Posts by Cassius

This is a shorter note: Around the 36 minute mark will appear Joshua explaining the origin of "discretion is the better part of valor." I never thought of that in an Epicurean context before, but now that I do think about it, it's the kind of comment that goes right to the Epicurean perspective on the proper use of any virtue.

We don't discuss it for long, and Joshua makes the point that Falstaff wasn't necessarily right in a way that would apply to all circumstances, but it's interesting to think about how the quote applies to the contextual analysis of virtue.

Quote from Joshua

My personal opinion; the desire for the perfection of virtue is both unnatural and unnecessary. It is in the same class as the desires for power, fame, luxurious riches, and eternal life.

Yes that is exactly the direction I would take this. And to the extent that Epicurus might have been saying this in the context of deep philosophical discussion, such as the letter to Menoeceus, rather than in the context of a "here's how you should choose your career" discussion, then the target of these comments might have been at least as much his philosophical opponents as it was those who couldn't control their urges for sex or food.

Quote from Bryan

the perfect is not *always* attainable for us

Absolutely right and very important as a part of the puzzle.

Maybe we should add the corollary:

...And the good is not the enemy of the perfect, either, if the limits of the idea of perfection are properly understood....

This post is to discuss the question in the title. As we have been seeing in Book Two of On Ends, Cicero (relying on the Platonist tradition, which appears to have been amplified by the Stoics), considered Virtue to be an end that is absolutely complete in itself.

It seems possible that one objection that Epicurus would have had to this approach (and I think we can see this illustrated in Lucian's "Hermotimus" dialogue, is that such perfection is unattainable and damaging to consider as the goal in place of "pleasure."

Therefore I think it is legitimate to ask, when Epicurus or the Epicureans talked about avoiding the pursuit of unnatural and unnecessary desires, whether this category of desires includes the pursuit of Platonic ideals of "Virtue" which are absolute and complete in themselves? Is it possible that this category includes more than just the things we normally discuss, such as fame and money and power, but also the extreme pursuit of "virtue" as mesmerized those who eventually emphasized that approach to an extreme in Stoicism?

Here are some cites:

Quote from Letter to Menoeceus

[127] For if he says this from conviction why does he not pass away out of life? For it is open to him to do so, if he had firmly made up his mind to this. But if he speaks in jest, his words are idle among men who cannot receive them.

We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come.

We must consider that of desires some are natural, others vain, and of the natural some are necessary and others merely natural; and of the necessary some are necessary for happiness, others for the repose of the body, and others for very life.

[128] The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and (the soul’s) freedom from disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness.

Quote from On Ends Book One - Torquatus

The great disturbing factor in a man's life is ignorance of good and evil; mistaken ideas about these frequently rob us of our greatest pleasures, and torment us with the most cruel pain of mind. Hence we need the aid of Wisdom, to rid us of our fears and appetites, to root out all our errors and prejudices, and to serve as our infallible guide to the attainment of pleasure. Wisdom alone can banish sorrow from our hearts and protect its front alarm and apprehension; put yourself to school with her, and you may live in peace, and quench the glowing flames of desire. For the desires are incapable of satisfaction; they ruin not individuals only but whole families, nay often shake the very foundations of the state. It is they that are the source of hatred, quarreling, and strife, of sedition and of war.

Nor do they only flaunt themselves abroad, or turn their blind onslaughts solely against others; even when prisoned within the heart they quarrel and fall out among themselves; and this cannot but render the whole of life embittered. Hence only the Wise Man, who prunes away all the rank growth of vanity and error, can possibly live untroubled by sorrow and by fear, content within the bounds that nature has set. Nothing could be more useful or more conducive to well-being than Epicurus's doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.

Quote from Lucian's Hermotimus

Lycinus. You must be of good cheer and keep a stout heart; gaze at the end of your climb and the Happiness at the top, and remember that he is working with you. What prospect does he hold out? when are you to be up? does he think you will be on the top next year—by the Great Mysteries, or the Panathenaea, say?

Hermotimus. Too soon, Lycinus.

Lycinus. By next Olympiad, then?

Hermotimus. All too short a time, even that, for habituation to Virtue and attainment of Happiness.

Lycinus. Say two Olympiads, then, for an outside estimate. You may fairly be found guilty of laziness, if you cannot get it done by then; the time would allow you three return trips from the Pillars of Heracles to India, with a margin for exploring the tribes on the way instead of sailing straight and never stopping. How much higher and more slippery, pray, is the peak on which your Virtue dwells than that Aornos crag which Alexander stormed in a few days?

Hermotimus. There is no resemblance, Lycinus; this is not a thing, as you conceive it, to be compassed and captured quickly, though ten thousand Alexanders were to assault it; in that case, the sealers would have been legion. As it is, a good number begin the climb with great confidence, and do make progress, some very little indeed, others more; but when they get half-way, they find endless difficulties and discomforts, lose heart, and turn back, panting, dripping, and exhausted. But those who endure to the end reach the top, to be blessed thenceforth with wondrous days, looking down from their height upon the ants which are the rest of mankind.

Lycinus. Dear me, what tiny things you make us out—not so big as the Pygmies even, but positively groveling on the face of the earth. I quite understand it; your thoughts are up aloft already. And we, the common men that walk the earth, shall mingle you with the Gods in our prayers; for you are translated above the clouds, and gone up whither you have so long striven.

Hermotimus. If but that ascent might be, Lycinus! but it is far yet.

Lycinus. But you have never told me how far, in terms of time.

Hermotimus. No; for I know not precisely myself. My guess is that it will not be more than twenty years; by that time I shall surely be on the summit.

Lycinus. Mercy upon us, you take long views!

Hermotimus. Ay; but, as the toil, so is the reward.

Lycinus. That may be; but about these twenty years—have you your master's promise that you will live so long? Is he prophet as well as philosopher? Or is it a soothsayer or Chaldean expert that you trust? Such things are known to them, I understand. You would never, of course, if there were any uncertainty of your life's lasting to the Virtue-point, slave and toil night and day like this; why, just as you were close to the top, your fate might come upon you, lay hold of you by the heel, and lug you down with your hopes unfulfilled.

Hermotimus. God forbid! these are words of ill omen, Lycinus; may life be granted me, that I may grow wise, and have if it be but one day of Happiness!

Lycinus. For all these toils will you be content with your one day?

Hermotimus. Content? Yes, or with the briefest moment of it.

Lycinus. But is there indeed Happiness up there—and worth all the pains? How can you tell? You have never been up yourself.

Hermotimus. I trust my master's word; and he knows well; is he not on the topmost height?

Lycinus. Oh, do tell me what he says about it; what is Happiness like? wealth, glory, pleasures incomparable?

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I don't want to raise any expectations that this is going to be a particularly "good" episode, but I do think it will cover some "important topics."

Two of them deserve threads of their own:

Thread

If We Agree For The Sake of Argument That "The Perfect Should Not Be The Enemy of The Good," then let's ask "What *Should* We Consider To Be The Proper Relationship Between The Perfect And The Good?"

This thread is to discuss the question in the title.

It seems to me that this aphorism, which most of us seem to agree is a good one, needs to be followed up with more explanation of what exactly *is* the proper way for us to view the "perfect" in relationship to "the good?"

Let's also presume that we don't immediately jump to the reductionist "there is no perfect" and "there is no good," although that may be a perfectly reasonable option that we can include in the discussion.

Presuming we are…

Cassius

February 26, 2024 at 4:43 PM

Post

RE: Given The Stress That Many Greek Philosophers' Placed On "Virtue" or a perfect view of "The Good" As The Ultimate Goal, To What Extent Would An Epicurus Have Considered That Approach An "Unnatural and Unnecessary Desire?"

[…]

Yes that is exactly the direction I would take this. And to the extent that Epicurus might have been saying this in the context of deep philosophical discussion, such as the letter to Menoeceus, rather than in the context of a "here's how you should choose your career" discussion, then the target of these comments might have been at least as much his philosophical opponents as it was those who couldn't control their urges for sex or food.

Cassius

February 26, 2024 at 6:45 PM

This thread is to discuss the question in the title.

It seems to me that this aphorism, which most of us seem to agree is a good one, needs to be followed up with more explanation of what exactly *is* the proper way for us to view the "perfect" in relationship to "the good?"

Let's also presume that we don't immediately jump to the reductionist "there is no perfect" and "there is no good," although that may be a perfectly reasonable option that we can include in the discussion.

Presuming we are talking to non-philosophers and want to give people practical advice, would we start with something like:

"The 'perfect' of a thing is a concept that we use to visualize what the 'best' of that thing would be, and by visualizing that concept of the 'best' of that thing, we can more easily work toward our target of approximating it. And even though we know from the start that the 'perfect' is not attainable for us, it still serves as a very valuable tool for us in calculating out actions, because there is no way we can hope to come close to a goal unless we start out knowing what the goal is."

I think we will see in discussing Cicero's objections to Epicurean philosophy that a lot of it amounts to stressing "the perfect" in a way most of us will consider to be unattainable. What then would we expect the ancient Epicureans to have said about this topic?

As long as several of our regular people remain engaged I am not inclined at all to see the conversation stop, so don't worry about that.

In my own case I am trying to edit the podcast we recorded yesterday as I think it contains some pressing material we also need to deal with, so I better work to keep Joshua in line over there while you guys tend to this.

Just keeping Joshua in line is a full time job so you guess tend to things so we don't need to many planks!!

We can go round and round quoting Richard Dawkins vs Sam Harris til the end of time, but if doing so causes us to lose sight of the larger goal of living happily through Epicurean philosophy, then we are not doing justice to the reason we are here in the first place.

Not everyone is going to agree with the way we implement that balance, but I think the best we can do is to try to accommodate "privately" those who have the time and interest to pursue the Harris road, while at the same time acknowledging that the Harris view is contrary to Epicurus and therefore not something to be promoted in public on this website.

As Dawkins says "we feel as if we are not deterministic -- and that's all that matters."

Now if someone wants to argue that that is not the position Epicurus took, or that he was wrong to do so, then *that also, or in fact even more* would be a point of productive discussion, because that would implicate the feelings anticipations and senses as the canon of truth. As Sedley says, the swerve itself may well have been an afterthought, as it certainly did not even make the letter to Menoeceus. We aren't required to ground the significance and importance of freedom of will on the swerve by a long shot, any more than we are tied to supporting every one of Epicurus' multiple possibilities for eclipses.

Which leads me to repeat again - if these discussions lead someone to think that Epicurus was so far off on basic issues that they want to drop major parts of his philosophy and refrain from representing themselves to be Epicurean, then we are all better off if that person pursues that result to their satisfaction. But those deviations aren't proper for extended development on this forum.

We do allow people here at the forum - even as Level 3 - who are clearly stating that they do not consider themselves to be "fully Epicurean." We can work with that so long as we do not have long and regular and unbalanced campaigns in public against core Epicurean positions. People who have agency can in fact change their minds, and working through defenses against attacks on Epicurean positions has extremely helpful results, exactly as we are doing in going through Book 2 of Cicero's On Ends in the Lucretius Today podcast.

But I think we owe it to those who are here to study Epicurus to keep the focus on explaining and defending Epicurean positions, and to conduct plank-walking episodes as privately as possible. In general and for the public, we should provide an Epicurean support group and not just another general philosophy forum where the only firm positon is that all firm positions are wrong. There are plenty of those on the internet where hard determinism is welcome. The "articles of faith" at such places are that all knowledge is impossible and that no one has any freedom of will whatsoever. That's exactly the kind of thing that Epicurus fought against, and we need to continue that tradition here if we expect to have an "Epicurean" community.

Interview: Richard Dawkins

QUESTION: Now, if we are gene machines, presumably then our behavior is also programmed by genes -- you have made that case. But Christians would say that there is a thing called free will, and that free will gives us a genuine choice about our actions, that effectively free will allows us to override biology. What is your response to that as a scientist?

MR. DAWKINS: I am very comfortable with the idea that we can override biology with free will. Indeed, I encourage people all the time to do it. Much of the message of my first book, "The Selfish Gene," was that we must understand what it means to be a gene machine, what it means to be programmed by genes, so that we are better equipped to escape, so that we are better equipped to use our big brains, use our conscience intelligence, to depart from the dictates of the selfish genes and to build for ourselves a new kind of life which as far as I am concerned the more un-Darwinian it is the better, because the Darwinian world in which our ancestors were selected is a very unpleasant world. Nature really is red in tooth and claw. And when we sit down together to argue out and discuss and decide upon how we want to run our societies, I think we should hold up Darwinism as an awful warning for how we should not organize our societies.

QUESTION: So you are not saying then that our genetic programming is fully deterministic?

MR. DAWKINS: It's an important point to realize that the genetic programming of our lives is not fully deterministic. It is statistical -- it is in any animal merely statistical -- not deterministic. Even if you are in some sense a determinist -- and philosophically speaking many of us may be -- that doesn't mean we have to behave as if we are determinists, because the world is so complicated, and especially human brains are so complicated, that we behave as if we are not deterministic, and we feel as if we are not deterministic -- and that's all that matters. In any case, adding the word "genetic" to deterministic doesn't make it any more deterministic. If you are a philosophical determinist, then adding the word "gene" doesn't increase the effect.

Richard Dawkins On Free Will

I posted this a couple years ago on one of my past blogs. I always find the topic worth revisiting. The following is a transcript of a question posed to and…

notesfrombabel.wordpress.com

Richard Dawkins at Politics and Prose .. The God Delusion
Question and Answer

Questioner: Dr. Dawkins thank you for your comments. The thing I have appreciated most about your comments is your consistency in the things I’ve seen you written. One of the areas that I wanted to ask you about and the places where I think there is an inconsistency and I hoped you would clarify it is that in what I’ve read you seem to take a position of a strong determinist who says that what we see around us is the product of physical laws playing themselves out but on the other hand it would seem that you would do things like taking credit for writing this book and things like that. But it would seem, and this isn’t to be funny, that the consistent position would be that necessarily the authoring of this book from the initial condition of the big bang it was set that this would be the product of what we see today. I would take it that that would be the consistent position but I wanted to know what you thought about that.

Dawkins: The philosophical question of determinism is a very difficult question. It’s not one I discuss in this book, indeed in any other book that I’ve ever talked about. Now an extreme determinist, as the questioner says, might say that everything we do, everything we think, everything that we write, has been determined from the beginning of time in which case the very idea of taking credit for anything doesn’t seem to make any sense. Now I don’t actually know what I actually think about that, I haven’t taken up a position about that, it’s not part of my remit to talk about the philosophical issue of determinism. What I do know is that what it feels like to me, and I think to all of us, we don’t feel determined. We feel like blaming people for what they do or giving people the credit for what they do. We feel like admiring people for what they do. None of us ever actually as a matter of fact says, “Oh well he couldn’t help doing it, he was determined by his molecules.” Maybe we should.. I sometimes.. Um.. You probably remember many of you would have seen Fawlty Towers. The episode where Basil where his car won’t start and he gives it fair warning, counts up to three, and then gets out of the car and picks up a tree branch and thrashes it within an edge of his life. Maybe that’s what we all ought to… Maybe the way we laugh at Basil Fawlty, we ought to laugh in the same way at people who blame humans. I mean when we punish people for doing the most horrible murders, maybe the attitude we should take is “Oh they were just determined by their molecules.” It’s stupid to punish them. What we should do is say “This unit has a faulty motherboard which needs to be replaced.” I can’t bring myself to do that. I actually do respond in an emotional way and I blame people, I give people credit, or I might be more charitable and say this individual who has committed murders or child abuse of whatever it is was really abused in his own childhood. And so again I might take a ..

Questioner: But do you personally see that as an inconsistency in your views?

Dawkins: I sort of do. Yes. But it is an inconsistency that we sort of have to live with otherwise life would be intolerable. But it has nothing to do with my views on religion it is an entirely separate issue.

Questioner: Thank you.

No one is overstepping. Even if someone decides that the disagree so firmly with a key Epicurean tenet that they just can't see calling themselves an Epicurean, that is for the best, because no one will be happy with being less than honest.

On the other hand, this forum is for made by and for people who are interested in promoting Epicurean philosophy, so that goal has to override total free speech here at the forum, as is very clearly set forth. That's a hard policy to enforce, but I think I need to do it as best I can for the good of the project.

Sometimes a higher "level" forum will solve the issue, as more "mature" Epicureans can better handle the debate. Another step after that would be "take it to private conversation.". The best I can say for now is that I think continuing the conversation in level three will be better, and we will see where things go from here.

Quote from Don

We need to work with the material world at hand as it is currently understood.

If that means that no ordinary person can have an opinion about the way his world works without a career in physics, and that even those with careers in physics have to be prepared to revise their opinions of the way the world works with every new seminar from Cambridge, then that is a prescription for total skepticism if taken literally.

I don't think anyone suggests that we need to take De Rerum Natura as a blueprint for a nuclear reactor, but the principles and perspectives laid down there remain valid and useful even as science changes.

And it is far more important for happy living to keep the global principles and perspectives in mind rather than it is to pore over the latest dissertations from Cambridge with our minds open to accepting any possibility.

Today Cicero hit the panel with one of the toughest questions in Epicurean philosophy, summarized in one way as: "If a life of pleasure is the good, why isn't a longer life of pleasure better than a shorter life of pleasure?"

We struggled through some initial thoughts, which I will get edited and posted as soon as I can. However this question will be extended throughout the next several episodes, so we will have an opportunity to grapple with this key issue.

Here is the heart of CIcero's argument:

But I shall be reminded (as you said yourself) that Epicurus will not admit that continuance of time contributes anything to happiness, or that less pleasure is realized in a short period of time than if the pleasure were eternal. These statements are most inconsistent ; for while he places his supreme good in pleasure, he refuses to allow that pleasure can reach a greater height in a life of boundless extent, than in one limited and moderate in length. He who places good entirely in virtue can say that happiness is consummated by the consummation of virtue, since he denies that time brings additions to his supreme good; but when a man supposes that happiness is caused by pleasure, how are his doctrines to be reconciled, if he means to affirm that pleasure is not heightened by duration? In that case, neither is pain. Or, though all the most enduring pains are also the most wretched, does length of time not render pleasure more enviable? What reason then has Epicurus for calling a god, as he does, both happy and eternal? If you take away his eternity, Jupiter will be not a whit happier than Epicurus, since both of them are in the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is pleasure.

Quote from Onenski

Assumption: The swerve is the basis for sustaining free will (leeway freedom a.k.a. the capacity to have done otherwise).

I look forward to the responses to the detailed way that Onenski presents this, but (per the arguments I seem to recall from the Sedley article) I do not think we should presume that Epicurus held that the swerve is the main reason for sustaining free will. It is likely more of a "multiple possibility" response, with the real basis for holding "free will" to be found as much in the canon as in the physics.

While the anti-determinism viewpoint features prominently in the Letter to Menoeceus and the Vatican Sayings, it's interesting to think about why it is not so explicit in the Principal Doctrines.

I would say that (at the very fewest) the following presume that we have the power of choice to pursue the things mentioned (prudence, honor, justice, reason) and, that Epicurus would say that holding to hard determinism is therefore detrimental to their implementation. Most of the rest (even the existence of a list in the first place) imply that the statements therein can be chosen as a basis of a happy life, which also presumes that the person seeking to implement them is not a hard determinist.

PD05. It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly, [nor again to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice] without living pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life is not living prudently, honorably, and justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous life] cannot possibly live pleasantly.

PD16. In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters, reason has ordained, and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain.

PD17. The just man is most free from trouble; the unjust most full of trouble.

I also think one of my favorite passages from Lucretius Book 2 strongly implies an anti-determinist viewpoint:

[1023] Now apply your mind closely to the documents of true reason, for a new scheme of philosophy presses earnestly for your attention, a new scene of things displays itself before you. Yet there is nothing so obvious but may at first view seem difficult to be believed, and there is nothing so prodigious and wonderful at first that men do not by degrees cease to admire. For see the bright and pure color of the sky, possessed on every side by wandering stars, and the Moon’s splendor, and the Sun's glorious light; these, if they now first shown to mortal eyes, and suddenly presented to our view, what could more wonderful appear than these? And what before could men less presume to expect? Nothing surely, so surprising would the sight have been. But now, quite tired and cloyed with the prospect, none of us vouchsafes so much as to cast our eyes up towards the bright temples of the sky. Therefore do not be frightened, and conceive an aversion to an opinion because of its novelty; but search it rather with a more piercing judgment. If it appears true to you, embrace it; if false, set yourself against it.

(The above quote is from the 1743 edition, whose "lost" translator Joshua is diligently even as we read this working on finding!)

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Boy this thread is extremely helpful for many reasons. Thinking about the David Sedley article equating Epicurus' attitude on Skepticism and Determinism leads to an obvious conclusion --- there was at least an "Unholy Trinity" of ideas that were anathema to Epicurus in the form of Idealism / Skepticism / Determinism. That leaves the question of whether supernatural religion falls with idealism, or whether it would be best to shift the literary analogy and consider supernatural religion, idealism, skepticism, and determinism to be the "Four Horsemen."

Quote from Don

but I don't see how the "swerve" - by definition a random event if I understand - can lead to a macro level volitional "choice" exercised by an free agent on the individual level.

You won't find a detailed explanation in those papers either, any more than Epicurus' atomism allowed him to be a nuclear physicist. As I gather the situation, the swerve operates on determinism in the same way that atomism operates on religion and "he who says that nothing can be known knows nothing" operates on skepticism. These posiitons provide a plausible perspective on specific challenges so we can live our lives productively while never knowing a complete "explanation" of all the mechanisms involved in any of them.

The religionists and the radical skeptics and the hard determinists don't have the evidence to establish their conclusions with certainty either, but they happily insist on superficially persuasive arguments which have real impact on real people who swallow them. And it appears that Epicurus held that it's not valid to retreat into "agnosticism" on any of these. Doubt and uncertainty on basic questions of life don't lead to happy living, they lead to passivism and nihilism and other unpleasantries.

If you adopt those views (religion/skepticism/determinism) then you go through life under the sway of people who generally use those religious / skeptical / determinist viewpoints to promote specific social conclusions.

At the end of your life you're dead and no more aware of whether the religionists / skeptics / determinists were right than when you started, but you have accepted viewpoints of others which are not what you yourself could validate through your own experience. You've lived your life (if you lived it at all) in practice without gods telling you what to do, in fact acting as if knowledge is possible, and in fact as if you had choices about the decisions you made. But all the while, if you accepted their claims, you lived under the sway of people who told you that your practical perspectives were unreal.

It seems to me that Epicurus was saying that the best course is just to reject the pretensions of religion, skepticism, and determinism in the first place, and live with the faculties that Nature gave you.

The burden of proof on the issues is not on Epicureans, who are living as nature provided using the faculties nature provided. The burden of proof is on the religionists, skeptics, and determinists, and Epicurus' arguments provide real-world observations that contradict their assertions. Nothing comes from nothing - the supernatural gods are refuted. Those who allege nothing can be known contradict themselves - skepticism is refuted. You can cite the swerve or simply say that it is not necessary to "live with necessity" because at the very least we can exit life when it ceases to please us - determinism is refuted. Each issue comes down to having confidence in the faculties that nature gave us vs imagining that there are "logical" proofs that can invalidate our practical experience. Epicurus says to go with practical experience.

Letter to Pythocles:

First of all then we must not suppose that any other object is to be gained from the knowledge of the phenomena of the sky, whether they are dealt with in connection with other doctrines or independently, than peace of mind and a sure confidence, just as in all other branches of study.

[86] We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that ‘the universe consists of bodies and the intangible,’ or that ‘the elements are indivisible,' and all such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena. For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations.

Welcome to Episode 216 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week pick up after devoting an episode to Happiness to where the discussion continued in Book 2 at the very end of Section XXVII, continuing into Section XXVIII:

REID EDITION

XXVII. ... On bodily pleasure (I will add mental, if you like, on the understanding that it also springs, as you believe, from the body) depends the life of happiness. Well, who can guarantee the wise man that this pleasure will be permanent? For the circumstances that give rise to pleasures are not within the control of the wise man, since your happiness is not dependent on wisdom herself, but on the objects which wisdom procures with a view to pleasure. Now all such objects are external to us, and what is external is in the power of chance. Thus fortune becomes lady paramount over happiness, though Epicurus says she to a small extent only crosses the path of the wise man.

XXVIII. Come, you will say to me, these are small matters. The wise man is enriched by nature herself, whose wealth, as Epicurus has taught us, is easily procured. His statements are good, and I do not attack them, but they are inconsistent with each other. He declares that no less pleasure is derived from the poorest sustenance, or rather from the most despicable kinds of food and dink, than from the most recherché dishes of the banquet. If he declared that it made no difference to happiness what kind of food he lived on, I should yield him the point and even applaud him ; for he would be asserting the strict truth, and I listen when Socrates, who holds pleasure in no esteem, affirms that hunger is the proper seasoning for food, and thirst for drink. But to one who, judging of everything by pleasure, lives like Gallonius, but talks like the old Piso Frugi, I do not listen, nor do I believe that he says what he thinks. He announced that nature’s wealth is easily procurable, because nature is satisfied with little. This would be true, if you did not value pleasure so highly. The pleasure, he says, that is obtained from the cheapest things is not inferior to that which is got from the most costly. To say this is to be destitute not merely of intelligence, but even of a palate. Truly those who disregard pleasure itself are free to say that they do not prefer a sturgeon ‘to a sprat; but he who places his supreme good in pleasure must judge of everything by sense and not by reason, and must say that those things are best which are most tasty. But let that pass; let us suppose he acquires the intensest pleasures not merely at small cost, but at no cost at all, so far as I am concerned; let the pleasure given by the cress which the Persians used to eat, as Xenophon writes, be no less than that afforded by the banquets of Syracuse, which are severely blamed by Plato; let the acquisition of pleasure be as easy, I say, as you make it out to be; still what are we to say about pain? Its agonies are so great that a life surrounded by. them cannot be happy, if only pain is the greatest of evils. Why, Metrodorus himself, who is almost a second Epicurus, sketches happiness almost in these words; a well regulated condition of body, accompanied by the assurance that it will continue so. Can any one possibly be assured as to the state of this body of his, I do not say in a year’s time, but by the time evening comes? Pain then, that is to say the greatest of evils, will always be an object of dread, even though it be not present, for it may present itself at any moment. How then can the dread of the greatest possible evil consort with the life of happiness? Someone tells me: Epicurus imparts to us a scheme which will enable us to pay no heed to pain. To begin with, the thing is in itself ridiculous, that no attention should be given to the greatest of evils. But pray what is his scheme? The greatest pain, he says, is short. First, what do you mean by short? Next, what by the greatest pain? May the greatest pain not continue for some days? Look to it, that it may. not continue some months even! Unless possibly you refer to the kind of pain which is fatal as soon as it seizes any one. Who dreads such pain as that? I wish rather you would alleviate that other sort, under which I saw that most excellent and most cultivated gentleman, my friend Gnaeus Octavius, son of Marcus, wasting away, and not on one occasion only or for a short time, but often and over quite a long period. What tortures did he endure, ye eternal gods, when all his limbs seemed on fire! Yet for all that we did not regard him as wretched, but only as distressed, for pain was not to him the greatest of evils. But he would have been wretched, if he had been immersed in pleasures, while his life was scandalous and wicked.

I've got limited time to pursue this at the moment but when I can I will also review David Sedley's "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism." In the meantime I highly recommend this for those digging into the issue.

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Sedley: "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism"

1983 Paper which is the one of the best treatments of Epicurus' view of the Free Will / Agency / Determinism issue available.

Cassius

June 3, 2020 at 8:40 AM

Also, in my own mind I combine Sedley's interpretations with those of AA Long in his "Chance and Natural Law In Epicureanism" which puts forth an explanation I find convincing as to why "the swerve" does not swallow up and invalidate the entire rest of the physics. By providing how small is the degree of the swerve you have a theory that allows both for the swerve of the atom giving rise to "choice" while also allowing the rest of the universe to proceed in a uniformly mechanistic way.

To me the two positions staked out by Sedley and Long go hand in hand to allow concistency in the theory.

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Long: "Chance and Natural Law In Epicureanism"

Long: "Chance and Natural Law In Epicureanism"

Cassius

June 28, 2019 at 8:52 AM