But for the problem you produced for me I have a simple solution. I need only make the minutest change in my article: I'll merely add a question mark to the title
I was thinking of asking you to do that and I appreciate you did it without asking! :-). Your good humor is very welcome!
Materialism and monism should be compatible. According to Epicurus, the soul is closely associated with the body. This is monism, too, in my understanding. There may be other aspects of monism which are not directly related to Epicurus' philosophy.
Yes it would be useful to get a clear fix on Epicurus and monism. While Epicurus would appear to clearly hold that the soul/spirit is physical, this group of "monists" below is far from Epicurean. It is tempting to say that while both have materialism in common, Atomism is the OPPOSITE of monism, with many and varied implications of that difference. Might it be possible that an equal or better case could be made that Spinoza was among the greatest STOICS of them all?
While the lack of information makes it difficult in some cases to be sure of the details, the following pre-Socratic philosophers thought in monistic terms:[25]
I will have to check into Vardoulakis so thank you. In the meantime I skimmed through Wikipedia, and rather than saying that Spinoza was among the greatest Epicureans of all, I have to begin to question whether Spinoza should be considered an Epicurean at all. Before I go further, nothing I am about to write takes away from my praise of your writing or the benefit that discussing this brings to us here in the forum. Distinguishing others who did not claim forthrightly to be Epicurean from those who did helps us understand the differences in ideas much better. Right now I don't know what Spinoza said himself about Epicurus, but the best way to attack these questions is to lay out the ideas of Epicurus and see how many of them and to what extent Spinoza (or anyone else) agreed. Here's a start:
| Epicurus | Spinoza | Rating |
|---|---|---|
| 1. No Thing Can Be Created From Nothing | 1. As a materialist, it appears that Spinoza may perhaps agree with this statement, but it appears Spinoza was a monist rather than an atomist, and there are profound implications to that difference. | |
| 2. Nature Has No Gods Over Her | 2. Spinoxa apparently said that Nature IS God, much like the Stoics, which would be very different from Epicurus' clear denial of supernatural gods. | |
| 3. Death Is Nothing To Us | 3. Spinoza seems to agree with Epicurus that there is no life after death, but there appears to be a question as to whether Spinoza and Epicurus advised us to think about death while we are alive. We'd have to clarify where both the Stoics and Epicurus stood on this as well. Is the "meditate mortem" phrase Stoic, or Epicurean, or both? Don has posted on this. Article: "By contrast, Spinoza’s “free person”—the ideal individual all of whose thoughts and actions are under the guidance of reason, not passion—rarely, if ever, thinks about death. In one of the more striking propositions of his philosophical masterpiece, the Ethics, Spinoza notes that “the free person thinks least of all of death.” This is because the free person knows that there is nothing to think about. They understand that there is no afterlife, no post-mortem realm of reward and punishment, no world-to-come. When a person dies, there is, for that person, nothing. In this respect, Spinoza’s view is closer to that of Epicurus." | |
| 4. He Who Says "Nothing Can Be Known" Knows Nothing. | 4. My first reading indicates that Spinoza may have been a skeptic, and that he may be closer to Plato's idea forms than to Epicurus' sensation-based canonics. Wikipedia: The Ethics has been associated with that of Leibniz and René Descartes as part of the rationalist school of thought,[102] which includes the assumption that ideas correspond to reality perfectly, in the same way that mathematics is supposed to be an exact representation of the world. The writings of René Descartes have been described as "Spinoza's starting point".[99] Spinoza's first publication was his 1663 geometric exposition of proofs using Euclid's model with definitions and axioms of Descartes' Principles of Philosophy. Following Descartes, Spinoza aimed to understand truth through logical deductions from 'clear and distinct ideas', a process which always begins from the 'self-evident truths' of axioms.[109] Overview of Spinoza's Ethics: "From a number of intuitive definitions, axioms, and postulates, Spinoza (1632-1677) seeks by means of the geometric method of proof to understand the essential nature of what is reality from what he believes to be clear and distinct ideas. He views the unity of Nature and God as the only existent uncaused substance and the necessary and efficient cause of all other things. Since God is the same thing as Nature, he concludes by means of Euclid's method of mathematical deduction that mind and the body are two aspects of the same thing: the connection among ideas map exactly to the connection among physical entities." | |
| 5. All Good And Evil Consists In Sensation | 5. To be determined. This looks good: “Knowledge of good and evil is nothing other than the emotion of pleasure or pain insofar as we are conscious of it.” — Proposition 8, Ethics VI, Spinoza. However to be more confident we would need to pin down Spinoza on "virtue." | |
| 6. Pleasure Is the Guide of Life | 6. To be determined. | |
| 7. There Is No Such Thing As Absolute Justice. | 7. Spinoza On Justice: "Spinoza studies have paid little attention to the concept of justice for centuries. However, he refers to it quite often in different contexts, especially in his mature texts. More specifically, he defines it as synonymous with suum cuique tribuere, even though he fails to provide a reasonable account of how this traditional legal expression fits into his philosophical system. This article shows that there is a relevant philosophical dimension in Spinoza’s treatment of the suum cuique that emerges out of his notion of equality. The main section identifies the connection between Spinoza’s references on justice as suum cuique and the different conceptions of equality that are inherent in his system (an ontological, a metaphysical, a productive (ethical), a legal, and a political equality). The conclusion tries to answer the question of whether such an understanding of the suum cuique as equality constitutes a theory of justice or not." Definition: Suum cuique tribuere is a Latin phrase that means to give each person what they deserve. It was one of the three general precepts in Roman law, which required people to not harm others, live honestly, and give everyone what they are owed. | |
| 8. There Is No Necessity To Live Under The Control Of Necessity. | 8. On first glance it appears that Spinoza was a strong determinist. Cite: Baruch Spinoza, "Human Beings are Determined" Abstract: Baruch Spinoza argues against the doctrine of free will as a result of demonstrating that the activity of our minds is equivalent to the activity of our bodies. The mind is more or less active (or contemplative) in accordance with the body's activity or sensing. |
I will work on updating this when I have more time to go through some of the source materials, but if Spinoza's main resemblance to Epicurus was that he was a "materialist" (and a monist, not an atomist, at that) then I am inclined to think at the moment that a good case could be made that on most core issues of philosophy, Spinoza may not have been an Epicurean at all.
We'll see, but I want to repeat that going through philosophers like this and examining how they compare to Epicurus on points of doctrine is a very helpful exercise.
I am sure the first drafts of this chart will need massive revision as my background in Spinoza is close to zero other than being aware of his name. I will update the chart as I have time and as others may provide cites.
Welcome, and can we look forward to reading your thesis at some point?
As always your writing is excellent Cyrano, and that was very enjoyable to read!
Do we have specific commentary by Spinoza about Epicurus? Not every materialist qualifies as an Epicurean, as the Epicureans displayed in the criticism of Democritus. Where would Spinoza fit in relation to Democritus in terms of skepticism and determinsim, two anathemas to Epicurus? I am certainly aware of Spinoza's reputation but have never studied him closely.
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This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.
Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.
In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).
Welcome to the forum!
Pacatus and others -
Let me talk to the other moderators about this and until then please conduct the investigative part of this discussion in private conversations or email or the SofE website or Facebook page. If we get too far into comparing the details of the organizations then we are bound to end up with some negativity one way or the other that won't advance the goals of our discussion forum. Perhaps at some point the moderators can get together and talk about how to present this, but til then let's hold off the public comparisons.
It has seemed to me for a long time - and still does - that the differences between the two approaches are very obvious. All one really has to do is review that 2019 thread as we linked above, and read our FAQ entry, or glance through Hiram's "Tending the Epicurean Garden." Some people will find themselves more comfortable with the eclectic and Humanist/Buddhist-friendly approach they find at Society of Epicurus, and some will reject that and be more comfortable with the approach we spell out very clearly here. Perhaps at some point the FAQ will bear a little more expansion to make the differences easier to find, but negativity from either side is unlikely to be helpful to anyone.
One thing that might change my mind is if I heard someone say "Gee I wasted a lot of time that you could have saved me." But that hasn't been raised as an issue yet, and in fact being confronted with the differences oneself is a very educational experience in sifting through the nuances of what Epicurus really taught.
Pacatus it would not be appropriate for me to speak for her or about Elayne's reasons for leaving other than to say that she posted about pursuing her own initiatives, and to say that she would always be welcome back. You are right to point out that her positions in that thread to which you pointed (which is linked in our FAQ on the Society of Epicurus) were very well made.
As per what Nate said, both he and Hiram and others of the SofE are reachable directly to discuss any points of interest there. As Don said, I too receive Hiram's newsletter and find it useful. Beyond that I think it still makes sense to refer to the FAQ entry I set up on this issue, and suggest that everyone with questions about this refer first to that and then explore the Society of Epicurus to see whether what they find works for them individually. Going through those details here at Epicureanfriends without first reading through the background would not likely lead to anything productive:
Sensation, it appears, is literally touch: atoms touching the human body. That seems to serve for sensation, thought, memory, etc.
Is that what you're getting?
Yes I am looking for further ways to explain how they would have seen the term "pleasure" to cover everything that is not painful. If you view every sensation involving awareness of smoothness as sort of an ultimate-level explanation, the "touch" that is involved in all sensation might have been seen as the mechanism. Maybe this was a way they might have explained the nature of pleasure as a touch sensation regardless of whether the touching that is involved comes through stimulation or through regular functioning.
It's always seemed to imply something significant that "touch" would be singled out to be exclaimed with "blessed be the gods above!" (around line 444 of Lucretius Book 2)
For Touch, the Touch (blessed be the Gods above!) is a Sense of the Body, either when something from without enters through the pores, or something from within hurts us, as it forces its way out, or pleases, as the effect of venery tickles as it passes through, or when the seeds, by striking against each other, raise a tumult in the body, and in that agitation confound the Sense; and this you may soon experience, if you strike yourself in any part with a blow of your hand. It is necessary, therefore, that the Principles of Things should consist of figures very different in themselves, since they affect the Senses in so different a manner.
Don that "pro Divinum numina sancta!" looks like a candidate to consider supplementing your "By Zeus!" 
Maybe better "For the Gods above are blessed!" ? or something else rather than "blessed be...."
Martin Ferguson Smith -- "For the holy gods are my witnesses that touch, yes touch, is the sense of the body......"
Also Bryan given your Latin what do you think of that sentence?
Rouse Loeb edition:
Maybe all these variations of "awareness" or "consciousness" are just coming from "sensation".... which would imply that they were thinking of sensation and awareness as exactly the same thing and would not accept a construction of something like a mind being aware only of itself or its thoughts - and therefore that awareness = sensation in every respect (?), and the word we use as "awareness" means nothing other than "sensation" to them. This issue seems to lurk behind a lot of issues that are regularly discussed, and would be why it is plain to Epicurus that death is total absence of sensation.
Similar discussion of awareness / experience in the context of pleasure:
I will look for others, but here's one citation to being "conscious" according to Rackham, but this may be an overlay of the translator:
Or maybe better said is that death is total absence of *awareness* of motion.
Sensation would not be Motion alone, because Motion never stops regardless, but our awareness of motion can and does stop at death.
The connection between awareness of smooth motion and pleasure seems clear from the passages. Smooth particles will move more smoothly and lead to awareness of smoother motions due to their shapes while rough atoms the opposite.
Of course we are presumably talking about small bodies here rather than atoms directly.
But the bottom line is that awareness of smooth interactions through motion are what is being felt. The analogy of pleasure as including both stimulative and nonstimulative experiences would be that smooth motions are going on in the healthy living body whether the body is being stimulated in some way or whether the body is simply functioning in its regular healthy way.
Head-shaking conclusion to the Bloomberg article:
"Barring a mass relocation, Friedman is working to refine what he’s got. There’s plenty left to do; the first contest yielded about 5% of one scroll. A new set of contestants, he says, might be able to reach 85%. He also wants to fund the creation of more automated systems that can speed the processes of scanning and digital smoothing. He’s now one of the few living souls who’s roamed the villa tunnels, and he says he’s also contemplating buying scanners that can be placed right at the villa and used in parallel to scan tons of scrolls per day. “Even if there’s just one dialogue of Aristotle or a beautiful lost Homeric poem or a dispatch from a Roman general about this Jesus Christ guy who’s roaming around,” he says, “all you need is one of those for the whole thing to be more than worth it.”"
Much more substantive article with nice graphics:
More coverage. Never heard of this site and not much new in the artlcle but the website has an interesting title perhaps for following events in modern Greece.
Welcome to Episode 214 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.
Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.
This week we move further into Section XXV:
REID EDITION
XXV. You, Torquatus, would do all this; for there is, I think, no action meriting the highest approbation, which I believe you likely to omit through fear either of death or of pain. But the question is not what consists with your disposition, but what consists with your philosophy. The principles which you maintain, the maxims which you have been taught and accept are utterly subversive of friendship, even though Epicurus should laud it to the skies, as indeed he does. Oh, but he himself cultivated friendships. Pray, who denies that he was not only a good man, but a kindly and a gentle man? In these discussions the point at issue concerns his ability, and not his character. Let us leave such aberrations to the light-minded Greeks, who persecute with their abuse those with whom they disagree about the truth. But whatever his kindliness in supporting his friends, yet if what you say of him is true (for I make no confident statements) he was deficient in penetration. But he won the assent of many. Perhaps deservedly too, but the evidence of the crowd is not of the highest importance; since in every art or pursuit, or in any kind of knowledge whatever, the highest excellence is always very scarce. And to my mind, the fact that Epicurus was himself a good man and that many Epicureans have been and many are to-day true in their friend- ships and strong and serious in the conduct of their whole life, not governing their plans by pleasure but by duty,—this fact makes the power of morality seem greater and that of pleasure less. Some men indeed so live that their language is refuted by their life. And while the rest of men are supposed to be better in their words than in their deeds, these men’s deeds seem to me better than their words.
XXVI. But this, I allow, is nothing to the purpose; let us look into your assertions about friendship. One of these I thought I recognized as a saying of Epicurus himself, that friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure, and deserves to be cultivated on that account, because our lives cannot be secure or free from apprehension without it, and so cannot be agreeable either. To such arguments I have made a sufficient answer. You have quoted another and more cultured maxim of the modern school, to which he himself never gave utterance, so far as I know, namely that the friend is desired with a view to advantage in the first instance, but that when familiarity has been established, then he is loved for his own sake, even if the expectation of pleasure be disregarded. Although this utterance may be criticized in many ways, I still welcome the concession they make; since it is enough for my purposes, though not for theirs. For they say that right action is sometimes possible without hope of or seeking after pleasure.
Others also, as you insisted, maintain that wise men enter into a sort of league with each other, binding them to entertain for their friends the very same feelings that they entertain for themselves; that such a league is not only possible but has often been made, and is of especial importance for the attainment of pleasures. If they have found it possible to establish this league, let them also establish another, namely to feel regard for equity, temperance, and all the virtues from pure love of them apart from interest. Or if we mean to cultivate friendships with an eye to gains and benefits and advantages, if there is to be no feeling of affection which renders friendship inherently from its own nature and its own power, through and for itself desirable, can there really be any: doubt that we shall prefer our estates and our house-rents to our friends?
At this point you may quote once more what Epicurus said in most excellent language on the merits of friendship. I am not inquiring what he says, but what it is open to him to say consistently with his own system and doctrines. Friendship has ever been sought for the sake of advantage. Do you imagine then that Triarius here can bring you more advantage than the granaries at Puteoli would if they belonged to you? Bring together all the points common in your school: the protection friends afford. Enough protection is already afforded you by yourself, by the laws, by ordinary friendships; already it will not be possible to treat you with neglect, while you will find it easy to escape from unpopularity and dislike; since it is with reference to such things that Epicurus lays down his maxims. And, apart from this, with such revenues at your command for the display of generosity, you will defend and fortify yourself excellently by means of the goodwill of many, without this friendship of the Pyladean order. But for a friend to share jest and earnest, as the saying is, your secrets, all your hidden thoughts? You may best of all keep them to yourself, next you may share them with a friend of the ordinary stamp. But allowing all these privileges to be far from odious, what are they compared with the advantages of such great wealth? You see then that if you gauge friendship by disinterested affection there is nothing more excellent, but if by profit, that the closest intimacies are less valuable than the returns from productive property. You ought to love me myself, and not my possessions, if we are to be true friends.
XXVII. But we dwell too long upon very simple matters. When we have once concluded and demonstrated that if everything is judged by the standard of pleasure, no room is left for either virtues or friendships, there is nothing besides on which we need greatly insist. And yet, lest it should be thought that any passage is left without reply, I will now also say a few words in answer to the remainder of your speech. Well then, whereas the whole importance of philosophy lies in its bearing on happiness, and it is from a desire for happiness alone that men have devoted themselves to this pursuit, and whereas some place happiness in one thing, some in another, while you place it in pleasure, and similarly on the other side all wretchedness you place in pain, let us first examine the nature of happiness as you conceive it.
Now you will grant me this, I suppose, that happiness, if only it exists at all, ought to lie entirely within the wise man’s own control. For if the life of happiness may cease to be so, then it cannot be really happy. Who indeed has any faith that a thing which is perishable and fleeting will in his own case always continue solid and strong? But he who feels no confidence in the permanence of the blessings he possesses, must needs apprehend that he will some time or other be wretched, if he loses them. Now no one can be happy while in alarm about his most important possessions; no one then can possibly be happy. For happiness is usually spoken of not with reference to some period of time, but to permanence, nor do we talk of the life of happiness at all, unless that life be rounded off and complete, nor can a man be happy at one time, and wretched at another; since any man who judges that he can become wretched will never be happy. For when happiness has been once entered on, it is as durable as wisdom herself, who is the creator of the life of happiness, nor does it await the last days of life, as Herodotus writes that Solon enjoined upon Croesus. But I shall be reminded (as you said yourself) that Epicurus will not admit that continuance of time contributes anything to happiness, or that less pleasure is realized in a short period of time than if the pleasure were eternal. These statements are most inconsistent ; for while he places his supreme good in pleasure, he refuses to allow that pleasure can reach a greater height in a life of boundless extent, than in one limited and moderate in length. He who places good entirely in virtue can say that happiness is consummated by the consummation of virtue, since he denies that time brings additions to his supreme good; but when a man supposes that happiness is caused by pleasure, how are his doctrines to be reconciled, if he means to affirm that pleasure is not heightened by duration? In that case, neither is pain. Or, though all the most enduring pains are also the most wretched, does length of time not render pleasure more enviable? What reason then has Epicurus for calling a god, as he does, both happy and eternal? If you take away his eternity, Jupiter will be not a whit happier than Epicurus, since both of them are in the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is pleasure. Oh, but our philosopher is subject to pain as well. Yes, but he sets it at nought; for he says that, if he were being roasted, he would call out how sweet this is! In what respect then is he inferior to the god, if not in respect of eternity? And what good does eternity bring but the highest form of pleasure, and that prolonged for ever? What boots it then to use high sounding language unless your language be consistent ? On bodily pleasure (I will add mental, if you like, on the understanding that it also springs, as you believe, from the body) depends the life of happiness. Well, who can guarantee the wise man that this pleasure will be permanent? For the circumstances that give rise to pleasures are not within the control of the wise man, since your happiness is not dependent on wisdom herself, but on the objects which wisdom procures with a view to pleasure. Now all such objects are external to us, and what is external is in the power of chance. Thus fortune becomes lady paramount over happiness, though Epicurus says she to a small extent only crosses the path of the wise man.
Just marking this thread with the note that Joshua has some recent very interesting circumstantial evidence about the true identity of the author of the 1743 edition, and we are waiting patiently for him to package that up for us in suitable form.
