Episode 196 of Lucretius Today is Now Available! We continue to cover fascinating material that is highly relevant to our conversations, so again I wanted to get this out as quickly as possible.
Cicero: "...[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'"
Torquatus: "Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be."
...
Cicero: Still, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?"
Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible."
CIcero - "On Ends" Book 2:iii:9 and 2:iii:11 (Rackham)
I see I have collected the 'smooth motion" references here:
Diogenes Laertius Book II Aristippus
"He laid down as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation."
Ironically enough "disturbance" is probably useful, but it can't be used in way that implies that the natural condition is immobile or unmoving or that any deviation from day-to-day smoothness is bad.
This sort of evokes the issue of whether Epicurus would agree that pleasure can be seen as "smooth motion" as I think Diogenes Laertius says of Aristippus. I am tempted to say that he would agree on that point, and that deviation from "smoothness" like on the oscilloscope or the EKG is the key attribute of pain. I believe we could enlist Lucretius to support that point.
That said, words like "normal" to refer to this state still rub me the wrong way, as if "exciting" pleasure is "abnormal."
Very good point! Normal might be one of the descriptive words that helps, but it isn't sufficient standing alone. "Natural" or similar is probably better. The names for both categories of pleasure need positive descriptors without associated negative baggage.
One more example, this time Torquatus using his own words in Book 1 line 56.
Rackham's "active sensation" does not seem as literal as Reid's "stirs the senses" - the operative word is again "moveat."
Non placet autem detracta voluptate aegritudinem statim consequi, nisi in voluptatis locum dolor forte successerit; at conta gaudere nosmet omittendis doloribus, etiamsi voluptas ea quae sensum moveat nulla successerit; eoque intellegi potest quanta voluptas sit non dolore.
Rackham:
But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain; while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain.
Reid:
We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain.
I think analogies would help.
My first suggestion is an EKG, with the normal heartbeat (which is in motion) beating in a regular pattern. The two types of pleasure included by Epicurus under the word "pleasure" would be (1) the normal regular heartbeat (pictured) and also (2) an agreeable (pleasurable) stimulation in which the heartbeat is faster/stronger but still regular.
A disagreeable (painful) stimulation would be irregular or misshapen patterns.
This would be a picture that would be described as pleasurable since it is normal:
Cicero would assert that picture does not illustrate pleasure, and that it would not illustrate pleasure unless the pattern deviated to be faster/stronger than normal.
I presume that a seismograph or an oscilloscope could be used for similar analogies. As long as life goes 'humming along" normally we are in pleasure, but when the sound gets distorted for any reason, that is pain.
Also just a little further down, once again we have a form of "moveo," this time with 'hilarity" 
"Everyone uses the Greek word hedone and the Latin voluptas to mean an agreeable and exhilariting stimulation of the sense."
Omnes enim iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece hedone Latine voluptatem vocant."
Omnes enim iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece hedone Latine voluptatem
jucundus, jucunda -um, jucundior -or -us, jucundissimus -a -um pleasant/agreeable/delightful/pleasing; congenial
moveo, movere, movi, motus move, stir, agitate, affect, provoke, disturb
sentio, sentire, sensi, sensus perceive, feel, experience; think, realize, see, understand
hilaro, hilarare, hilaravi, hilaratus cheer, gladden; give cheerful appearance to
graecus, graeca, graecum Greek
hedus, hedi Mkid, young goat; two stars in constellation Auriga,"The Kid"
fero, ferre, tuli, latus bring, bear; tell/speak of; consider; carry off, win, receive, produce; get
voluptas, voluptatis Fpleasure, delight, enjoyment
vocant.
voco, vocare, vocavi, vocatuscall, summon; name; call upon
More as to wording:
Here's Reid's translation of Cicero in Section III:
Cicero:‘Nay, said I, ‘either Epicurus is ignorant or else all human beings who are to be found anywhere are ignorant what pleasure is.’
Torquatus:‘How so?’
Cicero: "Because all pronounce that thing to be pleasure, by the reception of which sense is excited and is pervaded by a certain agreeable feeling.’
Rackham translates that in Loeb as -
"Because the universal opinion is that pleasure is a sensation actively stimulating the percipient sense and diffusing over it a certain agreeable feeling."
Let me get the Latin --
"Quia voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes quam sensus accipiens movetur et iucundiate quadam perfunditur."
voluptas, voluptatis F pleasure, delight, enjoyment
sentio, sentire, sensi, sensusperceive, feel, experience; think, realize, see, understand
accipio, accipere, accepi, acceptustake, grasp, receive, accept, undertake; admit, let in, hear, learn; obey
moveo, movere, movi, motusmove, stir, agitate, affect, provoke, disturb
iucunditate quadam perfunditur.
jucunditas, jucunditatis F charm, agreeableness, pleasing quality; pleasantness/amiability; favors
quidam, quaedam, quoddama certain thing
perfundo, perfundere, perfudi, perfususpour over/through, wet, flood, bathe; overspread, coat, overlay; imbue
Everybody understands that the pleasure of ice cream is different from listening to music, but they don't understand that pleasure includes both "exciting" pleasures and "all normal non-painful experiences of life."
In fact, I am not really sure that all of us here in this thread are agreed on this point. Does anyone not agree that Epicurus is including "all normal non-painful experiences of life" within "pleasure?"
If someone doesn't agree with this (now or even referring to future people who read this thread) we ought to get to the bottom of that.
While we could say "all normal non-painful feelings" instead of "all normal non-painful experiences of life," I would say that wider terminology is important because many are going to say that often they don't feel anything at all, and they are not referring to just when they are unconscious or asleep, they are trying to assert a "neutral" state. As I see it, it is the existence of a neutral state (that of non-feeling, or that of exactly balancing pleasure and pain to get "zero") that is the state being denied by Epicurus. I would say there is no "feeling" labelled "zero" nor is this likely to be a perfectly-matched "zero" sum of pleasures and pains. The latter might be possible, but still that would not be a third alternative beyond pleasure and pain.
For some reason this strikes me as relevant the conversation with Don on exciting vs non-exciting pleasures. Maybe "stir" is another word to add to the pot:
"The mind alone by itself has understanding for itself and rejoices for itself, when no single thing stirs either soul or body."
And the point Socrates is rejecting is exactly what Epicurus is doing in understanding that pleasure has many forms, all of them pleasurable:
But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance,—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!
As we speculated in the podcast, is it possible that the "variation" references in Epicurus are pointing here to Socrates, and affirming that we need to understand that the "types of pleasure" in which pleasure comes includes not only many specific parts of the body and mind but also "exciting" and "normal/non-exciting"? Everybody understands that the pleasure of ice cream is different from listening to music, but they don't understand that pleasure includes both "exciting" pleasures and "all normal non-painful experiences of life."
Thanks Joshua. Here is Bailey same area Line 98 of Book 3:
Thus often the body, which is clear to see, is sick, when, all the same we feel pleasure in some other hidden part; and contrariwise it happens that the reverse often comes to be in turn, when one wretched in mind feels pleasure in all his body; in no other wise than if, when a sick man’s foot is painful, all the while, may be, his head is in no pain. Moreover, when the limbs are given up to soft sleep, and the heavy body lies slack and senseless, yet there is something else in us, which at that very time is stirred in many ways, and admits within itself all the motions of joy and baseless cares of heart.
This is not the kinetic/katastematic distinction (I've been burned on making that assumption before!), but it's a distinction that gets discussed in Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Philodemus.
I know you're trying to get at the "pleasure when you're not 'doing' something 'pleasurable'" but there has to be a better way than "non-stimulating."
I am not sure exactly what the 'this' refers to there and that is part of the need for greater clarity.
The distinction that is super-critical is the issue that pleasure includes both (1) pleasures that we consider exciting from the norm of life, and (2) the norm of life which is not exciting, but which needs to be considered as pleasure whenever this "norm" is not receiving some painful input.
The real point is that every moment and every aspect of being alive is to be considered "pleasure" unless that moment or aspect involves receiving pleasure.
THAT"s the distinction and the two elements on which everything else stands. The default experience of life is "pleasure" in every moment and aspect unless some particular pain is intruding.
Do you consider that distinction the K/K distinction?
Because it is exactly this attitude here that is the problem: I know you're trying to get at the "pleasure when you're not 'doing' something 'pleasurable'" but there has to be a better way than "non-stimulating."
This wording accepts the requirement that pleasure requires excitement. The only requirement for labeling some moment of life "pleasure" is that is not "painful."
There are no other labeling options for something you are conscious and aware of other than "pleasure" or "pain."
Are we agreed on that last sentence?
On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain.
I can't really fault Cicero's reading of the "normal" view of pleasure. He's focusing on words like "delight" but especially '"agitation," which isn't being used in the "negative" sense of "agitation" but more in the "my washing machine has an agitator that washes the clothes." It's not really "length of time" that describes the agitation but something else, and I don't think "motion" really captures the issue either. Almost like we are talking about "excited" atomic particles.
On Ends Book Two:
Cicero: To let you know that I do understand, I first declare that by voluptas I mean what he means by hedone. Now though we often search for a Latin word equivalent to a Greek word and conveying the same sense, in this case there was no need to search. No word can possibly be discovered which more exactly represents in Latin the sense of a Greek word than voluptas. All men everywhere who know Latin denote by this word two things, delight existing in the mind and a sweet agreeable agitation in the body. In fact the character in Trabea’s play describes delight as excessive pleasure in the mind, just like the character in Caecilius, who gives out that he is delighted with all delights. But there is this distinction, that voluptas is applied also to the mind (an immoral feeling, as the Stoics think, who deign it as an irrational elevation of the mind when it fancies itself in the enjoyment of some great blessing) while laetitia and gaudium are not used in connexion with the body. But according to the usage of all who speak Latin, pleasure consists in feeling that kind of agreeableness which agitates some one of the senses. This agreeableness too you may apply metaphorically if you please to the mind; for we use the phrase to affect agreeably in both cases, and in connexion with it the word agreeable; if only you understand that midway between the man who says I am enriched with such delight that I am unsteadied and the man who cries now at last is my heart on fire, one of whom is transported with delight, while the other is racked by pain, comes this man’s speech though this our acquaintance is quite recent, for he is neither in a state of delight nor of torture; and also that between him who is master of exquisite bodily pleasures and him who is tormented by the intensest pains comes he who is removed from both states.
"Non-stimulating" and "not stimulated" sounds like there's no sensation at all.
I agree that that deduction would be something to be avoided.
The pleasure of floating on a calm sea
But this would be only one such pleasure and we'd likely want to avoid "floating" metaphors as well, unless we are ships, because floating is what ships do. I would say "floating" is going to evoke "mindlessness" or "total inaction" unless we are careful to exclude that. And that's where the kinetic language gets blurry, if for example savoring memories is kinetic.
We're humans, and what we're looking for I think is something the conveys "doing anything and everything that humans do when they are not 'excited' but also not in pain." We're looking for a word that describes all normal activities of life where we aren't "excited" but we are still functioning normally. I would think this is what Torquatus is pointing out as the answer to Chrysippus' hand hypothetical. A hand is which not being stimulated or excited or massaged still falls under "a hand in pleasure" so long as the hand is not in some affirmative pain.
I also think we need to acknowledge that there is a difference between pain and suffering
At the moment I would emphasize in order of importance:
(1) There are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, which means the presence of one is the absence of the other. Each and every feeling in life which is agreeable falls under pleasure, each and every feeling that is disagreeable falls under pain.
(2) Within "pleasure" and "pain" there are many different particular feelings which vary greatly from one another in terms of how we experience them. The pleasure of ice cream varies from the pleasure of listening to music. The pleasure of Beethoven differs from the pleasure of Wagner. This point two does not contradict point one, it's just a different perspective level.
(3) From a "whole person" perspective, the limit of the quantity of pleasure is the absence of pain. There is no way to improve the quantity of pleasure past 100%, and this understanding gives us the understanding that pleasure has a limit, and therefore it can't be made "better" by living forever. Living longer gives us more time experiencing pleasure, but no matter how long we live life never gets better than 100% pleasure.
Once propositions one and two are accepted then it's fair game to parse individual pleasures and pains any way one prefers to think about them and label them with whatever words seem useful in any language we'd like to use. But until it is accepted that pleasure includes both stimulating and non-stimulating pleasures, it's not possible to stand up against the argument of Cicero and others that Epicurus is using the term "pleasure" in a non-standard way.
Cicero's complaint is correct - Epicurus *is* using the word "pleasure" in a non-standard way, just like he uses "god" in a non-standard way. It seems clear that Epicurean terminology on pleasure differs from normal usage, and that "pleasure" includes two types of pleasures which we can understand in words that mean something to us ( 1 - exciting / stimulating pleasures vs 2 - pleasures of normal living in which we are not stimulated / excited).
The equation of "pleasure = absence of pain" is never going to make sense to a person who insists on sticking to standard terminology. Whatever explanations get us over that hurdle is desirable, and I am sure there are many ways to do it.
Here's a new one for me, from Chapter 6 of the Boeri /Aoiz book:
Trebatius Testa was one of the most renowned jurists of his time. He began his career under the protection of Cicero, who recommended him to Caesar. Trebatius joined Caesar in Gaul in 54 BC. In a letter from February 53 Cicero tells Trebatius that he knows he has become an Epicurean, and reproaches him that being an Epicurean contradicts his status as a politician and jurist (Fam. 2.12 1).70 We do not know how Trebatius replied, but several facts in his biography highlight the arguments by which an Epicurean could have responded to Cicero. Trebatius did not want to pursue a political career (in fact he refused the office of military tribune offered to him by Caesar in 54, which annoyed Cicero). However, he was able to make the most of his talent as a jurist and became Caesar’s adviser and familiaris. Trebatius, as Benferhat points out, got through the civil war without compromising himself or becoming a victim.71 He was also valued as a jurisconsult by Augustus. It could perhaps be said that Trebatius, without aspiring to power or office, enjoyed fame and prestige, which provided him with security until his death in his eighties. In the aforementioned letter of February 53, Cicero is particularly emphatic in questioning how an Epicurean could devote himself to law. It is one of Cicero’s anti-Epicurean arguments that most clearly reveals his omission of the central tenets of Epicureanism, for, as we have shown, the Epicureans developed a sophisticated defence of justice and law. One of the testimonies of Trebatius’ activity as a jurisconsult reflects just the kind of argument one would expect from an Epicurean jurist: the insistence on the utility of law. When Augustus consulted jurists on whether the use of codicils was in accordance with the ratio iuris, Trebatius convinced the emperor that it was by claiming that, in effect, the codicil was most useful and necessary for the citizens [utilissimum et necessarium hoc civibus esse].
I am reviewing the Boeri / Aioz book (Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy) and came across this passage relevant to our discussion of memory, from their Chapter 5:
In sum, friendship is an indispensable condition for happiness and, like justice, is a powerful means for achieving imperturbability. But friendship is also thought of as a sort of kinetic pleasure: the memory of a dead friend appears to Epicurus ‘sweet’ (Plutarch, Pleasant Life 1105E; Us. 213); it produces joy and ends by being a relief capable of counteracting the body’s pains.
Thanks for those calculations Pacatus!
Question: Can B1 and B2 also have katastematic qualities? For example, chronic physical pain or clinical depression?
You're pursuing this out of interest and you enjoy it (I feel sure), but to me i would think a newer person would find this to be hazardous if they pursue it before more basic issues are resolved. I don't have a cite ready at hand to back this up, but I am pretty sure that the authorities don't consider "duration" (implied in the word chronic) as "the" key defining aspect of katastematic pleasure, but rather "changeability," which is related but I would say is not the same. Don's concern was (I think rightly) "since memories can be a kinetic pleasure." It's pretty clear that some 'actions' like memories can come and go last longer than others, so it isn't the time element alone or maybe even primarily that distinguishes the two. If someone asserts that it is, where is the dividing line between a long-lasting kinetic pleasure and a katastematic one? A minute? An hour? A day? At what point in time is the dividing line crossed and kinetic become katastematic?
In fact, that's the underlying problem of talking about K/K. It isn't really clear what distinguishes one from the other. Does katastematic really equate to "rest?" How is sustained smooth motion over a long period of time different than "rest?" What is "rest" in the first place in a universe with no "bottom" and composed of never-ceasing-to-move atoms flying through space? I know that some people assert answers to these questions, but authoritative cites explaining these things are not easy to find, and certainly not clear explanations in Epicurean texts. By the time a newer person tries long enough to get to the bottom of it i would wager most of them have created for themselves more intellectual pain than pleasure and gone a long way toward thinking that trying to decode Epicurus is fruitless.
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