Posts by Cassius

Quote from Godfrey

Well stated Cassius !

Thank you Godfrey. This point plays a significant point in this episode 195, so if you get a chance to listen and comment I will be very interested.

Episode 195 of Lucretius Today is Now Available! We cover a lot of material that is very important to several rrecent discussions, so I wanted to get this out as quickly as possible.

The listener will have to be the judge of the final product, but I think we had a good recording session today and I think the final product should be a help to our discussions. One comment during early editing:

We talk a lot about how the division of the principal doctrines is a later and artificial add-on. Here is something that I think will help for this episode as to PD03:

PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

In this instance, I am thinking that the conventional numbering tends to minimize the separate and equally important status of the two sentences. I would separate them so that they stand alone:

A: The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful.

--- That's the sentence you are going to hear from Torquatus over and over and over. But the second in my view makes a separate point:

B: Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

--- That's a very important separate point: That not only as established in "A" is the limit of pleasure IN SUM the total absence of pain, but as a second and equally important aspect, IN UNITS of pleasure and pain in discrete areas of our experience, each UNIT is either a pain or a pleasure (and no combination or third alternative) for so long as that unit lasts in that "wherever" area of body or mind. Pleasurable experiences and painful experiences co-exist in different parts of experience like oil and water, but like oil and water they stay separate and do not lose their individual separate nature.

In the discussion featured in this episode, Torquatus continuously stresses point "A." Cicero has allowed Torquatus to state point "B" in Torquatus' prior monologue in Book One.

However when Cicero presses Torquatus on why Epicurus seems to be including two entirely separate things ( 1- pleasures of stimulation, 2- pleasures of normal living which do not involve stimulation) in his definition of "Pleasure," Cicero allows Torquatus in Book Two - at least in the section we focus on today - to refer only to point "A" as evidence for his position.

As I see it, in truth Epicurus' formulation requires both "A" and "B" for clarity: "in sum" the limit of quantity of pleasure in total is arrived at when all pain is removed, but ALSO, all the way along the sequence of "discrete units," each experience of life which is not painful is seen as pleasurable. You have to have both observations at both summary and unitary levels to understand how "absence of pain" has two meanings: One in sum as the limit of quantity, and one in discrete unitary experiences that go to make up that sum.

If true, this observation would mean that both sentences in the form we have them in PD03, which are not stated explicitly in the Letter to Menoeceus, have to be fully developed and understood before the passages in Menoeceus about pleasure -- which lead some to an ascetic interpretation of Epicurus -- can be fully appreciated as not saying that at all.

Let's see how this plays out in the podcast.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laetitia_(goddess)

Noun[edit]

laetitia f (genitive laetitiae); first declension

1. joy, gladness, happiness, pleasure, delight synonyms, antonyms ▲quotations ▼Synonyms: dēlicium, dēlectātiō, voluptās, gaudium, frūctus, alacritāsAntonyms: maeror, maestitia, aegritūdō, lūctus, trīstitia, trīstitūdō, tristitās, dēsīderium

laetitia - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

gaudium - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

Noun[edit]

gaudium n (genitive gaudiī or gaudī); second declension

1. joy, delight synonyms, antonyms ▲Synonyms: dēlicium, dēlectātiō, voluptās, laetitia, frūctus, alacritāsAntonyms: maeror, maestitia, aegritūdō, lūctus, trīstitia, trīstitūdō, tristitās, dēsīderium

In addition to the excerpt above to indicate where we will start, I have reformatted into dialogue form the text from which we will be reading, because it seems to me it is super-important. I would suggest the possibility that the name of "Hieronymus of Rhodes" ought to become almost as familiar to us as any of the core Epicureans, because Cicero points out that he stands for exactly the position that many many commentators today allege to be the position of Epicurus. Nevertheless, Torquatus points out that Hieronymous of Rhodes is "grossly mistaken." I think we are going to find that it is very helpful to be able to understand and express clearly the difference between Hieronymous of Rhodes and Epicurus, which this from Book Two of On Ends allows us to do:

Cicero: "Do you understand, then, what Hieronymus of Rhodes declares to be the supreme good, by the standard of which he thinks all things should be judged?"

Torquatus: "I understand that he holds freedom from pain to be the final good.”

Cicero: “Well, what view does this same philosopher hold of pleasure?"

Torquatus: "He asserts that it is not essentially an object of desire."

Cicero: "So he is of opinion that joy is one thing, absence of pain another."

Torquatus: “Yes, and he is grossly mistaken, for, as I proved a little while ago, the limit to the increase of pleasure consists in the removal of all pain."

Cicero: "I shall examine afterwards, what is the sense of your expression absence of pain, but that pleasure means one thing, absence of pain another, you must grant me,unless you prove very obstinate."

Torquatus: "Oh, but you will find me obstinate in this matter, for no doctrine can be more truly stated."

Cicero: "Pray, does a man when thirsty find pleasure in drinking?"

Torquatus: "Who could say no to that?"

Cicero: "The same pleasure that he feels when the thirst has been quenched?"

Torquatus: "No, a pleasure different in kind. For the quenching of the thirst brings with it a steady pleasure, whereas the pleasure which accompanies the process of quenching itself consists in agitation."

Cicero: "Why then do you describe two things so different by the same name?"

Torquatus: "Do you not recollect what I said a little while since, that when once all pain has been removed pleasure admits of varieties but not of increase?"

Cicero: "I do indeed remember, but though your statement is in good Latin, it is far from clear. For variety is a Latin word, and is in its strict sense applied to differences of colour, but is metaphorically used to denote many differences; we speak of a varied poem, varied speech, varied manners, varied fortune, pleasure too is usually called varied when it is derived from many unlike objects which produce pleasures that are unlike. If you intended this by the term variety, I should understand it, as indeed I do understand the word when you are not the speaker; I am far from clear what the variety is of which you speak, when you say that we experience the highest pleasure as often as we are without pain, when however we are eating things which rouse a pleasurable agitation in our senses, then the pleasure consists in the agitation, which produces a variety in our pleasures, but that the pleasure felt in absence of pain is not thereby increased; and why you should call that feeling pleasure, I cannot understand."

Torquatus: "Can then anything be sweeter than to feel no pain?’

Cicero: "Nay, be it granted that there is nothing better, for I am not yet investigating that question; does it therefore follow that painlessness, so to call it, is identical with pleasure?’

Torquatus: "It is quite identical, and is the greatest possible, and no pleasure can be greater."

Cicero: "Why then, when once you have so deigned your supreme good as to make it consist entirely in absence of pain, do you shrink from embracing, maintaining, and championing this exclusively? I ask what need there is for you to introduce pleasure into the assembly of the virtues, like some harlot into a company of matrons? The name of pleasure is odious, disreputable, open to suspicion. So you are in the habit of telling us this, very often, that we do not understand what kind of pleasure Epicurus means. Now whenever I have been told this (and I have been told it not unfrequently) I have the habit of getting now and then a little angry, though I usually bear myself with tolerable calmness in discussion. Do I not understand what hedone means in Greek and voluptas in Latin? Which, pray, of the two languages is it that I do not know? Next, how comes it that I do not know this, though all those are aware of it, whoever they be, that have chosen to become Epicureans? And this is a point argued by your school most admirably, that a man who is to become a philosopher has no need to be acquainted with literature. Thus just as our ancestors brought old Cincinnatus from his plough to make him dictator, so you gather from every village men who are indeed worthies, but surely not very well educated. They then understand what Epicurus means, and I do not?

Cicero: To let you know that I do understand, first declare that by voluptas I mean what he means by hedone. Now though we often search for a Latin word equivalent to a Greek word and conveying the same sense, in this case there was no need to search. No word can possibly be discovered which more exactly represents in Latin the sense of a Greek word than voluptas. All men everywhere who know Latin denote by this word two things, delight existing in the mind and a sweet agreeable agitation in the body. In fact the character in Trabea’s play describes delight as excessive pleasure in the mind, just like the character in Caecilius, who gives out that he is delighted with all delights. But there is this distinction, that voluptas is applied also to the mind (an immoral feeling, as the Stoics think, who deign it as an irrational elevation of the mind when it fancies itself in the enjoyment of some great blessing) while laetitia and gaudium are not used in connexion with the body. But according to the usage of all who speak Latin, pleasure consists in feeling that kind of agreeableness which agitates some one of the senses. This agreeableness too you may apply metaphorically if you please to the mind; for we use the phrase to affect agreeably in both cases, and in connexion with it the word agreeable; if only you understand that midway between the man who says I am enriched with such delight that I am unsteadied and the man who cries now at last is my heart on fire, one of whom is transported with delight, while the other is racked by pain, comes this man’s speech though this our acquaintance is quite recent, for he is neither in a state of delight nor of torture; and also that between him who is master of exquisite bodily pleasures and him who is tormented by the intensest pains comes he who is removed from both states.

Cicero: "Do you think then that I sufficiently grasp the force of expressions, or am I even at my age to be taught to speak either Greek or Latin? And, putting that aside, even granting that I do not clearly comprehend what Epicurus means, though I have, I believe, a clear knowledge of Greek, look to it that there be not some fault in him who uses such language that he is not understood."

Welcome mage !

There is one last step to complete your registration:

All new registrants must post a response to this message here in this welcome thread (we do this in order to minimize spam registrations).

You must post your response within 72 hours, or your account will be subject to deletion. All that is required is a "Hello!" but of course we hope you will introduce yourself -- tell us a little about yourself and what prompted your interest in Epicureanism -- and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Plus, other than the statement of Cicero about Epicurean philosophy taking Italy by storm in 50BC, I am not aware of much discussion at all about how popular Epicurean philosophy was in the Hellenized world by 50 AD. How much of the population of Greece ever was a blend of something that could be considered Epicurean? When Paul was complaining in general about the non-Christians, I have no idea how many in fact might have been Epicureans for these allusions DeWitt is drawing to be likely. Were the Epicureans always a small sect, or is it possible that in the relevant areas that we are talking about Epicurean views had in fact penetrated strongly. I am not sure I have read anything which even tried to project that. Is it possible that the Epicureans attained a level of popularity that no one today really suspects or admits? Is it possible that they far outnumbered the Stoics? I have no clue.

We have a tendency to think that Epicurean popularity somehow nosedived after Lucretius, but is it possible that that is not in fact the case and that it continued to be extremely popular, or perhaps even a majority, until the Christians took over?

I am particularly looking forward to the analysis of whether Epicurus was in their mind as the, or one of the, antichrist(s)!

Good grief how'd you get this research done so fast! You've been holding back!

Quote from Don

I think a better formulation would be "I exist, therefore, I feel." Existence comes before feeling.

I tend to agree with Jefferson, but I am not ready to disagree with your statement either. Given my understanding that Epicurus is taking the information provided by the senses (and prolepsis and feelings) as the ultimate way we determine what is true, I could see an argument that Jefferson's sequence is correct, and that we start with the senses/anticipations/feelings as given - because we have to - and go from there. I could also see some kind of combination that requires both simultaneously, and I tend to think that the decision of the Epicureans to combine canonics and physics may be related to that.

I hope we can find some material at some point from people like Sedley or others who have spent more time with what Sextus Empiricus has to say about Epicurus (which i have not studied). And surely there are many critical commentaries on that "I think therefore I am" formulation. Until we look at it further I better reserve taking a firm position on that one.

OK Titus here is a forum specifically dedicated to St Paul and Epicurus. Unless you have a better idea I would suggest that you or others interested in this just open a thread for each specific verse or issue that is contained in the book. I think we have at least a couple of posts on this book somewhere already so i will try to round them up and put them there too.

"Here" now means the forum where you are reading this:

Norman DeWitt's "St Paul And Epicurus"

Titus I would propose that you just set up a thread for each suggestion by DeWitt you find interesting and people can then pursue that specific reference over time. I agree this is worth pursuing whether anyone has in the past followed DeWitts lead or not. Let me look and see if we have one and if we don't I will set up a sub forum specifically for this book and you can create a thread on each verse or topic.

I have never heard of Dillahunty but he sure seems to be on the right side. If this is the way Peterson generally talks then he's insufferable. I think in these contexts this Thomas Jefferson quote is helpful. "Feeling" and "pleasure" are the key words, and it doesn't look like anyone today is willing to go there.

Jefferson to John Adams, August 15, 1820:    (Full version at Founders.gov)

…. But enough of criticism: let me turn to your puzzling letter of May 12. on matter, spirit, motion etc. It’s crowd of scepticisms kept me from sleep. I read it, and laid it down: read it, and laid it down, again and again: and to give rest to my mind, I was obliged to recur ultimately to my habitual anodyne, ‘I feel: therefore I exist.’ I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existencies then. I call them matter. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, or immaterial space. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need.

Quote from Don

The HUGE issue here is that the saying is completely divorced from its original textual context. Was Epicurus arguing against a specific point? Was he speaking generally?

To me this question shows the way to the answer. The items in a collection of quotes would more than likely be selected according to the generality and importance of its application. To say that we enjoy pleasure when we feel it without intervening step (thinking about it) is possible, but to me that is so obvious as to not likely be the meaning. To my knowledge no one contends that you have to think about pleasure before you feel it.

To say that we feel pleasure as soon as it happens is also true, but again adds little if anything that would qualify this as a great insight worthy of inclusion in the list.

I think we are in agreement that the focus is on time more than anything about evil.

I would see two options: (1) It could be having to do with something about the argument with the Cyreniacs which seems to be about whether we experience pleasure at the time we do something (philosophy as stated example) or later on. (2) It could have to do with pleasure being inseparable from life and being available only while you are alive.

I think both points would be correct Epicurean philosophy, and I think we agree that it's hard to know without more context.

I don't know that 42's sequence in the list tells us much, but it seems to be in a section of very practical advice.

It occurs to me to say this about the alternatives:

FIRST:

42. At the very same time, the greatest good is created and the greatest evil is removed.

That could be correct if stated in the context of Usener 423, that the realization of the escape from death, which is from most perspectives the worst thing that can happen to someone, brings the greatest joy in exhilaration that you have avoided death:

U423 Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their “thing delighted” – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: “That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good.”

SECOND:

Epicurus.net “The same time produces both the beginning of the greatest good and the dissolution of the evil.”

Understandable in pretty much the same as as the first alternative.

THIRD:

Bailey: “The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment.”

I agree with DeWitt that this statement is counterintuitive, not true, and therefore in DeWitt's word nonsensical.

FOURTH (DeWitt)

The same span of time embraces both the beginning and the end of the greatest good.

Presuming Don is correct as I do, this is an interpretation of a difficult sentence. I would say that regardless of whether it is what the original text said, this (along with the first two above alternatives) are correct statements of Epicurean theory. And I would further say that while the first two alternatives are limited to the situation of "escape from death," DeWitt's interpretation has the advantage of being both true to Epicurus and being more broadly applicable and therefore useful along the lines of the airliner analogy from the last podcast. I am not going to frequently need to understand that "escape from death" is one way to get a rush of enjoyment. On the other hand, I am frequently going to need to remind myself that there is no pleasure, no good of any kind, except for the span of time between birth and death while I am alive.

This may be an instance where DeWitt's interpretations outrun the text, but nevertheless I think where he ends up is both correct and highly valuable.

And that would be another example where, if the Epicurean commentator world had accepted this sentence from DeWitt in the 1950's when he wrote it, we would be a lot further along in rebuilding an Epicurean "movement" true to the origins of the school:

Quote from Quote from “Epicurus And His Philosophy” page 240 - Norman DeWitt (emphasis added)

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.”

---

I am conscious that many people probably read my exchanges with Don on this and think we are arguing with each other for no reason other than stubbornness. On the contrary, I think it is not really an "argument" but an exploration of the details, and the discussion is highly useful because it is going to lead to a lot of beneficial results. If we weren't having this back and forth it would be highly tempting just to drop the subject before the implications are fully brought out. We'd just be adding to the long list of people who read about Chrysippus' hand with glazed eyes and move on. Instead of making progress those people would just keep looking for the new form of pleasure that is better than sex, drugs, and rocknroll that they have been told by the commentators is hiding somewhere and will be found if they will just live a more ascetic life. The normal course is that they eventually stop looking and drop Epicurus altogether, and that needs to change.

Yes I agree there, but I think what Torquatus does say is textbook Epicurean viewpoints. At the moment my preferred interpretation of the situation is that where Torquatus speaks the words are textbook Epicurean, but that Cicero is leaving out the extended development of how life is pleasure that we are discussing now. The problem that most of us have with understanding the Chrysippus hand analogy is evidence that more explanation is needed than Cicero provides. I think the roots of it are there, as we are pulling out now in identifying normal life as pleasure, but it's so contrary to standard ways of thinking that much more development is needed, and I think that's where Cicero deliberately chose to leave it out.

And by leaving it out the full explanation of how it is legitimate to see normal life as pleasure we'll see how Cicero is able to harp over and over on this point as we continue in Book Two.

For better or worse i am afraid we have only started this discussion. On the podcast and in future discussion we will want to find a way to express this linkage without boring everyone to tears of frustration.

Another reason I find this interesting is that Torquatus clearly says exactly what Don is saying -- that Epicurus finds the highest good to be in pleasure. That seems clear and does make sense and Cicero does not object on that point.

But Torquatus does not seem to be as clear and successful in explaining Chrysippus' hand or the equation of pleasure as the absence of pain in a way that Cicero finds persuasive. (And I think most of us agree that for some reason - Cicero with his finger on the scale? - the point is not being made clearly.)

But whatever the reason, the "failure to communicate" seems to revolve around this very issue -- clarity and agreement in identifying simply "living, existing, being alive" as being pleasure.

Since my view on this is evolving I will extend this a little further:

Quote from Don

But more than that, calling living, existing, being alive, "the greatest good" doesn't get us anywhere.

See this is where I think affirmatively identifying life with pleasure does get you somewhere. When you start identifying "living, existing, being alive" tightly with pleasure, and you don't insist that the word pleasure applies only to the "tickling" of the senses, then "living, existing, being alive" does become a legitimate way to state your objective, pretty much as Maecenus is saying in his poem. Give me life because so long as I have life I can offset the pleasure of being alive against the pains he is listing.

That 's not the way we normally speak that our goal is just to remain alive, but seeing past the way we normally speak seems to be exactly a trademark Epicurean approach. The pleasure of simply "living, existing, being alive" (unless perchance we are experiencing some specific pain) is an essential part of the big picture as to why we want to continue to live.

Is calling "life" the "greatest good" the best way to get to the point were people have a proper and full understanding of all that is included in the term "Pleasure." I doubt it is, but the very discussion we're having now helps drive home the point that "pleasure" isn't limited to "tickling."

Quote from Don

But, one can't answer the question "Why do you do what you do?" by saying "Life" or "I do everything because I'm alive."

If you equate in your mind the normal state of "life" or "because I am alive" to "pleasure," then you do get pretty close to answering those questions that way.

I'd have to think further about it but saying (1) "Life is pleasure" is not much less clear or acceptable as saying (2) "pleasure is the absence of pain."

I can understand (2) as correct only because i know the background explanation that there are only two feelings. I could probably understand (1) as correct just as firmly by knowing the background explanation that life is the one pleasure that is essential to all others.

If we wanted we could discuss this parallel even further by discussing the analogies between pleasure and health / saving vs pain and disease / destruction. >> VS37. Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains.

Quote from Don

Life isn't the "greatest good", but...

Having stated that...

Live is everything to us because life

I think you and I will have to disagree on that one. When I say something is "everything" to me i pretty much mean to myself that it is the most important thing that I have, and I have no issues with thinking that the most important thing i have is my "greatest good." And when i identify life as pleasurable when I am not in pain, I have no problems seeing 'pleasure' as meaning 'life." It all depends on the context in which you are speaking. My goal is to pleasure can be said as my goal is to live pleasurably. If we are using constructs like 'pleasure is the absence of pain" which requires thought to understand since it is not our normal usage, it's not much different to consider "life" as a placeholder for "pleasure." But we can agree to disagree because I don't think it's particularly important to state it that way - it is more clear to us to say "pleasure is the goal" or "pleasure is the greatest good."

I am also very interested in your comment on whether Vatican Collection 42 is being emended by translators. We may have covered it already but I don't recall.

Do we already have Maecaenus in our list of later Epicureans? If we don't I am wondering if we shouldn't, because the more I read the more Epicurean he sounds. And I would bet that some people are denying that he is Epicurean because of his preference for luxury, and the ascetic-version of Epicurean philosophy (which I think is wrong) prevents them from accepting that he was in fact pursuing Epicurean philosophy as he thought appropriate under his circumstances, somewhat like Atticus.

EDIT: Yes i see Nate has him listed - good work Eikadistes!

Introduction

Maecenas, a descendant of Etruscan kings and a friend of Emperor Augustus, was a leading figure in both the late Roman Republic and the early Empire. During the civil wars that followed Julius Caesar’s death, he acted as a diplomat, a close adviser to the future Augustus, and for a time was even in charge (with Agrippa) of the government of Rome and Italy. He is also believed to have played a major role in the emergence of the imperial regime. Although rarely present on the battlefield, he is often seen as Caesar the Younger’s right-hand man. Above all, from the late 40s BCE, he was the patron of some of the most famous Latin poets. He symbolized from very early on the golden age of literary patronage and it is mainly to this activity that he still owes his fame today: for example, Virgil’s Georgics and Aeneid, Horace’s Odes or Propertius’s Elegies were composed under his aegis. He also left behind the image of a bon vivant with an unusual, one might even say eccentric, personality, and of an epicurean who preferred staying in the shadows to the limelight. The very limited and scattered data from ancient sources (even his date of birth is uncertain) derives in part from opponents who did not appreciate the fact that a simple knight, who had refused to be a magistrate and privileged his personal relationship with Caesar the Younger, played a leading role in Rome at a time when the city was in the throes of transformation. The singularity of his behavior, in a very normative society, accentuated certain misunderstandings. Thus, Maecenas left a controversial image which is still widely debated today. In all likelihood, if he became involved in Roman politics, alongside the future Augustus during the civil wars, it was out of duty, as he was probably convinced that troubled times required action. After Caesar the Younger’s victory over Antony and Cleopatra, in 31–30 BCE, he felt the need to regain his freedom and, at the end of what was a political epiphany (Maecenas remained in the political limelight for only a few years), only retain his role as a discrete personal advisor. He also continued to spearhead a movement to turn Rome not only into a political and military power, but also a cultural one. The death of this faithful and loyal companion in 8 BCE was experienced by Augustus, his friend, as an irreparable loss.

General Overviews

The political and cultural context explains to a large extent, despite Maecenas’s oddities, the modalities of his political action and cultural work. Rome changed profoundly at the time of Augustus’s Principate and, even though a political culture endured, institutions and society underwent transformations that distinguished it in part from Republican Rome. In this framework, the personality of the prince, Augustus, friend of Maecenas and man of literature, was pivotal (Le Doze 2020). Because of his authority and the accumulation of powers, all eyes were on him. His reformist policies, including their traditionalist dimension that should not be overlooked, shaped a new Rome after the civil wars (Hurlet and Mineo 2009, Rivière 2012). However, others than the prince contributed to the transformation of the empire’s capital (Morrell, et al. 2019) and to the profound developments of this period, which are not limited to institutional changes (Galinsky 1996, Galinsky 2005, and Wallace-Hadrill 2008). The triumviral period (Osgood 2006, Pina Polo 2020), which preceded the establishment of the Principate, generated a lot of anxiety, and created a context that influenced poetic production. Zanker 1988 is an excellent introduction to the debates that surround Maecenas, for the author studies how the values advocated by the Augustan regime permeated Roman society through images: similarly, historians have often suggested that Maecenas exploited poets to serve Augustus’s interests.