Posts by Cassius

Don's previous suggested threads:

https://home.uchicago.edu/~rjr6/articles/Instinct--Encyclopedia%20of%20Animal%20Behavior.pdf

Animal Instincts: Not What You Think They Are

Marc Bekoff explains how many different animal species show grief, friendship, gratitude, wonder, and a range of other emotions.

greatergood.berkeley.edu

The Sound of Running Water Puts Beavers in the Mood to Build

This one weird trick can help you exploit a beaver's natural instincts.

www.mentalfloss.com

Note also: The article on "the sound of running water puts beavers in the mood to build" might also be an example of how outside influences trigger resulting behaviors, as seems to be a part of the "image" theory.

In the discussion of prolepsis, I - for one - regularly throw around the supposed "example" that beavers are born with the innate disposition to build dams, and that this is not "learned" after birth from their parents. The assertion would imply that while this behavior may be amplified from watching others after birth, it is not primarily dependent on observation after birth, and that baby beavers separated from older beavers at birth would still build dams.

Pretty obviously the truth or falsity of this assertion bears on the issue of exactly what kind of behaviors are transmitted genetically over generations, and plays into the whole "blank slate" controversy. If beavers are born with certain types of behaviors being innate, then it's not much of a leap to consider that humans are too.

There are probably lots of other significant examples, but Beavers really stand out as dramatic examples which capture the imagination. It therefore probably makes good sense to focus on them as a litmus test example - if beavers can be established to have this disposition programmed into them before any personal exposure of any kind to prior dam-building, then I would think most all the other alleged examples of genetic dispositions in the natural world will be correspondingly easy to accept - or harder to accept if innate beaver dam-building is a myth.

We've discussed this in the forum on the past, primarily in the thread I will link below. Some links were produced, primarily by Don if I recall correctly, but i don't recall that we found any kind of "gold standard" article from a respected publication or source that really nailed down the question with persuasiveness. And I also know that some people dispute the contention that beavers are "born" with this behavior programmed in them, and they consider the assertion to be totally false.

Thus this thread is born. Every time we discuss anticipations/prolepsis we come around eventually to dealing with this question of what in fact we are able to observe in nature as to whether "patterned" behavior is totally learned after birth, or is partially encoded in our genetics. The title of this thread will hopefully make it more findable on the future when we need these sources. So as time goes by, I would appreciate it if those of us who are interested in this question could use this thread to collect the best links which bear on it, positively or negatively. If this is true, let's embrace it, if it's false, let's blow it out of the water.

Post

RE: Is There A Relationship Between "Anticipations" and "Instinct"?

(Since I am suggesting we always ought to be planning our seminar presentations)

[…]

On the symbolism of pigs/hogs I think there is some material which help explain the reference. We surely know it it existed from the Boscoreale cup and the Horace reference. I think there is a church father comment also referencing it in which hogs are cited as pursuing pleasure singlemindedly.

Numerous animals would work for the others but any that are known for their instinctive behavior, beavers and their…

Cassius

April 23, 2021 at 5:23 AM

Quote from Twentier

Or is this just his response to Plato's belief in innate ideas that precede birth and have a more fundamental reality than death.

Twentier while I don't think this is *all* there is to it, I do think this is a major part. The whole question of how the mind works is too fundamental to leave to the possibility of supernatural influence. Living things are pretty clearly not just a "blank slate," and if you are going to tackle explaining chaos and how the universe was not created but eternal, you have to come up with an explanation of how thought also arises from the atoms.

Plato and everyone else decided to default to the supernatural. Epicurus refused to do that and instead came up with a theory in which everything - including thought - stems from flows of atoms. I think the answer to unwinding this lies more in following a chain of reasoning which begins with moving atoms and then inch by inch assembles into arms and legs and eyes and brains and thought. Everything has to stem from flows of atoms; beavers have to have imprinted upon them at birth - naturally - the disposition to build dams. Flows of atoms from place to place are the only way to solve the action-at-a-distance problem without defaulting to the supernatural.

I think Epicurus was 100% serious about his ideas of divinity. There has to be a natural process by which pleasure arises from flows of atoms, and everything more complicated builds on that over time. And the reason I agree with you that this is so important is that you just can't leave these kind of things without a natural explanation or -- we see what the priests have managed to do even after Epicurus came along. The same nihilism which bothers so many people today is going to attack anyone who doesn't ultimately come to grips with whether there's something otherworldly and more than our existence, or whether our existence and happiness needs no outside justification.

And in the end I don't see what Epicurus proposed as absurd at all. Everything - including every living thing - is constantly bombarded from all sides with atoms flowing from all directions, and those atoms *do* both influence us, as they are also influenced by where they came from. They come to us and induce reactions on our part - reactions through the five senses, and for all we know reactions directly on our body like the sun causes us to make Vitamin D. And those influences impact all parts of us - including our minds - and our brains wire themselves over time in response to these patterns. As our brains wire themselves we find ourselves in tune with certain patterns that have struck us in the past, and our genetics find ways to transmit over generations dispositions to respond analogously in the future.

Also, as we've been discussing lately, our minds form patterns of behavior as to pleasure and pain that allow us to think about what a "higher" life would be like if we never faced pain or death. We can imagine and benefit from considering what that life would look like - everyone needs a goal and vision of how they would like to live. In parallel with that aspirational aspect, we can think about how in an infinite and eternal universe that is filled with planets like Earth there are bound to be beings that have reached that level. And our consideration of that level of performance constitutes a goal for ourselves mentally and conceptually, just like all pleasure constitutes a goal for us.

I'm far from saying that this kind of explanation solves all the issues, but I think that it's a very reasonable approach and one that continues to have a lot more validity than most any I can name. And It sure beats giving in to the priests or to suicidal nihilism.

More:

XLI. But they are free from pain. Is that sufficient for beings who are supposed to enjoy all good things and the most supreme felicity? The Deity, they say, is constantly meditating on his own happiness, for he has no other idea which can possibly occupy his mind. Consider a little; reflect what a figure the Deity would make if he were to be idly thinking of nothing through all eternity but “It is very well with me, and I am happy;” nor do I see why this happy Deity should not fear being destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and agitated by an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are constantly floating off from him. Your Deity, therefore, is neither happy nor eternal.

You guys are much better with the text than I am, and i have read many times that the earlier section seems to have the images going the wrong way, but when you look at the rest of what is said in attacking Velleius, it sure looks like a case can be made that everyone understood the images to be coming *from* the gods, and the "to" must be some kind of transcription error.

(Of course given the nature of the theory, it IS true that we ourselves are giving off images too, which the gods would be able to observe (if they were so inclined) just like we apparently are argued to perceive theirs. But I wouldn't expect that our paying attention to the idea of gods in any way "focuses" the images streaming off of us to go in the direction of the intermundia.)

Joshua and I will get to all of this over time, but it's apparent that there is a lot more in OTNOTG in regard to images that is relevant to prolepsis, even if we have to reverse engineer it from Cotta's criticisms:

XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it, could comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images are continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how do you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say, of innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal? To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave, I will call your Ἰσονομία), and say that as there is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve. Be it as you say; but let those causes preserve which have existence themselves. I cannot conceive these your Gods to have any. But how does all this face of things arise from atomic corpuscles? Were there any such atoms (as there are not), they might perhaps impel one another, and be jumbled together in their motion; but they could never be able to impart form, or figure, or color, or animation, so that you by no means demonstrate the immortality of your Deity.

An additional fly in the ointment is that in reading ahead to a section where Velleius is being attacked, it seems that I remember seeing another reference to these images and the gods, and that in the second reference the preposition goes the other way.

Of course I don't have the cite on the tip of my tongue and without it this comment is useless, but I will see what I can do, and Joshua and I can look for it as we go further in OTNOTG.

Edit - it might be this from later in Book One, but I may remember something even more definite. Plus this is Yonge and I may be remembering Rackham:

XXXVII. “They have nothing to do,” your teacher says. Epicurus truly, like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some sportive exercise. But we are to suppose the Deity in such an inactive state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer happy. This doctrine divests the Gods of motion and operation; besides, it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe that the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity.

But let it be as you would have it, that the Deity is in the form and image of a man. Where is his abode? Where is his habitation? Where is the place where he is to be found? What is his course of life? And what is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys? For it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and enjoy what belongs to him. And with regard to place, even those natures which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them: so that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth; the air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all allotted to it. Some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. There are some, also, which are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering in burning furnaces.

In the first place, therefore, I ask you, Where is the habitation of your Deity? Secondly, What motive is it that stirs him from his place, supposing he ever moves? And, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their several natures, what is it that the Deity affects, and to what purpose does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? In short, how is he happy? how eternal? Whichever of these points you touch upon, I am afraid you will come lamely off. For there is never a proper end to reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but not by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it is to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant supply of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on which our minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine nature to be happy and everlasting.

Edit TWO == same implication of direction from the gods:

XXXVIII. What, in the name of those Deities concerning whom we are now disputing, is the meaning of all this? For if they exist only in thought, and have no solidity nor substance, what difference can there be between thinking of a Hippocentaur and thinking of a Deity? Other philosophers call every such conformation of the mind a vain motion; but you term it “the approach and entrance of images into the mind.” Thus, when I imagine that I behold T. Gracchus haranguing the people in the Capitol, and collecting their suffrages concerning M. Octavius, I call that a vain motion of the mind: but you affirm that the images of Gracchus and Octavius are present, which are only conveyed to my mind when they have arrived at the Capitol. The case is the same, you say, in regard to the Deity, with the frequent representation of which the mind is so affected that from thence it may be clearly understood that the Gods are happy and eternal.

There are not many books like "Living For Pleasure" which I personally would recommend. Haris Dimitriadis' "Epicurus and the Pleasant LIfe" probably would be next on a list geared to your specifications. You might also like Catherine Wilson's How To Be An Epicurean.

The recommended reading list in our FAQ is geared toward helping people read the works of the ancient Epicureans directly, as that is a far more accurate way to find out what Epicurus really taught:

Can You Suggest A Reading List For Learning About Epicurus? - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Less in line with your specifiication to be short would be:

1 - Norman DeWitt's Epicurus and His Philosophy, which is the best "textbook" treatment of Epicurean Philosophy

2 - A Few Days in Athens - which conveys Epicurean philosophy in Fiction form but is probably the most true-to-form original work on Epicurus written since the ancient world. You can read that online here: AFewDaysInAthens.com

That is a good video UnpaidLandlord thank you! The video producer seems to know the topic and I expect he is largely expressing it well. On that basis if we conclude that the essence of Camus' advice is to take a radical "WHO CARES?" position, then I have to affirm my earlier disposition that this Camus is about as much a reverse-Epicurean as you can get.

Sounds like the producer is correct that Camus is more like a "Stoic on Steroids" in expanding "indifference" to a whole new level of nihilistic glory. Camus might object to nihilism, but I hear no praise of pleasure or any other justification for going through what pain does exist in life.

In the apparent emphasis on "freedom" as an end in itself, rather than because freedom brings pleasure, I see nothing good at the end of that tunnel at all. Sounds like just another arbitrary "virtue" being elevated without regard as to its foundation or why we should do so.

This video also does a better job of contrasting Camus against Nietzsche. In my mind the issues the producer brings out are to the credit of Nietzsche and demerit of Camus.

What I am hearing is reminding me also of why i have never been a fan of "modern atheism" for example of the Sam Harris type. Pointing out the erroneous nature of supernatural gods is all well and good, but to live happily we have to replace that void with something to organize our lives. Epicurus shows how pleasure and pain fill that role, but I don't see how Camus is doing anything but destroying, and failing to replace it with anything. As Epicurus said, there are indeed worse things than conventional religion. Epicurus put his finger on hard determinism as an example of something worse, but I would not be surprised if he would put radical "Who cares?-ism" at or near that same rank.

All this is why I see it is as so important to embrace a positive and understandable worldview, like Epicurus taught, rather than just act the bull in a china shop running around destroying without ever providing a reasonable basis for hoping to succeed in living a happy life. No one I am aware of comes close to Epicurus in that regard.

I am pretty sure the video I watched was this one - although for some reason as I listen to it tonight the voice seems a little different than I remember. But the video background appears clearly the same, so this much be it. Seemed pretty evenhanded as best I could tell:

I watched a Youtube video on Camus tonight and i get the impression that interpretation of him is all over the board, all the way from existentialism, which he apparently strenuously denied, to there not being a dimes worth of difference between Camus and Nietzsche. It all seems to hinge on exactly who or what is being labeled as "absurd," and why, and that's where the lack of clarity is so glaring, much like the ambiguity of the legacy of Democritus leaves everyone wondering whether he was laughing "with" humanity or "at" humanity. I tend to think after brief exposure that Camus doesn't deserve to be considered to be on the "nihilist" team, but it also does not seem likely to me that his work could be interpreted so broadly if there were not some smoldering coals that create the smoke that surrounds him. I am thinking (so far) that there is probably a lot to learn from taking apart his views, but probably not much to be gained by holding up any system that he created as a model to emulate.

Yep this is a very practical exercise and I have always found it very clarifying in the handful of times i have done it. Great advice Godfrey. When we compile lists of "things every Epicurean should do" this has to be on them.

Yes that Warren passage does resonate with me, and reminds me of my currrent favorite David Sedley quote, which also fits the conversation:

34 DAVID SEDLEY - EPICURUS' REJECTION OF DETERMINISM:

Epicurus’ response to this is perhaps the least appreciated aspect of his thought. It was to reject reductionist atomism. Almost uniquely among Greek philosophers he arrived at what is nowadays the unreflective assumption of almost anyone with a smattering of science, that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter; but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth. (The truth that sugar is sweet is not straightforwardly reducible to the truth that it has such and such a molecular structure, even though the latter truth may be required in order to explain the former). By establishing that cognitive scepticism, the direct outcome of reductionist atomism, is self-refuting and untenable in practice, Epicurus justifies his non-reductionist alternative, according to which sensations are true and there are therefore bona fide truths at the phenomenal level accessible through them. T

We will also want to consider Jeffrey Fish's "Not All Politicians are Sisyphus," as well as the Boeri book "Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy" released last year. From the Fish article, which suggests that we reconsider the standard interpretation of Lucretius' reference to Sisyphus:

I don't think we can unwind all this without getting back to exactly what it was that Sisyphus is alleged to have done to be set up for the punishment which now defines his whole life.

Sisyphus - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

It's hard for me to see as all bad a figure who tricked Hades into ENDING death on earth at least for a while. And whose sin seems to consist significantly in not yielding to the orders of the gods.....

In a companion thread we are mentioning Sisyphus, and this thread will be the place to explore that in more depth so we have a thread to cite in the future.

I know Lucretius mentions him but we need to start earlier to get the back story.

Lots of good material to discuss coming from this. We need a thread specifically on Sisyphus, so I will set that up.

Thread

The Meaning Of the Story of Sisyphus

In a companion thread we are mentioning Sisyphus, and this thread will be the place to explore that in more depth so we have a thread to cite in the future.

I know Lucretius mentions him but we need to start earlier to get the back story.

Cassius

July 5, 2024 at 12:52 PM

Please don't take these or my prior remarks as being unfriendly, because I do not mean them in that way at all. All of us have gone through different philosophies in the past and we would not be here now if we have not.

Having said that, this is an Epicurean forum, and not a generalist philosophy group where all philosophies are equally "respected" and discussed dispassionately. And therefore I would say:

Quote from UnPaid_Landlord

As I understand it, it's more about accepting the reality with it's absurd nature and still living passionately

This is exactly the point in issue --- life does NOT have an absurd nature, from my point of view, and from what I read of Epicurus, he would say the same. Giving in on the question of whether "life is absurd" and not challenging that perspective is to give up the issue at the beginning.

Quote from UnPaid_Landlord

but I think it need not be a pessimistic philosophy, I don't why some people just misunderstand many things as negative, for example I have personally met some fellows who think Buddhism is really negative and pessimistic, and I can't understand what them at all,

Same perspective here, but in the reverse. I DO see Buddhism as essentially negative and pessimistic, and I cannot understand at all why someone would view it otherwise.

To repeat, we have all gone through different phases and perspectives and I don't make these statements to be argumentative. If we didn't have discussions with people who come to Epicurean discussion with different views, then we'd never give anyone the opportunity to engage with pro-Epicurean positions and potentially change their minds.

But we would not be an Epicurean forum if we did not --- at the same time that we welcome people who are not currently in tune with Epicuruean views - state clearly how we see Epicurus' views compare with others, and if we did not advocate for Epicurus' position, rather than accept very contradictory positions as if they were equally valid.

In this thread we're focusing on Absurdism and digging directly into the negative aspects, and it is unfortunate that we're doing so without having first engaged with you (talking to Unpaid_Landord) on the commonalities between what you're saying and Epicurus. I hope that you'll not get such an immediate bad impression from this thread that you don't continue to keep an open mind about this forum and Epicurus in general.

I don't think Epicurus would advise starting out tacking divisive subjects immediately, so this turn of discussion is probably unfortunate. But I think Epicurus would say that when clear issues arise, and others are watching (this is a public forum that anyone can read) it's best not to gloss over and defer deep issues for a later time that may never come. That's one reason why so much of the preliminary materials on this website that people go through in the registration process are geared toward putting such issues front and center, so they get discussed early.

If someone were to ask me: "Give me a cite to an Epicurean or someone writing about Epicurus who says something like the rant you just wrote" my first response would be Frances Wright in Chapter 10 of A Few Days In Athens. I think this section does a great job of capturing the flavor of what is explicit and implicit in the surviving texts, and which rejects the nihilism and absurdism and similar modern "isms':

A reasonable-length excerpt from that to quote here would be:

Quote from Frances Wright - A Few Days in Athens

Should we, then, to avoid the evil, forego the good? Shall we shut love from our hearts, that we may not feel the pain of his departure? No; happiness forbids it. Experience forbids it. Let him who hath laid on the pyre the dearest of his soul, who hath washed the urn with the bitterest tears of grief — let him say if his heart hath ever formed the wish that it had never shrined within it him whom he now deplores. Let him say if the pleasures of the sweet communion of his former days doth not still live in his remembrance. If he love not to recall the image of the departed, the tones of his voice, the words of his discourse, the deeds of his kindness, the amiable virtues of his life. If, while he weeps the loss of his friend, he smiles not to think that he once possessed him. He who knows not friendship, knows not the purest pleasure of earth. Yet if fate deprive us of it, though we grieve, we do not sink; Philosophy is still at hand, and she upholds us with fortitude. And think, my sons, perhaps in the very evil we dread, there is a good; perhaps the very uncertainty of the tenure gives it value in our eyes; perhaps all our pleasures take their zest from the known possibility of their interruption. What were the glories of the sun, if we knew not the gloom of darkness? What the refreshing breezes of morning and evening, if we felt not the fervors of noon? Should we value the lovely-flower, if it bloomed eternally; or the luscious fruit, if it hung always on the bough? Are not the smiles of the heavens more beautiful in contrast with their frowns, and the delights of the seasons more grateful from their vicissitudes? Let us then be slow to blame nature, for perhaps in her apparent errors there is hidden a wisdom. Let us not quarrel with fate, for perhaps in our evils lie the seeds of our good. Were our body never subject to sickness, we might be insensible to the joy of health. Were our life eternal, our tranquillity might sink into inaction. Were our friendship not threatened with interruption, it might want much of its tenderness. This, then, my sons, is our duty, for this is our interest and our happiness; to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortitude. To walk, in short, through life innocently and tranquilly; and to look on death as its gentle termination, which it becomes us to meet with ready minds, neither regretting the past, nor anxious for the future.”

Note: As per earlier commentary on Wright by me and others here on the forum, it is questionable whether it is necessary to go down the road of arguing philosophically that the "good would not exist but for the bad." However as a practical argument to focus the mind that we have to make choices and set our own attitudes, and that we might not understand the pleasure so well without the experience of pain, I think this argument in Chapter 10 works extremely well.

Here's more commentary on what I perceive to be one of the larger problems this discussion brings up. I'm not criticizing Camus, because I don't know that he himself took these positions. But this is based on what I would expect the word "Absurdism" to convey to the average man-on-the-street in 2024 English.

The meaning I get from the term "absurdism" is:

"When I look at the world I see horror and injustice and sadness all around, sprinkled with a few dots of pleasure that are ridiculously insignificant in comparison with the pain. I don't think it's worth worrying about whether I can explore nature and understand the way the world works so as to reduce the pain and increase the pleasure. The horror and sadness are so overwhelming that there is no alternative but wall it off from my mind and paper over the wall with an attitude of considering everything to be "Absurd." That way I don't have to think about taking responsibility for my role in the problem, or for the fact that it is *my* assessment that the world is such a horrible place. I will just occupy my mind with thinking how useless and absurd the universe is and how insignificant I am and just do the best I can to survive."

If I were to rewrite that from what I would expect Epicurus to say, it would be something like:

"When I look at the world I see both terrible and beautiful things. I also see Nature as the originator of everything, and I see that nature has no intention to create things that I think are horrible. I see that Nature works through regular and understandable means, and that tells me that I can work *with* nature to increase the number of things that I see that are pleasing, and to reduce the number of things that I find to be sad. I do that because I see that the pleasing things in life are far more significant and important to me than the painful things, and I see that I can have an effect upon my world and that I have a limited time within which to experience and increase pleasure and minimize those parts that painful. The pleasure I get from the pleasing aspects of life so far outweighs the painful that I am more than happy to choose the painful, at time, so that my overall life contains more pleasure. I will therefore explore nature and work to understand the way the world works so as to reduce the pain and increase the pleasure that I find in it. The last thing I will do is close my mind to facts and laugh at the seriousness of my desire to obtain pleasure or eliminate pain. And since nature is what it is, and I have the power to assess it pleasurably, even though some who call themselves "absurdists" assess it negatively, I will take responsibility for seeing that so long as I am alive and can experience life with more pleasure than pain, then I will see life as pleasurable to me, and do everything I can to stay alive to enjoy it as long as I can. I will do the best I can, not resigning that I have no hope to succeed, but confident that I do have the free will and ability to live happily even though I know I will encounter pain along the way. And I will hold in contempt those who are so "otherworldly" minded that they rebel against the way things are and label it "absurd."

Just to be clear despite my initial negative remarks I do think this thread will be very helpful. It sounds like the questions everyone is asking are very logical and exploring this will lead to identification of why Camus (and maybe Nietzsche too) seemed to drift "away" from Epicurus. So far in my book this issue stems from seeing Epicurus as "sad" and "retreating" (which i would argue is extremely mistaken) and is at the core of many problems.

Both Camus and Nietzsche seem to have some very good points, but my current speculation would be that when they ran into the "absence of pain" problem, rather than rejecting the orthodox academic interpretation of Epicurus, they dropped Epicurus hlmself. They should have embraced the interpretation preserved through Torquatus that life in the "absence of pain" IS pleasurable -- and that this position is logical, straightforward, and without any hint of irony or sarcasm or logical double-dealing or word-gaming.

Rather than interpret Epicurus sympathetically, they decided that Epicurus was essentially a deeply sad and fragile "snowflake" (need another synonym there to avoid the current political overtones of that word) who adopted as his primary goal in life that of walling himself up in a garden so as to flee from every drop of pain. That's the problem interpretation we are regularly running into, and for Epicurus to be seen as life-affirming and happy and positive, that interpretation has to be combated and exposed as erroneous.