Posts by Cassius

Yes, definitely -- the top jar needs to be larger, or in some way indicating that the pouring could go on forever - maybe no "top jar" at all, just a stream of liquid from a source that is off camera. As it is, you have to imagine the hand constantly moving to fill the top jar with more water, and then pouring it into the main jar.

So the graphic would have greater effect if it were an animated gif, with the liquid pouring in real time, and the excess above the rim spilling over the sides. But I don't know how to get together such an animated gif - that's a project for the future. But such a graphic would be desirable to have, because the action would continue forever as long as you look at the graphic.

Here's the part of Lucretius Book 6 that sanctions this specific allusion, connecting filling a jar with the issue of limits:

[09] For when he saw that mortals had by now attained well-nigh all things which their needs crave for subsistence, and that, as far as they could, their life was established in safety, that men abounded in power through wealth and honours and renown, and were haughty in the good name of their children, and yet not one of them for all that had at home a heart less anguished, but with torture of mind lived a fretful life without any respite, and was constrained to rage with savage complaining, he then did understand that it was the vessel itself which wrought the disease, and that by its disease all things were corrupted within, whatsoever came into it gathered from without, yea even blessings; in part because he saw that it was leaking and full of holes, so that by no means could it ever be filled; in part because he perceived that it tainted as with a foul savor all things within it, which it had taken in.

And so with his discourse of truthful words he purged the heart and set a limit to its desire and fear, and set forth what is the highest good, towards which we all strive, and pointed out the path, whereby along a narrow track we may strain on towards it in a straight course; he showed what there is of ill in the affairs of mortals everywhere, coming to being and flying abroad in diverse forms, be it by the chance or the force of nature, because nature had so brought it to pass; he showed from what gates it is meet to sally out against each ill, and he proved that ’tis in vain for the most part that the race of men set tossing in their hearts the gloomy billows of care. For even as children tremble and fear everything in blinding darkness, so we sometimes dread in the light things that are no whit more to be feared than what children shudder at in the dark and imagine will come to pass. This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature. Wherefore I will hasten the more to weave the thread of my task in my discourse.

Joshua came up with the question in the title of this thread in part because Kalosyni asked for an explanation of PD19.

One way of attacking that original question is to visualize water, symbolic of pleasure, being poured in to a jar, which symbolizes a human life.

Keep pouring pleasure into the jar for a minute, or a year, or for an infinite time, and you can never fill the jar more than full. The amount of water (pleasure) in the jar (your life) will be no greater after an infinity of time than after the first minute. The drops of water in the vase will have varied due to the continuous pouring, but the total amount of pleasure contained in the jar will never be greater despite the increase in time of pouring.

(This would make a better graphic as an animated GIF with the water continuously running and spilling over the sides of the jar, but that's beyond my ability at the moment.)

Such an illustration might work for pleasure. Does it also work for pain? I think it probably does, but my mind is not made up and we had some disagreement on that in our discussion.

Joshua brought up the question in the thread title tonight in our Twentieth Zoom, and I think it's a great question.

Whichever way one wants to answer, Yes or No, the discussion should bring greater clarity to the meaning of - PD19. "Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure."

What do you think. Would Epicurus endorse this variation of PD19, and if so how would he answer it, and with what kind of explanation?

Here are the Lacus Curtius Links to the Senecan period as recorded by Tacitus:

So both Tacitus and Cassius Dio record significant information about Seneca's personal activities. Looking for links to research these, I see that the Cassius Dio material can be found at LacusCurtius starting here. I've linked to 60 to be sure to capture the period leading up to Nero - apparently the heart of the Seneca material is in 62:

Cassius Dio — Book 60

Seneca encouraging Nero to kill Nero's mother:

12 Sabina on learning of this persuaded Nero to get p63 rid of his mother, alleging that she was plotting against him. He was incited likewise by Seneca (or so many trustworthy men have stated), whether from a desire to hush the complaint against his own name, or from his willingness to lead Nero on to a career of unholy bloodguiltiness that should bring about most speedily his destruction by gods and men alike.

Seneca leading on the false flatterers of Nero:

20 As a fitting climax to these performances, Nero himself made his appearance in the theatre, being announced under his own name by Gallio. So there stood this Caesar on the stage wearing the garb of lyre-player. This emperor uttered the words: "My lords, of your kindness give me ear," 2 and this Augustus sang to the lyre some piece called "Attis" or "The Bacchantes,"5 while many soldiers stood by and all the people that the seats would hold sat watching. Yet he had, according to report, but a slight and indistinct voice, so that he moved his whole audience to laughter and tears at once. 3 Beside him stood Burrus and Seneca, like teachers, prompting him; and they would wave their arms and togas at every utterance of his and lead others p81 to do the same.

Seneca the loan-shark:

2 An excuse for the war was found in the confiscation of the sums of money that Claudius had given to the foremost Britons; for these sums, as Decianus Catus, the procurator of the island, maintained, were to be paid back. This was one reason for the uprising; another was found in the fact that Seneca, in the hope of receiving a good rate of interest, had lent to the islanders 40,000,000 sesterces that they did not want,7 and had afterwards called in this loan all at once and had resorted to severe measures in exacting it.

The Death of Seneca, committing suicide after claiming to be ill but nevertheless leaving his entire property to the same Nero who had ordered him to die:

25 1 It would be no small task to speak of all the others that perished, but the fate of Seneca calls for a few words. It was his wish to end the life of his wife Paulina at the same time with his own, for he declared that he had taught her both to despise death and to desire to leave the world in company with him. So he opened her veins as well as his own. 2 But as he died hard, his end was hastened by the soldiers; and she was still alive when he passed away, and thus survived. He did not lay hands upon himself, however, until he had revised the book which he was writing15 and had deposited his other books with some friends, fearing that they would otherwise fall into Nero's hands and be destroyed. 3 Thus died Seneca, notwithstanding that he had on the pretext of illness abandoned the society of the emperor and had bestowed upon him his entire property, ostensibly to help to pay for the buildings he was constructing. His brothers, too, perished after him.

Seneca was extremely wealthy to have been a promoter of asceticism:

In AD 58 the senator Publius Suillius Rufus made a series of public attacks on Seneca.^[28] These attacks, reported by Tacitus and Cassius Dio,^[29] included charges that, in a mere four years of service to Nero, Seneca had acquired a vast personal fortune of three hundred million sestertii by charging high interest on loans throughout Italy and the provinces.^[30] Suillius' attacks included claims of sexual corruption, with a suggestion that Seneca had slept with Agrippina.^[31] Tacitus, though, reports that Suillius was highly prejudiced: he had been a favorite of Claudius,^[28] and had been an embezzler and informant.^[30] In response, Seneca brought a series of prosecutions for corruption against Suillius: half of his estate was confiscated and he was sent into exile.^[32] However, the attacks reflect a criticism of Seneca that was made at the time and continued through later ages.^[28] Seneca was undoubtedly extremely rich: he had properties at Baiae and Nomentum, an Alban villa, and Egyptian estates.^[28] Cassius Dio even reports that the Boudica uprising in Britannia was caused by Seneca forcing large loans on the indigenous British aristocracy in the aftermath of Claudius's conquest of Britain, and then calling them in suddenly and aggressively.^[28] Seneca was sensitive to such accusations: his De Vita Beata ("On the Happy Life") dates from around this time and includes a defense of wealth along Stoic lines, arguing that properly gaining and spending wealth is appropriate behavior for a philosopher.^[30]

It appears Seneca learned his eclecticism very early. Wikipedia has this information on Seneca's early teachers, who were of the eclectic school known as the "School of the Sextii":

School of the Sextii

The School of the Sextii was an eclectic Ancient Roman school of philosophy founded around 50 BC by Quintus Sextius the Elder and continued by his son, Sextius Niger, however it went extinct shortly after in 19 AD due to the ban on foreign cults.^[1] The school blended elements of Pythagorean, Platonic, Cynic, and Stoic philosophy together^[2] with a belief in an elusive incorporeal power pervades the body in order to emphasize asceticism, honesty, and moral training through nightly examinations of conscience as a means of achieving eudaimonia.^[3] The primary sources of information on the school are Seneca the Younger, who was taught by one of its members named Sotion, and the 5th century writer Claudianus Mamertus.^[3] Other members of the school included Papirius Fabianus, Crassicius Pasicles, Celsus.^[3] While Seneca the Younger often conflates the school with Stoicism, the Sextians were not as inclined to rigorous logical exercises or any abstruse abstract thinking, and unlike the Stoics, advocated avoidance of politics, engaging in the correspondence between words and life, and vegetarianism.^[4]

Although this book is written from a Stoic perspective, it is so representative of the dominant Stoic-infused modern view of Epicurus that we may want to review it at least briefly next on the podcast, after we complete "On The Nature of the Gods." It contains a lot of commentary on Epicurean philosophy in the form of referencing "pleasure," which we can productively use to unravel where Seneca might be accurate from the larger sections where is is probably inaccurate in his characterization of Epicurus.

I plan to make some notes as I review this and wanted to start with two explicit mentions of Epicurus. I am underlining the parts I would challenge. The quote below from from the Gutenberg edition, translated by Sir Roger L'Estrange.

In this first excerpt from Chapter XV, I submit we see illustrated a strong example of Seneca turning Epicurus into a Stoic. There are no known examples of actual Epicureans construing pleasure in real life following this ascetic model (eating only for hunger, drinking only when thirsty, seeking the end of eating and drinking as "satiety," or categorizing all non-ascetic pleasures as "an evil cause" or lumping them into terms like "sloth, gluttony, and lust." Nor would I submit that the ancient Epicureans would ever have admitted that a proper interpretation of Epicurus makes him appear to be "in womanish dress."

Quote from From Chapter XV

225 - "Happy is that man that eats only for hunger, and drinks only for thirst; that stands upon his own legs, and lives by reason, not by example; and provides for use and necessity, not for ostentation and pomp! Let us curb our appetites, encourage virtue, and rather be beholden to ourselves for riches than to Fortune, who when a man draws himself into a narrow compass, has the least mark at him. Let my bed be plain and clean, and my clothes so too: my meat without much expense, or many waiters, and neither a burden to my purse nor to my body, not to go out the same way it came in. That which is too little for luxury, is abundantly enough for nature. The end of eating and drinking is satiety; now, what matters it though one eats and drinks more, and another less, so long as the one is not a-hungry, nor the other athirst? Epicurus, who limits pleasure to nature, as the Stoics do virtue, is undoubtedly in the right; and those that cite him to authorize their voluptuousness do exceedingly mistake him, and only seek a good authority for an evil cause: for their pleasures of sloth, gluttony, and lust, have no affinity at all with his precepts or meaning. It is true, that at first sight his philosophy seems effeminate; but he that looks nearer him will find him to be a very brave man only in a womanish dress."

In this second excerpt specifically mentioning Epicurus, from Chapter XVI, the underlined par (at least as translated "the wise man will bear all injuries) sounds like an almost Jesus-like "turn the other cheek" directive. Instead, it's much more likely to be a reference to PDO4, which is not an excuse for "bearing" all injuries and doing nothing about them, but a statement that pain is short if intense, manageable if long, and always ultimately escapable if truly intolerable. Most of this is Seneca just being a normal Stoic and posturing that virtue allows someone to rise above whatever may happen to him, but his reference to Epicurus obscures what it is that Epicurus is talking about.

Quote from From Chapter XVI

Epicurus will have it, that a wise man will bear all injuries; but the Stoics will not allow those things to be injuries which Epicurus calls so. Now, betwixt these two, there is the same difference that we find betwixt two gladiators; the one receives wounds, but yet maintains his ground, the other tells the people, when he is in blood, that it is but a scratch, and will not suffer anybody to part them. An injury cannot be received, but it must be done; but it may be done and yet not received; as a man may be in the water, and not swim, but if he swims, it is presumed that he is in the water. Or if a blow or a shot be levelled at us, it may so happen that a man may miss his aim, or some accident interpose that may divert the mischief. That which is hurt is passive, and inferior to that which hurts it. But you will say, that Socrates was condemned and put to death, and so received an injury; but I answer, that the tyrants did him an injury, and yet he received none. He 236 that steals anything from me and hides it in my own house, though I have not lost it, yet he has stolen it. He that lies with his own wife, and takes her for another woman, though the woman be honest, the man is an adulterer. Suppose a man gives me a draught of poison and it proves not strong enough to kill me, his guilt is nevertheless for the disappointment. He that makes a pass at me is as much a murderer, though I put it by, as if he had struck me to the heart. It is the intention, not the effect, that makes the wickedness. He is a thief that has the will of killing and slaying, before his hand is dipt in blood; as it is sacrilege, the very intention of laying violent hands upon holy things. If a philosopher be exposed to torments, the ax over his head, his body wounded, his guts in his hands, I will allow him to groan; for virtue itself cannot divest him of the nature of a man; but if his mind stand firm, he has discharged his part. A great mind enables a man to maintain his station with honor; so that he only makes use of what he meets in his way, as a pilgrim that would fain be at his journey’s end.

Again, these are just a couple of instances where Epicurus is mentioned directly. There's a lot more to say about this book and how it contributes to making Epicurean philosophy almost unrecognizable, and how Seneca's version of Epicurus is unfortunately what prevails today.

I was reorganizing the forum dedicated to comparing Epicurus to non-Epicurean philosophers, and in doing so I assigned names of the respective major players in each group to the title of the forum. For example, I added the name Aristippus to what was formerly the "Epicurus vs Cyreniacs" forum.

When I came to "Scientism" I did not find a suitable name to associate with the term, as it seems to be a largely negative term that few people seemingly would want to identify with. However the following sections of the Wikipedia article as of today (7/20/24) contains some good information about what the controversy is about, so it seems worth memorializing it here in case it were to be for some reason unavailable later:

Scientism

Scientism is the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality.^[1][2]

While the term was defined originally to mean "methods and attitudes typical of or attributed to natural scientists", some scholars, as well as political and religious leaders, have also adopted it as a pejorative term with the meaning "an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities)".^[2][3]

Overview

Francis Bacon has been viewed by some scholars as an early proponent of scientism,^[4] but this is a modern assertion as Bacon was a devout Anglican, writing in his Essays, "a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion."^[5]

With respect to the philosophy of science, the term scientism frequently implies a critique of the more extreme expressions of logical positivism^[6][7] and has been used by social scientists such as Friedrich Hayek,^[8] philosophers of science such as Karl Popper,^[9] and philosophers such as Mary Midgley,^[10] the later Hilary Putnam,^[10][11] and Tzvetan Todorov^[12] to describe (for example) the dogmatic endorsement of scientific methods and the reduction of all knowledge to only that which is measured or confirmatory.^[13]

More generally, scientism is often interpreted as science applied "in excess". This use of the term scientism has two senses:

• The improper use of science or scientific claims.^[14] This usage applies equally in contexts where science might not apply,^[15] such as when the topic is perceived as beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, and in contexts where there is insufficient empirical evidence to justify a scientific conclusion. It includes an excessive deference to the claims of scientists or an uncritical eagerness to accept any result described as scientific. This can be a counterargument to appeals to scientific authority. It can also address attempts to apply natural science methods and claims of certainty to the social sciences, which Friedrich Hayek described in The Counter-Revolution of Science (1952) as being impossible, because those methods attempt to eliminate the "human factor", while social sciences (including his own topic of economics) mainly concern the study of human action.
• "The belief that the methods of natural science, or the categories and things recognized in natural science, form the only proper elements in any philosophical or other inquiry",^[16] or that "science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective"^[11] with a concomitant "elimination of the psychological [and spiritual] dimensions of experience".^[17][18] Tom Sorell provides this definition: "Scientism is a matter of putting too high a value on natural science in comparison with other branches of learning or culture."^[19] Philosophers such as Alexander Rosenberg have also adopted "scientism" as a name for the opinion that science is the only reliable source of knowledge.^[20]

It is also sometimes used to describe the universal applicability of the scientific method, and the opinion that empirical science constitutes the most authoritative worldview or the most valuable part of human learning, sometimes to the complete exclusion of other opinions, such as historical, philosophical, economic or cultural opinions. It has been defined as "the view that the characteristic inductive methods of the natural sciences are the only source of genuine factual knowledge and, in particular, that they alone can yield true knowledge about man and society".^[21] The term scientism is also used by historians, philosophers, and cultural critics to highlight the possible dangers of lapses towards excessive reductionism with respect to all topics of human knowledge.^{[22][23][24][25][26]}

For social theorists practising the tradition of Max Weber, such as Jürgen Habermas and Max Horkheimer, the concept of scientism relates significantly to the philosophy of positivism, but also to the cultural rationalization for modern Western civilization.^[13][27] Ernesto Sabato, physicist and essayist, wrote in his 1951 essay Hombres y engranajes ("Man and mechanism") of the "superstition of science" as the most contradictory of all superstitions,^[28] since this would be the "superstition that one should not be superstitious". He wrote: "science had become a new magic and the man in the street believed in it the more the less he understood it".^[28]

Definitions

Reviewing the references to scientism in the works of contemporary scholars in 2003, Gregory R. Peterson^[29] detected two main general themes:

• It is used to criticize a totalizing opinion of science as if it were capable of describing all reality and knowledge, or as if it were the only true method to acquire knowledge about reality and the nature of things;
• It is used, often pejoratively,^[30][31][32] to denote violations by which the theories and methods of one (scientific) discipline are applied inappropriately to another (scientific or non-scientific) discipline and its domain. An example of this second usage is to term as scientism any attempt to claim science as the only or primary source of human values (a traditional domain of ethics) or as the source of meaning and purpose (a traditional domain of religion and related worldviews).

The term scientism was popularized by F. A. Hayek, who defined it in 1942 as the "slavish imitation of the method and language of Science".^[33]

Mathematician Alexander Grothendieck, in his 1971 essay "The New Universal Church", characterized scientism as a religion-like ideology that advocates scientific reductionism, scientific authoritarianism, political technocracy and technological salvation, while denying the epistemological validity of feelings and experiences such as love, emotion, beauty and fulfillment.^[34] He predicted that "in coming years, the chief political dividing line will fall less and less among the traditional division between 'right' and 'left', but increasingly between the adherents of scientism, who advocate 'technological progress at any price', and their opponents, i.e., roughly speaking, those who regard the enhancement of life, in all its richness and variety, as being the supreme value".^[34]

E. F. Schumacher, in his A Guide for the Perplexed (1977), criticized scientism as an impoverished world view confined solely to what can be counted, measured and weighed. "The architects of the modern worldview, notably Galileo and Descartes, assumed that those things that could be weighed, measured, and counted were more true than those that could not be quantified. If it couldn't be counted, in other words, it didn't count."^[35]

In 1979, Karl Popper defined scientism as "the aping of what is widely mistaken for the method of science".^[36]

In 2003, Mikael Stenmark proposed the expression scientific expansionism as a synonym of scientism.^[37] In the Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, he wrote that, while the doctrines that are described as scientism have many possible forms and varying degrees of ambition, they share the idea that the boundaries of science (that is, typically the natural sciences) could and should be expanded so that something that has not been previously considered as a subject pertinent to science can now be understood as part of science (usually with science becoming the sole or the main arbiter regarding this area or dimension).^[37] According to Stenmark, the strongest form of scientism states that science does not have any boundaries and that all human problems and all aspects of human endeavor, with due time, will be dealt with and solved by science alone.^[37] This idea has also been termed the myth of progress.^[38]

Intellectual historian T. J. Jackson Lears argued in 2013 that there has been a recent reemergence of "nineteenth-century positivist faith that a reified 'science' has discovered (or is about to discover) all the important truths about human life. Precise measurement and rigorous calculation, in this view, are the basis for finally settling enduring metaphysical and moral controversies." Lears specifically identified Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker's work as falling in this category.^[39] Philosophers John N. Gray and Thomas Nagel have made similar criticisms against popular works by moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, atheist author Sam Harris, and writer Malcolm Gladwell.^[40][41][42]

Welcome to Episode 238 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," where the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defends the Epicurean point of view. Last week we left off right at the very end of section 19, and we will pick up there and continue into section 20.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XIX. Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must necessarily understand to be such that everything in it is made to correspond completely to some other answering part. This is called by Epicurus ἰσονομία; that is to say, an equal distribution or even disposition of things. From hence he draws this inference, that, as there is such a vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less number of immortals; and if those which perish are innumerable, those which are preserved ought also to be countless. Your sect, Balbus, frequently ask us how the Gods live, and how they pass their time? Their life is the most happy, and the most abounding with all kinds of blessings, which can be conceived. They do nothing. They are embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. They rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. They are satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasures.

XX. Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity—what can be a more uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be happy that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the world, who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of things, surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the advantage and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with a very troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to consist in a tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an exemption from all employment.

The philosopher from whom we received all our knowledge has taught us that the world was made by nature; that there was no occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though you deny the possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so easy to her, that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds. But, because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce such effects without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic poets, when you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have recourse to a Deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could view that vast and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where the mind, extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that it can find no end, no extremity to stop at. In this immensity of breadth, length, and height, a most boundless company of innumerable atoms are fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of a void space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another; and by this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which, in your opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of bellows and anvils. Thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom we must dread day and night. For who can be free from fear of a Deity who foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks all things his own; a curious, ever-busy God?

Hence first arose your Εἱμαρμένη, as you call it, your fatal necessity; so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an eternal chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this philosophy, which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes everything to fate? Then follows your μαντικὴ, in Latin called divinatio, divination; which, if we would listen to you, would plunge us into such superstition that we should fall down and worship your inspectors into sacrifices, your augurs, your soothsayers, your prophets, and your fortune-tellers.

Epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty, we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others. We pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence which is above all excellence and perfection. But I fear my zeal for this doctrine has made me too prolix. However, I could not easily leave so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though I must confess I should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long.

Happy Birthday Charles ! We've missed you - hope you are doing well!

Happy Birthday to Charles! Learn more about Charles and say happy birthday on Charles's timeline: Charles

Thank you Bryan!

And in regard to Kalosyni's

Quote from Kalosyni

Just thinking about practical applications.

I have two comments at the moment:

1 - ALL of these discussions lead to practical conclusions!

and

2 - Since you asked for it, I will raise the stakes:

- Is it not possible that Epicurus was considering his "infinity of mortals is matched by an infinity of non-mortals" (to the extent that is a satisfactory translation) as relevant to comparison of pleasures?

In other words, if all things that exist have an infinite number of counterparts, and infinity of x is the same number as an infinity of y -- does that not have relevance to consideration of "complete" or "pure" pleasure, in the sense that an infinity of the pleasure of eating watermelon is the equilvant of an infinity of being King of Persia.

PD09 relevant here perhaps?

These are quick rough thoughts that will need a lot of sharpening, but in the end I will be surprised if there is NOT an implication of the principles of infinity to the principles of pleasure.

Might this not partially explain why it would be so clear to Epicurus that "total absence of pain" equals "the highest pleasure"?

Thank you Don! That will give us a foundation for dealing with the Latin references, because just the differences between Yonge and Rackham we've seen already indicate that there's a lot of speculation going on about the implications.

The whole issue of limits and absence of limits seems fundamental to everything and carry over from physics to ethics and probably to canonics as well. I would think that Lucretius and people writing in the Latin period understood what was going on and are largely reliable, but the further away we get from people who had access to the wider set of texts the less I would trust the translations.

This is going to feed also into the differences in the way "ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeat," is viewed by Rackham as "match and counterpart," vs. Yonge's "everything in it is made to correspond completely to some other answering part."

And on the issue of whether infinity leads to an infinite number of identical things, or simply an infinite number of "like" things, we'll need to scrutinize the words referencing the concept of "like" and "unlike."

Ok this one is up. Note that we recorded this Sunday morning, before many of our recent conversations on isonomia and infinity, but I think the result is pretty current with recent postings.

Episode 237 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we explore isonomia and the implications of infinity!

OK maybe I misinterpreted your post above -- I was thinking you meant that the Epicureans did not think that there was no limit to the amount of distance you could travel in any direction.

These would be the key sections from Lucretius (Bailey Edition) supporting the conventional view that Epicurus held that the universe is limitless in size in all directions.

[951] But since I have taught that the most solid bodies of matter fly about for ever unvanquished through the ages, come now, let us unfold, whether there be a certain limit to their full sum or not; and likewise the void that we have discovered, or room or space, in which all things are carried on, let us see clearly whether it is all altogether bounded or spreads out limitless and immeasurably deep.

[958] The whole universe then is bounded in no direction of its ways; for then it would be bound to have an extreme point. Now it is seen that nothing can have an extreme point, unless there be something beyond to bound it, so that there is seen to be a spot further than which the nature of our sense cannot follow it. As it is, since we must admit that there is nothing outside the whole sum, it has not an extreme point, it lacks therefore bound and limit. Nor does it matter in which quarter of it you take your stand; so true is it that, whatever place every man takes up, he leaves the whole boundless just as much on every side.

[968] Moreover, suppose now that all space were created finite, if one were to run on to the end, to its furthest coasts, and throw a flying dart, would you have it that that dart, hurled with might and main, goes on whither it is sped and flies afar, or do you think that something can check and bar its way? For one or the other you must needs admit and choose. Yet both shut off your escape and constrain you to grant that the universe spreads out free from limit. For whether there is something to check it and bring it about that it arrives not whither it was sped, nor plants itself in the goal, or whether it fares forward, it set not forth from the end. In this way I will press on, and wherever you shall set the furthest coasts, I shall ask what then becomes of the dart. It will come to pass that nowhere can a bound be set and room for flight ever prolongs the chance of flight. Lastly, before our eyes one thing is seen to bound another; air is as a wall between the hills, and mountains between tracts of air, land bounds the sea, and again sea bounds all lands; yet the universe in truth there is nothing to limit outside.

[984] Moreover, if all the space in the whole universe were shut in on all sides, and were created with borders determined, and had been bounded, then the store of matter would have flowed together with solid weight from all sides to the bottom, nor could anything be carried on beneath the canopy of the sky, nor would there be sky at all, nor the light of the sun, since in truth all matter would lie idle piled together by sinking down from limitless time. But as it is, no rest, we may be sure, has been granted to the bodies of the first-beginnings, because there is no bottom at all, whither they may, as it were, flow together, and make their resting-place. All things are for ever carried on in ceaseless movement from all sides, and bodies of matter, are even stirred up and supplied from beneath out of limitless space.

*Loeb here has* [998] Lastly, one thing is seen before our eyes to be the limit of another; air separates hills and mountains air, earth bounds sea and contrariwise the sea is the boundary of all lands; the universe, however, has nothing outside to be its limit.

I need to know exactly what Aristotle said, but I could see Epicurus agreeing that the 'concept of infinity" is a mental construct only, while at the same time holding that the number of atoms actually existing is uncountable and extends without limit or boundary out into space "forever."

I see the javelin example as highly useful - it illustrates that the limit is in US, not in the reality of space or atoms, because "if we could live forever" we could go on throwing the javelin outward, and counting atoms, forever and ever.

I am not sure you can square that with the "javelin" example in Lucretius, Don. Can you?