Posts by Cassius

Julia I agree with the thrust of most of your post but as to this I am not completely clear on what you are saying:

Quote from Julia

In my opinion, getting fancy with "desire"/"desirable" and "pleasure"/"pleasurable" would be like getting fancy with emotion-words, like "happiness", or, more precisely, with experience-words, like "joy". When first grasping the word, it matters to be precise about the inner experience it refers to (eg something fun-but-forbidden may cause joy and guilt, pleasure and pain; it matters to delineate that honestly, precisely, without getting hung up on morals).

At the very least, as to pleasure, it seemed absolutely clear to Cicero, and I would say to Norman DeWitt and now to me also as the only logical way to read the texts, that Epicurus was in fact taking a very non-standard and radically different stance. He was redefining "pleasure" to include not only sensory stimulation but also all other experiences which are not painful, even if not normally considered by the majority of people to be included in pleasure. I see no other persuasive way to explain numerous statements by Torquatus, including his response to Chrysippus' "hand" argument.

I don't see you referring to that his expansion of the definition of pleasure in your comments so far. I think it's important to take a position on how Epicurus was using the word pleasure in a non-standard way to make any sense of many highly reliable texts, including but not limited to the Principle Doctrines and the letter to Menoeceus themselves.

The line from DeWitt that's right on point is from page 240 of his book:

Quote

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.

Discussion of how Epicurus refers occasionally to "god" but more often to "gods" causes me to think about this:

I presume it is pretty clear that in regard to "images," Epicurus was saying that "images" are constantly streaming away from all objects, some of which impact our minds and cause results through that impact. In other words, images are a constant stimulation to the mind and going on all the time.

However it seems that there is an intersection between "images" and "prolepsis," and that "prolepsis' is also considered to be a contact with reality. I am presuming that images involve one aspect, but not necessarily the only aspect, of prolepsis/anticipation.

I am not sure whether the plural of prolepsis is prolepses, so it will be more clear to ask the question referring to "anticipation(s)":

Is Epicurus saying that we have continuous "anticipations" of the gods going on essentially all the time, or is or was a single "anticipation" of the gods innate in us at birth or some early moment all that was needed to spur on the "believe that a god is blessed and imperishable" conclusion?

I'm trying to be more clear on the correct wording of describing what Epicurus was saying in English, keeping in mind that I think most of us agree that we do not consider prolepsis / anticipation to be an "opinion" or "conclusion" but rather some kind of "input" to an eventual conclusion.

And I am presuming that the data content of "images" is essentially in the "arrangements" of the atoms of the images, retaining the "shapes" of the objects from which they came, and it is our receipt of these invisible-to-the-eye arrangements/shapes that is being received by the mind and reported for further processing, just as the eyes are reporting "visible-to-the-eye" shapes and colors and brightnesses but not an opinion as to "what" is being seen.

So in referring to divinity or to justice, was Epicurus saying (1) that the anticipations involved are constantly being received, but are judged to be always consistent with blessedness and imperishability, or (2) that somehow a limited number of anticipations have been received in the past from which a single opinion of blessedness and imperishability has been reached in the mind?

Probably not a hugely important question but it would relate to the general interpretation of anticipation as a faculty. I presume that the answer is (1) and that in general we should be referring to conclusions about the gods or justice or anything else to be formed from anticipations in the plural rather than in the singular.

Martin I read the quoted part as saying that the important thing is to arrive at the point where the mental image associated with each word is absolutely clear to the person who is stating the formulation, not that the person stating the formulation has to accept the definition proposed by others. And I'd relate that to the discussion of the development of language and how different peoples arrive at different words and languages, because language is not handed down by a god or central authority, but by local people developing their own word assignments. In most cases you can and should, because it is most convenient, to use the commonly-established formulation. But the real objective is clarity and for the purpose of happy living, and when that means rejecting the majority definition, seems to me he is advocating rejecting it.

Gosh my typing is terrible. I've now changed "implicated" to "implication"

Quote from Godfrey

We've given a lot of effort to understanding what Epicurus meant by "pleasure;" the same effort needs to be applied to understanding what he meant by "desire."

Yes I agree and for the reasons I have stated. Buddhism and Stoicism have introduced poisonous presumptions in ordinary communication that "desires" are all of a single class, and that that class is to be eliminated as bad or even evil. That may or may not have been the case in 300 BC, but it is the case today, so when we talk about desires today there is a huge difference between ordinary issues of "wanting to accomplish a goal (any goal)" vs "passionate intoxicating ardent longing" which most everyone will agree is a thing to be avoided. (At the very least, most of us would agree that the "intoxicating" part is bad. I would be willing to defend "passionate ardent longing" depending on the context of what is being discussed. But at some point most of us will agree that there is a red line where desire that is intoxicating and gives no regard to other realities is dangerous and self-destructive.)

But to repeat the poison in the air is the idea that Epicurus would agree with the Buddhists and Stoics and other ascetics and agree that all desire is to be eliminated, and I would say that is an implication that should never go unchallenged.

Anybody who wants to can save this message and with my blessings slap me every time i am participating in a discussion about things in which we firmly believe the existence of, without ever having seen or heard or touched or tasted or smelled them directly, if I fail to make sure that we site ATOMS as a prime example of such a thing! I am afraid I failed to do so at least in at one spot in this episode so I will have to use every method I can to try to do better!

Well we made a little more progress in today's episode, rather than spending most of the time on a single sentence, but we did go back over the implications of Joshua's theorizing about the parallels in logical structure between Torquatus' explanation of Epicurus' views on the 'highest good' and Velleius' explanation of Epicurus' views on the nature of a 'god.' I will get this episode edited and up over the next several days as the issue involved goes to the general issue of definitions now being discussed in a parallel thread over the nature of 'desire' and Epicurus' use of words in non-standard ways. We've begun to move forward in the podcast discussion a little past this topic, but next week we'll probably touch on it again as I want to suggest that the same issue Joshua is observing as to "the good" and "gods" probably also applies to "pleasure," in my view. There are more implications of what Joshua is suggesting than we have yet fully discussed.

Quote from Julia

"What is desire?" reminds me of how important it is to stick closely to ordinary language, to not redefine things but to remain as close to everyday speech as possible.

To this we are going to have to compare a series of text references that show that while Epicurus felt it important to be clear, he did not think it was important, and in fact was willing to radically redefine, that to which ordinary words are used to refer.

I think it is clear from the texts for example that he used "gods," and "pleasure," and even "virtue" in ways radically different than common usage, and so he was not willing to accept terminology that is used in everyday speech.

For example he said:

Letter to Herodotus: "First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning. [38] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen."

--- I do not believe this means that we use words in a way that conforms to ordinary usage in all cases, but overrridingly that we are clear, by stating our terms, even when others disagree with us:

VS29. For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many. Note 29 Translation by C. Yapijakis, Epicurean Garden of Athens, Greece. Bailey: “In investigating nature I would prefer to speak openly and like an oracle to give answers serviceable to all mankind, even though no one should understand me, rather than to conform to popular opinions and so win the praise freely scattered by the mob.”

And we know from repeated complaints from Cicero that Epicurus used words (such as pleasure and prolepsis) in new ways that no one had done before, which was such a great source of controversy that Cicero's complaints are unmistakeable that he was in fact actually doing that.\

So with "desire" as much as "pleasure," it will be necessary for us to take a position on exactly what Epicurus was referring to. This would be at the root of the controversy we continually have over whether Epicurus was attempting to "eradicate all desire" as Buddhists or Stoics would argue, or whether it was only particularly harmful desires (those that cannot possibly be attained or clearly can be expected to bring more pain than pleasure) to which he was advising caution.

Same question will apply to use of the word "desire" in the entire topic of "natural and necessary *desires."

But I presume there that everyone is taking the position that desire is *all* choice and avoidance and not limited to "passionate longing"

I am looking forward to input from our Greek Expert Team on this topic!

I know it makes sense to me that the question of what will happen based on any decision is intuitively the right way to look every question.

Whether VS71 was intended to be targeted at passionate intoxicating desires, such as love which is extensively addressed by Lucretius, is a separate but very related issue.

"VS71. Every desire must be confronted by this question: What will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished, and what if it is not?"

I do not view that as referring only to, or primarily to, "passionate longing."

So what do we think the context supports as to the intent of VS71?

I just checked wikipedia and several dictionary sites which are similar:

Quote

Desires are states of mind that are expressed by terms like "wanting", "wishing", "longing" or "craving". A great variety of features is commonly associated with desires. They are seen as propositional attitudes towards conceivable states of affairs. They aim to change the world by representing how the world should be, unlike beliefs, which aim to represent how the world actually is. Desires are closely related to agency: they motivate the agent to realize them. For this to be possible, a desire has to be combined with a belief about which action would realize it. Desires present their objects in a favorable light, as something that appears to be good.

I am out of time to continue but it seems to me that there is a wide variety of intensities that can be encompassed in the word, and probably that is something to focus on whether we have any agreement.

If desire is forced into the box of "passionate longing" then we have one issue. If "desire" is used as a stand-in for "anything I wish to do" then we have an entirely different set of results.

i still detect there is ambiguity about the way the relationship between 'desire' and 'choice and avoidance' is being discussed here.

Does everyone agree that "I desire to brush my teeth right now" is a perfectly acceptable ordinary English equivalent of "I choose to brush my teeth right now"?

The point is that we can use

desire = the object of desire

and we can also use

desire = choose

So as to the discussion of whether desire is the motivator or not, it seems to me it should always be clear that what you are talking about as the "motivator" is the "reward" and not the initial willpower "choice" to pursue the reward.

That's all i will add at the moment but this gets into the whole problem of considering words like "virtue" as "ends in themselves" or "something to do because it produces pleasure."

There are lots of things in life that i can identify as "desirable" but would never choose to pursue because of the costs involved. But that doesn't mean that i discount them as being desirable, or fail to hold in my mind the knowledge that they are desirable. It just means that we always have lots of alternative possibilities from which we have to constantly choose between according to the consequences of what actions we take.

So the phrasing "desire is the motivator" can be correct or incorrect depending on what definition is being given to "desire."

One statement made in that article caught my eye:

Quote

Similarly, System 1 encourages us to see things dualistically, meaning we have trouble thinking of the mind and body as a single unit. This tendency emerges quite early: young children, regardless of their cultural background, are inclined to believe that they have an immortal soul – that their essence or personhood existed somewhere prior to their birth, and will always continue to exist.

I tend to doubt that that statement is true as a general tendency apart from the conditioning of religion / culture / upbringing. I would doubt that children raised in nature, who quickly get exposed to the cycle of life with the animals they see around them constantly being born and dying, would have any problem seeing for themselves that they too are part of the same cycle.

There are many different ways of looking at things and therefore lots of charts, but I am tempted to say in the fundamental abstract that the first question is always as stated in "VS71. Every desire must be confronted by this question: What will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished, and what if it is not?"

In my own mind I have a very hard time separating "desire" from "pleasure and pain" and "choice and avoidance" or even "willpower," and that's a major reason I have a problem separating out "desire" as if it is some fundamental of human nature apart from everything else. I think they are all a part of a bigger picture and acting as if there is a "desire" part of your brain that acts totally on its on is going to lead to lots of problems. Apart from the fundamental bodily needs it seems to me that what one desires is a complicated sum of all sorts of other influences and thoughts up to that moment of life, and all of those components have to be considered in how one's "desires" or "emotions" came into existence.

Quote from Julia

True, and very good point. If one is powerless but enjoys thinking about something – maybe the outcome of match of one's favourite sports team – then there would be nothing wrong with that

Quote from Julia

For me – by chance – it happens to be that everything I do in fact think about but cannot change are things which make me very unhappy (primarily contemporary politics).

The example of sports I think works very well. As a spectator you can't change the results of the game, and yet your observation of it certainly brings lots of pain or pleasure to some people. I am not a big sports fan myself (and don't remember that I ever was) but there can be lots of real benefits from being a "fan" of a particular team or sport, and I wouldn't think Epicurus would disapprove of it just because you have no influence over a particular game.

As to contemporary politics I agree that this is a topic of major concern. Our rule against discussing it on the forum is for the sake of the greater goal of pursuing the work of "Team Epicurus," and "Epicurus" doesn't have a stake in any political position other than as it directly affects Team Epicurus. Some political issues have to be dealt with even under the rules, and so there are considerations on such issues as "censorship" and "free speech" where we already have to calibrate how best to proceed.

Here too I think Epicurus would say that the practical implications of political issues as the affect individuals cannot be ignored, and I would personally encourage everyone to firmly maintain awareness of world affairs that could impact them, and adjust their lives accordingly. But for the sake of the EpicureanFriends project we need to strictly moderate that here, so other venues for individual communication need to be used to pursue those adjustments to purely political events. I think we already have lots of private communications going on between members of EpicureanFriends without those bleeding over into problems for the forum, and that's something that probably needs to expand over time.

Quote from Julia

For example, if I were given the option, I (or certainly a younger me) would probably decide that my grief is limitless (unnatural) anyway and thus to be avoided (equal parts naive to or wilfully ignorant of the fact that this will cause psychological baggage for the rest of my life), rather than allow myself to feel it, to work through the emotion (and thus trade unpleasantness now for more of a spring in my step later).

One aspect of this time that has been on my mind recently is how giving in to worry about suffering is totally unproductive. By worrying or focusing on the suffering in life, we don't do a think to correct that suffering, or extend our own lives by an hour. The time spent on feeling bad about suffering is just subtracted from your life never to come again. I understand it's something we all go through and I go through it myself, but I think I am finding the best way to get over it is to focus on one of the many reminders that life is short and for an eternity we will be no more.

VS10. Remember that you are mortal, and have a limited time to live, and have devoted yourself to discussions on Nature for all time and eternity, and have seen “things that are now and are to come and have been.”

I obviously don't think that should be read to mean "you have a limited time to live and therefore you should spend all your time "discussing" life. I think it means you've devoted yourself to understanding the big picture and then taking action to apply that knowledge to using your life to your best ability. And simply feeling overwhelmed by sorrow doesn't strike me as a good use of limited time. Some things can't be changed, but there's usually something that can be done to improve almost any situation.

I want to think further but my first reaction is that your modification definitely improves an otherwise questionable analysis.

What I want to think further about is whether it makes sense to elevate the "is it in my control?" to a first level division, and I am not sure that the natural and necessary deserves that either.

If the topic of the chart is "basic method of thinking" then I suspect the tree needs to be pulled up from its roots and reoriented toward keeping in the central focus the only criteria nature gives us to decide among what to choose and to avoid.

After that, There are likely many other questions to ask and considerations besides whether something is in your control and whether it is "natural" or "necessary"

I agree fleshing out charts is a very useful exercise.

Also just to say - good to hear from you Shahab, and stay safe over there!

Welcome to Episode 241 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 21 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, responds to Velleius, and we - in turn - will respond to Cotta in particular and the Skeptical argument in general.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXIII. ...

I allow that there are Gods. Instruct me, then, concerning their origin; inform me where they are, what sort of body, what mind, they have, and what is their course of life; for these I am desirous of knowing. You attribute the most absolute power and efficacy to atoms. Out of them you pretend that everything is made. But there are no atoms, for there is nothing without body; every place is occupied by body, therefore there can be no such thing as a vacuum or an atom.

XXIV. I advance these principles of the naturalists without knowing whether they are true or false; yet they are more like truth than those statements of yours; for they are the absurdities in which Democritus, or before him Leucippus, used to indulge, saying that there are certain light corpuscles—some smooth, some rough, some round, some square, some crooked and bent as bows—which by a fortuitous concourse made heaven and earth, without the influence of any natural power. This opinion, C. Velleius, you have brought down to these our times; and you would sooner be deprived of the greatest advantages of life than of that authority; for before you were acquainted with those tenets, you thought that you ought to profess yourself an Epicurean; so that it was necessary that you should either embrace these absurdities or lose the philosophical character which you had taken upon you; and what could bribe you to renounce the Epicurean opinion? Nothing, you say, can prevail on you to forsake the truth and the sure means of a happy life. But is that the truth? for I shall not contest your happy life, which you think the Deity himself does not enjoy unless he languishes in idleness.

But where is truth? Is it in your innumerable worlds, some of which are rising, some falling, at every moment of time? Or is it in your atomical corpuscles, which form such excellent works without the direction of any natural power or reason? But I was forgetting my liberality, which I had promised to exert in your case, and exceeding the bounds which I at first proposed to myself. Granting, then, everything to be made of atoms, what advantage is that to your argument? For we are searching after the nature of the Gods; and allowing them to be made of atoms, they cannot be eternal, because whatever is made of atoms must have had a beginning: if so, there were no Gods till there was this beginning; and if the Gods have had a beginning, they must necessarily have an end, as you have before contended when you were discussing Plato’s world. Where, then, is your beatitude and immortality, in which two words you say that God is expressed, the endeavor to prove which reduces you to the greatest perplexities? For you said that God had no body, but something like body; and no blood, but something like blood.

XXV. It is a frequent practice among you, when you assert anything that has no resemblance to truth, and wish to avoid reprehension, to advance something else which is absolutely and utterly impossible, in order that it may seem to your adversaries better to grant that point which has been a matter of doubt than to keep on pertinaciously contradicting you on every point: like Epicurus, who, when he found that if his atoms were allowed to descend by their own weight, our actions could not be in our own power, because their motions would be certain and necessary, invented an expedient, which escaped Democritus, to avoid necessity. He says that when the atoms descend by their own weight and gravity, they move a little obliquely. Surely, to make such an assertion as this is what one ought more to be ashamed of than the acknowledging ourselves unable to defend the proposition. His practice is the same against the logicians, who say that in all propositions in which yes or no is required, one of them must be true; he was afraid that if this were granted, then, in such a proposition as “Epicurus will be alive or dead to-morrow,” either one or the other must necessarily be admitted; therefore he absolutely denied the necessity of yes or no.

Can anything show stupidity in a greater degree? Zeno, being pressed by Arcesilas, who pronounced all things to be false which are perceived by the senses, said that some things were false, but not all. Epicurus was afraid that if any one thing seen should be false, nothing could be true; and therefore he asserted all the senses to be infallible directors of truth. Nothing can be more rash than this; for by endeavoring to repel a light stroke, he receives a heavy blow. On the subject of the nature of the Gods, he falls into the same errors. While he would avoid the concretion of individual bodies, lest death and dissolution should be the consequence, he denies that the Gods have body, but says they have something like body; and says they have no blood, but something like blood."

Quote from Kalosyni

Drives for survival, health, and happiness do not require wealth, power, or fame.

I would say the correctness of that statement depends entirely on how you define "wealth," "power," and "fame." Words like this have very flexible meanings with no bright lines that can be determined philosophically and out of context of the person involved. The question of "how much is enough" for those things - and any "thing" - is going to be contextual and not reducible to high-level specific rules. The only uitimate consideration is "pleasure" and "pain."

Ok I am coming here after the pig latin discussion so I may be off on a tangent but in regard to that chart in the last post, or any chart, it seems to me the basic ground rules are:

(1) Nature give us ONLY two criteria to use for deciding what to choose and to avoid, and those criteria are pleasure and pain.

(2) I perceive that in some minds, this statement of only two criteria sounds like Epicurus was referring to "the pleasures of the moment" and "the pains of the moment." I do *not* see that as a correct inference and I do not think Epicurus was saying that. To me it is very clear that Epicurus is saying that each decision much consider *all* pleasure and pain (mental and bodily) over *all* periods of time (now, tomorrow, for as a long as we live) and that each decision must evaluate *every possible* ramification before you can conclude that the action should be taken or avoided. Of course it is not possible to do an extensive analysis every moment about every decision, and you have no guarantee that your assessment will be correct, because you cannot have total control over the future. But doing our best to make such an analysis *is* essentially what we are doing by internalizing all the considerations and learning to adjust our conduct over time according to the results that our actions bring.

(3) All the discussion of "natural" and "necessary" is *contextual*, and cannot be reduced to universals that apply to all people at all times and all places. Even breathing can be postponed if by holding your breath to swim out of a cave you save your life. As Torquatus said, the classification has a principle, that things which are most natural and most necessary are generally going to be the easiest to obtain, and therefore can generally be obtained with the least resulting pain, but that is **not** a general statement that nature universally demands that you *only* eat bread and drink water and live in a cave. The natural and necessary classifications can act as a general guide for those times when you don't have enough information to be confident that what you can do will be achievable. What is expected as we get smarter over time, however, is that we learn to know what is and is not possible, and at what cost of pain, so over time we move out of the cave and we start eating more than bread and drinking more than water, unless circumstances demand otherwise. And generally speaking circumstances do *not* demand otherwise, and we *can* do a lot better than bread and water and caves.

(4) The most important observation to make at this point in the analysis is that we frequently choose pain in order to gain more pleasure, and so the fact that an action may result in *some* pain is absolutely *not* a reason not to engage in it. The question is the *net result.* If the action generates more pleasure than pain, then it is justifiable to take it. Of course we frequently have lots of choices from which we can choose among, so we also have to not only compare the pleasure and pain from a single action, but we have to compare the net pleasure/pain that would result and choose from between alternatives by comparing the net amount of pleasure.

(5) As to the "emptiness" or "vanity" of some desires, it is obviously a bad idea to set your sights on achieving goals that are impossible to obtain - like living forever - because the impossible will by definition not be achievable, and you will always end up frustrated. But how do you know ahead of time whether a goal is possible or not? And exactly how long you should try to live, or exactly how much money should you should pursue, or exactly how much food should you should eat? There are no universal rules to answer these questions, so you always go back to the first and foremost point, that nature gives you only pleasure and pain by which to decide what to choose and what to avoid. You then do your very best to guide your actions by estimating -- in the long run and from the widest possible perspective - what the results of your actions are going to be in terms of net pleasure and pain. And to be clear - net pleasure and pain *that effects you.* It makes no sense to be concerned about pleasure and pain in the abstract, if they don't affect you, but it does make sense to consider the pleasure or pain of those around you to the extent that their reaction to your actions will have an impact on your own pleasure and pain (just as we evaluate in regard to our friends).