Posts by Cassius

Episode 199 of the Lucretius Today is Now Available! This week we return to our coverage of "On Ends" Book Two, and we summarize several aspects of where we are in the discussion.

After several weeks of quick editing, this week has fallen back to a more normal time period. Should be complete by Saturday and hopefully sooner. In the meantime the first of several notes.

- At the 30 minute mark Joshua comments about use of the term tetraphamakos in the ancient world, but said he wasn't sure of the cites. I think we've looked this us previously as to where that word occurs, but for the moment all I have is this from the Wikipedia entry:

The name cannot be traced further back than Cicero and Philodemos. Pamela Gordon, Epicurus in Lycia: The Second-century World of Diogenes of Oenoanda, University of Michigan Press (1996), p. 61, fn 85, citing A. Angeli, "Compendi, eklogai, tetrapharmakos" (1986), p. 65.

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-- We've probably got this covered somewhere in a private post so if someone recalls the exact cite and how that cite uses the term it would be good to add that in this thread.

Quote from burninglights

what Plato calls pleasure, Epicurus calls kinetic pleasure, and what Plato calls the neutral state, Epicurus calls katastematic pleasure!

And that labeling would be important to emphasize IF we saw that Epicurus himself in his letters, or Lucretius in his poem, or Diogenes of Oinoanda on his wall were insisting on that labeling as a clear point. Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor says we don't see that, and that Lucretius and Epicurus and Diogenes of Oinoanda are all using the word "pleasure" as the best term to describe tightly integrated word referring to all possible types of pleasure.

As I see it the best argument that Epicurus did insist on that labeling is the list of articles that Diogenes Laertius cites. However contrary to that argument is Nikolsky's observation that Diogenes Laertius was writing as a cataloger who (just like we may be doing today) was looking at Epicurus with the expectation to apply these labels to Epicurus' framework - a framework that does not necessarily turn on "motion" at all.

Where I think we all agree is that it is very important to emphasize that the normal natural state is one of pleasure, even in the absence of active stimulation.

What we don't agree on, or at least I don't see us being sure of, is that the key issue in discussing this natural state involves "motion." Both "kinetic" and "katastematic" appear to focus on "motion" vs. "rest," while "Pleasure" entails both. And I'd be open to the idea too that "motion" and "rest" probably do not describe all the possible types of pleasure, and that whether "in motion" or "at rest" or "otherwise," any experience that is not painful falls under "pleasure."

Here is Nikolsky making the point I think we keep circling around:

Everyone agrees that we call the actions involved in satisfying thirsts, hungers, and our desires for any type of pleasure by the name of "pleasure."

The big question is not (1) whether to label the natural state of life in which we find ourselves after we have (temporarily) satisfied our immediate thirsts, hungers, and desires as either "katastematic pleasure or kinetic pleasure."

The big question is (2) whether to label "the natural state of life in which find ourselves after we have (temporarily) satisfied our immediate thirsts, hungers, and desires" by the name of "pleasure."

The reason that (2) is the big issue is that everyone does not agree with labeling (2) as Pleasure. Plato and Cicero and most of the orthodox world do not consider "the natural state of life in which we find ourselves after we have temporarily satisfied our immediate thirsts, hungers, and desires." And because they don't consider (2) to be a state of pleasure, they conclude that it is impossible to ever reach satisfaction, because you are constantly chasing new food, new drink, and new stimulations.

Once you take the position that "the natural state of life in which find ourselves after we have (temporarily) satisfied our immediate thirsts, hungers, and desires" is a pleasure, then it's easy to see that you can live a life of pleasure in most everything you do, even if you have never heard of the words "kinetic" or "katestematic."

I keep putting "temporarily" in brackets only because we all know that we'll get hungry and thirsty and want more pleasures every couple of hours so long as we continue to live. That observation doesn't matter to Epicurus, because he identifies *both* the state of acting to fulfill those desires, and the state of fulfillment, as pleasure, so the general condition of life is pleasure. It's only when some affirmative outside disruptive influence intrudes to cause pain that we are not in pleasure in that part of our experience.

Nikolksy says it this way:

Quote from Don

My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.

But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?

Quote from burninglights

“When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profilgates [...] but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. (Men. 131).” This point is pretty clear, in my opinion.

This is a key statement. This is "clear," in my opinion, in relating to "katastematic pleasure," only if you previously and firmly have a position that "freedom from pain" is linked to katastematic pleasure.

If Epicurus is, as Torquatus asserts, using the term "freedom from pain" to be an exact synonym of "pleasure," then there is no necessity to read anything whatsoever into the statement in terms of "katastematic pleasure" other than that freedom from pain - which means any experience whatsoever that is not painful - "kinetic," "katastematic," or "supercalifragilistexpealidocius" is a pleasure.

That's the point Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor make at length -- there is no reason to read any presumptions about katastematic or kinetic whatsoever into the nature of "freedom from pain" other than that the term "freedom from pain" is interchangeable as a synonym for pleasure.

Every time we go down the road of saying "it's a particular TYPE of pleasure that really is important" then the red warning bells ought to be clanging full force. Pleasure is pleasurable because it is a feeling like snow is white and sugar is sweet. Once you start applying additional qualifiers to "what kind of pleasure you really want" then you've got a major logical dilemma. It's 100% logical to talk about choices and avoidance in terms of what kind of results that they bring, and I think that's where this discussion really goes. You choose and avoid your actions in terms of the total pleasure and pain that result. And yes mental pleasures are often (but not always) more easily in reach than mental ones. But that's not always true, nor does it mean that one type of pleasure is better than another.

Quote from burninglights

All this is to say that I think his point is that it’s ‘pleasure all the way down.’

With that I fully agree, and that takes us back to whether and how to pursue the K/K discussion in a way that doesn't take our eye off the ultimate objective, which is a life of "pleasure."

As to DL 10:137, that's a statement that's reflected in Torquatus at greater length in On Ends Book One XVII. I agree that in general it means that mental feelings are going to be more significant than "bodily" ones, but again that doesn't resolve anything as to katastematic and kinetic because those terms don't map straight to mental and bodily. So again we have a situation where it's clear and productive to observe that mental feelings can be used to overcome bodily pains, and that's graspable and easy to understand. But dividing them katastematically and kinetically is not at all the same observation.

XVII. And I will now explain in a few words the things which are inseparably connected with this sure and solid opinion.

There is no mistake with respect to the ends themselves of good and evil, that is to say, with respect to pleasure and pain; but men err in these points when they do not know what they are caused by. But we admit that the pleasures and pains of the mind are caused by the pleasures and pains of the body. Therefore I grant what you were saying just now, that if any philosophers of our school think differently (and I see that many men do so, but they are ignorant people) they must be convicted of error. But although pleasure of mind brings us joy, and pain causes us grief, it is still true that each of these feelings originates in the body, and is referred to the body; and it does not follow on that account that both the pleasures and pains of the mind are not much more important than those of the body. For with the body we are unable to feel anything which is not actually existent and present; but with our mind we feel things past and things to come. For although when we are suffering bodily pain, we are equally in pain in our minds, still a very great addition may be made to that if we believe that any endless and boundless evil is impending over us. And we may transfer this assertion to pleasure, so that that will be greater if we have no such fear.

This now is entirely evident, that the very greatest pleasure or annoyance of the mind contributes more to making life happy or miserable than either of these feelings can do if it is in the body for an equal length of time. But we do not agree that, if pleasure be taken away, grief follows immediately, unless by chance it happens that pain has succeeded and taken the place of pleasure; but, on the other hand, we affirm that men do rejoice at getting rid of pain even if no pleasure which can affect the senses succeeds. And from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is not to be in pain. But as we are roused by those good things which we are in expectation of, so we rejoice at those which we recollect. But foolish men are tortured by the recollection of past evils; wise men are delighted by the memory of past good things, which are thus renewed by the agreeable recollection. But there is a feeling implanted in us by which we [pg 119] bury adversity as it were in a perpetual oblivion, but dwell with pleasure and delight on the recollection of good fortune. But when with eager and attentive minds we dwell on what is past, the consequence is, that melancholy ensues, if the past has been unprosperous; but joy, if it has been fortunate.

Still thinking about this one I think we all would agree that Epicurus would not think that being sad about the death in any way benefits the deceased. I suppose as I think about it myself the primary issue would be a reflection on the cause of the situation hopefully leading to a response by the appropriate people to try to make sure the situation is not repeated. But as far as feeling pity or sorrow "for the child" it would be more "for the situation.". Definitely an interesting question.

Of course there is a Vatican saying on this too -

Quote from Cassius

VS66. Let us show our feeling for our lost friends, not by lamentation, but by meditation.

Tonight at 8pm, we will cover Vatican Saying 38 and 39.

Please join us. (Post here in this thread if you have never attended one of these sessions as we do have a vetting process for new participants.)

VS40. The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens of necessity.

VS41. We must laugh and philosophize at the same time, and do our household duties, and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy.

Quote from Kalosyni

Here is something that is being worked on (list by Cassius) which could jumpstart some practical application of Epicurean philosophy:

What she means there is that i am working on a new format for presenting the lifestyle issues by using the historical characters to illustrate how *they* embodied the desired characteristics. Sort of like a much-abbreviated Plutarch's Lives, but with the focus being one a couple of distinguishing attributes rather than a full bio.

If anyone has any:

1 - suggestions for further illustations, or

2 - desire to compose a couple of paragraphs on how the life illustrates the virtue(s)

then feel free to let me know and I will incorporate that into the finished product.

By the way those "Distinctive Life Aspects" are very preliminary.

That was indeed a great line but if I recall correctly, all credit goes to DON for that one!

I am going to have to come back later for more extended comment but I note that the question uses the word "Pity" and I think that in itself is a deep question -- made famous by Nietzsche - as to the status and desirability of "pity." Compassion, pretty clearly yes, is all over Epicurean texts. Is "pity" the same thing?

Quote from Blank_Emu43

So, how should we as Epicureans feel about a child dying since they didn't get to live past childhood and experience more good things in life?

I think like most of us being confronted with a child dying would cause Epicurus to think any number of things, but I feel certain that among them he would feel feel sadness for just the reason stated here.

Epicurus said that life is desirable, and that means that longer life is also desirable, even if the pleasures involved are "variation" of pleasures already experienced. There's no need to dramatize the issue by referring to a child dying -- life is desirable - period, so long as you don't know for sure that the extra time life will not be more painful than pleasurable.

Beyond that I am sure that the particular circumstances of why the child has died, what could have been done to prevent it, etc., would all be worthy of comment by Epicurus.

Yes I agree Don's pointing out an improvement on the fulfillment aspect, so I would reword:

Cicero's discussion isn't unreasonable. No one - including Epicurus - seems to have ever alleged that (1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *being fulfilled* are exactly the same thing. You'd have to be pretty obtuse to argue that those are exactly the same in every respect and that it isn't at least somewhat reasonable to distinguish them from each other.

The bigger questions include:

1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"

2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or being fulfilled?

3 - Do any of these concepts (1) or (2) or (3) stand intrinsically or by some absolute standard as superior, hierarchically, to the other(s), such that they separately deserve to be considered to be the "ultimate pleasure" or "highest pleasure" or the "best pleasure" or "real pleasure" for all people at all times and at all places?

As I understand it Epicurus would answer:

1- Yes.

2 - No.

3 - No.

Quote from Don

It seems to me that there are only two types of pleasure, but I'd again characterize them as "action" and "rest" (with obvious more explanation needed to flesh out those two words).

As for this part I'd say "if we want to talk in terms of action and rest there are only two, but there are many ways to categorize and describe forms of pleasure."

And making the whole issue a question of "movement" being the key question bakes into the cake doubt about the status of "stillness." It becomes very difficult to see how the status of "health" of body or mind is a pleasure if "movement or stillness" is elevated as the defining criteria.

I see issues of movement as one of many ways to slice and dice aspects of pleasure, but I wouldn't elevate movement to the core issue. The core issue is whether whatever we are talking about is pleasing to us or not, and it's not necessary to specify anything more than "being alive and without pain." If we specify that we are alive and what we aren't feeling in a particular experience is pain, then what we're feeling at that experience is pleasure, regardless of how fast or slowly that thing is "moving."

Quote from burninglights

All of this does actually align pretty well with the 'traditional' interpretation of these terms as reported by Cicero -- that a kinetic pleasure would be the pleasure of drinking when thirsty and katastematic being the pleasure of having fulfilled that desire. I think that, probably to hone his attack, he just picked a really banal and myopic example.

Yes - Cicero's discussion isn't unreasonable. No one - including Epicurus - seems to have ever alleged that (1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *fulfilling a desire* are exactly the same thing. You'd have to be pretty obtuse to argue that those are exactly the same in every respect and that it isn't at least somewhat reasonable to distinguish them from each other.

The bigger questions include:

1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"

2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or fulfilled?

3 - Do any of these concepts (1) or (2) or (3) stand intrinsically or by some absolute standard as superior, hierarchically, to the other(s), such that they separately deserve to be considered to be the "ultimate pleasure" or "highest pleasure" or the "best pleasure" or "real pleasure" for all people at all times and at all places?

As I understand it Epicurus would answer:

1- Yes.

2 - No.

3 - No.

Right now we have most of our "special resources" stored under this link:

- Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

If we end up creating a "concordance" of uses of words that are a variation of "pleasure," we definitely need to add it there.

I don't think we've previously done this (I know I haven't myself) but some of Don's posts have come very close to being a "concordance" of where words denoting pleasure are found.

If we can pull that together somewhere that would be well worth the effort. At the very least we ought to find out where this has been posted before and post the links here, and then we can turn that into a reference page as we have time.

Here's from that Stanford / Konstan article. Possibly all or possibly only part of it is accurate, and no doubt digging in to the details will be helpul, especially if we could prepare a "concordance" of every time one of these words appears.

But one thing I can say for sure - a strictly academic approach can easily make a normal person's eyes glaze over and lead too all sorts of doubt and uncertainty if not handled carefully. Almost like the letter to Menoeceus as to religion being preferable to hard determinism, I could see some people saying "save me God from these incessant vocabulary drills!"

Quote

The ability to reason or calculate (logismos) cannot be a function of images. It is the faculty that lets us infer by analogy from the visible world to the invisible, and also that with which we may recognize that not all pleasures are to be chosen at all times, since some immediate pleasures may lead to long-term pain or harm (Letter to Menoeceus = LM 129). What is more, one must know something about the nature of pleasure in order to pursue it rationally, and likewise for pain. Epicurus, it appears, uses the terms pleasure and pain (hêdonê, algêdôn) strictly in reference to physical pathê or sensations, that is, those that are experienced via the non-rational soul that is distributed throughout the body. As for the rational part or mind, we have positive and negative experiences through it too. Most prominent among the negative mental states is fear, above all the fear of unreal dangers, such as death. Death, Epicurus insists, is nothing to us, since while we exist, our death is not, and when our death occurs, we do not exist (LM 124–25); but if one is frightened by the empty name of death, the fear will persist since we must all eventually die. This fear is one source of perturbation (tarakhê), and is a worse curse than physical pain itself; the absence of such fear is ataraxy, lack of perturbation, and ataraxy, together with freedom from physical pain, is one way of specifying the goal of life, for Epicurus.

There are also positive states of mind, which Epicurus identifies by the special term khara (joy), as opposed to hêdonê (pleasure, i.e., physical pleasure). These states too depend on belief, whether true or false. But Epicurus does not treat khara as an end, or part of the end for living: rather, he tends to describe the goal by negation, as freedom from bodily pain and mental disturbance (LM 128). However, happiness (eudaimonia), according to Epicurus, is not simply a neutral or privative condition but rather a form of pleasure in its own right — what Epicurus called catastematic or (following Cicero’s Latin translation) “static” as opposed to “kinetic” pleasure. Although the precise nature of this distinction is debated, kinetic pleasures seem to be of the non-necessary kind (see below), such as those resulting from agreeable odors or sounds, rather than deriving from replenishment, as in the case of hunger or thirst. The philosophical school known as the Cyrenaics advocated increasing desires and seeking ever new ways of gratifying them.

Epicurus objected that such pleasures are necessarily accompanied by distress, for they depend upon a lack that is painful (Plato had demonstrated the problematic nature of this kind of pleasure; see Gorgias 496C–497A, Philebus 31E–32D, 46A–50C). In addition, augmenting desires tends to intensify rather than reduce the mental agitation (a distressful state of mind) that Epicurean philosophy sought to eliminate. Catastematic pleasure, on the contrary, is (or is taken in) a state rather than a process: it is the pleasure that accompanies well-being as such. The Cyrenaics and others, such as Cicero, maintained, in turn, that this condition is not pleasurable but rather neutral — neither pleasurable nor painful.

Moderators' Note: After this thread gets a week or two old and begins to get less active, let's delete this moderation comment and move the thread here:

Lucretius

Quote from Kalosyni

The question remains...what would a philosopher/teacher wear?

I would say that differs according to how ascetic they were, and since I personally don't think Epicurus was into asceticism, I'd be surprised if he didn't have a varying wardrobe.

Seems I remember that Frances Wright took one of the Cynics to task for his dress in "A Few Days In Athens" but I don't recall her talking about color Epicurus wore. Maybe it's in the first chapter that I skip through quickly because it's a little too "flowery" for my taste.

Nate I have noted over the years on Facebook that both you and your wife are very talented and creative. So is this a painting done with brush and paint, or computer graphic designing, or what? I hope you'll be able to encourage her to do more like this. And do I see that she's done more than one work on Epicurus? I tried to follow links on the etsy page but was not sure how to look for the rest of her work.