Posts by Cassius

Thank you for asking Twentier and you now have that trophy. It's still a little bit of a work in progress, and I have more thinking to do about how to implement it, which I'll probably make another post about before too long.

Also - I had forgotten that Joshua had brought up this very issue - of Descartes - in our recording of the Lucretius Today podcast two days ago. It isn't quite ready for release but when it is I will come back here and point out how Joshua addresses this around the 40 minute mark.

Below is a link that was posted on the Facebook group by one of the participants there. I have now listened to the podcast, which is an interview by Annika Nordquist with a professor by the name of Aaron Zubia, and in general I am very pleased with it. Of course there are some issues that deserve criticism, but here's my general take, which is very positive:

Despite the title, the podcast does not get into modern partisan politics, and the "origins of liberalism" is a reference much more to "modern classical liberalism" than to the partisan kind. The podcast is a very literate discussion focusing on Hume, but really talking almost as much about Epicurus as anything else. The interviewer and the interviewee both sound very academic, and they treat Epicurus fairly to the extent their religious presumptions allow them. The limitation on my endorsement is that it is clear that both interviewer and interviewee are traditional Christians, and so they have to tone down their praise of Epicurus even when they evidently agree with him. Except for some minor comments about people like Jordan Peterson at the end of the podcast, where it becomes clear that they will never endorse Hume or Epicurus, likely because of their religious presuppositions, both parties on the podcast are obviously impressed by Epicurus. I think that in general this would be a better introduction to Epicurus' work than most any generalist podcast I have heard in a long time. It covers issues like "virtue," the criticism of Socrates, criticism of Stoicism, the basis of empiricism, the "apikoros" issue involving Jewish thought, and lots of issues that don't often get discussed in generalist podcasts.

I was a little disappointed in the professor's defense of Epicurus' view of the senses, as the interviewer asked one of the frequent questions about how Hume, or Epicurus, could put trust in the senses when there's illusions and stuff. The professor didn't go into how error is in the mind and not in the sensations, but if I recall the answer he gave was decent enough, and I don't recall that then or ever did the professor criticize Epicurus or make him sound naive or obsolete.

In fact the main take-away I got from the episode, who is devoting a lot if his emphasis to Hume, is clearly persuaded by many of the opinions of Epicurus (and Hume), and that he would agree with most all of them but for that stubborn refusal to let go of Jerusalem and Judeo-Christianity, which became clear at the end of the episode. However all in all I think this podcast episode is well worth the time to listen.

You might want to give it until about the seven or eight minute mark for the conversation to turn to Epicurus, and in retrospect I am shocked that they managed to have the entire discussion without once - to my recollection - mentioning Thomas Jefferson! And his name cried out for mention when they started discussing "head" vs "heart" and they did not mention Jefferson's "Head and Heart" letter where Jefferson clearly sides with Epicurus, nor did they mention any of Jefferson's letters supporting Epicurus. Both interviewer and interviewee appear to be "Madisonians" so they aren't predisposed to depart from their "Madisonian" traditionalism, but you can hear in their voices that they are surprised how much good they are finding in Epicurus!

I myself have done very little reading in Hume, and this podcast makes me want to find that time to correct that oversight.

Some others might have better responses on this, but my first thought is that some point you are going to run into your question being a matter of biology rather than philosophy. Philosophically, the issue divides between the mind (whatever that is) and the eyes (for example, whatever that is) and the formation of opinions. Philosophy isn't going to be able to tell you the exact mechanism of these things, but when you are asking mental questions about whether to trust "the senses" or "something else" or "nothing at all" then you into philosophical choices. Reductionism to worrying about what particular atoms are doing at a particular moment is impossible and self-defeating and not required in order to come up with a logical framework of analysis. I think Epicurus was mostly concerned with answering those from a philosophical perspective who asserted that "the senses can't be trusted" but on the other hand "reason" or "logic" or "the gods" can be trusted. Epicurus is pointing out that those alternatives do not really exist, in that the gods don't answer these questions for you, and "logic" and "reason" do not have direct connections with reality to answer them either. Only the senses (and anticipations and feelings) are considered to be direct connections with reality whose input must be dealt with as "real."

Also as to this

Quote from profkesarsarwara

I hadn't considered the mind and the senses as being separate, and error in the former being caused by lack of information from the latter

It would probably be better to say that the mind and the senses are separate, and that errors in the mind are caused by misinterpretation by the mind of the information provided by the senses. The senses report "truly" exactly what they perceive, without any added opinion. Exactly what to make of what they receive, however, is the job of the mind, and the mind very easily jumps to conclusions that are not warranted by specific perceptions of the senses. The only way to judge the 'truth" of an opinion generated from one set of observations is to test it by the opinions generated by many other observations over time and from various perspectives. Only when the assembled opinions start to resolve into a consistent conclusion are we confident that the opinion is correct. So sometimes "lack of information" would be the right term, but probably a better way of looking at it is that the observations over time are not consistent, so we need to suspect that something is going on to cause us to want to "wait" to form a strong opinion until the observations begin to resolve consistently with observations about which we are confident.

Profkesarsarwara - Great to hear from you and that you are studying philosophy so closely! Your father would be proud!

The short answer to your question is that there is a flaw in the premises that the senses are ever deceived. The senses do not form opinions, they simply report information exactly as they perceive it. Opinions are formed in the mind, and it is there that error takes place if we conclude something that is not sufficiently supported by clear and repeated observations of the senses. Erroneous opinions cannot be corrected if the information from new sensations is not accepted with the same confidence as those of prior perceptions, so if is false to deride the senses as unreliable. It is the proper use of the senses that is in question, and so all opinions have to be tested against repeated observations of the senses and nothing accepted as true unless and until the observations begin to line up consistently with one another.

A longer presentation of this can be found in Book 4 of Lucretius where this precise issue of illusions is discussed. (I will come back and post a line reference)

I also highly recommend the entirety of Chapter 8 of DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy," especially that part from the start of the chapter up to page 142.

Check your messages here and I will respond further, but this should get you or anyone else started on the path that makes tne most sense to me in interpreting Epicurus on this issue.

Lot's of good comments above but to comment on only two:

Quote from Don

Do I think Epicurus would change his mind about some of his ideas given a chance to learn modern explanations? Sure.

I think it is important (for me at least) to be clear that the areas where he would change his mind involve relatively insignificant speculations on operations of nature which he knew were open to revision. On the "more philosophical" matters of ethics and epistemology I don't think he would have any reason to revise much at all.

Quote from Godfrey

Was Epicurus perhaps making his school friendlier, less intimidating?

That's a very good point that I haven't seen anyone suggest before, and which had not occurred to me. What appears to us to be "cult-like" behavior might be viewed as a significant "lessening" or "freeing" of attitudes - almost certainly so in comparison with the Pythagoreans. We don't really know what the everyday attitudes were within the schools of the time period, and even today we have examples of professional teachers who are very intimidating and allow no dissent within their classrooms. Joshua's cite to Plotinus is something i've never heard either and helps a lot in thinking about these issues.

What you've just described Don is the major theme of Lucian's "Hermotimus" dialog. We've got to find some time at some point to make a recording of that and promote it.

I cannot recommend it highly enough. It is witty and fun to read and extremely helpful on this topic.

Let's continue the discussion of arguments in favor of supernatural gods here:

We can eventually split that thread too down into separate subthreads by argument, but let's start a general thread first so we can create the list that needs to be addressed.

I haven't refreshed my reading recently enough to know if Cicero includes a similar argument in "On The Nature of The Gods," but he might. We can discuss this in the same way that we can include Epicurus' "riddle," even though it is not explicitly in the text.

Might as well save people clicking on the link to see this very depressing chain of fallacious reasoning. Here it is - we might branch this out into a thread "Epicurean Responses to the Ontological Argument For God" and we can decide in which episode to include this discussion. We will probably want to develop this into a thread and be sure Joshua is ready for it before we decide which episode to include it in.

In fact, I am fine with listing out all major / similar logical arguments for the existence of supernatural gods and including them, or at least mention of them, as the episodes proceed. I suspect many of them will indeed be covered in what Velleius has to say, either explicitly or by implication.

a. The Argument Described

St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury (1033-1109), is the originator of the ontological argument, which he describes in the Proslogium as follows:

[Even a] fool, when he hears of … a being than which nothing greater can be conceived … understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding.… And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.… Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

My preliminary comments are:

At the very least one observation that goes along with the discussion is that Epicurus was long dead even when that was written, so he was not around to give orders, nor does there seem to have been a strict passing of "authority." I would certainly personally not trust a subsequent head of the school as much as I would trust Epicurus himself. The more time that passed after Epicurus died, the more and different arguments that would have arisen requiring variations on the original responses.

I would also see an analogy to seeing Epicurus as "a god" or even a "father figure" as Lucretius discusses -- gods don't intervene to tell us what to do, they serve as examples that we emulate as best we can. Father's sometimes try to intervene, but the "father figure" I would suggest is generally associated with the idea of giving wise advise to be followed as best the child can apply it. And when Philodemus was writing Epicurus wasn't around to be the kind of father who demands to be obeyed.

At the same time, there is no doubt in my mind that some kind of uniformity of message is necessary if one is to be logically thought of as an Epicurean. Epicurus' logic was as rigorous as anyone else's, and once a core doctrine was established with confidence (as opposed to subsidiary ideas where "waiting" and keeping an open mind between apparently valid alternatives is appropriate) then logical consistency requires general acceptance of those views. It's very possible to be friendly and accepting of those with differing views in many subjects, especially with students during a learning process. But if being considered an Epicurean means anything, it means some kind of agreement with core doctrines. And if one is running a school or any kind of organization, then it's inherent in the organization that there is going to be some kind of line between what is and what is not acceptable. I can't imagine Romans and most Greeks taking much of anything "on authority." The Pythagoreans seem to be an exception, and we see Cicero himself arguing against that point of view in his philosophical works. But at the same time, words and ideas have to mean something, and we do the best we can to be clear when we use them. The word "Epicurean" is not infinitely flexible, nor does it mean only that one wants to be "happy" or that one finds "pleasure" enjoyable.

We're going to rightly recoil against aggressive claims of authority since for 2000 years we've lived in a world ruled by oppressive religions. But the remedy to oppression isn't total abandonment of standards, randomness, and absence of consistency, it's well thought out standards based on sound evidence and sound reasoning. And that does mean eventually coming to conclusions, not reverting to skepticism and holding that no conclusions are possible.

• Topics For This Week:

  • Cicero says that the greater part of mankind is united in what Nature leads us to suppose, which is that there are gods.
  • Protagorus and Diagorus the Melian and Theodorus of Cyrene entirely believed that there are no gods.
    • Protagorus [ ]Protagoras (/prəʊˈtæɡəˌræs/; Greek: Πρωταγόρας; c. 490 BC – c. 420 BC)[1] was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher and rhetorical theorist. He is numbered as one of the sophists by Plato. In his dialogue Protagoras, Plato credits him with inventing the role of the professional sophist. Protagoras also is believed to have created a major controversy during ancient times through his statement that, "Man is the measure of all things," interpreted (possibly wrongly, since he disagreed) by Plato to mean that there is no objective truth; Protagoras seems to have meant that each person's own personal history, experiences and expectations, developed over their lifetime, determine their judgments, opinions, and statements regarding "truth" (which is the title of the book in which Protagoras made this statement). When a person makes a judgment about a certain thing—good or bad or beautiful or unjust—that person will differ from other people's judgments because their experience has been different.]
    • Diagorus the Melian Diagoras "the Atheist" of Melos (Greek: Διαγόρας ὁ Μήλιος) was a Greek poet and sophist of the 5th century BC. Throughout antiquity, he was regarded as an atheist, but very little is known for certain about what he actually believed. Anecdotes about his life indicate that he spoke out against ancient Greek religion. He allegedly chopped up a wooden statue of Heracles and used it to roast his lentils and revealed the secrets of the Eleusinian Mysteries. The Athenians accused him of asebeia (impiety) and banished him from their city. He died in Corinth.
    • Theodorus of Cyrene [Theodorus of Cyrene (Greek: Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος) was an ancient Greek mathematician who lived during the 5th century BC. The only first-hand accounts of him that survive are in three of Plato's dialogues: the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman. In the former dialogue, he posits a mathematical construction now known as the Spiral of Theodorus. Little is known as Theodorus' biography beyond what can be inferred from Plato's dialogues. He was born in the northern African colony of Cyrene, and apparently taught both there and in Athens.[1] He complains of old age in the Theaetetus, the dramatic date of 399 BC of which suggests his period of flourishing to have occurred in the mid-5th century. The text also associates him with the sophist Protagoras, with whom he claims to have studied before turning to geometry.[2] A dubious tradition repeated among ancient biographers like Diogenes Laërtius[3] held that Plato later studied with him in Cyrene, Libya.[1] This eminent mathematician Theodorus was, along with Alcibiades and many other of Socrates' companions (many of whom would be associated with the Thirty Tyrants), accused of distributing the mysteries at a symposium, according to Plutarch, who himself was priest of the temple at Delphi.]
  • Those who affirm that gods exist are divided on many details, but the most important question that divides them is whether the gods are active in the affairs of our world or inactive.
    • How many people today hold to that view of "inactive" gods? Why?
  • If the gods are inactive there is no reason to worry about piety, but it is possible that if we cast off piety then the virtues - including the most excellent, which is justice, may perish with it!
    • Note: This is specifically rejected in Diogenes of Oinoanda Fragment 20 -
      • Fragment 20 - [So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.
      • On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?
      • So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [not does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before. That not only [is our doctrine] helpful, [but also the opposite doctrine harmful, is clearly shown by] the [Stoics as they go astray. For they say in opposition to us] that the god both is maker of [the] world and takes providential care of it, providing for all things, including human beings. Well, in the first place, we come to this question: was it, may I ask, for his own sake that the god created the world [or for the sake of human beings? For it is obvious that it was from a wish to benefit either himself or human beings that he embarked on this] undertaking. For how could it have been otherwise, if nothing is produced without a cause and these things are produced by a god? Let us then examine this view and what Stoics mean. It was, they say, from a wish to have a city and fellow-citizens, just as if [he were an exile from a city, that] the god [created the world and human beings. However, this supposition, a concoction of empty talking, is] self-evidently a fable, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher’s argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense. Yet even if, in the belief that he was doing some good [to himself, the god] really [made the world and human beings], .............
  • Other philosophers believe the whole world is directed and governed by the gods, and they consult and provide for the preservation of mankind.
    • Carnaedes rejected this. What do we know about Carneades? [ Carneades (/kɑːrˈniːədiːz/; Greek: Καρνεάδης, Karneadēs, "of Carnea"; 214/3–129/8 BC[2]) was a Greek philosopher,[3] perhaps the most prominent head of the Skeptical Academy in ancient Greece.[3] He was born in Cyrene.[4] By the year 159 BC,[citation needed] he had begun to attack many previous dogmatic doctrines, especially Stoicism and even the Epicureans,[5] whom previous skeptics had spared.]
  • Then Cicero explains why he turned from politics to philosophy, and why he took up the Academic School as his own since it has been long neglgected and foresaken and buries things in a kind of artificial night.
    • In truth, he has been studying philosophy and associating with philosophers all his life.
    • The practical reason why he started writing is that the republic had been taken over by Caesar, and he wanted to reproduce in Latin the learning of the Greeks.
    • Also death of his daughter and other things led to melancholy disposition.
  • People should not care about his opinion, they should care about what is reasonable, and they should reject the custom of the Pythagoreans to refer all questions to whether the master (Pythagorus) said it himself.
  • As to why he chose the Academy, we should look to his book on the "Academic Questions." The custom of the Academy is to "dispute all things and assume nothing certainly" and was begun by Socrates and reinvigorated by Carneades.
  • Cicero denies that he thinks that nothing whatsoever is true, but that there is so much falsehood blended with truth that there is no certain rule for judging what is true, and it follows that many things are probable enough, even though not evident to the senses, that a wise man chooses to direct his conduct by them.
  • So he is going to go through all the opinions of the major schools about the nature of the gods, and if we find that all of them agree on something, or that what any one says is absolutely true, then he will give up the Academy!
  • The scene then of the dispute will be home of Gaius Aurelius Cotta, who was talking with Senator Gaius Velleius, the Epicurean. Quintus Lucillius Balbus was also there, taking the Stoic side. Cicero says that if Marcus Piso were present, no school would lack an advocate. It appears that Piso would have represented the Peripatetics, because Cotta says that Antiochus held that the Peripatetics did not differ from the Stoics in substance but only in words. Cotta says this is actually a significant difference, but says more on that later.
  • Velleius is asked to repeat what he is previously said for Cicero to hear it. Velleius replies with a smile that Cicero will not be fair but an advocate for Cotta's views, because just like Cotta, Cicero had learned from Philo to be certain of nothing. In response, Cicero proclaims his impartiality and lack of bias.

  
  

Today we updated Archive.org so that all episodes up through the current episode 225 are now available.

The Lucretius Today Podcast : EpicureanFriends.com : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

The Lucretius Today Podcast, sponsored by EpicureanFriends.com

archive.org

Looks like the total download is now up to about 11.2 gigabytes.

Quote

Roman dictator Sulla destroyed the Platonic Academy in 86 BCE,

I am not familiar with this episode. Did he destroy all of the schools or did he play favorites? Sulla has always been an enigmatic figure in my mind.

Plato's final resting place revealed using 'bionic eye'

New imaging techniques crack open the Herculaneum papyri, the famously indecipherable scroll from the the Villa dei Papyri.

interestingengineering.com

This article is very ambiguous and unclear as it appears they are talking about scrolls that may be from Philodemus, but the article is about where Plato is buried:

Quote

A “bionic eye” enabled his research team to read about 1,000 words from the history of the Academy by Philodemus of Gadara, an Epicurean poet and philosopher. With this new technology, they penetrated layers of carbon with optical coherence tomography (OCT) and infrared hyperspectral imaging techniques.

The emerging technology known as OCT performs high-resolution cross-sectional imaging commonly used to take pictures of the back of an eye using reflected light. Infrared hyperspectral imaging has a variety of subsets from near to mid to far. Simply put, it can reveal hidden features of an object that may not be visible to the naked eye. These techniques brought 2,000 year old text to the surface.

Details from Plato’s life uncovered

Researchers believe that they have identified the location of Plato’s burial site.

According to their findings, his final resting place appears to be in a private area in a garden in the academy, near a shrine to the Muses. Roman dictator Sulla destroyed the Platonic Academy in 86 BCE, but archeologists rediscovered it in the 20^th century. Currently open to the public, archeologists have thoroughly examined the site, but we always seem to uncover something else.

Lucretius Today Podcast Episode 225 - "Cicero Argues That Commitment To Virtue Is A Bar To Pleasure" Is Now Available -

Earlier today I was asked a couple of questions that would be good to toss around, since it's a common question:

What does Epicurus offer to the world (common people) today?

1. Don't you have to be rich to be an Epicurean?
2. Epicureanism doesn't offer anything "positive" like Stoicism or Buddhism offers. What do you offer to compete with those?
3. What if your life isn't "together" and you don't have time to read philosophy? Why would someone like that spending any time discussing Epicurus?
4. Why don't you ever discuss "meaningfulness" because I've been convinced that's what I should want out of life?
5. How do you expect me to understand Epicurus when he approaches so many things so differently than what I am familiar with at church or in the workplaces?

Those are just samples but we've heard similar questions many times before.

If we are really profiting from studying Epicurus, we ought to be able to answer such questions confidently and concisely.

I will give my own thoughts but let's throw this out for discussion.

I have updated the first post above with the text from the first seven sections of Book One of "On the Nature of the Gods." We'll go through that only in summary form, but there is important information in it about the state of religious views in Cicero's time, and where the views of Epicurus fit into that spectrum.

So she's not offering just pleasure, but getting pleasure by apparently unjust means:

"Nay; you shall have the fruits of others' toil, and refrain from nothing that can bring you gain. For to my companions I give authority to pluck advantage where they will.’"

But interesting:

“Now when Heracles heard this, he asked, ‘Lady, pray what is your name?’

“‘My friends call me Happiness,’ she said, ‘but among those that hate me I am nicknamed Vice.’

And this does not strike me as simple "virtue" but more "common sense" or "the way things are" -

For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to man without toil and effort. If you want the favour of the gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do good to your friends: if you covet honour from a city, you must aid that city: if you are fain to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do good to Hellas: if you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must cultivate that land: if you are resolved to get wealth from flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you essay to grow great through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practise their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat.’

And this is NOT the Epicurean approach to Pleasure:

[30] ‘What good thing is thine, poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do nought to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day.

So at least at this point I wouldn't see the ancient Epicureans seeing Hercules as an enemy, but someone else whose story has been distorted by religion and virtue.

Not sure about the rest.

So this is Socrates speaking to Aristippus himself?

Thank you Don! So is the Greek indeed "Vice" rather than Hedone / Pleasure?

i am in the middle of editing this podcast and my attention is turned back to this:

We mention in the podcast that the very last argument that Cicero makes against Epicurus in Book 2 concerns how we should look to Hercules for the proper model of life rather than to Epicurus. We haven't talked much about "The Choice" between virtue and pleasure that Hercules was reputed to have made, but I think this deserves a lot more attention. The story was obviously of very great influence in the ancient world, but when we discussed it in the podcast none of us were very familiar with it and we had to rely on a quick read of Wikipedia. I think we can do a lot better than that, and I suspect that exploring the story would reveal why Lucretius chose to talk so much about Hercules in listing some of his explouts and comparing his accomplishments to those of Epicurus. Cicero speculates that if had given Torquatus time to answer that Torquatus would have argued that Hercules did what he did for pleasure, just as Torquatus answered that his own ancestors had fought wars for pleasure.

Given this story is apparently so central in ancient thought, I think we ought to explore it more. If anyone has anything to say before the podcast comes out, add it here, and we will probably in the end split of "The Choice of Hercules" or "Hercules at the Crossroads" into a separate thread of its own.

Is the choice that between "Virtue and Vice" or "Virtue and Pleasure?"

We will want to articulate the proper Epicurean response to this.

Post

RE: Episode 225 - Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 30 - Cicero Argues That Commitment To Virtue Is A Bar To Pleasure

Of relevance to this Episode:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hercules_at_the_crossroads

Cassius

April 21, 2024 at 10:17 AM