Posts by Cassius

Yep now we are getting to the reasons why this needs to be discussed.

Quote from Don

. Once your start down pain and pleasure "units" - dolors and hedons - you've left Epicurean philosophy and are talking Utilitarian philosophy. Which is one reason I'm reluctant to wholeheartedly endorse Godfrey 's location, intensity, duration formulation.

I think you're correctly connecting the issues, and I don't like "the greatest good for the greatest number," but I am not ready to throw out efforts to quantify pleasure as inherently inappropriate. Yes that seems to be with what the Benthamites were struggling with, but i don't know enough of their texts to say whether they got it wrong or not.

This issue of choosing among pleasures has to be articulated in some way other than saying "more pleasant" or "less pleasant" if we are to communicate to people what we are talking about. Because I can't conceive that anyone would say that "all pleasures are equal in every respect." If they are not equal in *every* respect, then do we not need to explore and articulate the differences?

Quote from Don

Regardless of the possible bread and water interpretation, I think this *is* what Epicurus taught. Know - at a gut level - what you absolutely need to live a self-sufficient, pleasurable life of well-being. Then you *know* if everything else was tragically taken from you, IF all other sources of (kinetic) pleasure were removed from you, you would still be able to lead a life of pleasure without pain on that. BUT he also taught to ENJOY the varieties of pleasure available to us here and now.

I think this is where France Wright was correct in framing the argument between Zeno and Epicurus, and Cicero was showing his intelligence by picking out the same issue: the question is "Does Epicurean philosophy leave the door wide open to *whatever* interpretation of pleasure one desires to make?"

Would indeed Epicurean philosophy have nothing to say between Lucretius at a young age (1) deciding to spend his life shepherding sheep on a hillside vs (2) deciding to become an epic poet and spending his life composing "On The Nature of Things?"

We can pose the question pretty easily: Lucretius as a lifelong shepherd living without pain would be at the exact same height of pleasure as Lucretius the Epic Poet living without pain. We can say that easily because our definitions of the hypothetical make them both "without pain" and therefore "at the height of pleasure."

What in Epicurean philosophy provides the guidance to the young Lucretius to tell him to pursue the life of the epic poet vs the life of the shepherd.

(I have nothing against shepherds -- just using them as a convenient paradigm example.)

I would say that even if we say that both lives are "without pain" and therefore the height of pleasure, we could say that one choice or the other would be "more pleasurable" in the specific case of Lucretius. If we can say that, we ought to be able to explain how, and why that choice would be appropriate for him, even though any pains involved in the life of an epic poet would be quite different from the pains confronting a shepherd.

If we simply say 'one option is more pleasurable and you simply have to figure it out for yourself" - that might be a viable answer. I am asking "Is that the best we can do to explain the choice?"

My opening post was far too wordy but that quick take makes it easier to focus. My comments in red:

Here's my quick take:

1. Pleasure feels good. That's what makes it pleasure and not pain. Comment:  No controversy there.
2. Choiceworthiness is determined by consequences, both to oneself and how one is perceived by one's community and friends. Comment:  Not much controversy there, though I would say that "how one is perceived by one's community and friends" ultimately resolves to being significant because it will lead to a consequence to oneself.
3. "Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether a pleasure might bring some disturbance." Yes. Comment: This is where I think more explanation is required, and my question may not be worded in an optimum way. The "some" was intended to be a reference to measure. The question might be better stated as "Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether choosing one pleasure might produce one unit of pain, while another pleasure might produce zero units of pain?" The real point of the question is whether "any amount of pain" is sufficient to make one choose one pleasure over another, or whether you have to quantify BOTH the amount of pleasure and the amount of pain in order to make a decision.
4. "Can one pleasure be so much more pleasing than another that it is worth choosing?" That's just another way of asking "What are the consequences of this pleasure vs that pleasure?" Comment: Yes I agree that's another way of asking the same question, the answer which I think is "Yes." Agreed?
5. I continue to soapbox that we can have more confidence in accessing some pleasures than others (the infamous katastematic vs "kinetic" discussion). Comment: In this context I will say that "availability of access" is probably not a key factor in dealing with this issue. Yes accessing some pleasures will be easier (involve less pain) than others. But I don't think "involving less pain to access" is the full answer to the question of which pleasures to pursue. If it were, then the rest of the discussion would be resolved in favor of a rule that "Pursue first and foremost those pleasures which are easiest to access" and that would be fairly interpretable, standing alone, as "live in a cave on bread and water."

How about short classic Epicurean phrases:

Death is nothing to us.

Nothing comes from nothing or goes to nothing (or some version of that)

and other similar short sentences as a start in both Latin and Greek

Quote from Joshua

The Gettysburg Address for example is rather well known, and if you already know the words you can work out the Greek letters without much trouble.

That seems like a VERY good idea. Take a passage you know by heart and express it in Greek lettering.

What about word order in Greek? Do we have the same issues of order and use of inflection that we have in Latin? Did the Greeks write long sentences and intentionally make you wait to the end of the sentence to find out what it is about like the Romans did?

A new participant in the forum posted a graphic today that reminds us of that the word "Ataraxia" is associated with Epicurus. We've discussed that word from many perspectives, but I would like to further the discussion:

Let's resolve to be as obstinate as Torquatus was, and let's say that "absence of pain" *IS* "pleasure." If all absence of pain is pleasure, then the number and types of experiences of human life that fall within the term pleasure are dramatically expanded. That perspective would imply that *every* experience of human life that is not painful is pleasurable. No middle ground; no neutral; no third position. Let's take that perspective as agreed for the moment and consider two examples Torquatus gave.

The hand in its normal condition and not feeling any pain is not only in a state of pleasure, but in the greatest pleasure. What do we presume about this "normal conditon?" Does not the "normal condition" of the hand include not only those hands that are motionless, but also hands being in regular use doing the things hands normally do, from drumming fingernails on a desktop to holding things and squeezing things and on and on and on? I would say that the hand can and does innumerable things in its normal pain-free condition. If so, then the hand is at the height of pleasure whether motionless or whether being massaged by a professional masseuse. In each case the hand is at the height of pleasure. Does that mean it is no concern to me whether the hand is motionless, or is being massaged by a masseuse? Should the hand (if it could think) be equally satisfied in either case and take no notice of the difference?

Another example from Torquatus is this one: A host at a party is pouring wine for a thirsty guest who is drinking it. Both are stipulated to have no pain: the host because he had no pain to begin with, and the guest because his only pain (thirst) is alleviated by the drinking. Both therefore have no pain, and are therefore considered to be at the height of pleasure. Does that mean that it should be of no concern whether we are the host or the guest? Should we view both the experience of pouring and the experience of drinking as exactly the same and never express a preference between the two?

I think Epicurus might answer those questions in this way:

"First of all, both the motionless hand and the massaged hand, and both the pouring host and the drinking guest, are at the height of pleasure because we have stated that they have no pain in their experience. Someone whose life is "full" of pleasure cannot have his quantity of pleasure experienced, because he is already full. But of course the two sets of experiences are not the same in every respect. Only a dolt would say that being massaged is the same as being motionless, or that pouring wine is the same experience as drinking it. I am not a dolt, and you are not a dolt, and you should not think that I am saying that all ways of experiencing pleasure, or "absence of pain," are the same and equally to be chosen. Some experiences of pleasure are to be chosen over other experiences of pleasure, and some ways of experiencing absence of pain are to be preferred over other ways of experiencing absence of pain. No person's life is identical to another person's experience, and you have to decide which way to pursue the goal of absence of pain for yourself. As I told Menoeceus, the wise man chooses not the pleasure that is the longest but that which is most pleasant, and by that you should understand that I know the difference between drinking water and drinking wine - and you should too!"

Would you agree with what I am suggesting Epicurus would say?

After thinking about that, let me ask the question Eoghan asked about "absence pain" in another recent thread. Consider how you would articulate an answer to someone who asks you this question:

"You have said Ataraxia is desirable. Is all Ataraxia the same?" How should I consider any differences in the experience of ataraxia in determining how I am going to live my life? Does the pleasantness of my experiences while I am not disturbed have anything to do with it? Am I supposed to consider the location, duration, and intensity of pleasures, or are all pleasures of equal significance to me so long as I am not disturbed?

How would you articulate the answer to that question to someone?

I think we have made a lot of progress in seeing how "absence of pain" *is* pleasure. Now we need to go back and integrate whether all pleasures are identical, or some are to be chosen over others, and how. Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether a pleasure might bring some disturbance, or can one pleasure be so much more pleasing than another that it is worth choosing, even if choosing that greater pleasure brings some degree of disturbance?

Good to hear from you Shahab and hope you are staying safe.

Your interpretation of Strauss reflects my own understanding. Maybe Strauss was so used to looking for hidden meanings in Plato that he couldn't accept a straightforward meaning of pleasure as pleasure in Epicurus.

Or maybe he was just on Plato's side like Cicero was, and he wanted to make Epicurus incomprehensible. Either way, it's a sad situation but one we have to get past.

For example, right after I closed the thread, Eoghan sent me this:

"My only real hesitancy with mindfulness et al is that it seems it falls into the same trap as modern Stoicism does, which is to say it takes one small part of a larger system. (mindfulness for Buddhism - Ethical living/virtue as the sole good for Stoicism). A lot of Buddhists I know would say that the point of meditation ultimately is to obtain the right view which is to understand the 4 part cure, 8 fold path, Samsara etc... But if it is having discernible benefit for you (helping you live pleasurably) then I think it's good but be very careful as these techniques are hard to separate from their tradition."

I suspect a lot of us have thoughts like that, while others who are more into mediation will feel a lot stronger in support of it. Before we open up that public discussion let me talk to the moderators about it.

Edit:

I also want to comment on this that Eoghan said: "But if it is having discernible benefit for you (helping you live pleasurably) then I think it's good but be very careful as these techniques are hard to separate from their tradition." That's stated well, but it's worth making clear that it would not be sufficient just to consider "meditation" to be a pleasure, because as we all know it is Epicureanism 101 that not all pleasures are to be chosen, and some are to be avoided when they bring more pain than pleasure. Prudence tells us to look into what to expect "all" the ramifications to be, and that's what needs discussion before a section on "meditation" becomes a significant part of this forum.

Now that this thread has come to life again I reviewed it from the beginning and decided to change the title to "Meditation and Epicurean Philosophy (?)."

To my recollection we have never held a close discussion of what "meditation" really means. By raising the point I realize that bringing it up will seem to be an invitation to go there, and I am not even sure that is desirable consistent with our forum goals. One of the main reasons for the existence of this forum is to resist any effort at amalgamation of teachings from schools which have highly different views of the universe and of the goal of life, and a thread which becomes an advertisement for "the benefits of Buddhist meditation" or "the benefits of Stoic mindfulness" is going to skirt close to something that needs to be conducted elsewhere. On the other hand, "the hazards of Buddhist meditation" or "the hazards of Stoic mindfulness" would be more obviously consistent with the purposes of the forum.

As per the Wikipedia page on meditation:

Difficulties in defining meditation

No universally accepted definition

Meditation has proven difficult to define as it covers a wide range of dissimilar practices in different traditions. In popular usage, the word "meditation" and the phrase "meditative practice" are often used imprecisely to designate practices found across many cultures.[19][20] These can include almost anything that is claimed to train the attention of mind or to teach calmness or compassion.[21] There remains no definition of necessary and sufficient criteria for meditation that has achieved universal or widespread acceptance within the modern scientific community. In 1971, Claudio Naranjo noted that "The word 'meditation' has been used to designate a variety of practices that differ enough from one another so that we may find trouble defining what meditation is."[22]: 6 A 2009 study noted a "persistent lack of consensus in the literature" and a "seeming intractability of defining meditation".[23]

Separation of technique from tradition[edit]

Some of the difficulty in precisely defining meditation has been in recognizing the particularities of the many various traditions;[24] and theories and practice can differ within a tradition.[25] Taylor noted that even within a faith such as "Hindu" or "Buddhist", schools and individual teachers may teach distinct types of meditation.[26]: 2 Ornstein noted that "Most techniques of meditation do not exist as solitary practices but are only artificially separable from an entire system of practice and belief."[27]: 143 For instance, while monks meditate as part of their everyday lives, they also engage in the codified rules and live together in monasteries in specific cultural settings that go along with their meditative practices.

I think for the moment I am going to close this thread and refer the issue to a moderator discussion before we proceed further. I feel confident from past experience that some of our core people find mediation of a type helpful (Matt, who started the thread, being a good example.) But we one of the purposes of this forum is to provide direction for people who are new to Epicurus, and we need to first identify to what extent certain variations on "meditation" can be harmful from an Epicurean perspective.

I'll set something up on that and eventually this thread will likely be re-opened, but we at least need a reference somewhere that covers basics on:

1. The hazards of certain types of mediation,
2. What types of meditation might be consistent with Epicurean philosophy, and
3. What references if any in the Epicurean texts indicate endorsement of any type of meditation.

I am slow to the Greek game but I am thinking we will probably split out these last comments / hints into a "Can We Persuade Don To Make A "Greek For Beginner's" Presentation?"

My own small contribution is that I just finally discovered if I did a screen shot of a Greek term I could upload it to Google Images and it will provide a translation. This is hugely useful to me because I am regularly cutting and pasting from PDFs of books that have Greek words, but for some reason my PDF program does not pick up the Greek letters and turns it into gibberish. And looking for a Greek keyboard to retype them is very difficult when you're not familiar with the letters. What I've just discovered is that the link below will take an image of the Greek lettering and turn it into Greek text for you.

Welcome to Episode 202 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week we continue in Section X, moving past the first passage to the next main thought:

X .....

What no one ever called pleasure, he calls so; he rolls two things into one. This active form of pleasure (for thus he describes these sweet and sugared pleasures, so to call them) he sometimes so refines away, that you think Manius Curius is the speaker, while he sometimes so extols it, that he declares himself to be without even an idea of what good is over and above this. When we get to this kind of language, it should be put down, not by some philosopher, but by the censor, for its fault is not a matter of; language only but of morality as well. He finds nothing to blame in sybaritism, if only it be free from unbounded passion and fear.

Quote from Raphael Raul

I am an artist and create, at times, philosophical art posters.

I'll post one on the site relevant to our times with an Epicurean thought.

Looking forward to it!

Ha and now I get to disagree with Pacatus for sure

Yes I agree that Haris' book is good and I recommend it. Haris and I have been on friendly terms for years but I regret not nearly as closely as we should have. I think Haris' viewpoint is largely consistent with what people will read here on this forum from the majority.

As to my older books I really need to pull them from circulation they are so old and in need of updating. At the time I was working with them I was in a pure "compilation" mode and I was mainly experimenting with being sure that the texts i thought were important were easily available in free format. That's now no longer an issue and I really should revise them, but for now I need to prioritize my time and the podcast and our discussions here seem more important in superceding those old epubs.

Thanks for the kind words and I do think we need to expand the reading list. But at least now we can say to those who read Emily Wilson and DeWitt - "Read the forum for further ideas."

I didn't see Godfrey's post 28 before posting my 29. I think our posts are consistent. A variety of mental models are helpful for unwinding the different perspectives.

Quote from Godfrey

Because of the innumerable locations and potentially overlapping durations, pleasure is, most likely, always "mixed" overall (unless you're a god...).

That's what I have described as the "whole person" perspective -- there are lots of things going on at one time in separate parts of experience, and the end result of looking at them in total is "mixed." But the individual components are like oil and water, they can be stirred together into a mix but they don't merge into something new.

Quote from Pacatus

Pleasure and pain are like opposite ends of a rope on a pulley: as one goes up, the other goes down. There is no neutral state.

Every analogy has its issues but yes I like that too, especially if you can fix your attention on the ropes hanging parallel with each other and not worry about the point at which the rope is at the very "top" of the pulley and going neither up nor down.

Just like the analogies with the balance scales, where the sides are exactly balanced and you have to deal with how to label the pointer (or the balance) being precisely even.

This is where I think you have to go back to being clear about your perspective. From the "whole person" perspective I would say that discrete pains and pleasures can "balance each other out" where it's hard to say which of the two is greater. But from the perspective of placing weights representing pleasure on one side, and weights representing pain on the other, you're always measuring discrete feelings.

The pointer of the dial may indicate dead zero in sum, but what you're measuring is always an accumulation of (1) discrete feelings of pleasure against (2) discrete feelings of pain, and you're never placing on the scale "neithers" or "something else" or "neutrals" or "mixeds."

Quote from Pacatus

The niggling concern I would have with stopping there, though, is that without the kind of “fleshing out” in Don ’s post #21 (which I’ve also bookmarked), especially the part I quote below, your post #16 could almost have been written by an Aristippian Cyrenaic* (even with your opening point that “tranquility and ataraxia are fully contained within the word pleasure, but ‘pleasure’ is not fully contained within tranquility or ataraxia”). Unless I glossed over something in my reading (not enough coffee yet ) …

I think what you're observing there is the issue of how context affects the presentation of detailed issues. I perceive Eoghan's post as referring more to "non-specialists in 2023 who speak English who want to get started understanding what Epicurus stands for." In that context I would say you want to explain the differing aspects of "Pleasure" as fully as possible in understandable everyday English without use of foreign or very technical words.

The context where the people you are talking to are familiar with the controversies regarding kinetic and katastematic labels, and are wondering why there is so much discussion about those terms in some quarters, is different. For them, I think you want to then move to Don's passages and explain to them how "katastematic" and "kinetic" map pretty neatly onto "stimulating pleasures" and "other kinds of pleasure which don't necessarily result from stimulation."

Only the most advanced in reading are really going to be interested in the controversy as to whether these labels derive from Diogenes Laertius mapping later developments (such as Carneades) on top of Epicurus, or whether they derive from years of interactions with the Stoics, or whether Epicurus himself held those these labels to be extremely important.

What's clear from any perspective is that just as Epicurus was narrowing his definition of "Gods" to exclude supernatural implications, he was expanding his definition of "pleasure" to include not only "sex, drugs, and rock'n'roll" but "pleasures of normal daily living which derive from the mind's appreciation of the normal healthy state as something that is desirable in itself." In both cases the majority of people are using these words in a significantly different way, so explanations are necessary to avoid both innocent misunderstandings and intentional misrepresentations. (I use scare quotes just to indicate that the formulations are tentative, not that I'm quoting anyone.)

VS29. For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many. [12]

Thinking out loud about some potential rhetoric that needs to be fine-tuned but here's the thought:

Q: What's the difference between Pop Modern Epicureanism and Classical Greco-Roman Epicureanism?

A: Pop Modern Epicureans accept Cicero's argument that absence of pain (ataraxia / tranquility) is something different and higher than Pleasure, while Classical Greco-Roman Epicureans laughed in Cicero's face at the very idea.

Quote

Cicero: "...[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'"Torquatus: "Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be." ...

Cicero: Still, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?" Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible." CIcero - "On Ends" Book 2:iii:9 and 2:iii:11 (Rackham)

Quote from Don

The recent in-depth discussions of "absence of pain = pleasure" have given me a new perspective on the katastematic/kinetic "debate." The health of the body and the tranquillity of the mind *is* katastematic pleasure. The "normal" functioning of freedom from pain in body and mind that has been discussed *is* katastematic pleasure. "Absence of pain" in the mind is literally ataraxia which Epicurus gives as an example of *a* katastematic pleasure.

Yes I think this is the way things are going, and I think we are essentially in total agreement. Expressing these things is tricky and that's where we can get better with practice. For example in Kalosyni's post above as to how to describe "mixed situations" I think we have to be careful and precise, and it relates back to the discussion we had recently about how to evaluate things that are going on simultaneously, like the separate pains and pleasures of Epicurus' last day.

Part of the weight that remains to be removed from the "absence of pain" terminology is how to flip back and forth easily between seeing that you don't have to expect every ounce of pleasure from life before you can experience any pleasure, but on the other hand it is proper and helpful to talk about exactly that -- the theoretical goal IS to expel every ounce of pain, at which you would have reached the limit of pleasure.

I think that's what can be confusing about the way Cicero's Torquatus is flipping so quickly from saying "the absence of pain is pleasure" to saying " the absence of pain is in fact the HIGHEST pleasure."

At least for me, I am not yet familiar enough with the dual implications to move from one to the other and back again without confusing the issue and thinking that, "Well if I can't hit the highest pleasure without expelling every ounce of pain, then there is a "kind of pleasure" that I'll never reach, because I am afraid I am never going to be 100% successful at expelling all pain."

Apparently there is something in my thought process (not sure what yet) that makes me think that "the perfect is the enemy of the good" and that there is a tension between 100% pleasure and 99% pleasure (another title of a recent thread). Somehow the theoretical goal of 100% pleasure seems an insult to 99% pleasure, and yet I think it would make no sense at all that somehow it takes a totally different set of tools and actions to achieve 100% pleasure rather than 99% pleasure.

The Buddhist/Stoic planted implication is that the only way to reach 100% pleasure is by being an ascetic, because only by denying yourself most of the ordinary pleasures of life will you never have any disappointment or letdown, and you're infinitely better off doing so rather than living a life of 99% normal pleasurable activities. All of that is because 100% is infinitely better and more to be chosen than 99%. And I think that makes no sense and it's no way it could have been Epicurus' position.

"Absence of pain" sounds to me (maybe conditioned by religion?) like an absolutist position, and yet Torquatus and apparently the ancient Epicureans are flipping right from "anything that is not painful is pleasurable" to "and to be totally without pain is the greatest pleasure."

I think seeing how "being totally without pain is the greatest pleasure" relates to "anything that is not pain is pleasure" remains to be the subject of a lot of discussion and essays and memes and explanations to make that more clear.

And that's what reminded me to repost the "Perspectives Chart" I started working on. It needs total reworking but this issue is what is driving that -- making clear how to get comfortable with flipping between constructions that say 'the absence of pain is pleasure, and indeed the greatest pleasure." That "indeed" reflects a perspective we have to learn.

Quote from Kalosyni

I wonder if the idea of "mixed" pleasure might need some further examination because it seems that there may be pleasures which are mixed with a tinge of mental uncertainty. There are times in life when you chose pleasures in which you are uncertain what the final result will be (mental pain or a minor problem may result but you are fairly confident that you won't end up physically wounded or dead).

OK someone correct me if I am wrong but care has to be taken here: "mixed" is exactly what a feeling *never* is: a feeling is either pleasure, or it is pain. It is never "both" or "neither" or "mixed."

"Mixed" is a word that describes results which have multiple feelings, in that Epicurus' feelings were mixed on his last day - he felt some pleasure and some pain -- but in different parts of his experience. His gladness of his feelings for his friends was not mixed - it "co-existed" in his experience with other experiences which were painful.

But at the feeling level, feelings are discrete, at the total experience level, multiple feelings co-exist to produce the full level of experience that we're talking about as 100%, such as 60% pleasurable feelings and 40% painful feelings.

Quote from Kalosyni

And thought that came to me regarding "pleasure is the absence of pain" is that this is simply a guide or a tool to find moderation...rather than arbitrarily deciding "I will only eat one heaping full plate of spaghetti" then if you use the phrase "pleasure is the absence of pain" to decide to stop eating when you aren't feeling hungry anymore.

"Moderation" is never the ultimate goal either, any more than calmness is the 'ultimate' goal. Moderation in eating is a tool to find pleasure. It's pleasure that is the ultimate goal and sometimes you're going to eat more than other times. So I'd say you never set out to "Find moderation," you set out to find pleasure, through which moderation is often (not always) an appropriate tool.

It's an interesting question as to what the A to Z analogy really means. Is "foundation" and "fulfillment" what is going on when we travel from "A to Z"? Is "Z" the "fulfillment" of "A"? (I suppose if you're looking at the full string, then the full string of letters might be seen that way). Or is the analogy really firmly focused on "First to last" which is more of a "time" analogy than a "fulfillment' analogy? (And although it's familiar to us from religion, it probably doesn't deserve that taint, because it's useful apart from religion - right?)

I say all that because I suppose the issue is ultimately "How was Epicurus using it?" When we say "beginning and end" the word "end" get's confusing with "goal." But if we say "first to last" then "last" doesn't have quite the same connotation of goal, it really just means "last," like from our first breath after birth to our last breath in dying.

I think Don's post 15 is very close to where it needs to be, but I sense there is still equivocation on the issue that the single word that expresses the ultimate goal in most sweeping terms is not "Tranquility" or "Ataraxia" but "Pleasure."

(And this post is not by any means targeted at Don. We're all doing this at times, me included. Eoghan has asked for proposed responses to explanations to outsiders, and that's what we're working on improving.)

Pleasure is the global term; tranquility and ataraxia are fully contained within the word pleasure, but "pleasure" is not fully contained within tranquility or ataraxia. There are pleasures which do not involve tranqulity or calmness or any other similar term. Are those other pleasures less "worthy" than calmness?

When tranquility and ataraxia are used in a way that conveys that they, and not pleasure, are the goal, then the other pleasures are deprecated, and the issue of their status remains muddy. Epicurus was extending the definition of the word Pleasure so that it would include all agreeable feelings, including feelings such as Don is describing and that many people don't ordinarily think of as "Pleasure." If we fail to follow his lead and use the umbrella term, then we're throwing away the main tool that gets us to the point of clarifying what pursuing "pleasure" really means and how it fits into "the nature of things."

The reason this is a continuing question, and the reason that Eoghan is posing it again, is that the orthodox view is that it is wrong to say that "Pleasure" is the goal. The orthodox gatekeepers of acceptability say we should be saying "Tranquility" or "Ataraxia" or some other "acceptable" word instead. And in most cases they are not saying it because they really believe in calmness -- they're saying it because they have another agenda, and they don't want *you* to see pleasure as a legitimate goal.

I don't think these questions will ever begin to clarify in peoples' minds unless the focus remains first, last, and always on "Pleasure." We should say to heck with the nay-sayers who think that the medicine is too bitter to drink. This issue has become as muddy as it is precisely because of this equivocation that we all are tempted to make -- We all know that the Stoics and the Buddhists and the Humanists and the Virtue-crowd are the majority, and we hear in their tone of voice the same condescension and bitterness that we hear in Cicero's abhorrence at the very idea of saying that "Pleasure" is the goal of life.

We should make a clean break with that equivocation and never back down from saying clearly that "Pleasure" is the goal of life. After that, we can then explain all the many facets of what "Pleasure" means for as long and as far as we'd like to go. But the battle is going to be won or lost on keeping it clear that it is Pleasure which is the banner under which we're traveling, and the banner's not ataraxia or aponia or tranquility or any other word than "Pleasure."

When you enter a discussion looking like you're apologizing for the word Pleasure, then you look afraid and you lose the argument before it's even started.

We're "Living for Pleasure," and we're not "Living For Ataraxia" or "Living for Tranquility" or anything else - unless, that is, that we're ready to admit that joy and gladness and what everyone admits to be under the definition of Pleasure are not a legitimate part of the goal of life. Every time we indicate that Ataraxia or Tranquility is more important than Pleasure we are repudiating the definition of pleasure that Epicurus was promoting. An apt analogy is Peter swearing to Jesus that he is a disciple and then immediately turning around and denying him three times before the cock crowed.

If we don't insist on continuing to use the word "Pleasure" as the description of the goal, then we're admitting that the Ciceros of the world have won. No one really believes that there is some special transcendental state constituting "ataraxia" or "tranquilty" which is outside of pleasure and is the real goal of life. The issue is whether we are going to defend the word "Pleasure," or whether we retreat under pressure to what we think is a respectable euphemism, and admit that Cicero has won.

Torquatus didn't retreat and we shouldn't either.