Posts by Cassius

In addition I think we still have a lot more to clarify about what "a prolepsis" is. When we say "a prolepsis of ______" something , that something is coming out in our description as a conception, and I don't think that is right.

Prolepsis should lead to formation of concepts but not be concepts themselves, just like eyes never tell us what a thing is, but only give us raw data about color and brightness and sharpness and the like. Possibly even the eyes don't tell us "boundaries" either, of where one "thing" stops and another starts. Maybe "thing" is itself an opinion of the mind after our mind assembles the data from the senses.

On the nature of "things" might itself have multiple meanings.

Quote from Twentier

Let's use the example of "demons" (as a class).

Well, "demons as a class" already sounds like a conceptual construct to me. Blessedness (pleasure) and Imperishability (life) seem to me things that are much more on a level of "sensation." "Gods" would be the conceptual embodiment of those characteristics (blessedness and life/imperishability) in perfected form. "Demons" i guess could be considered conceptual construction like "gods," but I don't think once you start talking about "demons" you are still talking about something that can be a true opinion generated by a prolepsis, just like the existence of centaurs would not be a true opinion, even though they can be generated by "images."

Quote from Twentier

I have experienced a prolepsis of a being "with a permanent lack of pleasure" and I assign to that prolepsis the word "demon", as a class of perfectly-pleasureless beings?

So I think I would first have to unpack that sentence in the same way. "Prolepsis" seems to me to be focusing on "arrangements" but to assign to a particular arrangement a label "a living person who permanently lacks pleasure" probably goes into "false opinion."

Once again I think these are great questions, and I am sure that my answers can be improved. I think these questions do have good answers, I am just not at all sure mine so far are the best that can be given.

Quote from Twentier

How do I know that "the gods" in "dreams" are more real than centaurs and cyclops?

That's a good approach and I bet it has several ways of responding. Both gods and centaurs are "real" from the perspective of affecting us, but gods are "more real" than centaurs if "real" is thought of as meaning that the thing has likely an ongoing physical existence capable of generating its own images on a regular basis. Here are two starting points that will need revision:

- Our observations of the physical universe tells us that "gods" are likely and possible, but that centaurs are not. In the case of gods we are talking about a wide class that could have very many forms, so long as those forms are consistent with blessedness and imperishability. In the case of "centaurs" that's an assertion of a very specific physical formation that conflicts with our long experience with both humans and horses.

- "Gods" as a class are very frequently the topic of our interest (receipt of images), but "centaurs" are very infrequently so. Repeatability / regularity is a major aspect of something being "real." Anything with an independent existence will regularly generate images of their own. Centaurs are combinations of images of men and horses which happen much less frequently.

I would be interested in Bryan 's thoughts on this. But the issue turns on the overriding question of the meaning of "real" and how we consider anything to be real.

Quote from Twentier

Similarly, Epicurus advises against romantic exploits, but stops short of explicitly prohibiting them, so long as they do not cause turmoil.

I think the last phrase there should be "does not cause more pain than pleasure" which would be the general way the analysis applies to all topics. Because although I know that not everyone interprets PD10 this way, I think it is reasonably interpreted to mean that no activity can ever be "blanketly" ruled out because there is no fate and thus no absolute certainty as to result. It seems to me its always a problem to state any rule of conduct in terms of an absolute rule, as that would override the physics and the fact that nature gives us only pleasure and pain as guides.

Quote from Twentier

I wonder, like sex and politics if Epicurus would allow for a non-theistic rejection of the traditional gods if one is so inclined by their natural disposition?

Therefore (after my first comment) I would say that he would "allow" the possibility of such a position, if indeed in a particular case it does lead to a successful result, but he'd "warn against it" as going against general human experience.

Quote from Bryan

Yes, but of course just a little bit remains.

This is excellent work Bryan! I presume this is yours? Can we set up a "Demetrius Lacon" Thread or subforum to include this and the links to papyri from which you are working?

I am thinking a subforum in this section:

Ancient Epicurean Texts (300 BC to 300 AD)

Quote from Twentier

(3) Hermarkhos, Demetrios, Philodemos, and Lucretius making indications that the gods breathe and converse is not a preconception, but inductive reasoning that happens to be coherent with the preconception, and (4) the actual gods don't really exist except as concepts in our minds.

I think Point 3 is correct and applies to Epicurus as well. Preconceptions are never the same as inductive reasoning, and I would say "statements of fact" are always better termed "conceptions," as "statements of fact" are never the same as preconceptions. "Opinions" is another good word, as Epicurus apparently said (Diogenes Laertius?) that opinions can be true or false, but unfortunately today the word "opinion" is firmly understood to imply that the opinion is "not true," so in most cases clarity will require some other word.

As to point 4 I would say the problem is the meaning of the term "the actual gods." If someone insists that the term "actual gods" must include Yahweh, Allah, Zeus, Thor, or whoever, then yes I would say the statement "actual gods do not exist except as concepts in our mind" is true, because *those gods* do not exist as independently real beings with bodies and locations and so forth.

However the term "actual gods" by no means requires accepting that Yahweh and the rest are included within that term. Therefore I would submit the statement "the actual gods don't really exist except as concepts in our minds" as that statement would be made in common discussion and understood by 99% of people today would be seen in Epicurean terminology as false.

I would say (as I think you did later in the post) that if Epicurus were here today he would say something like the following, which is what I understand the texts to mean when read fairly. Epicurus would say "divinity" or "god" is a term that humans apply to living beings that meet a certain criteria of total blessedness and total deathlessness, and that this term is applicable to and appropriate to describe beings which our physics and understanding of nature tell us do actually exist in the universe.

The problem always comes when someone makes specific assertions about some personality like Yahweh or Zeus or any of the rest actually existing. It's also a problem to make general assertions about the class of gods that goes beyond deathlessness and blessedness, as none of those assertions have ever proven to be reliable and reproducible and worthy of belief.

Thus it appears that the Epicureans speculated about "quasi-bodies" and "quasi-blood" to acknowledge that we can reasonably believe that the class of "gods" have certain qualities that allow them to exist in the universe, but that we do not have the ability to specify the details of those qualities given our lack of information from our vantage point here on Earth.

Quote from Twentier

This brings up another point: various Epicureans have presented the argument that a Creator cannot be a god because a Creator must have been bored, or lonely, or in need of other beings prior to creation; such a state is inconsistent with blessedness.

Which is why I would expect Epicurus to have emphasized life in the universe along a "spectrum" in which there will be lots of beings lots more advanced than us which *do* create their own "worlds" (but not from nothing), with the status of "god" being reserved for those that have in fact reached the point of wanting nothing that they do not already have.

Quote from Twentier

How can a blessed quasi-animal always have existed?

I tend to think that their answer there would have been that gods "as a kind" have always existed as a part of natural processes leading to that result, but that gods as individuals have not existed forever, given that the only things that have existed without creation are matter and void. This leads down the road DeWitt mentions that the gods have to act to maintain their deathlessness. I suppose it's not inconceivable that individual gods might conclude after eons that variety really does not add to complete pleasure, and decide voluntarily to go out of existence. I wouldn't be surprised if the ancient Epicureans asked themselves that question, at the very least as part of the discussion about beings like us, who will surely die, and questioning how much in fact we necessarily lose by being mortal rather than deathless. Variety is in fact nice to us who haven't learned the lesson, but if we were to in fact experience for ourselves (through technology in the future) how it does not in fact make pleasure "more complete," then I am thinking that it would be conceivable to decide, once we were really sure that we had experienced "complete" pleasure, that nothing more is needed, and to get tired of the "more."

Quote from DeWitt Epicurus and His Philosophy Chapter 7, page 127

Plutarch, who employed part of his leisure in digging up old slurs out of the archives, wrote scornfully: "It was not because Colotes had read 'the heaven-descended Canons' that bread was perceived by him to be bread and fodder fodder." Even after the time of Plutarch the Canon seemed good to the frivolous Alciphron for a joke between two courtesans, the Epicurean Leontion and Lamia, mistress of Demetrius the Besieger: "How long will one have to put up with this philosopher? Let him keep to his books on Physics, to his Authorized Doctrines and his cock-eyed Canons.

The footnote to that last part referencing Alciphron is Ep. 2.2.2 (Loeb 4.17, p.309), where the translator uses "distorted."

That letter can be read in full here: https://archive.org/details/in.ern…ge/308/mode/2up

From the introduction to that volume of Alciphron:

INTRODUCTION

1. GENERAL

Of the prose letters that have come down to us from Greek antiquity a few, like the short letters of Epicurus, are letters in the simple sense of the word ; most are “literary efforts,” some genuine, like the amusing and informative letters of Synesius or the vapourings of Dionysius of Antioch, some forged, hke the letters attributed to Phalaris or to Socrates. ‘Forged ” 1s perhaps a dangerous word to use in some cases, the line between letters forged with intent to deceive and letters forged without such intent 1s often difficult or impossible to draw In the case of the letters in the present volume, however, there 1s no such difficulty they are forged without intent to deceive (i.e., they are “imaginary ”’), and they all illustrate, in one or way another, the workings of that “‘ Second Sophistic ” which so rarely had the art to hide its art. Some of them are genre letters suggestive of the pastoral idyll, the names of writers and of addressees being avowedly fictitious some of them purport to be written by historical characters to historical characters.

I want to get this down before I forget the list - at the moment I forget where the "cockeyed" reference comes in, but we can circle back for that. This only took me about ten minutes to put together. I am sure there are many more.

Every one one of these major positions of Epicurus can easily be ridiculed. Nevertheless, most of us who study Epicurus come to the conclusion that when we look close they actually contain much more than a "grain" of truth, from at least one very important perspective.

There's enough of this going on that we ought to consider that there is a pattern here. Especially when considered VS29, and the argumentin Gellar-Goad's article describing "the sun is the size it appears to be" as an Epicurean "shibboleth." To be an Epicurean in the ancient world apparently meant being willing to be accused of being ridiculous, so why not even today get used to it and revel in the experience?

Every one of these requires that we set aside superficial interpretations and look for the perspective that makes them true:

1. All sensations are true.
2. Gods are plainly visible to us.
3. A truly blessed and imperishable being spends a life totally unoccupied.
4. Death is nothing to us.
5. Pleasure is the highest good.
6. Pleasure is the absence of pain.
7. The complete absence of pain is not only a pleasure, but the greatest pleasure.
8. The hand in its normal condition is not only experiencing pleasure, but the greatest pleasure.
9. The host who is not in pain is in the same condition of pleasure as the thirsty guest who is given drink.
10. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than a limited life.
11. Acute pain is short, lesser pains are also short and manageable, and even longer-term pains permit a predominance of pleasure over pain.
12. The size of the sun is at it appears to be.
13. Virtue is not the same for all people at all times and all places, but it is impossible to live a happy life without living virtuously.
14. If the pleasures of a profligate could in fact bring a pleasurable life we would have no cause to blame them, because they would be achieving the goal, which is pleasure, and avoiding the evil of life, pain.
15. If any pleasure could be magnified so as to occupy and remain over time our total experience, pleasures would never differ from ne another.
16. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when pain due to want is removed, but only varied. PD18
17. Images moving through the air cause us to see ghosts which can be considered to be real and make us think about gods and dead people. (e.g. Cicero's taunt of Cassius Longinus)
18. The dreams of madmen are true.
19. It is not easy to decide how we would act if we could commit crimes without being discovered.
20. Democracy is the worst form of government (Twentier's Philodemus quote)
21. Kings are fine to live under if they bring about an end to men fearing each other. PD6
22. If we were not troubled by fear of gods and death and the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural science.

One good use of this thread would be to point out more we can add to this list.

I have an idea for a new thread, the content of which I won't post here, so as to derail this one, but which deserves discussion of its own.

Ok we can follow up on this topic in a different location so as to leave this current thread open for the images discussion:

Thread

"If You Wish To Be An Epicurean, Get Used To Being Called 'Cockeyed'" - or - "Why Vatican Saying 29 Would Make A Good Epicurean Tatoo"

I want to get this down before I forget the list - at the moment I forget where the "cockeyed" reference comes in, but we can circle back for that. This only took me about ten minutes to put together. I am sure there are many more.

Every one one of these major positions of Epicurus can easily be ridiculed. Nevertheless, most of us who study Epicurus come to the conclusion that when we look close they actually contain much more than a "grain" of truth, from at least one very important…

Cassius

July 9, 2024 at 7:57 AM

Quote from TauPhi

If every object constantly emits eidolas, what about objects that are made up with 2 atoms only? Two atoms combined already make an object and according to the theory, that object should start emitting constant flow of eidolas.

I see that as an example of something we see a lot in modern Epicurean writing - a construction of an Epicurean theory that makes no effort to view the theory in a workable way. If you and I can realize that a two-atom body would not be radiating atoms, then Epicurus would certainly have understood that too. I see no improper deference or leap of faith at all in concluding that everyone - including Epicurus - should realize that two-atom bodies (if they deserve the term bodies at all - are not going to be radiating off particles that they don't have. We don't know a lot about what Epicurus thought about images, but one thing we do know is that images are natural and therefore made of atoms just like everything else.

I don't have the specialized background to be able to take positions on particle physics and develop understandable analogies, but the basic point of the atomic theory, of which images are only a part, is that things happen through the movement of particles through void, and not "supernaturally" without that movement. And while I am perfectly happy to talk about waves and quarks and all sorts of other imaginative names, I am not going to defer to any theorists or theories which ultimately are do not take into account that "natural vs supernatural" position. Call them waves or quarks or whatever, they are "material" from any reasonable viewpoint, and that makes them consistent with Epicurus' position.

That's the base of image theory, not a hostile construction like Cicero was suggesting, which would make no sense, under the Epicurean viewpoint. As noted in my first post, the theory would *not* be that Kodak-quality images are flying through the air that we need no optical lenses or other means to perceive. The more charitable view is probably not much more than that particles from outside, retaining some degree of "arrangement" that does not require lenses focusing onto optical nerves or ears leading to eardums, produce stimulus and reaction in the particles making up the human body. There seem to me to be very logical ways that such a construction can be analogized to modern observations in ways that are productive and not any more ridiculous on their face than the atomic theory itself appeared to the anti-Epicureans 2000 years ago.

I realize that not everyone is going to want to pursue this line of thinking, just like everyone is not going to want to entertain discussion of "god." But the purpose of this forum is to provide a place for those who *do* wish to explore such possibilities in a reasonable manner.

As we proceed in this and other topics like the nature of the gods, our goal will be to allow negative commentary without discouraging or stifling those who want to make positive contributions. I know that Tau Phi speaks for a significant group here, but because I have interacted so much with him personally I also feel sure he would not want his post to be interpreted as stifling free discussion of the topic.

We will moderate the thread as we do the forum, encouraging constructive discussion of epicurean theories even where they seem outdated, Unfortunately, others will read this who have no way of knowing that Tau Phi would not want productive conversation to be stifled. Therefore to be clear, everyone who reads this thread in the future should know that we will treat this topic, as we do all Epicurean positions, respectfully and reasonably. We will encourage constructive discussion of all well-documented Epicurean theories even if conventional wisdom tells us that modern orthodoxy would frown at the idea of taking Epicurus seriously.

Sounds like a very good approach to me!

I will probably re-title this and perhaps move it to physics, but we need at least one thread to discuss possible physical mechanism by which Epicurus' theory of images is treated as possibly containing at least a grain of truth and possibly much more.

I may also rewrite this first post over time, because I was rushing when I first posted it. Primary issues to discus would include:

(1) Analogies for how the brain might be affected by external sources not coming through the eyes or the five senses, which I think would include research on how the brain can be impacted by radiation (including cell phones, and similar issues discussed here: https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3425/14/4/308

(2) Analogous physical principles now known to us by which a received (even with no power) can react to external stimulus, such as passive RFID devices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chipless_RFID

(3) Exploring just what is reliably asserted about prolepsis / images and what is not, such as our recent discussions that prolepsis would not be the receipt of fully-formed ideas, but something less than that. We know for example that Cicero was joking/picking at Cassius alleging that Epicureans might say that he (Cicero) was thinking of Cassius because of an image of Cassius floating through the air, but that might be a reduction ad absurdem and might well go significantly beyond what Epicurus actually asserted. Presumably Epicurus did not think that fully-formed "conceptual pictures" (like the conceptual picture of Cicero) floated through the air to be interpreted by the mind directly as an image of Cicero, but something less than that, just like the eyes transmit something that in our MINDS we conclude indicates Cicero, not because the eyes "tell" us it is Cicero.

Happy Birthday to Twentier! Learn more about Twentier and say happy birthday on Twentier's timeline: Twentier

Given my own personal background, I tend to imagine gods looking like their appearance in Greek or Roman statues, perhaps updated to fit the science fiction depictions of superior beings that I've also been exposed to over the years. Various "Star Trek" episodes tend to come to mind in my case, particularly "Errand of Mercy" which seems almost as if it was written to address this question. In that episode the god-like examples were portrayed as old men, however, and I don't necessarily see the "old" part as appropriate. (This picture will refresh the memory of those who have seen it.)

To keep it consistent with the views that the Epicureans talked about, I would see a group of beings like that living with absolutely no burdensome work to perform, but still active in an Olympus-like environment, dealing with each other absolutely happily and with no conflicts, and never growing older or subject to disease or death.

I agree with Twentier's first post that as a practical matter it would take a path of technological progression to reach that stage, and that most of the way along that path there would be "work" involved to maintain the machinery to keep the environment safe. And if there is an indeed an issue that the gods are deathless but have not been eternally immortal, then there would be some kind of activity that they are involved in which would maintain them in their state of happiness and security, even though they would not consider that maintenance to be "work."

But in imagining gods of any appearance whatsoever, the core requirement is to see them as totally blessed and imperishable so that they are in no way interested in our human activities, so it's hard to imagine what kind of activities they would find most fruitful to them. So long as that core requirement is maintained, I would expect that we're right in the middle of one of those exercises where "multiple possibilities" have to be entertained, meaning that we have to be satisfied thinking of options but not choosing only one as the only possible godlike way to spend your time. It's easy to understand the point that each person or being is going to have their own history of exposures to different people and depictions and that they will develop their own mental pictures of such beings.

The difference in mental depictions however does not mean that real beings that fit the general descriptions don't actually exist. I have in my mind right now a picture of an average Englishman or average German or average Russian, and just because my mental depictions don't exactly match what I would see if I actually went to England or Germany or Russia, that discrepancy does not mean that Englishmen and Germans and Russians don't actually exist.

The exercise involved in thinking about how such an existence might operate is probably the most beneficial aspect of the exercise, as a means of seeing how we might incrementally adjust our own experience to come as close to that "superior" way of life as we possibly can. It's a way of visually thinking about the question: "How might I reorganize my life to live better given my own circumstances."

Twentiers thread on this is here:

Thread

Give Us an Example of God!

How do you anticipate the gods that are compatible with Epicurean theology?

• I personally imagine a sort of transhumanist depiction of the gods: behold! Human evolution has become re-directed through intentional engineering of bio-mechanical extensions that have cured disease and prevented aging. We live in space stations that are removed from solar radiation and rely upon self-reliant forms of power for energy. Our location in space is deep enough that the expansion of space will forever thicken

…

Eikadistes

July 7, 2024 at 7:29 PM

Yep, it seems likely that flowing water triggers the immediate action. By why is the reaction "build a dam" rather than "run away" like most other animals would do when "triggered" by something with which it is not familiar? It seems to me the deeper we look the more certain it is going to be that a significant amount of this is "instinct." Would a baby spider separated from its kind never build a web? I would think it would -- maybe not as good a web, but still a web.

I would find it helpful to pin down Richard Dawkins' views on this, since I generally consider him to be a source of credible and well thought out positions:

The Extended Phenotype - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Dawkins proposes there are three forms of extended phenotype. The first is the capacity of animals to modify their environment using architectural constructions, for which Dawkins provides as examples caddis houses and beaver dams.

Edit: I've never heard of a "caddis house."

Caddisflies are best known for the portable cases created by their larvae. About thirty families of caddisfly, members of the suborder Integripalpia, adopt this stratagem. These larvae eat detritus, largely decaying vegetable material, and the dead leaf fragments on which they feed tend to accumulate in hollows, in slow-moving sections of streams and behind stones and tree roots. The cases provide protection to the larvae as they make their way between these resources.^[25]

The case is a tubular structure made of silk, secreted from salivary glands near the mouth of the larva, and is started soon after the egg hatches. Various reinforcements may be incorporated into its structure, the nature of the materials and design depending on the larva's genetic makeup; this means that caddisfly larvae can be recognised by their cases down to family, and even genus level. The materials used include grains of sand, larger fragments of rock, bark, sticks, leaves, seeds and mollusc shells. These are neatly arranged and stuck onto the outer surface of the silken tube. As the larva grows, more material is added at the front, and the larva can turn round in the tube and trim the rear end so that it does not drag along the substrate.^[25]

Caddisfly cases are open at both ends, the larvae drawing oxygenated water through the posterior end, over their gills, and pumping it out of the wider, anterior end. The larvae move around inside the tubes and this helps maintain the water current; the lower the oxygen content of the water, the more active the larvae need to be. This mechanism enable caddisfly larvae to live in waters too low in oxygen content to support stonefly and mayfly larvae.^[22]

I see references to someone named Lars Wilson studying this, but the references look questionable:

Running water is sound of spring for beavers | Juneau Empire - Alaska's Capital City Online Newspaper

And this one is not in English:

Observations and Experiments on the Ethology of the European Beaver "(castor Fiber L)"

books.google.com

The University of Chicago article ends as written below, and its overall tone and content appears to me to reinforce the position of something like: "Beavers *are* born with innate dispositions to build dams, but the more exposure they have to their groups while growing up the better they build."

At this moment I would say that of the three cites above, the University of Chicago article appears most persuasive, while the other two articles are more "fluffy." However even the University of Chicago article is more of a "history of science" approach than a "this is what was found in laboratory tests under controlled conditions" approach. It would be highly desirable to find instances of the latter.

The Contemporary Resolution:

Three basic positions have been taken on animal instinct. From Descartes through the early work of Lorenz, instincts were understood to be constituted by chains of reflexes that respond to certain environmental releasers. James Watson, B. F. Skinner, Z. Y. Kuo, and other behaviorists in the first part of the twentieth century rather attempted to account for apparently fixed patterns of behavior by appeals to subtle modes of conditioning. The later Lorenz and evolutionary biologists like Ernst Mayr (1904–2005) established the third and most recent conception of instinct, one that recognized the role of genetically determined, species-specific information as well as the environmental conditions required for the implementation of the information. Mayr epitomized this recognition in his proposal that two kinds of programs governed animal behavior, a more closed program and a more open program (Mayr 1974). Closed programs were those in which the releasing mechanisms were controlled by the genome of the species, such as mate recognition and display in many animals. For instance, fertile female Drosophila of one species, if reared in isolation and placed among males of several species that displayed to her, would unerringly receive only the male of her own species. However, freshly hatched graylag goose chicks would follow any object of the right size, if exposed to the moving object (e.g., Lorenz’s head while swimming) during a critical period in the young gosling’s life. The chicks rapidly learned the stimulus that released the fixed behavior of following. In some species of bird, a chick raised with chicks of a different species would imprint on the foster species and attempt to mate with its members. These cases of imprinting represent a more open program. The mechanisms of instinct, therefore, differ depending on the species of animal and the relative open or closed character of the program. Most behavior biologists today recognize these different instances of instinctual modes of behavior and have thus revitalized the instinct concept.

Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018, Jennifer Vonk and Todd Shackelford
Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior
10.1007/978-3-319-47829-6_1064-1

Instinct
Robert J. Richards
Departments of History, Philosophy, and Psychology, The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA