding at the moment.
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You know, in regard to this use of words issue, I have been struck over the last several months by this passage from page 240 of DeWitt's book:
“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.
I have read lots of books and articles on Epicurus but I can't recall a paragraph that expressed this issue in quite this way - a way I find much more clear than anything else I recall reading.
You could repeat that format over and over with other key concepts such as:
The fact that the name of virtue was not customarily applied to define conduct that is practically efficient to producing a pleasurable life did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.
The fact that the name of gods was not customarily applied to beings that are not supernatural, or to blissful ways of life to which we should aspire, did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.
The fact that the name "absence of pain" was not customarily applied to all experiences of pleasure did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.
The fact that the name "death is nothing to us" was not customarily applied to describe the state of non-being after death, did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.
There are probably other examples as well, but those are the first that come to mind.
Further -- I am sure that other writers must have written other short and concise and clear statements of Epicurean "clarification" or "redefinition" as it relates to understanding the philosophy. Maybe some of you guys can think of statements similar to that passage from page 240 of EAHP. Unfortunately, what I seem to remember is statement after statement to the effect that "Epicurus didn't really mean pleasure, he meant absence of pain," with an explicit or implicit nod toward this being a Stoic or Buddhist or apathetic way of looking at the question.
If you can think of other formulations similar to DeWitt's, focusing on "absence of pain" applying to any non-painful experience whatsoever ("the normal state of being") please post them, and if there are enough we'll make a new thread of them.
This is an extremely important issue to understand. People who aren't willing to be flexible in following the twists and turns of word meaning are never going to be anything but frustrated with Epicrurus -- as was one Marcus Tullius Cicero.
but, again, that seems to reflect a kind of paradigm shift from more conventional understandings of the word
"Paradigm shifts from from conventional understandings of the word" seems to be much of what we're doing lately. It's a real challenge to think about where this goes in terms of how to convey the difference in meaning of words. It's hard to attached the prefix "Epicurean-" to everything but it seems to me that when we're talking about religion and the word cult and the like almost everything has to be considered in that "Epicurean-religion" "Epicurean-gods" context. I am not sure if the word "cult" has enough benefit in it to put it in the class of words that could or should be rehabilitated. Does "cult" add anything that can't be obtained through discussion "religion" in Epicurean terms? I think some people here would take the position that "religion is in itself a bad word" which has no merit worth rehabilitating, and some don't.
Zeno of Sidon comes from the coast of what is now Lebanon. Here's a history site for archaeology in the area:
Sidon Excavation | Sidon Excavation
For some reason (probably because this area of Jordan is for some reason finding its way into headlines nowadays) I decided to look up info on the home area of Philodemus. Looks like the Archaeological Museum in this area has lots of good information and interesting pictures.
I think at least for those of us in America an opening statement of our intent to conduct ourselves in our public role as an Epicurean would remind everyone that someone somewhere once said something about all of us possessing the "right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
One might then need to do some Oenoanda-style "shouting" about how a life of happiness is a life of pleasure, but that would still be a good start, I think. 
Great use of the forum to coordinate work. Thank you TauPhi for finding that reference!
This is really excellent and challenging material we are going through in sections XXII and XXIII of Book 2 right now, so I managed to complete editing of Episode 212 early in the week, and I am now opening this thread about Episode 213. Please feel free to post any comments or questions about this week's text so we can consider including them in the recording of the podcast which will take place on 2/3/24.
Welcome to Episode 213 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.
Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.
This week we move into Section XXIII:
REID EDITION
XXIII. But let us grant this: the very name pleasure has no prestige, and we perhaps do not understand it; for you philosophers say over and over again, that we do not under- stand what kind of pleasure you mean. Surely it is a hard and abstruse subject! When you speak of atoms and spaces between universes, which do not and cannot exist, then we understand ; and can we not understand pleasure, which every sparrow knows so well? What if I bring you to admit that I not only know what pleasure is (it is indeed an agreeable activity affecting the sense) but what you intend it to be? At one time you intend it to mean exactly what I just now indicated, and imply by the name that it is something active, and produces a certain variation ; at another time you speak of a certain other supreme pleasure, which is incapable of increase ; this you say is present when all pain is absent; this you call stable pleasure. Let us grant that this is pleasure. State before any public meeting you like that you do everything with a view to avoiding pain. If you think that even this statement cannot be made with proper honour and dignity, say that both during your term of office and your whole life you intend always to act with an eye to your interest, doing nothing but what is profitable, nothing in fine except for your own private sake; what kind of uproar do you think there will be, or what hope will you have of the consulship, which is now very well assured to you? Do you mean then to follow a system such that you adopt it when alone and in the company of your friends but do not venture to proclaim it or make it public? But in reality when you attend the courts or the senate you have always on your lips the language of the Peripatetics and the Stoics. Duty and equity, honour and loyalty, uprightness and morality, everything worthy of the empire and the Roman people, all kind of dangers to be faced for the commonwealth, death due to our country,—when you talk in this strain, we simpletons are overcome, but you I suppose laugh in your sleeve. Verily among these phrases, splendid and noble as they are, no place is found for pleasure, not merely for that pleasure which you philosophers say lies in activity, which all men in town and country, all I say, who speak Latin, call pleasure, but even for this stable pleasure, which no one but you entitles pleasure.
XXIV. Consider then whether you ought not to avoid adopting our language, along with opinions of your own. If you were to disguise your features or your gait in order to make yourself appear more dignified, you would be unlike yourself; are you the man to disguise your language, and say what you do not think? Or to keep one opinion for your home, as you might a suit of clothes, and another for the streets, so that you bear on your brow a mere pretense, while the truth is concealed within? Consider, I pray you, whether this is honest. I believe that those tenets are true which are moral, praiseworthy and noble, which are to be proclaimed in the senate, before the people, and in every public meeting and assembly, for fear that men should feel no shame in thinking what they feel shame in stating. What room can there be for friendship, or who can be a friend to any one whom he does not love for that friend’s sake? What does loving, from which the word friendship comes, mean, unless that a man desires some one to be endowed with the greatest possible blessings, even though no benefit accrues to himself from them? It is advantageous to me, says he, to entertain such feelings, Say rather, perhaps, to be thought to entertain them. For you cannot entertain them, unless you really mean to do so; and how can you do so, unless love itself takes possession of you? And love is not usually brought about by calculating the balance of advantage, but is self-created, and springs into existence unsolicited. Oh, but it is advantage that I look to. Then friendship will last just so long as advantage attends it, and if advantage establishes friendship, it will also remove it. But what will you do, pray, if, as often happens, friendship is deserted by advantage? Will you abandon it? What sort of friendship is that? Will you cleave to it? How is that consistent ? You see what principles you have laid down about friendship being desirable with a view to advantage. I am afraid of incurring unpopularity, if I cease to support my friend. First I ask why such a proceeding deserves to be unpopular, unless because it is disgraceful? But if you refrain from abandoning your friend, from the fear that you may meet with some inconvenience, still you will wish him to die, that you may not be tied to him without any profit. What if he not merely brings you no advantage but you have to make sacrifices of your property, to undergo exertions, to face the risk of your life? Will you not even then glance at yourself and reflect that every man is born to pursue his own interests and his own pleasures? Will you give yourself up to a despot, to suffer death as surety for your friend, even as the Pythagorean of old submitted to the Sicilian despot, or while you are really Pylades, will you assert yourself to be Orestes, from the wish to die in your friend’s stead, or if you were really Orestes, would you try to disprove Pylades’ story, and disclose yourself, and failing to convince, would you refuse to petition against the execution of you both at once?
RACKHAM EDITION:
XXIII. "But let us grant your position. The actual word 'pleasure' has not a lofty sound; and perhaps we do not understand its significance : you are always repeating that we do not understand what you mean by pleasure. As though it were a difficult or recondite notion! If we understand you when you talk of 'indivisible atoms' and 'cosmic interspaces,' things that don't exist and never can exist, is our intelligence incapable of grasping the meaning of pleasure, a feeling known to every sparrow? What if I force you to admit that I do know not only what pleasure really is (it is an agreeable activity of the sense), but also what you mean by it? For at one moment you mean by it the feeling that I have just defined, and this you entitle kinetic pleasure, as producing a definite change of feeling, but at another moment you say it is quite a different feeling, which is the acme and climax of pleasure, but yet consists merely in the complete absence of pain; this you call static' pleasure. Well, grant that pleasure is the latter sort of feeling. Profess in any public assembly that the motive of all your actions is the desire to avoid pain. If you feel that this too does not sound sufficiently dignified and respectable, say that you intend both in your present office and all your life long to act solely for the sake of your own advantage, — to do nothing but what will pay, nothing in short that is not for your own interest; imagine the uproar among the audience! What would become of your chances of the consulship, which as it is seems to be a certainty for you in the near future?
Will you then adopt a rule of life which you can appeal to in private and among friends but which you dare not openly profess or parade in public? Ah, but it is the vocabulary of the Peripatetics and the Stoics that is always on your lips, in the law-courts and the senate. Duty, Fair-dealing, Moral Worth, Fidelity, Uprightness, Honour, the Dignity of office,
the Dignity of the Roman People, Risk all for the state. Die for your Country, — when you talk in this style, we simpletons stand gaping in admiration, — and you no doubt laugh in your sleeve. For in that glorious array of high-sounding words, pleasure finds no place, not only what your school calls kinetic pleasure, which is what every one, polished or rustic, every one, I say, who can speak Latin, means by pleasure, but not even this static pleasure, which no one but you Epicureans would call pleasure at all.
XXIV. Well then, are you sure you have any right to employ our words with meanings of your own? If you assumed an unnatural expression or demeanour, in order to look more important, that would be insincere. Are you then to affect an artificial language, and say what you do not think? Or are you to change your opinions like your clothes, and have one set for indoor wear and another when you walk abroad? Outside, all show and pretence, but your genuine self concealed within? Reflect, I beg of you, is this honest? In my view those opinions are true which are honourable, praiseworthy and noble — which can be openly avowed in the senate and the popular assembly, and in every company and gathering, so that one need not be ashamed to say what one is not ashamed to think.
Again, how will friendship be possible? How can one man be another man's friend, it he does not love him in and for himself? What is the meaning of 'to love' — from which our word for friendship is derived — except to wish some one to receive the greatest possible benefits even though one gleans no advantage therefrom oneself? 'It pays me,' says he, to be a disinterested friend.' No, perhaps it pays you to seem so. Be so you cannot, unless you really are; but how can you be a disinterested friend unless you feel genuine affection ? Yet affection does not commonly result from any calculation of expediency. It is a spontaneous growth ; it springs up of itself. But,' you will say, I am guided by expediency.' Then your friendship will last just so long as it is attended by expediency. If expediency creates the feeling it will also destroy it. But what, pray, will you do, if, as often happens, expediency parts company with friendship ? Will you throw your friend over ? What sort of friendship is that? Will you keep him? How does that square with your principles? You remember your pronouncement that friendship is desirable for the sake of expediency. I might become unpopular if I left a friend in the lurch.' Well, in the first place, why is such conduct unpopular, unless because it is base? And if you refrain from deserting a friend because to do so will have inconvenient consequences, still you will long for his death to release you from an unprofitable tie. What if he not only brings you no advantage, but causes you to suffer loss of property, to undergo toil and trouble, to risk your life?
Will you not even then take interest into account, and reflect that each man is born for himself and for his own pleasure? Will you go bail with your life to a tyrant on behalf of a friend, as the famous Pythagorean did to the Sicilian despot? or being Pylades, will you say you are Orestes, so as to die in your friend's stead? or supposing you were Orestes, would you say Pylades was lying and reveal your identity, and if they would not believe you, would you make no appeal against your both dying together?
XXV. Yes,Torquatus, you personally would do all these things ; for I do not believe there is any high or noble action which fear of pain or death could induce you to forgo. But the question is not what conduct is consistent with your character, but what is consistent with your tenets. The system you uphold, the principles you have studied and accept, undermine the very foundations of friendship, however much Epicurus may, as he does, praise friendship up to the skies. But, you tell me, Epicurus himself had many friends. Who pray denies that Epicurus was a good man, and a kind and humane man? In these discussions it is his intellect and not his character that is in question. Let us leave to the frivolous Greeks the wrong-headed habit of attacking and abusing the persons whose views of truth they do not share. Epicurus may have been a kind and faithful friend; but if my opinion is right (for I do not dogmatize), he was not a very acute thinker.
Episode 212 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we take up Cicero's allegation that a philosophy of pleasure is so disgraceful that it cannot be proclaimed in the Senate, in Court, or in public at all.
This is not a very creative graphic, but I had to do something to memorialize this line from On Ends Book 2 that we are discussing in this week's episode. Cicero's sarcastic line not only helps emphasize the importance of the philosophical definition of pleasure, but it's also probably a good way to think about animals consider pleasure to be.
I dont think I have attended one of the Monday meetings before, but I'd like to tonight!
Unfortunately it's "First Monday" which this month means NEXT Monday!
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You'll note that the editor in the posting box has a significant number of new features, one example of which is the last one - an icon for adding a FAQ entry into the post. You might find this helpful in quickly pointing people to a standard answer. If you see additional FAQ entries that would be helpful, let us know. If you'd like to create your own "canned" response on an issue, you can do so with the "personal notes" function which is the second from the last icon.
This article that came across in my feed today reminded me of a subject that has interested me for years - the "mysterious" Roman dodecahedrons. I doubt they relate directly to Epicurean issues, but when something from the Roman period seems unexplainable I always wonder if there's not something interesting and significant that needs to be integrated into our thinking about the period. It's tempting to suggest that these have some kind of Pythagorean or Platonic aspect, but I've never seen any firm argument in that direction. I thought I would post this just to see if anyone else had run into any interesting explanations for these that might be relevant to us.
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Very interesting! Only had time for a quick scan but I have to comment on this threshold point:
Salutations. As Lucretius, the ancient Roman poet and philosopher, my magnum opus "De Rerum Natura" (On the Nature of Things) serves as a grand exposition of Epicurean philosophy. This didactic poem, written in the first century BCE, is a testament to my deep admiration for the teachings of Epicurus, the Greek philosopher whose atomistic and materialistic view of the world profoundly influenced my thinking.
The poem, spanning six books, is a comprehensive attempt to explain the nature of the universe, the role of humanity within it, and the principles of Epicurean thought. Its central thesis is that the universe operates according to natural laws, without the intervention of divine beings. It emphasizes the importance of seeking tranquility and freedom from fear, particularly the fear of death and the gods, a state known as "ataraxia."
To me that is already interesting how the AI system may have been fed Lucretius' poem, but I certainly don't think it got that underlined sentence from the poem itself, but from outside commentary. Had it reasoned primarily from the poem, I would expect it would have picked up "pleasure" as what is emphasized, rather than tranquility or freedom from fear, which might have been picked up as implications but not as the first thing one would mention after summarizing the poem for oneself.
I didn't see Dons post before writing my post 25. The Will stands out in my mind as an insurmountable obstacle to those who want to argue that Epicurus forbid or even discouraged marriage. Given the will it can continue to be argued that he advised caution and deliberation, as he did with everything, but the argument that he was a strong opponent or he forbid it is to me just more evidence of how hostile much of the academic world is to Epicurus.
Lots of good research there, thank you Pacatus!
None of it changes my view that Epicurus was not a dictator and did not forbid or grant allowances on much of anything (except presumably deference to philosophical core issues, and this would certainly not be among those.
Further, I am more convinced than ever at this point in my studying that Epicurus was extremely practical and did not have absolute right and wrong bright lines on most any kind of action, and most any kind of action may be needed depending on circumstances, even engagement in the "political" world as needed. So given his flexibility toward even the virtues II would have expected him to see marriage as no more mandatory or forbidden as a general rule. and just as Lucretius ends Book 4, habit and long standing benefit can render even the unpredictable institution of matrimony as something from which the wise can benefit, if the appropriate spouse is available.
