This thread was taking a strong turn into discussion of hierarchy in social structures, so that part of the discussion has been split to the link below. Let's keep the discussion of "Pro's and Con's of Considering Epicurean Philosophy as a Religion" here, and let's move the more general "social and societal" aspects of hierarchical structures here to the link below.
In both threads, let's remain aware of the "no partisan / contemporary politics" rules of the forum.
From "Epicurus In Rome" - Part 1, Chapter 5 - Caesar the Epicurean? A Matter of Life and Death ----
Scholars have often pointed to and that concerns Caesar’s attitude to death. According to Epicurus, of course, fear of death is – together with fear of the gods – the main obstacle to attaining a happy life, and a person cannot achieve ἀταραξία without having internalized the truth that “death is nothing to us” (ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, KD ). Whatever his other philosophical beliefs may or may not have been, Caesar on a number of occasions displayed a contempt for death that might be seen as at least Epicurean-inflected. Passing over his well-attested physical courage and death-defying acts during his military campaigns, I will concentrate in what follows on a few attested utterances, which combine to allow perhaps some insight into Caesar’s views on life and death.
The first is an argument Caesar reportedly made in his speech on
December 5, 63 BC, when the senate debated the fate of the convicted
Catilinarians. After the consul-designate Silanus had proposed the death penalty and the subsequent speakers had seconded his motion, Caesar suggested instead lifelong imprisonment without the possibility of parole. While the greater part of his speech as reconstructed by Sallust in his War against Catiline is concerned with cautioning the senators against approving a measure of questionable legality, Caesar also offers a striking argument against the death penalty itself (Sall. BC 51.20):
de poena possum equidem dicere, id quod res habet, in luctu atque miseriis mortem aerumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse; eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere; ultra neque curae neque gaudio locum esse.
About the punishment I can speak according to the facts: in sorrow and
misery death is a relief from grief, not a torture. It dissolves all human ills, and beyond it, there is place for neither care nor joy.
While Sallust is not quoting Caesar verbatim, he presumably availed
himself of the senatorial archives in reconstructing the speeches, and the historicity of the remarks on death is confirmed not only by the fact that Sallust’s Cato, in responding to Caesar, refers back to them, but crucially also by Cicero’s own summary of the discussion in the fourth speech Against Catiline. As for Cato, he begins his attack on Caesar’s proposal as follows (Sall. BC 52.13):
C. Caesar a little while ago gave this order a well-phrased and well-
structured lecture on life and death, apparently deeming false what is said about the underworld, namely, that divorced from the good, the wicked inhabit horrid, desolate, foul and fearful places.
Cicero, finally, paraphrases Caesar’s views on death as follows (Cat. 4.7-8):
The other speaker understands that death was not created by the immortal gods for the sake of punishment, but is either a necessity of nature or freedom from toil and misery. Thus wise men have never undergone it unwillingly, and brave men have often even willingly sought it ... He leaves only life to the criminals. If he had taken that away, he would have removed with one single pain many miseries of mind and body as well as all punishments for their crimes. Therefore, in order that there be some fear left in life for wicked men, those men of old maintained that there were some punishments of this sort set for the impious in the underworld—since of course they understood that without them, not even death would have to be feared.
Even though Caesar’s and Cato’s words are filtered through Sallust, and it is unclear to what extent Cicero is distorting or embellishing Caesar’s
argument, there still emerges a reasonably clear image of what Caesar must have said. Apparently, he claimed that the death penalty was not a suitable punishment because death constitutes the absolute endpoint for human experience beyond which a person will be affected by neither good nor ill – and certainly not the punishments of the traditional underworld. As a result, death is not to be feared (non esse mortem ipsam pertimescendam, Cic. Cat. 4.8).
I need to check my sources on the accusations against Caesar resulting from this speech. I think I have read that Cicero made them, but in Sallust here is what comes from Cato;
13 "In fine and finished phrases did Gaius Caesar a moment ago before this body speak of life and death, regarding as false, I presume, the tales which are told of the Lower World, where they say that the wicked take a different path from the good, and dwell in regions that are gloomy, desolate, unsightly, and full of fears.
In addition to the above quotes I think we can include the statements made by Julius Caesar, as a result of which he was accused of being an Epicurean, that the Cataline Conspirators should not be sentenced to death, but to prison, because death is a relief from punishment. Here is where Caesar says this as recorded by Sallust:
LacusCurtius • Sallust — The War With Catiline
15 "For my own part, Fathers of the Senate, I consider no tortures sufficient for the crimes of these men; but most mortals remember only that which happens last, and in the case of godless men forget their guilt and descant upon the punishment they have received, if it is a little more severe than common. 16 I have no doubt that Decimus Silanus, a gallant and brave man, was led by patriotism to say what he did say, and that in a matter of such moment he showed neither favour nor enmity; so well do I know the man's character and moderation. 17 Yet his proposal seems to me, I will not say cruel (for what could be cruel in the case of such men?) but foreign to the customs of our country. 18 For surely, Silanus, it was either fear or the gravity of the offence which impelled you, a consul elect, to favour a novel form of punishment. 19 As regards fear it is needless to speak, especially since, thanks to the precautions of our distinguished consul, we have such strong guards under arms. 20 So far as the penalty is concerned, I can say with truth that amid grief and wretchedness death is a relief from woes, not a punishment; that it puts an end to all mortal ills and leaves no room either for sorrow or for joy.
I was talking to Kalosyni earlier today and it is my understanding that she is going to post regardin the topic for our discussion on the 20th zoom that will be relevant to our discussion of pain, including how Epicurus frees us from the fear of eternal pain. Here are several relevant quotes:
Lucretius Book 1: [102] You yourself sometime vanquished by the fearsome threats of the seer’s sayings, will seek to desert from us. Nay indeed, how many a dream may they even now conjure up before you, which might avail to overthrow your schemes of life, and confound in fear all your fortunes. And justly so: for if men could see that there is a fixed limit to their sorrows, then with some reason they might have the strength to stand against the scruples of religion, and the threats of seers. As it is there is no means, no power to withstand, since everlasting is the punishment they must fear in death.
Nietzsche "Antichrist" Section 58: "The sneakishness of hypocrisy, the secrecy of the conventicle, concepts as black as hell, such as the sacrifice of the innocent, the unio mystica in the drinking of blood, above all, the slowly rekindled fire of revenge, of Chandala revenge—all that sort of thing became master of Rome: the same kind of religion which, in a pre-existent form, Epicurus had combatted. One has but to read Lucretius to know what Epicurus made war upon—not paganism, but "Christianity", which is to say, the corruption of souls by means of the concepts of guilt, punishment and immortality.—He combatted the subterranean cults, the whole of latent Christianity—to deny immortality was already a form of genuine salvation."
Lucretius Book 3 - [01] ... For as soon as thy philosophy, springing from thy godlike soul, begins to proclaim aloud the nature of things, the terrors of the mind fly away, the walls of the world part asunder, I see things moving on through all the void. The majesty of the gods is revealed, and their peaceful abodes, which neither the winds shake nor clouds soak with showers, nor does the snow congealed with biting frost besmirch them with its white fall, but an ever cloudless sky vaults them over, and smiles with light bounteously spread abroad. Moreover, nature supplies all they need, nor does anything gnaw at their peace of mind at any time. But on the other hand, the quarters of Acheron are nowhere to be seen....,
Lucretius Book 3 - [74] In like manner, often through the same fear, they waste with envy that he is powerful, he is regarded, who walks clothed with bright renown; while they complain that they themselves are wrapped in darkness and the mire. Some of them come to ruin to win statues and a name; and often through fear of death so deeply does the hatred of life and the sight of the light possess men, that with sorrowing heart they compass their own death, forgetting that it is this fear which is the source of their woes, which assails their honour, which bursts the bonds of friendship, and overturns affection from its lofty throne. For often ere now men have betrayed country and beloved parents, seeking to shun the realms of Acheron.
Lucretius Book 3 - [978] Yea, we may be sure, all those things, of which stories tell us in the depths of Acheron, are in our life. Neither does wretched Tantalus fear the great rock that hangs over him in the air, as the tale tells, numbed with idle terror; but rather ’tis in life that the vain fear of the gods threatens mortals; they fear the fall of the blow which chance may deal to each. [984] Nor do birds make their way into Tityos, as he lies in Acheron, nor can they verily in all the length of time find food to grope for deep in his huge breast. However vast the mass of his outstretched limbs, though he cover not only nine acres with his sprawling limbs, but the whole circle of earth, yet he will not be able to endure everlasting pain, nor for ever to supply food from his own body. But this is our Tityos, whom as he lies smitten with love the birds mangle, yea, aching anguish devours him, or care cuts him deep through some other passion.
There are probably other quotes on how Epicurus frees us from fear of eternal torment, so if others have similar quotes please add them here.
We will be continuing in this episode 219 with Cicero's criticisms of Epicurus' views of pain. This is a very challenging topic, so if anyone has any thoughts we should consider prior to the recording, please add them here.
Cicero's first criticism revolves this that is recorded from Diogenes Laertius:
[118] And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy. Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence. Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament.
Seemingly, exactly to the contrary, Cicero says: "There are certain maxims, and I might almost say enactments, concerning courage, which prohibit a man from being womanish in the midst of pain. So we must think it disgraceful, I do not say to feel pain (for that certainly is occasionally inevitable) but to make that old rock of Lemnus ghostly with the roarings of a Philoctetes, which, by echoing back the shriekings, cryings, groanings, sighings, dumb though it be, returns the sounds of lamentation.
It is really interesting how CIcero's criticisms track points that are also included by Diogenes Laertius some hundreds of years after CIcero's time, almost as if they were going by exactly the same sources of material despite the difference in time when they were writing.
The full text of Cicero's criticism is in the first post of this thread:
Your translation and commentary is very useful, and I appreciate the effort that went into it. Bouncing ideas back and forth is a both enjoyable and very profitable for our project!
To follow up on the last comment I made, I am convinced that PD03 and similar statements about managing pain have to be read as "over a long period of time" and maybe even "permanently."
It's important to conclude that pleasure can predominate over pain continuously, but we have to recognize that we sometimes choose pain when it leads to greater pleasure or less pain down the road, so sometimes clearly we are going to experience pain that we can't wish away by mental focus on happier thoughts.
One implication of observing that pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation, is that you have to know that if you truly do run into some insurmountable awful and problem that is beyond your ability to manage, then you have to know that you can escape the grip of that problem in order to truly be confident and without fear of the future.
Yes this is a very delicate subject but it's one that over time we need to find diplomatic ways to emphasize. There are a lot of things in life that inspire fear, but the knowledge that nothing can hold us in its grip permanently unless we allow it is a very liberating thing.
"For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living."
"I think that, even if one were unable to proceed to all the detailed particulars of the system, he would from this obtain an unrivaled strength compared with other men."
Lucretius Today Podcast Episode 218 - Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 25 - "Can The Epicurean Not Distinguish Between Greater and Lesser Pleasures and Pains?" Is Now Available -
I think Peter's post is interesting and points up the need to be clear about context. If "exercise" is what we do to repair the damage from being absolutely sedentary and eating a terrible diet full of hazardous chemicals and overloaded with carbohydrates, then I would say Epicurus would *not* stress exercise as the remedy -- he would go to the root of the problem and look to uproot the cause, rather than apply a "remedy" to a problem that would not exist but for stupid behavior that caused damage that would not otherwise have occurred.
If 'exercise' is the kind of normal activity level that Peter is talking about as the sort of "natural state," then that kind of exercise is presumably desirable.
I take Peter as focusing on those who hype exercise out of its natural place, and I expect Epicurus would tell an exercise fanatic to get their minds focused on the true goal of life just like Epicurus told Polyaneus to get over his fixation with geometry/mathematics.
I need to find the proper cite for this one, which needs addition here in this thread.
11. The stable condition of well-being in the body and the sure hope of its continuance holds the fullest and surest joy for those who can rightly calculate it.
You see, Epicureanism has an egalitarian ethos and a tendency to want to opt out of mainstream culture (traits that it shares with early Christianity and some egalitarian movements in the modern era) but it also shows little interest in fighting or provoking same mainstream culture.
Perhaps I should be sure we are on the same page as to "egalitarian" -- (Affirming, promoting, or characterized by belief in equal political, economic, social, and civil rights for all people.) I grant you that Epicureanism is interpreted that way today, but I do not take for granted that the early Epicureans interpreted it that way. They were no doubt happy to welcome new friends, but this does not ring of open arms to "all people" regardless of their views and actions: "The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself, and the rest at least not alien; but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus."
And as for not showing much interest in "fighting" the mainstream culture, I suppose that too depends on the definition of "fight," but i interpret most of Epicurus' views as a very strong rejection of the "mainstream culture" of the time.
why the Epicureans never experimented with things like common ownership of wealth even though the acquisition of wealth and luxuries runs contrary to a marked preference for minimalism.
Again I think this is the way Epicurus is interpreted but I do not think that a rigorous interpretation of Epicurus truly results in a "marked preference for minimalism." VS63. Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is like him who errs through excess. And Epicurus' statement that common ownership of property is not a good idea also seems consistent with PD39 that we have a strong preference for friends over wide-open obligations.
To illustrate how strong the Epicurean tendency for minimalism was consider the cause of Epicurus' death. His kidney disease likely came about as a result of an extremely low-fat diet.
OK aside from that being very speculative, I don't believe that the evidence supports Epicurus eating an extremely low-fat diet. Yes there are statements about bread and water and cheese but those are more likely to be philosophical statements of the importance of self-reliance than his standard diet. Epicurus' will shows him to have been affluent and I would expect his personal diet reflected at least a middle-class lifestyle. I see no reason to think that the Roman Epicureans, who had access to the sources we don't have, interpreted him as calling for an extreme eating pattern.
I think that Peter k's and Kalosyni's posts are reconcilable by pointing out that "looking for the goodness and pleasure that you can experience while you are let alive" comes in many different forms. Some people have a greater tolerance to the type of society they live in than do others, but I don't think it is valid from an Epicurean point of view to say that one perspective is "wrong" and the other "correct." Peter K is focusing on the "soul-destroying" aspects of certain circumstances, while Kalosyni probably doesn't see the things that Peter K sees as "soul-destroying" as nearly so much of a problem.
I would feel sure that the ancient school had similar differences of opinion. That doesn't mean that one is wrong and the other right, as much as it means that Peter K is focusing on the survival of the school in the face of opposition as a greater pleasure to him than some others might rank it. But it's not a matter of wrong or right nearly so much as it is a matter of what we each individually value the most, and each person has to make their choices based on what they value the highest.
Welcome to Episode 219 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.
Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.
Last week we focused on Cicero's allegation that luck places the happy life out of reach of many Epicureans. This week we pick up at the start of Section XXIX - REID EDITION -
XXIX. Again when you say that great pain is short, while prolonged pain is light, I do not understand what it is that you mean. For I am acquainted with instances where pains were not only great but also prolonged for a considerable time; and yet for enduring them there is another and truer method, of which you who do not love morality for its own sake cannot avail yourselves. There are certain maxims, and I might almost say enactments, concerning courage, which prohibit a man from being womanish in the midst of pain. So we must think it disgraceful, I do not say to feel pain (for that certainly is occasionally inevitable) but to make that old rock of Lemnus ghostly with the roarings of a Philoctetes, which, by echoing back the shriekings, cryings, groanings, sighings, dumb though it be, returns the sounds of lamentation.
Let Epicurus chant his prophecy to such an one, if he can, one whose veins within him, tainted with poison from the serpent’s tooth, bubble with foul torments. Says Epicurus: hush, Philoctetes, your pain is short. But for nearly ten years already he has been lying sick in his cave. If tis long ‘tis light; for it has its pauses, and sometimes slackens. First, it is not often so; next what is this slackening worth, when not only is the recollection of past pain fresh in the mind, but the dread of future and imminent pain causes a torment? Let the man die, says he. Perhaps it is best so, but what becomes of your saying there is always a balance of pleasure? For if that is true, see that you be not committing a crime in advising death. Rather hold language such as this, namely, that it is disgraceful, that it is unmanly to be weakened by pain, to be broken by it and conquered. For your maxim "if ’tis hard, ’tis short, if ’tis long, ’tis light," are a mere parrot’s lesson. Pain is usually assuaged by the soothing application of virtue, I mean loftiness of spirit, endurance and courage.
XXX. Not to digress too far, hear what Epicurus says on his death-bed, that you may perceive how his actions are at variance with his maxims: Epicurus wishes health to Hermarchus. I write this letter (he says) while passing a happy day, and the last of my life. Pains in the bladder and intestines are upon me, so severe that their intensity cannot be increased. Wretched creature! If pain is the greatest of evils we cannot call him anything else. But let us listen to the man himself. Still, all these are outweighed, he says, by elation of mind arising from the recollection of my theories and discoveries. But do you, as befits the feelings you have entertained from your youth up for me and for philosophy, remember to protect the children of Metrodorus.
After this I do not admire the death of Epaminondas or of Leonidas more than this man’s death; though one of these, after winning a victory over the Lacedaemonians at Mantinea, and finding that his life was ebbing away, owing to a serious wound, asked, as soon as he saw how things stood, whether his shield was safe. When his weeping comrades had answered that it was, he asked whether the enemy had been routed. When he heard that this too was as he desired, he ordered that the spear which had pierced him should be extracted. So he died from the copious flow of blood, in a moment of exultation and victory.
Leonidas again, the king of the Lacedaemonians, along with the three hundred men whom he had led from Sparta, when the choice lay between a base retreat and a splendid death, confronted the enemy at Thermopylae. The deaths of generals are celebrated, while philosophers mostly die in their beds. Still it makes a difference how they die. This philosopher thought himself happy at the moment of death. A great credit to him. My intense pains, he says, are outweighed by elation of mind. The voice I hear is indeed that of a true philosopher, Epicurus, but you have forgotten what you ought to say. For, first, if there is truth in those matters which you say it causes you joy to recall, I mean, if your writings and discoveries are true, you cannot feel joy, since you now possess no blessing which you can set down to the account of the body; whereas you have always told us that no one can feel joy unless on account of the body, nor pain either. J feel joy in my past joys, he tells me. What past joys? If you say those relating to the body, I read that you set against your pains your philosophical theories, and not any recollection of pleasures enjoyed by the body; if you say those relating to the mind, then your maxim is untrue, that there is no joy of the mind, which has not a relation to the body. Why after that do you give a commission about the children of Metrodorus? What is there about your admirable goodness and extreme loyalty (for so I judge it to be) that you connect with the body?
I meant to post this yesterday too, but since we are diving back into the Greek it would probably help to compare the Latin, since those words are more familiar to most of us.
So in the recent back and forth between Cicero and Torquatus it appears that the words that are most often being translated into happy / happiness is a form of beatus:
Book II:XXVII : (Rackham)
Latin: XXVII. Sed in rebus apertissimis nimium longisumus. Perfecto enim et concluso neque virtutibus neque amicitiis usquam locum esse si ad voluptatem omnia referantur, nihil praeterea est magno opere dicendum. Ac tamen, ne cui loco non videatur esse responsum, pauca etiam nunc dicam ad reliquam orationem tuam. Quoniam igitur omnis summa philosophiae ad beate vivendum refertur, idque unum expetentes homines se ad hoc studium contulerunt, beate autem vivere alii in alio, vos in voluptate ponitis, item contra miseriam omnem in dolore, id primum videamus, beate vivere vestrum quale sit. Atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor, si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere totum poni in potestate sapientis. Nam si amitti vita beata potest,beata esse non potest.
XXVII. “But we dwell too long upon the obvious. For when it has been conclusively proved that if pleasure is the sole standard there is no room left either for virtue or friendship, there is no great need to say anything further. Still I do not want you to think I have failed to answer any of your points, so I will now say a few words more in reply to the remainder of your discourse. The end and aim of every system of philosophy is the attainment of happiness; and desire for happiness is the sole motive that has led men to engage in this study. But different thinkers make happiness consist in different things. According to your school it consists in pleasure, and conversely misery consists solely in pain. Let us then begin by examining what sort of thing happiness as you conceive it is. You will grant, I suppose, that if there is such a thing as happiness, it is bound to be attainable in its entirety by the Wise Man. For if happiness once won can be lost a happy life is impossible.
What does that tell us? That we ought to be looking into the subtleties of "blessedness".... but that takes us back to "happy" as the asserted best translation.
beatus - Wiktionary, the free dictionary
The Latin appears to have no "religious" or "divine" connotation at all(?)
For those who prefer dark themes' we've added five new options to the site today. Go down to the "Change Style" option at the very bottom right of the page, or go into your user control panel, and select one of the "Ambience" options, which come in five separate color options.
This theme was just released in the last several days and there are some rough edges, but i expect those to be ironed out soon. The edges I know about are that on the desktop. the option to expand or collapse the sidebar is labelled with the German "Seitenleiste." A little more of a problem is that the User Icons for notifications and conversations don't "stick" to the top left of the window as you scroll down the page. As far as the mobile versions go, I don't see any problems with those at all.
I think those who miss some of the dark themes that we had in the past will find these 'Ambience' options more to their liking.
If you have any questions or issues just let us know in the thread below.
it's not satisfaction of "specific" desires but more being satisfied - taking pleasure - in what is currently available... while at the same time being open to luxuries when they become available
If "being open to luxuries when they become available" means waiting for them to drop in your lap without making effort to obtain them, I would argue that is wrong. We would never choose pain to achieve a greater pleasure if that were the case.
Since I know you don't do that personally I know you don't mean that extreme conclusion, but that's why I would always warn against any kind of formulation that sounds like a very flat "whatever you have now is good enough" approach. In many cases, what you have "now" is not good enough to just stand by and stay in the same condition. A wise person can be happy even when on the rack, but that doesn't mean he should be content to stay there.
I doubt anyone here would fall into that trap, but I would say that a lot of people who study Epicurus get exactly that impression, and reach some very damaging conclusions about Epicurus because of it.
Yes the translation of well being suits me fine and that serves just as well to kick the can down the road to the question "What is well-being"? Satisfaction of desires isn't sufficient there either because you still have to ask "what desires?"
You then arrive again at the same resolution that Epicurus is basing his goal on pleasure, and then you go back to discussing the unique way he looks at pleasure, as both stimulative and nonstimulative. Then you are also back to whether pleasure requires the external goods that Kalosyni started talking about in the first post.
Every step requires clarity if you're going to say something worthwhile, and sometimes it's a lot easier to say what you are *not* saying than what you are.
Further, they say that once obtained, happiness like wisdom or any other virtue is never lost. (Anything less than true is no longer true and anything less than straight is no longer straight. If something we thought was true or straight becomes untrue or bent, then we obviously misunderstood its perfection in the first place since it had within it the potential for imperfection.)
In support of the different way that Epicurus looked at virtue, and held that sometimes actions we think to be virtuous can lose that character in different circumstances, I think we can cite below as to the particular virtue of "justice."
Justice is a virtue in everyone's dictionary so far as I know, so here is Epicurus clearly saying that something can be virtuous (in this case just) at one moment, and then in another moment under different circumstances can change into something we see to be no longer just. But that change doesn't mean that it wasn't just when it appeared to be just: And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.
PD37. Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.
PD38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.
