Welcome Ed!
Ed tells me:
I actually came across Epicurus philosophy about 2 weeks ago. I was online, I think TikTok or YouTube and came across several AI generated philosophy debates. I was inclined to Epicurus point of views on life. I did some more googling and found his friends! I consider myself a life learner and look forward to learning more about Epicurus philosophy
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This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards and associated Terms of Use. Please be sure to read that document to understand our ground rules.
Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from most other philosophies, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit of truth and happy living through pleasure as explained in the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be assured of your time here will be productive is to tell us a little about yourself and your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you already have.
You can also check out our Getting Started page for ideas on how to use this website.
We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).
Welcome to the forum!
Welcome to Episode 311 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week in the absence of Joshua and Kalosyni we will make a brief review of Dr. Emily Austin's "Epicurus and The Politics Of The Fear of Death," which we have discussed in a recent thread thanks to Pacatus bringing the article to our attention.
Next week we will be back with more Tusculan Disputations, but this week we'll set the stage for more discussion of this very good article.
This week we will continue further into Lucretius starting at line 29 and we'll go as far as line 102 if we get there:
Bring it to pass that meantime the wild works of warfare may be lulled to sleep over all seas and lands. For thou only canst bless mortal men with quiet peace, since ’tis Mavors, the lord of hosts, who guides the wild works of war, and he upon thy lap oft flings himself back, conquered by the eternal wound of love; and then pillowing his shapely neck upon thee and looking up he feeds with love his greedy eyes, gazing wistfully towards thee, while, as he lies back, his breath hangs upon thy lips. Do thou, goddess, as he leans resting on thy sacred limbs, bend to embrace him and pour forth sweet petition from thy lips, seeking, great lady, gentle peace for the Romans. For neither can we in our country’s time of trouble set to our task with mind undistressed, nor amid such doings can Memmius’s noble son fail the fortunes of the state. For it must needs be that all the nature of the gods enjoys life everlasting in perfect peace, sundered and separated far away from our world. For free from all grief, free from danger, mighty in its own resources, never lacking aught of us, it is not won by virtuous service nor touched by wrath.
For the rest, do thou (Memmius), lend empty ears and a keen mind, severed from cares, to true philosophy, lest, before they are understood, you should leave aside in disdain my gifts set forth for you with unflagging zeal. For of the most high law of the heaven and the gods I will set out to tell you, and I will reveal the first-beginnings of things, from which nature creates all things, and increases and fosters them, and into which nature too dissolves them again at their perishing: these in rendering our account it is our wont to call matter or the creative bodies of things, and to name them the seeds of things, and again to term them the first-bodies, since from them first all things have their being.
When the life of man lay foul to see and grovelling upon the earth, crushed by the weight of religion, which showed her face from the realms of heaven, lowering upon mortals with dreadful mien, ’twas a man of Greece who dared first to raise his mortal eyes to meet her, and first to stand forth to meet her: him neither the stories of the gods nor thunderbolts checked, nor the sky with its revengeful roar, but all the more spurred the eager daring of his mind to yearn to be the first to burst through the close-set bolts upon the doors of nature. And so it was that the lively force of his mind won its way, and he passed on far beyond the fiery walls of the world, and in mind and spirit traversed the boundless whole; whence in victory he brings us tidings what can come to be and what cannot, yea and in what way each thing has its power limited, and its deepset boundary-stone. And so religion in revenge is cast beneath men’s feet and trampled, and victory raises us to heaven.
Herein I have one fear, lest perchance you think that you are starting on the principles of some unholy reasoning, and setting foot upon the path of sin. Nay, but on the other hand, again and again our foe, religion, has given birth to deeds sinful and unholy. Even as at Aulis the chosen chieftains of the Danai, the first of all the host, foully stained with the blood of Iphianassa the altar of the Virgin of the Cross-Roads. For as soon as the band braided about her virgin locks streamed from her either cheek in equal lengths, as soon as she saw her sorrowing sire stand at the altar’s side, and near him the attendants hiding their knives, and her countrymen shedding tears at the sight of her, tongue-tied with terror, sinking on her knees she fell to earth. Nor could it avail the luckless maid at such a time that she first had given the name of father to the king. For seized by men’s hands, all trembling was she led to the altars, not that, when the ancient rite of sacrifice was fulfilled, she might be escorted by the clear cry of ‘Hymen’, but in the very moment of marriage, a pure victim she might foully fall, sorrowing beneath a father’s slaughtering stroke, that a happy and hallowed starting might be granted to the fleet. Such evil deeds could religion prompt.
Episode 310 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "Neither Happiness Nor Virtue Are Binary States"
Joshua also quotes in this episode from Game of Thrones. I have not watched that so I am coming up dry looking for a video clip of the scene, but here is a link to the text:
Quotes by Davos
Melisandre: Are you a good man, Davos Seaworth?
Davos: I am a man. I am kind to my wife, but I have known other women. I have tried to be a father to my sons, to help make them a place in this world. Aye, I've broken laws, but I never felt evil until tonight. I would say my parts are mixed, m'lady. Good and bad.
Melisandre: A grey man. Neither white nor black, but partaking of both. Is that what you are, Ser Davos?
Davos: What if I am? It seems to me that most men are grey.Melisandre: If half of an onion is black with rot, it is a rotten onion. A man is good, or he is evil.[11]
—Melisandre and Davos
Please indicate how I would get to that page from the home page.
We're going to improve that and make it easier to find. For the time being it is par of the "Map" box in the right sidebar if you are on a wide screen, or near the footer if you're on a phone.
We've updated the "Map" page with an easier-to-read version. The old maps are still there but this is definitely easier to navigate on a phone-sized screen:
I certainly don't think it's a cut and dried argument for hooking up to the machine (which I don't think you're saying btw!).
Right. I generally see the experience machine hypothetical as geared toward the normal ordinary person to test their views of pleasure. This set of facts focuses more on someone who is in a very difficult situation with no realistic hope of improvement. But it does deepen the question in my view, because once you break down the barrier of "I would *always* choose reality no matter how bad it is" then you start to ask questions about what circumstances would justify such a decision.
As another way of revisiting the same question in this hypothetical, I recently rewatched the Star Trek original series two part episode: "The Menagerie." I would say that this story sets up the question pretty well.
In that episode, the Christopher Pike, the first captain of the Enterprise has been tragically injured in a radiation accident and injured to the point where he is a total invalid with a fully working mind but the with the inability to move over than to blink one for yes and two for no through light bulbs on his wheelchair. Spock kidnaps Pike and hijacks the Enterprise and takes him to a planet where the occupants have incredible powers of illusion. On that planet they have a female human (who like the Epicurean gods, did not have a pattern by which to reassemble her remains after she crash-landed on the planet) and that want Pike to be her mate. In the original pilot Pike refused to stay, but in the Menagerie he is so injured and disfigured that it becomes debatable whether he should return to the planet and live "under the illusion" of perfect health, or reject the opportunity in favor of his existing reality.
All variations of this hypothetical require that you grapple with the question of who evaluating who is running the machine, and this scenario is no different.
But for those who like Star Trek this is an interesting way to ask the question of choosing between something that is apparently an "illusion" as opposed to "reality."
The final words of the second episode are something to the effect:
"Captain Pike has his illusion and you have your reality. May your way be as pleasant."
Also from section 14 of the same chapter:
XIV.¶
To me such are the only men who appear completely happy; for what can he want to a complete happy life who relies on his own good qualities, or how can he be happy who does not rely on them? But he who makes a threefold division of goods must necessarily be diffident, for how can he depend on having a sound body, or that his fortune shall continue? but no one can be happy without an immovable, fixed, and permanent good. What, then, is this opinion of theirs? So that I think that saying of the Spartan may be applied to them, who, on some merchant's boasting before him, that he had despatched ships to every maritime coast, replied, that a fortune which depended on ropes was not very desirable. Can there be any doubt that whatever may be lost, cannot be properly classed in the number of those things which complete a happy life? for of all that constitutes a happy life, nothing will admit of withering, or growing old, or wearing out, or decaying; for whoever is apprehensive of any loss of these things cannot be happy; the happy man should be safe, well fenced, well fortified, out of the reach of all annoyance, not like a man under trifling apprehensions, but free from all such. As he is not called innocent who but slightly offends, but he who offends not at all; so it is he alone who is to be considered without fear who is free from all fear, not he who is but in little fear. For what else is courage but an affection of mind, that is ready to undergo perils, and patient in the endurance of pain and labour without any alloy of fear? Now this certainly could not be the case, if there were anything else good but what depended on honesty alone. But how can any one be in possession of that desirable and much-coveted security (for I now call a freedom from anxiety a security, on which freedom a happy life depends) who has, or may have, a multitude of evils attending him? How can he be brave and undaunted, and hold everything as trifles which can befal a man, for so a wise man should do, unless he be one who thinks that everything depends on himself? Could the Lacedæmonians without this, when Philip threatened to prevent all their attempts, have asked him, if he could prevent their killing themselves? Is it not easier, then, to find one man of such a spirit as we are inquiring after, than to meet with a whole city of such men? Now, if to this courage I am speaking of we add temperance, that it may govern all our feelings and agitations, what can be wanting to complete his happiness who is secured by his courage from uneasiness and fear; and is prevented from immoderate desires and immoderate insolence of joy, by temperance? I could easily show that virtue is able to produce these effects, but that I have explained on the foregoing days.
Notes during editing:
I set up a separate thread for the issue of Happiness not requiring absolute absence of pain, and I'm going to name this episode something to the effect that Epicurus does not consider Happiness to be a binary state (where the only two options are happiness and unhappiness).
That raises something that Joshua points out, however: Epicurus does treat pain and pleasure as a binary state - that you are either feeling one or the other but not both at the same time and not an in-between state.
So we'll want to discuss: what's the difference between "happiness / unhappiness" and "pleasure/pain?"
This point is implicit in many other discussions here on the board, especially those which relate to:
- Epicurus stating that he was happy even in the midst of dying from kidney disease.
- Epicurus saying that the wise man can be happy even while on the rack.
- Torquatus explaining to Cicero that the wise man is always happy because he always has more reason for joy than for vexation.
The reason I wanted to post this is to include a section of "Tusculan Disputations" where Cicero directly addresses the point that some people want to argue that "happiness" requires "completeness" - basically that if you are 99% happy but have 1% of your experience "not happy" then you should not consider yourself to be "happy."
This also falls under discussion of "the perfect is not the enemy of the good."
But here's one place where Cicero brings this up in Tusculan Disputations Part V, and takes the absolutist position:
VIII.¶
A. I wish that indeed myself; but I want a little information. For I allow, that in what you have stated, the one proposition is the consequence of the other; that as, if what is honourable be the only good, it must follow, that a happy life is the effect of virtue: so that if a happy life consists in virtue, nothing can be good but virtue. But your friend Brutus, on the authority of Aristo and Antiochus, does not see this: for he thinks the case would be the same, even if there were anything good besides virtue.
M. What then? do you imagine that I am going to argue against Brutus?
A. You may do what you please: for it is not for me to prescribe what you shall do.
M. How these things agree together shall be examined somewhere else: for I frequently discussed that point with Antiochus, and lately with Aristo, when, during the period of my command as general, I was lodging with him at Athens. For to me it seemed that no one could possibly be happy under any evil: but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if there are any things arising from body or fortune, deserving the name of evils. These things were said, which Antiochus has inserted in his books in many places: that virtue itself was sufficient to make life happy, but yet not perfectly happy: and that many things derive their names from the predominant portion of them, though they do not include everything, as strength, health, riches, honor, and glory: which qualities are determined by their kind, not their number: thus a happy life is so called from its being so in a great degree, even though it should fall short in some point. To clear this up, is not absolutely necessary at present, though it seems to be said without any great consistency: for I cannot imagine what is wanting to one that is happy, to make him happier, for if anything be wanting to him he cannot be so much as happy; and as to what they say, that everything is named and estimated from its predominant portion, that may be admitted in some things. But when they allow three kinds of evils; when any one is oppressed with every imaginable evil of two kinds, being afflicted with adverse fortune, and having at the same time his body worn out and harassed with all sorts of pains, shall we say that such a one is but little short of a happy life, to say nothing about the happiest possible life?
I would say that's it's important to recognize that Epicurus is taking the position with which Cicero disagrees, that a happy life is so called from its being so in a great degree, even though it should fall short in some point.
In other words, Epicurus did not hesitate to call his last days happy even though he very definitely felt physical pain - and therefore those days could have been "more happy" without that physical pain during that time.
Yes that's one of the key quotes. There are several paragraphs in that section that are packed with info.
Excellent points.
These issues of recognizing more than one level of reality are discussed in similar manner in Sedley's "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism."
it seems to be difficult for some people (Plato et al) to think about there being a "higher-level" pespective and for others (Democritus) to think about there being an "atomic-level" perspective without ending up denying that our "middle-level" persective also exists and is just as real as the other two. In fact it's not "just as real" but for us it's actually more real because it is the level at which our senses function, and as you say the only way we can be sure of anything about the lower or higher levels is by the way we see impacts in our own level.
So that's why it's so important not to let the sensations be disparaged as untrustworthy. As soon as you stop demanding evidence at our own level of sensation then you've set the stage for all the otherworldiness both of religion and of "weird science" which goes with hope or speculation alone and without grounding in evidence that we can confirm.
I personally equate this too with Epicurus' statement about "outlining" in the letter to Herodotus. We have to keep the various levels of truth in our awareness at all times and be able to go back and forth between them without missing a beat.
And yes we'll go back over this in detail in the Sunday Zooms on Lucretius and then when we get back to Lucretius after the current review of the bigger-picture issues Cicero has summarized for us .
That's where I see us at currently. Most all of us need additional grounding in both the details and in the bigger picture. Cicero can show us where Epicurus stacks up (revolts) against the majority consensus. At the same time Lucretius shows us how Epicurus reasoned to his conclusions.
Cicero (On Ends / Tusculan Disputations / Academic Questions) gives us the big picture questions which everyone was asking and to which Epicurus was reacting, but Cicero doesn't give us the backup details of how Epicurus reached his conclusions. Lucretius gives us the backup details that explain how Epicurus reached his conclusions, but Lucetius often doesn't give us the big picture questions which everyone in 50 BC understood.
We need both in order to understand the full picture and what it means for us today.
Everyone should feel free to suggest addition of new "Cards" or rearrangements of items on existing cards. It won't be possible to accommodate all requests, but if you think something should be arranged differently then it's very possible others think the same, and we might not pick it up if someone doesn't suggest the possibility.
One of the main purposes of this format is to help those who access the site on cell phones in a narrow portrait mode. Drop-down menus and sidebars don't work very well on that format, but different people use different formats so if you see something that can be improved let us know.
The sorites question is going to come up again in upcoming podcast episodes so I am posting this as a refresher (Edited from Grok). I suspect there are a lot of people like me who aren't very familiar with this question or its unusual name. However the question it frames (especially in terms o "emergent properties" of atoms coming together into bodies) is very important in understanding how Epicurus differs from Democritus and other Greek philosophers.
The sorites problem (from Greek σωρός, sōros = “heap”) is a famous paradox in philosophy and logic that exposes how vague concepts break down when we try to apply sharp, precise boundaries to them.
Classic formulation (the heap paradox):
The reasoning looks perfectly logical, but the conclusion is absurd — we all know a million grains of sand piled up is a heap.Same paradox with other vague concepts:
Why it’s a problem
The sorites paradox reveals that many everyday concepts (heap, forest, tall, red, old, rich, conscious, alive, etc.) are vague — they have borderline cases and no precise cutoff point. Classical logic assumes everything is either true or false with a sharp boundary, but vague concepts don’t work that way.
Main attempted solutions (very brief)
Bottom line
The sorites paradox shows that the world is full of genuinely fuzzy boundaries, and our crisp yes/no logic isn’t always equipped to handle them cleanly. It’s why the question — “Does a forest exist apart from its trees?” — is so slippery: there’s no single tree whose addition magically creates “a forest,” yet somehow the forest is undeniably real once enough trees are present.In short: the sorites problem is the philosophical land-mine hiding inside every vague word we use every day.
Example: Does a forest exist apart from its trees?
Yes — but only in certain ways, and no in others. It depends on what you mean by “exist.”
Most useful answer:
The forest is real the same way a marriage is real, or a city is real, or a song is real.
It cannot be reduced to the individual components without losing something essential, yet it has no existence completely independent of them either.So:
A forest both is, and is not, its trees — depending on whether you’re wearing the hat of a poet, an ecologist, a philosopher, or a chainsaw salesman.
PD26. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.
Joshua is right to point to this one, which is relatively clear. And I think he's right to say that the test is not limited to "bodily" - unless someone is speaking in the sense that everything is "bodily" in the end - but that's not the sense being discussed as far as I can tell.
I think Torquatus makes clear and there's no reason to doubt him that mental pains and pleasures can often be more significant to us that bodily pains and pleasures. Dying for a friend would be an extreme decision but one that seems to clearly involve mental over bodily considerations.
And in the end I don't think that's even a close issue. While maintenance of the body is necessary in order for us to do anything, most of the biggest decisions that have the most affect our course of life are not primarily for the sake of the "body" at all.
You have to do the math yourself, for yourself!
.... because only YOU can measure the pain or pleasure that results from any action.
It is exactly wrong to do what the Benthamites tried to do and reduce the calculation purely to mathemetics.
However, so long as you realize that the mathematics is only an aid, and cannot be applied as the final factor, I would say that lining things up statistically does make some sense as a tool of analysis.
So I'd still maintain that in any difficult decision it probably does make sense to sit down and try to enumerate the options as a spreadsheet. If you don't, you're not making your best effort to think things though. But you have to remember that the assignment of units of pain and pleasure is entirely relative to you.
Therefore I would not say "don't even try to add them up because it can't be done."
i would say "plotting out the possibilities in detail is the only rational way to proceed, but you have to remember that there is no "necessity" in ethical decisionmaking. You can't treat your projection as applicable to anyone else or even to yourself at a later time. A moment by moment analysis is all that is possible,
This meeting focused on discussing Lucretius' poem "On the Nature of Things" (De Rerum Natura) and its relationship to Epicurean philosophy. Participants explored the opening passages of the poem, particularly the invocation to Venus, and debated its symbolic meaning within Epicurean thought. The group also discussed approaches to studying Epicurean philosophy, the relationship between Lucretius and Epicurus, and plans for systematically working through the text in future meetings.
The meeting began with an extensive discussion about why Lucretius opens his Epicurean poem with an invocation to Venus, which seems contradictory to Epicurean theology. Several interpretations were offered. Tau suggested it serves dual purposes: as a poetic device and as flattery toward Memmius (the poem's dedicatee), who claimed descent from a hero in Aeneas' army. By addressing Venus as "mother of Aeneas' sons," Lucretius creates an ancestral connection that would appeal to Memmius. Raphael proposed that Venus represents a symbol of natural forces rather than a literal deity, suggesting educated Romans would understand this symbolism. Cassius noted that the specific attributes described in the opening passage might more precisely represent pleasure rather than nature in general, as there's no mention of pain or fear. Joshua contributed that Lucretius was heavily influenced by Empedocles, who described forces of love and strife in nature, which Lucretius transformed into Venus and Mars.
Dave: Who was Lucretius writing to? Who was this Memmius pointed to?
Joshua: He dedicates the poem to Gaius Memmius, a Roman politician who was exiled to Athens and bought the derelict house that belonged to Epicurus. Cicero wrote to Memmius asking him not to tear down the house, as it was a pilgrimage site for Epicureans. The poem may have been part of a campaign to convince Memmius to preserve this important Epicurean landmark.
Dave: I thought the Greeks really considered their gods to be individuals residing somewhere.
Raphael: The educated Greeks and Romans knew that these stories (mythos) were conjured up by poets. They understood them as symbolic personifications of forces of nature.
The group discussed various approaches to studying and understanding Epicurean philosophy. Dave observed that most new members of the forum mention reading DeWitt as their introduction to Epicureanism, wondering why this particular text seems to be the common starting point. Tau shared that he came to Epicureanism through other sources and only read DeWitt later, expressing criticism that DeWitt "takes too many liberties" and presents speculation as fact. Patrikios agreed that DeWitt might not be the best starting point for newcomers, suggesting that more accessible modern works might serve better as introductions. Raphael emphasized the importance of primary sources, arguing that readers should begin with Epicurus' own words before moving to interpretations. The discussion highlighted the challenge of finding appropriate entry points for people at different stages of understanding.
Dave: I usually look at the About section of anyone that joins. It seems like every single person says their reading is DeWitt. Nobody comes in from some other material or reading background. I wonder why that is.
Cassius: People probably pick up the emphasis we place on it on the forum. They likely lurk for a while before setting up an account, see the reading list, and notice that book is included.
Tau: I joined the forum after I studied Epicureanism for some time. I only read DeWitt's book much later, and I was never impressed with it because he takes too many liberties and presents stuff as fact when he has absolutely no ground to do that.
Cassius: There are many different opinions about many different things, and that's part of what we discuss.
Cassius established his position that Lucretius was attempting to faithfully and accurately represent Epicurus rather than extend or modify Epicurean philosophy. He suggested that Lucretius likely had Epicurus' books "On Nature" in front of him and was following not only the content but also the sequence of Epicurus' presentation. Tau agreed, noting that this would explain the heavy emphasis on physics in Lucretius' poem, as Epicurus' "On Nature" primarily dealt with physics. The group discussed the value of Lucretius as a well-preserved, extensive text from someone attempting to explain Epicureanism about 200 years after Epicurus, at a time when there had been sufficient opportunity to process and develop the philosophy. Joshua mentioned David Sedley's book "Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom," which attempts to reconstruct Epicurus' "On Nature" using Lucretius as a guide.
Cassius: I'm coming to this with a position that Lucretius is doing everything he can to faithfully and accurately represent Epicurus. I do not think that Lucretius is trying to extend anything, or change anything, or improvise, or improve anything in Epicurus. Not everybody takes that position, and there are some articles out there that imply that Lucretius, for example, on the swerve, was improvising.
Tau: Lucretius was not really a philosopher himself, he was a brilliant poet, but he didn't try to philosophize or push Epicureanism further. He didn't try to develop the philosophy. He just tried to put the philosophy in the most beautiful words he could.
