Posts by Cassius

Godfrey to continue on this part of the discussion in an admittedly narrow and technical way rather than making a super important point, I wanted to make another comment on your statement here:

Quote from Godfrey

So, interestingly, the maximum pleasure of the entire organism is the absence of pain, whereas the absence of pain is the minimum of pleasure for any specific location in the organism.

I made a comment on this already, but here is something more about considering any interpretation of "absence of pain" as a "minimum":

From section IV of Book Two (again I am rewording to make it clear who is speaking so check the original:

Torquatus: ‘Can then anything be sweeter than to feel no pain?’

CIcero: "Nay, be it granted that there is nothing better, for I am not yet investigating that question; does it therefore follow that painlessness, so to call it, is identical with pleasure?’

Torquatus: ‘It is quite identical, and is the greatest possible, and no pleasure can be greater.’

Presuming that last sentence is translated correctly, and I have no reason to doubt it, this is another explicit statement that the Epicurean position is that:

1 - "Painlessness"/ "Absence of Pain" is IDENTICAL to pleasure. I interpret that to mean that the two concepts ("absence of pain" and "pleasure") are two separate words being used to describe exactly the same thing, meaning that the two words can be used interchangeably in referring to an individual discrete feeling.

2 - That using the term 'painlessness" or "pleasure" without any modifiers or caveats can also imply that you are referring to pleasure at the "macro" or "whole organism" level and therefore you are referring to "pure pleasure" which by definition means the "greatest pleasure," "no pleasure being greater."

My point in this post is that i am cautious in the wording so we can try to track the Epicurean usage. If you refer to a person, or a person refers to themselves at the moment, as being "painless," then that seems to be the equivalent of saying that they are at the height of pleasure in both body and mind as a full organism. If you refer, on the other hand, to some part of your body as being painless (such as hand or foot or your mind) then you are just referring to a location and saying nothing about the rest of the body or mind, which could be experiencing pain at the same time.

So I am cautious about referring to "painless" as a starting point. A painless foot and hand and adding them up is a good start, yes, but "painlessness" at the macro full organism level is apparently being defined as being 100% full of pleasure and a very great pleasure. Now maybe "variation" can explain this in a way consistent with "starting point," but I'm not sure that's consistent with the texts.

Maybe in the discussion of variation we'll find more to go on as to that aspect.

Welcome to Episode 196 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Books One and Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted to Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition

We are using the Reid edition, so check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

As we proceed we will keep track of Cicero's arguments and outline them here:

Cicero's Objections to Epicurean Philosophy

Last week we started discussion of Section IV and this week we will pick up at the same place and deal with Cicero's argument as he pursues his argument that Epicurus does not know what he means when he talks about pleasure:

Anytime we start talking in terms of a "life" or implying "length of time" is an issue I think we need to remember this from the letter to Menoeceus:

[126] But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another (yearn for it) as a respite from the (evils) in life. (But the wise man neither seeks to escape life) nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

New followup at Facebook:

John Bramwell

On the 9th September Cassius Amicus posed an interesting question wether I would prefer to be an ignorant shepherd lying in the grass or Epicurus in pain both with only a week to live.

There is no easy answer to this poser as there is other factors to be contemplated. Did the young shepherd have an old widowed mother to take care of etc.

But what if the period of time were different and what if they did not know the time frame at all.

Had the shepherd been told of the horrors that might await him, all sorts of things.

I am not going to give an opinion except that I think it is only human beings that have a concept of death and once this “cat” was out of the bag there was no going back.

Perhaps I am being naive but I believe that Epicurus put the cat back in the bag, so to speak.

CASSIUS REPLY:

Hi John. The point in the hypothetical was to compare the life of an educated Epicurean, even with significant physical pain (Epicurus), to the life of an uneducated regular person who spends his or her time without significant physical pain (the hypothetical shepherd). As you say, there are all sorts of unknowns in the hypothetical, but the issue involves assessing what "absence of pain" really means in Epicurean philosophy and how we process that term as the goal of life.

This is a subject on which Cicero criticized Epicurus extensively in Book 2 of Cicero's "On Ends," and that's the subject of our most recent Episode 195 of the Lucretius Today podcast.

Ultimately I think there is no absolute answer to the question of which life is "best" or which "should" be preferred. There are no divine answers or Platonic absolutes which establish which is "better." We all have our own feelings of pleasure and pain as to what is most significant to us, and we can offset pleasures against pains and still find a predominance of pleasure even in situations involving significant pain.

I respect anyone who answers differently from me as having a right to their own opinion, but I know which I personally prefer to choose in my own life. I frequently choose actions which bring some amount of pain in exchange for greater pleasure thereafter, and I do not obsess over avoiding all forms of pain every second of my life.

I think the position we take on what Epicurus is saying on this point is the difference between considering Epicurus to be the greatest philosopher of the western world vs. considering Epicurus to be a ho-hum also-ran.

Note: the podcast post is here:

Quote from Don

Oh, and great discussion in 195! Well done! Looking forward to more Cicero dissection.

Ok I am glad we pass that test, because I am pretty sure we want to add 195 to the list of "most important" episodes.

Quote from Godfrey

A question is "why is absence of pain throughout the organism (macro) the limit of magnitude, whereas a more localized pleasure (micro) can increase beyond mere absence of pain?"

I think we could reword that this way:

A question is "why is absence of pain (which is the definition of pleasure) through the organism (at macro level) the limit of magnitude, whereas a more localized pleasure (at the micro level) can increase?"

If that is saying the same thing, which I think it is, the answer is pretty obvious: a macro level pleasure cannot increase by definition. because it has no more room to increase, while pleasure at any smaller degree than macro level can increase because it still has room to increase.

I am not sure this is any more difficult than remembering "positive, comparative, superlative" as parts of speech.

In "good, better, best" the "good" gives you a description of what you are talking about, the "better" is the comparative form distinguishing one from another, and the "best" is by definition the superlative form which you are saying cannot (again by definition) increase.

I am thinking words like "full" and "complete" and "pure" and "godlike" are meant as superlatives and simply being used to refer to the "best" possible.

And I think these issues we're discussing are the primary and important big picture items to get clear first.

Secondarily we have the kinetic/katastematic issue as Don has interjected I think correctly as "types" or categories of pleasure that are included in the sweeping mix as descriptions that involve manner of experience. As differences involving manner of experience those are useful to consider but i don't see them as words expressing comparatives or superlatives of Pleasure as the general category. You can use and need both. They are types of pleasure like mental vs bodily or hearing vs seeing or long-lasting vs short, but I don't see them as being evaluated as better or best types of Pleasure, which is the big complaint I have against the usual K/K analysis. I would say both are "good" types of pleasure (all types of pleasure being "good") but their relative contribution toward one's total experience can increase and decrease with circumstances as part of making up the total organism over its lifetime. Many types of trees can make up a forest, but what we want to talk about in general terms as a way of evaluating the best way of life (the way we want to set as our goal) is the "forest" level. If we expend our entire conversation on "what about elms?" and "what about poplars?" and "what about oaks?" and "what about pines?" etc etc then we lose our focus on discussing "what about the forest as a whole?"

Quote from Godfrey

So, interestingly, the maximum pleasure of the entire organism is the absence of pain, whereas the absence of pain is the minimum of pleasure for any specific location in the organism

Yes as to the first part before the comma, but I am not sure that our definition of pleasure as absence of pain necessarily leads to the part after the comma. Perhaps this is where the "quantity" issue comes in, with quantity being relevant differently at the macro vs the micro levels. Maybe quantity applies at the macro level but at the micro level that is where you have duration, intensity, and location?

Maybe duration intensity and location are not relevant at the macro / full level? (Maybe I should say the macro/full perspective.)

Does that involve the Diogenes Laertius statement that there are two types of happiness/pleasure, one at the god level and one capable of increase and decrease?

"They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures."

Quote from Godfrey

"In terms of an entire organism, the maximum pleasure is the absence of pain throughout the organism. In any part of the organism, any degree of pleasure removes all pain in that part for as long as it is there, because pleasure is equal to the absence of pain

So to restate my question, I think this is significant advance in explaining what "absence of pain" is intended to mean. But there still remains a "degree" question as to why a baby whose day is 100% pleasure should wish to live another day, much less live to adulthood. There is another aspect of identifying what we mean by "the entire organism" that must explain that point. Something relating to the lifespan and/or natural capacities of the organism.

Welcome Mage, and I hope your expectations will be met.

"Full" is a term that applies equally to a jar whether the size of the jar is pint, quart, or gallon. But an organism is alive and can perhaps expand or contract its "size" in a way that may be relevant to this conversation?

In other words how do we look at "the full organism" in a way that accounts for the desirability of not simply accepting the "minimum pleasure" that is available to it immediately at hand?

Is there something about the nature of a human or intelligent being that leads to pain if the organism does not seek out the pleasure that is available to it?

What is the most clear way of explaining "This is why you don't just accept the food and water and shelter that is readily at hand, and why you instead educate yourself and work to add to the amount of pleasure that you experience in your life?"

As to the question: "Should an organism be satisfied with a low degree of pleasure that in fact drives out all pain when a higher degree of pleasure exists and is available to the organism that would also drive out all pain?"

What would you say to that?

Or is that impossible due to the first sentence of your restatement? Do we come back to the issue of location, intensity, and duration? How do we integrate the two perspectives (whole organism vs individual experiences) more clearly?

Godfrey I think that is creative and makes a lot of sense. Someone might ask if the "entire organism" includes the mind and I think the answer to that would be "of course."

Quote from Godfrey

"In terms of an entire organism, the maximum pleasure is the absence of pain throughout the organism. In any part of the organism, any degree of pleasure removes all pain in that part for as long as it is there, because pleasure is equal to the absence of pain.

I am unfamiliar with the details of Bentham and utilitarianism so I can't comment too much except to say that my problem with Utilitarianism has always been that I believe "the greatest good for the greatest number" is a terrible way of looking at things in sum.

I can't believe that Epicurus would agree that "the greatest number" is a desirable way of ranking an ultimate goal, but it may be that along the way the Utilitarians had aspects of their thought that was closer to that of Epicurus.

Apparently Frances Wright thought so.

If someone has expertise or wants to read up then we can eventually start or renew a Utilitarianism comparison thread -- I think we have one already...

Indeed we do:

Epicurean Philosophy vs. Utilitarianism

Another key question, Godfrey:

If "pleasure" = "absence of pain," does that mean that all pleasures are the same, and it makes no difference to us which pleasures we experience in life?

My answer would be:

Of course it does NOT mean that!

Pleasures (and pains) differ in intensity, duration, and location. Cites for that proposition would include PD09 + the common experience of everyone.

The pleasures of sitting on the floor of a cave chanting to yourself are quite different from the pleasures of flying to the moon in a rocket with your best pals.

No one with any degree of intelligence would allege that those pleasures are the same, but no one has the inherent authority to substitute their judgement of what is pleasing for those of another person. Some people may in fact find their ultimate fulfillment in life in sitting in a cave chanting. I am not such a person, and I doubt most of us in this forum are such people either. If we don't make more of our lives then that, then we will feel psychological pain of missing out on pleasure that was within our reach at reasonable cost but which we failed to seize.

You can view it in terms of different people having different estimates of pleasure and pain, or in other ways, but it would be ludicrous to suggest that all pleasures are the same and that it makes no difference to us which we choose to pursue in life.

In general, "we want to pursue choices that produce the life for us that is most completely full of pleasure," which means exactly the same thing as that "we want to pursue choices that produce that life for us that is most completely devoid of pain." Once you understand the equivalency then you are fine, but under conditions in which "absence of pain" first evokes in the person you are speaking to visions nihilistic nothingness, then you need to explain what you are saying in full.

Godfrey:

I am thinking that these guys are being ruthlessly logical. Hieronymous of Rhodes has for whatever reason identified "Freedom from pain" to be the ultimate good (maybe Hieronymous really WAS obsessed with escaping pain as all that matters to him, as Epicurus is alleged to be?) Since Hieronymous does not equate "pleasure" with "freedom from pain," he excludes "pleasure" from his goal and says it is not necessary.

In contrast as to Epicurus (and if I could record again I would stress this point harder) I am now convinced that Epicurus is saying BOTH of these two points:

"A" - The "limit of pleasure" is exactly the same as and can be called interchangeably "the absence of pain." ALSO:

"B" - Any discrete feeling of "pleasure" is exactly the same as and can be called interchangeably a feeling of "absence of pain." Likewise, if desired, any discrete feeling of "pain" is exactly the same as and could be called interchangeably a feeling of "absence of pleasure."

I think we should be reading Epicurus as being ruthlessly logical, and realizing that he had to bring the normal state within the term "pleasure" for philosophical discussion. You therefore end up with people like Torquatus, and Epicurus in the letter to Menoeceus, speaking in terms that sound like (and are, to an extent) a mathematical equivalency:

"Pleasure" = "Absence of Pain and "Pain" = "Absence of Pleasure."

In the past I would have said that Epicurus was equating them in terms of "Quantity" only, as per the first part of PD03. I would have stressed that Epicurus was not saying that "Pleasure" is the equivalent of "Absence of Pain" in every respect, just "quantity."

Now I would say that my prior interpretation did not go far enough. I would now say that Epicurus is simply redefining the terminology and saying that the terms are interchangeable, because there are only two feelings and the presence of one is the absence of the other, period.

The reason I can embrace this equivalency is I think it is also clear from numerous references in Epicurus and Torquatus this does not lead to a woo-woo definition of absence of pain as something other than or higher than pleasure. The first part of PD03 just gives us the "goal" in terms of "the sum of our experience" -- the theoretical goal being to reach 0% painful experiences which literally means 100% pleasurable experiences.

The second part of PD03 gives us the rest, which is that life is lived as a combination of discrete experiences (even "feeling happy" at a particular moment is a discrete experience) and when we refer to discrete feelings, we can label the desirable ones as either "pleasure" or "absence of pain" and mean exactly the same thing with either term.

To me this is validated by concluding that it is obvious to us (as it would have been to Epicurus) that the step from 99% pleasure/absence of pain to 100% pleasure/absence of pain is absolutely not a difference in kind, but only in degree. No "practical" person in his right mind would suggest that in climbing a mountain, there is no benefit from approaching within a foot of the summit, and that only at the very last inch of the summit is the benefit of mountain climbing realized. The benefit of being within a foot of the summit is essentially indistinguishable from being at the very point of the summit.

You could extend that analogy forever: No practical person in his right mind would suggest that in climbing a ladder, there is no benefit from being on the next to the last rung, and that only when you position yourself on the very last rung does climbing a ladder have any benefit. The benefit of being on the next-to-last rung is essentially similar in every practical respect to being on the highest rung.

No practical person in his right mind would suggest that in dining at a banquet there is no benefit from eating the first delicacy in front of you, and that only after you have eaten delicacies to the point of being stuffed does eating delicacies have any benefit. The benefit of eating each delicacy along the way until you are close is essentially similar in every practical respect to having eaten the last delicacies to the point where you are full.

No one of reasonable mind would conclude that reaching the very summit of the mountain or the top rung of the ladder or being close-to-full of delicacies at a banquet means that every step or bite along the way has been worthless and should be discarded. No MORE steps up the mountain or the ladder or bites of food are needed, but the ones you have taken already are an essential and necessary part of whatever it is that you have accomplished.

Unless Hieronymous was a dedicated ascetic viewing pleasure as evil to be avoided at all costs (maybe he was a proto-Stoic) he was committing the grossest error in denying that pleasure is not a requirement and the same as freedom from pain. So while Hieronymous and Epicurus both were comfortable with embracing "freedom from pain" as a statement of the supreme good, their definitions of what "freedom from pain" really means are so dissimilar as to make a night and day difference.

And in conclusion let's go ahead and be "obstinate" and validate two of Cicero's criticisms:

(1) As to terminology, "Pleasure is the absence of pain" is a key insight that Epicureans naturally keep repeating even if it drives Cicero batty that it has two meanings (first as to the sum or limit, and second as to discrete feelings). If it makes Cicero angry , so what? (I see this as another example of the in-your-face approach, such as "the sun is the size it appears to be.")

(2) Regardless of whether it is immodest to say it, Epicurus was wise about the supreme good, and Hieronymous was a fool. If it is being immodest to take a firm position on what is wise and what is not wise in regard to pleasure, then taking a firm position is just what Epicurus was doing, and it seems to me that he is telling us to do the very same thing.

Here's the text again for quick reference:

Quote from Cassius

Cicero: "Do you understand, then, what Hieronymus of Rhodes declares to be the supreme good, by the standard of which he thinks all things should be judged?"

Torquatus: "I understand that he holds freedom from pain to be the final good.”

Cicero: “Well, what view does this same philosopher hold of pleasure?"

Torquatus: "He asserts that it is not essentially an object of desire."

Cicero: "So he is of opinion that joy is one thing, absence of pain another."

Torquatus: “Yes, and he is grossly mistaken, for, as I proved a little while ago, the limit to the increase of pleasure consists in the removal of all pain."

Cicero: "I shall examine afterwards, what is the sense of your expression absence of pain, but that pleasure means one thing, absence of pain another, you must grant me, unless you prove very obstinate."

Torquatus: "Oh, but you will find me obstinate in this matter, for no doctrine can be more truly stated."

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Titus please keep Don fed with challenges! I am afraid right now my mind is on other issues and I have left my concerns with Paul behind for now, but I still find it interesting!

Yes I want to echo Titus - thank you Don for the extensive research!

DUH! thank you Martin!!!

Happy Birthday to ChadM! Learn more about ChadM and say happy birthday on ChadM's timeline: ChadM

Quote from Godfrey

Well stated Cassius !

Thank you Godfrey. This point plays a significant point in this episode 195, so if you get a chance to listen and comment I will be very interested.