Posts by Cassius

I think in the end we'll convert the format to something more like this:

But it will be a lot easier to collaborate over time and use the lexicon entry linked above as the place where we grow the chart and develop the data for the final version.

Based on work Don and Nate have done previously I'd like to continue to work on an easy-to-read table to help people orient to major events in the Epicurean world. The Lexicon section of the forum has been updated to add the following table which can be edited collaboratively. Please comment if you have suggestions - obviously lots more work needed on this. As it continues to come together the table will be easier to cut and paste and use elsewhere.

Timetable Of The Epicurean World - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Quote from Lowri834

I've just started reading Lucretius, the Martin Ferguson Smith translation.

Thanks for the comment, and that's a good choice of translations. We don't tend to talk about his that often, probably because it's one of the more recent and still in copyright, but his is probably the current best for pure scholarship.

Quote from Don

Suffice to say that I don't think one should pity the potential life that isn't going to exist.

Seems to me this is sort of a continuation of our search for a good way to express the issue that life is desirable, and we want it to continue under favorable circumstances if that is possible, and yet we don't get bent out of shape over the fact that continuous extension isn't possible.

This is an issue that applies to we ourselves or to little girls or to whatever heart-rending example we'd like to pose as the hypothetical.

Quote from Don

Which moves into how one may try to process this. Epicureanism acknowledges that the death of a friend or loved one or family member is going to "bite." There is nothing wrong with feeling grief, unlike the Stoics who teach that losing a child should no more affect one than breaking a tea cup. There is nothing wrong with deeply feeling the loss and sadness. But... Epicureans should not let grief overwhelm them. That isn't healthy. We need to turn to the memories that bring us both joy for the experience and sadness that the person is gone.

This is similar to the way Frances Wright expresses it in chapter 10, and I'd recommend that as additional food for thought:

Quote from A Few Days In Athens Chapter 10

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But there is yet a pain, which the wisest and the best of men cannot escape; that all of us, my sons, have felt, or have to feel. Do not your hearts whisper it? Do you not tell me, that in death there is yet a sting? That ere he aim at us, he may level the beloved of our soul? The father, whose tender care hath reared our infant minds — the brother, whom the same breast hath nourished, and the same roof sheltered, with whom, side by side, we have grown like two plants by a river, sucking life from the same fountain and strength from the same sun — the child whose gay prattle delights our ears, or whose opening understanding fixes our hopes — the friend of our choice, with whom we have exchanged hearts, and shared all our pains and pleasures, whose eye hath reflected the tear of sympathy, whose hand hath smoothed the couch of sickness. Ah! my sons, here indeed is a pain — a pain that cuts into the soul. There are masters that will tell you otherwise; who will tell you that it is unworthy of a man to mourn even here. But such, my sons, speak not the truth of experience or philosophy, but the subtleties of sophistry and pride. He who feels not the loss, hath never felt the possession. He who knows not the grief, hath never known the joy. See the price of a friend in the duties we render him, and the sacrifices we make to him, and which, in making, we count not sacrifices, but pleasures. We sorrow for his sorrow; we supply his wants, or, if we cannot, we share them. We follow him to exile. We close ourselves in his prison; we soothe him in sickness; we strengthen him in death: nay, if it be possible, we throw down our life for his. Oh! What a treasure is that for which we do so much! And is it forbidden to us to mourn its loss? If it be, the power is not with us to obey.

Should we, then, to avoid the evil, forego the good? Shall we shut love from our hearts, that we may not feel the pain of his departure? No; happiness forbids it. Experience forbids it. Let him who hath laid on the pyre the dearest of his soul, who hath washed the urn with the bitterest tears of grief — let him say if his heart hath ever formed the wish that it had never shrined within it him whom he now deplores. Let him say if the pleasures of the sweet communion of his former days doth not still live in his remembrance. If he love not to recall the image of the departed, the tones of his voice, the words of his discourse, the deeds of his kindness, the amiable virtues of his life. If, while he weeps the loss of his friend, he smiles not to think that he once possessed him. He who knows not friendship, knows not the purest pleasure of earth. Yet if fate deprive us of it, though we grieve, we do not sink; Philosophy is still at hand, and she upholds us with fortitude. And think, my sons, perhaps in the very evil we dread, there is a good; perhaps the very uncertainty of the tenure gives it value in our eyes; perhaps all our pleasures take their zest from the known possibility of their interruption. What were the glories of the sun, if we knew not the gloom of darkness? What the refreshing breezes of morning and evening, if we felt not the fervors of noon? Should we value the lovely-flower, if it bloomed eternally; or the luscious fruit, if it hung always on the bough? Are not the smiles of the heavens more beautiful in contrast with their frowns, and the delights of the seasons more grateful from their vicissitudes? Let us then be slow to blame nature, for perhaps in her apparent errors there is hidden a wisdom. Let us not quarrel with fate, for perhaps in our evils lie the seeds of our good. Were our body never subject to sickness, we might be insensible to the joy of health. Were our life eternal, our tranquillity might sink into inaction. Were our friendship not threatened with interruption, it might want much of its tenderness. This, then, my sons, is our duty, for this is our interest and our happiness; to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortitude. To walk, in short, through life innocently and tranquilly; and to look on death as its gentle termination, which it becomes us to meet with ready minds, neither regretting the past, nor anxious for the future.”

Another aspect that I am still rolling over in my mind is the difficulty (at least for me) in applying the "absence of pain" terminology to both (1) my general summation and assessment of my condition which includes both pleasures and pains, and (2) an individual sensation / feeling which can be either pleasure or pain but not both or neither.

I personally (and I do not think I am alone) have a strong tendency to interpret "absence of pain" as conveying a focus on a general assessment in which "unless every ounce of pain is eliminated from my life then I haven't achieved anything." That perspective is akin to the Judeo-Christian attitude that we are worms because we all sin and fall short of the glory of god, or the Stoic attitude that "unless we've reached the summit of the mountain all our mountain-climbing is for nothing."

I'm of the view that this perfectionist "all or nothing" attitude is so baked in the cake of modern religion and philosophy that it makes it very hard to even comprehend any other approach. The detailed analysis of the individual feelings and experiences of a variety of pleasures leads me to conclude that to Epicurus it's not a perfect result of "pure pleasure" that is the main thing (other than as a goal), but the moment-by-moment achievement of the best we can do under our own circumstances to ensure the predominance of feelings of pleasure over feelings of pain. Epicurus wasn't experiencing "pure pleasure" on the last day of his life, but up to the end he was doing the best he could to summon up pleasure to override pain, just as Lucretius analogizes Venus calming Mars.

The only way to break out of the "all or nothing" perspective is to engage in the scheme of systematic study, preferably with others "like ourselves" as Epicurus recommends.

Quote from Blank_Emu43

Would it be right to say that a person who lives for five years can have the same amount of pleasure in their life as someone who lives for eighty years?

I would say that we can't be sure of that (I wouldn't argue that a shorter life necessarily means less pain) but I would definitely argue that this observation **could** be true, depending on the circumstances of the person. It's easy to think of people who live long lives with a negative attitude who seem (at least to us) to be suffering the whole way through. In contrast it's also easy to think of people who "die young" but seem to have had a positive upbeat and happy attitude during most of that shorter life. I'd definitely choose the shorter happier life over the longer miserable life.

Quote from Blank_Emu43

I can't wait to read your reply! I've read a lot of your posts and I always learn something new.

A good reminder that Don has been "slacking off" and still owes us his commentary on this one!

One of the things I would like to see us discuss in this episode is something to the effect of the "transformational power of studying the texts," and here is an example:

When you combine our recent discussions about pleasure including both the "stimulation kind of pleasure" and the "appreciation of being alive-and-not-in-pain kind of pleasure," I think from here on I am never going to see the opening of Books One and Two of Lucretius as I did before.

Formerly I saw the opening of book one as a "hymn to Venus," which seems a nice way to label it but out of place in a non-religious book. And I formerly saw the "it is sweet to observe the shipwrecks of the fools" as kind of weird, and as Joshua and others often note, a little off-putting and lacking in compassion. I remember us discussing this with Emily Austin as even seeing it as a "slip" of Lucretius not being on his best form.

At this point, after all our discussions, I think from here on I am going to see these two openings as illustrating these two aspects of pleasure from which Dewitt concludes "The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism."

From that perspective, I think we can see Lucretius giving a shockingly prominent position in his poem to hammering home this point about Epicurus' innovation: The two openings show how pleasure comes both through (1) the stimulations of Venus (toward sex and trade on the oceans and all the other activities that we pursue at the leading of pleasure), as well as through (2) the workings of our mind through true philosophy which lead us to appreciate how great a pleasure it is to be alive when we are free from disaster. This is a type of gladness that can come only through "scheme of systematic contemplation" and the mind being prepared to figure these things out, which alone can give us "the confident expectation of their continuance."

For most of the close to fifteen years of my reading of Lucretius and Epicurean texts I don't think I would have noticed, much less appreciated, that these parallels could be drawn in the way Lucretius is structuring his poem.

Rather than seeing the poem as mainly a dry physics discussion that focuses on the gods being natural (PD01) and there being no existence after death (PD02), you can also see the poem as hammering home this point about the extension of the concept of pleasure being everything going on when we are not in pain (PD03). Rather than seeing Venus' calming influence on Mars in the opening of book one as a weirdly inappropriate thing for an "anti-religious" poet to say, we can see that too as an application of PD04, in which we have access to pleasure to allow us to offset and endure the pains that sometimes come upon us. Venus calming Mars reflects Epicurus' use of gladness of mind to calm the pains of his disease.

Whether these observations are what was in Lucretius' mind or not, I think they are useful, and they would never have occurred to me to consider in the same way before we focused so much attention on these issues. You just aren't going to get that kind of appreciation of what is going on without study into the deeper aspects of the philosophy, just like the "'light of day" isn't good enough to observe on its own without appreciating what it illuminates.

Quote from Don

Fabulous episode everyone! Very much enjoyed listening to this one.

Thank you for the kind words. I was a little worried about this one, but editing can sometimes work miracles

Don and Joshua have done a great job with the initial welcome so thanks to them and for your introduction.

I personally think Emily Austin and Catherine Wilson are the best of the contemporary writers, so those are a great place to start. Maybe it's technically appropriate to call those two pop-philosophy books, since they are geared at the lay reader, but those two writers are in my view head and shoulders above most of the rest in that category.

Sounds like you're pretty well into the "hard" philosophy and now that you're almost past those two books you will not be surprised to see me recommend the DeWitt book for the rest of the sweeping overview, then of course there are reams of technical articles on more detailed issues.

Given that utiltarian background I feel sure you will be interesting in reading about Bentham's friend Frances Wright and her "A Few Days In Athens" which is mostly very sound in its Epicureanism.

Let us know what you're interested in and I am sure there will be lots of people interested in helping your reading or just discussing your interests.

Thanks again for introducing yourself.

Welcome Novem !

There is one last step to complete your registration:

All new registrants must post a response to this message here in this welcome thread (we do this in order to minimize spam registrations).

You must post your response within 72 hours, or your account will be subject to deletion. All that is required is a "Hello!" but of course we hope you will introduce yourself -- tell us a little about yourself and what prompted your interest in Epicureanism -- and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Thanks for that - so it appears that 1005 5:8-9 is where both the word and the for lines appear, and that papyri.info page seems like the best place to send people for the reference (many of my old Oxford links no longer work).

So BOTH the single word and the four lines appear on fragment 117?

... which looks like thison that page (I can't find a way to have a direct link to that part of the page.

Episode 199 of the Lucretius Today is Now Available! This week we return to our coverage of "On Ends" Book Two, and we summarize several aspects of where we are in the discussion.

After several weeks of quick editing, this week has fallen back to a more normal time period. Should be complete by Saturday and hopefully sooner. In the meantime the first of several notes.

- At the 30 minute mark Joshua comments about use of the term tetraphamakos in the ancient world, but said he wasn't sure of the cites. I think we've looked this us previously as to where that word occurs, but for the moment all I have is this from the Wikipedia entry:

The name cannot be traced further back than Cicero and Philodemos. Pamela Gordon, Epicurus in Lycia: The Second-century World of Diogenes of Oenoanda, University of Michigan Press (1996), p. 61, fn 85, citing A. Angeli, "Compendi, eklogai, tetrapharmakos" (1986), p. 65.

--

-- We've probably got this covered somewhere in a private post so if someone recalls the exact cite and how that cite uses the term it would be good to add that in this thread.

Quote from burninglights

what Plato calls pleasure, Epicurus calls kinetic pleasure, and what Plato calls the neutral state, Epicurus calls katastematic pleasure!

And that labeling would be important to emphasize IF we saw that Epicurus himself in his letters, or Lucretius in his poem, or Diogenes of Oinoanda on his wall were insisting on that labeling as a clear point. Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor says we don't see that, and that Lucretius and Epicurus and Diogenes of Oinoanda are all using the word "pleasure" as the best term to describe tightly integrated word referring to all possible types of pleasure.

As I see it the best argument that Epicurus did insist on that labeling is the list of articles that Diogenes Laertius cites. However contrary to that argument is Nikolsky's observation that Diogenes Laertius was writing as a cataloger who (just like we may be doing today) was looking at Epicurus with the expectation to apply these labels to Epicurus' framework - a framework that does not necessarily turn on "motion" at all.

Where I think we all agree is that it is very important to emphasize that the normal natural state is one of pleasure, even in the absence of active stimulation.

What we don't agree on, or at least I don't see us being sure of, is that the key issue in discussing this natural state involves "motion." Both "kinetic" and "katastematic" appear to focus on "motion" vs. "rest," while "Pleasure" entails both. And I'd be open to the idea too that "motion" and "rest" probably do not describe all the possible types of pleasure, and that whether "in motion" or "at rest" or "otherwise," any experience that is not painful falls under "pleasure."

Here is Nikolsky making the point I think we keep circling around:

Everyone agrees that we call the actions involved in satisfying thirsts, hungers, and our desires for any type of pleasure by the name of "pleasure."

The big question is not (1) whether to label the natural state of life in which we find ourselves after we have (temporarily) satisfied our immediate thirsts, hungers, and desires as either "katastematic pleasure or kinetic pleasure."

The big question is (2) whether to label "the natural state of life in which find ourselves after we have (temporarily) satisfied our immediate thirsts, hungers, and desires" by the name of "pleasure."

The reason that (2) is the big issue is that everyone does not agree with labeling (2) as Pleasure. Plato and Cicero and most of the orthodox world do not consider "the natural state of life in which we find ourselves after we have temporarily satisfied our immediate thirsts, hungers, and desires." And because they don't consider (2) to be a state of pleasure, they conclude that it is impossible to ever reach satisfaction, because you are constantly chasing new food, new drink, and new stimulations.

Once you take the position that "the natural state of life in which find ourselves after we have (temporarily) satisfied our immediate thirsts, hungers, and desires" is a pleasure, then it's easy to see that you can live a life of pleasure in most everything you do, even if you have never heard of the words "kinetic" or "katestematic."

I keep putting "temporarily" in brackets only because we all know that we'll get hungry and thirsty and want more pleasures every couple of hours so long as we continue to live. That observation doesn't matter to Epicurus, because he identifies *both* the state of acting to fulfill those desires, and the state of fulfillment, as pleasure, so the general condition of life is pleasure. It's only when some affirmative outside disruptive influence intrudes to cause pain that we are not in pleasure in that part of our experience.

Nikolksy says it this way:

Quote from Don

My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.

But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?

Quote from burninglights

“When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profilgates [...] but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. (Men. 131).” This point is pretty clear, in my opinion.

This is a key statement. This is "clear," in my opinion, in relating to "katastematic pleasure," only if you previously and firmly have a position that "freedom from pain" is linked to katastematic pleasure.

If Epicurus is, as Torquatus asserts, using the term "freedom from pain" to be an exact synonym of "pleasure," then there is no necessity to read anything whatsoever into the statement in terms of "katastematic pleasure" other than that freedom from pain - which means any experience whatsoever that is not painful - "kinetic," "katastematic," or "supercalifragilistexpealidocius" is a pleasure.

That's the point Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor make at length -- there is no reason to read any presumptions about katastematic or kinetic whatsoever into the nature of "freedom from pain" other than that the term "freedom from pain" is interchangeable as a synonym for pleasure.

Every time we go down the road of saying "it's a particular TYPE of pleasure that really is important" then the red warning bells ought to be clanging full force. Pleasure is pleasurable because it is a feeling like snow is white and sugar is sweet. Once you start applying additional qualifiers to "what kind of pleasure you really want" then you've got a major logical dilemma. It's 100% logical to talk about choices and avoidance in terms of what kind of results that they bring, and I think that's where this discussion really goes. You choose and avoid your actions in terms of the total pleasure and pain that result. And yes mental pleasures are often (but not always) more easily in reach than mental ones. But that's not always true, nor does it mean that one type of pleasure is better than another.

Quote from burninglights

All this is to say that I think his point is that it’s ‘pleasure all the way down.’

With that I fully agree, and that takes us back to whether and how to pursue the K/K discussion in a way that doesn't take our eye off the ultimate objective, which is a life of "pleasure."

As to DL 10:137, that's a statement that's reflected in Torquatus at greater length in On Ends Book One XVII. I agree that in general it means that mental feelings are going to be more significant than "bodily" ones, but again that doesn't resolve anything as to katastematic and kinetic because those terms don't map straight to mental and bodily. So again we have a situation where it's clear and productive to observe that mental feelings can be used to overcome bodily pains, and that's graspable and easy to understand. But dividing them katastematically and kinetically is not at all the same observation.

XVII. And I will now explain in a few words the things which are inseparably connected with this sure and solid opinion.

There is no mistake with respect to the ends themselves of good and evil, that is to say, with respect to pleasure and pain; but men err in these points when they do not know what they are caused by. But we admit that the pleasures and pains of the mind are caused by the pleasures and pains of the body. Therefore I grant what you were saying just now, that if any philosophers of our school think differently (and I see that many men do so, but they are ignorant people) they must be convicted of error. But although pleasure of mind brings us joy, and pain causes us grief, it is still true that each of these feelings originates in the body, and is referred to the body; and it does not follow on that account that both the pleasures and pains of the mind are not much more important than those of the body. For with the body we are unable to feel anything which is not actually existent and present; but with our mind we feel things past and things to come. For although when we are suffering bodily pain, we are equally in pain in our minds, still a very great addition may be made to that if we believe that any endless and boundless evil is impending over us. And we may transfer this assertion to pleasure, so that that will be greater if we have no such fear.

This now is entirely evident, that the very greatest pleasure or annoyance of the mind contributes more to making life happy or miserable than either of these feelings can do if it is in the body for an equal length of time. But we do not agree that, if pleasure be taken away, grief follows immediately, unless by chance it happens that pain has succeeded and taken the place of pleasure; but, on the other hand, we affirm that men do rejoice at getting rid of pain even if no pleasure which can affect the senses succeeds. And from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is not to be in pain. But as we are roused by those good things which we are in expectation of, so we rejoice at those which we recollect. But foolish men are tortured by the recollection of past evils; wise men are delighted by the memory of past good things, which are thus renewed by the agreeable recollection. But there is a feeling implanted in us by which we [pg 119] bury adversity as it were in a perpetual oblivion, but dwell with pleasure and delight on the recollection of good fortune. But when with eager and attentive minds we dwell on what is past, the consequence is, that melancholy ensues, if the past has been unprosperous; but joy, if it has been fortunate.

Still thinking about this one I think we all would agree that Epicurus would not think that being sad about the death in any way benefits the deceased. I suppose as I think about it myself the primary issue would be a reflection on the cause of the situation hopefully leading to a response by the appropriate people to try to make sure the situation is not repeated. But as far as feeling pity or sorrow "for the child" it would be more "for the situation.". Definitely an interesting question.

Of course there is a Vatican saying on this too -

Quote from Cassius

VS66. Let us show our feeling for our lost friends, not by lamentation, but by meditation.

Tonight at 8pm, we will cover Vatican Saying 38 and 39.

Please join us. (Post here in this thread if you have never attended one of these sessions as we do have a vetting process for new participants.)

VS40. The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens of necessity.

VS41. We must laugh and philosophize at the same time, and do our household duties, and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy.

Quote from Kalosyni

Here is something that is being worked on (list by Cassius) which could jumpstart some practical application of Epicurean philosophy:

What she means there is that i am working on a new format for presenting the lifestyle issues by using the historical characters to illustrate how *they* embodied the desired characteristics. Sort of like a much-abbreviated Plutarch's Lives, but with the focus being one a couple of distinguishing attributes rather than a full bio.

If anyone has any:

1 - suggestions for further illustations, or

2 - desire to compose a couple of paragraphs on how the life illustrates the virtue(s)

then feel free to let me know and I will incorporate that into the finished product.

By the way those "Distinctive Life Aspects" are very preliminary.