Posts by Cassius

Quote from Novem

I'm not a physicist so I am not able to comment, but I can say that theoretical physics is very hard to understand, and very theoretical indeed.

Yes, very true, and we need people who really want to dig into these issues to help discuss them intelligently and persuasively.

But in the meantime, I am not going to let the Lawrence Krausses of the world bother me by injecting doubt as to the existence of a possible supernatural factor into my day to day life.

Am I supposed to believe that just maybe some miracle happened with no explanation at all, and that I need to rely on some quantum physicist about whom I know nothing personally and whose good faith and integrity I have no way to judge (and considerable reason to doubt) to tell me how to think about the ultimate issues of nature? I think not.

Episode 209 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week will be a special episode in which we feature our "Foundations of Epicurean Philosophy," a collection of excerpts based on the ancient Epicurean texts and rearranged in an order that covers the main aspects of Epicurean philosophy in one presentation.

I suspect that some will have hesitation, but before anyone else responds I want to be on the record.....

I one hundred percent agree with your reasoning, and all the Lawrence Krauss's in the world and his cohorts will never convince me otherwise!

This is not a matter of philosophy vs science, it's a matter of philosophy informing a debate in which scientists of good faith are on both sides of the argument, and the resolution of such issues being ultimately a matter of philosophy.

I doubt there would ever come a time when I would consider the position you take in this article to be a "requirement" here at the forum, but as someone recently said in another context about the issue of Epicurean theology, it's a shame that this position doesn't always get the respect it deserves within Epicurean circles! It is certainly the position that Epicurus himself took.

Thank you for posting this. It would be relatively easy for me or one of us to take he PDF and reduce it to plain text, but I would appreciate it if you would post it into a post rather than just the PDF. I would like to take this and add it into our "articles" section as a featured article. No doubt over time there will be good-faith dissenters, but I think this is the position that Epicurus would take even today, and this needs to be on any site devoted to Epicurean philosophy.

Welcome to Episode 210 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week we move into Section XIX:

XIX. Apply the same remarks to self-restraint or temperance, by which I mean a government of the desires which pays allegiance to reason. Well then, supposing a man to yield to vice, in the absence of witnesses, would he shew suffcient regard for modesty, or is there something which is in itself abominable, though attended by no disgrace? What? Do brave men go to battle and pour out their blood for their country, because they have gone through the arithmetic of pleasures, or because they are carried away by a certain enthusiasm and tide of feeling? Pray do you think, Torquatus, that old Imperiosus, if he were listening to our talk, would find greater pleasure in giving ear to your speech about himself, or to mine, in which I stated that he had done nothing from regard for himself, but everything in the interest of the commonwealth; while on the contrary you said he had done nothing but what he did out of regard to himself? If more- over you had further chosen to make the matter clear, and to state your view more plainly, that he acted entirely with an eye to pleasure, how do you think he would have endured it?

Be it so; suppose, if you like, that Torquatus acted for the sake of his own interests (I would rather use this word than pleasures, particularly in relation to so great a man); did his colleague Publius Decius, who was the first of his family to achieve the consulship, think anything of his own pleasures, when he had offered himself up, and was rushing into the midst of the Latin line, with his horse at full gallop? Where did he expect to catch his pleasure or when, knowing that he must instantly die, and seeking his death with more burning zeal than Epicurus thinks should be given to the search for pleasure? And if this exploit of his had not been justly applauded, never would his son have emulated it in his fourth consulship, nor would this man’s son again have died on the field of battle, while conducting as consul the war with Pyrrhus, thus offering himself for his country as a third sacrifice from the same family in unbroken succession. I refrain from further instances. The Greeks have few in this class, Leonidas, Epaminondas, some three or four others ; if I begin to gather up our own examples, I shall indeed compel pleasure to surrender her- self to virtue as her prisoner, but the day will not be long enough for me, and just as Aulus Varius, who was looked upon as a rather severe judge, used to say to his assessor, when witnesses had been examined, and still others were being summoned: Ether we have got enough witnesses or I do not know what is enough, so I think I have supplied enough witnesses. Why, was it pleasure that led you yourself, a most worthy representative of your ancestors, while quite young, to rob Publius Sulla of the consulship? And when you had conferred this office on that staunchest of gentlemen, your father, what a noble consul he was, and what a noble citizen after his consulship, as always! And it was by his advice that I myself carried out a policy which had regard to the general interest rather than my own.

But how excellently you seemed to me to speak, when you set before us on the one side a man crowned with most numerous and most intense pleasures, free from all pain, either actual or impending, and on the other side one racked with most grievous torments over his whole frame, with no pleasure, either attendant or prospective, and then asked who could be more wretched than the latter man or more happy than the former, and thence inferred that pain is the paramount evil, and pleasure the paramount good! XX. There was a man of Lanuvium, Lucius Thorius Balbus, whom you cannot remember; he lived in such fashion that no pleasure could be discovered, however rare, in which he did not revel. Not only was he a zealot for pleasures, but he possessed ability and resource in this line of life ; and he was so devoid of superstition, that he cared nothing for those sacrifices and shrines which are so very numerous in his native place, and so free from fear in face of death, that he died for his country on the field of battle. The bounds to his passions were prescribed not by the classification of Epicurus, but by his own sense of repletion. Yet he took care of his health, he availed himself of such exercise as might send him thirsty and hungry to dinner, and of such food as was at once pleasantest and easiest to digest, and of wine sufficient to give pleasure without doing harm. He gave heed to those other matters in the absence of which Epicurus says he fails to under- stand what goad means. All pain kept aloof; but if it had come, he would have endured it without weakness, though he would have resorted to physicians rather than philosophers. He had an admirable complexion, perfect health, extreme popularity, his life in fact was replete with all the divers forms of pleasure. This is the man you pronounce happy; at least your system compels you to it; but I have hardly the courage to say who it is that I prefer to him; virtue herself shall speak for me, and shall without hesitation prefer to your man of happiness her Marcus Regulus; and virtue proclaims that when he had re- turned from his own country to Carthage of his own choice and under no compulsion but that of his honour, which he had pledged to the enemy, he was happier in the very hour at which he was tortured by want of sleep and hunger, than Thorius when drinking on his bed of roses. He had conducted important wars, had been twice elected consul, had enjoyed a triumph, though he did not regard his previous exploits as so important or so splendid as his last sacrifice, which he had taken upon him from motives of honour and consistency: a sacrifice that seems pitiable to us when we hear of it, but was pleasurable to him while he endured it. In truth, happy men are not always in a state of cheerfulness or boisterousness, or mirth, or jesting, which things accompany light characters, but oftentimes even in stern mood are made happy by their staunchness and endurance. When Lucretia was violated by the king’s son, she called her fellow-countrymen to witness and cut short her life by her own hand. The indignation felt at this by the Roman people, with Brutus for their leader and adviser, gave freedom to the community, and in remembrance of the lady both her husband and her father were elected consuls in the first year. Lucius Verginius, a poor man and sprung from the people, in the sixtieth year after freedom had been won, slew his maiden daughter with his own hand rather than let her be sacrificed to the lust of Appius Claudius, who then held supreme authority.

Sequence of Arguments In Book Two

1. Cicero alleges that Torquatus does not know what pleasure means. “As it is, however, I allege that Epicurus himself is in the dark about it and uncertain in his idea of it, and that the very man who often asserts that the meaning which our terms denote ought to be accurately represented, sometimes does not see what this term pleasure indicates, I mean what the thing is which is denoted by the term.” (End of Section II)
2. No one else talks about Pleasure this way
3. Epicurus is failing to be clear
4. No only do the words differ, but the THINGS differ - freedom from pain is not pleasure
5. In holding that pleasure is the supreme good Epicurus says that ANY kinds of pleasures are desirable, even depraved ones, if they banish pain, which is what he means by evil (Section VII)
6. Epicurus calls a profligate life desirable, and that is despicable. No reputable man speaks that way.
7. How can pleasure be the supreme good, when we can't even say that pleasure is the goal of a dinner? (IX)
8. The natural and necessary distinction is awkwardly worded.
9. Even Epicurus says that pleasure is not the goal, because what he really says is the goal is “absence of pain” (X)
10. Epicurus' defense of pleasure based on looking at babies and animals makes no sense because they are not authorities on the subject.
11. It may be difficult to determine whether pleasure is a primary endowment of man, but certainly there are others that are more important, such as man's intellectual ability, and the virtues.
12. The senses cannot decide as to the goal because they have no jurisdiction to answer that question.
13. If we do refute the claim that pleasure is the supreme good we must turn our backs upon virtue. (XIV)
14. The moral is that which, even if it had no utility, would be desired for its own qualities, regardless of its advantages. (XIV-45)
15. The classical virtues are seen to be lovely and beautiful in themselves.

This thread then took a strong turn into a discussion of very important questions about "meaning" and "meaningfulness" (with a dash of "skepticism vs. dogmatism" thrown in) so it is branched off for easier reference here:

Thread

What Would Epicurus Say About Searching For "Meaning?"

Perhaps this belongs in this column. It is from the excellent article referenced by @Don in #37 above: "In fact, Marcus [Aurelius] admits that if Epicurean natural science were right, he would fall into despair. Without providence, he asks, 'Why care about anything?'" So, is this a pivotal issue: caring? That is, vis a vis Victor Frankl and the search for meaning. If we seek to avoid pain and find pleasure are we thereby finding meaning? Or, do we need to look further? Thoughts?

BrainToBeing

January 12, 2024 at 9:46 AM

This will eventually be referenced in the FAQ under meaningfulness.

I can easily see myself saying at some appropriate time and place to an appropriate person:

The meaning of life is PLEASURE, you dolt, and the reason that you kick back against it is that you have bought into a warped view of the world in which life is not a pleasure but a prison sentence for your "immortal soul" - which is nothing more than a figment of your imagination drummed into you by two thousand years of false religious indoctrination!

And after that I would warm up to be more blunt.

Quote from Pacatus

Third, when such down-to-earth ideas of “meaning” are seriously considered, the notion that Epicurean philosophy offers no means to (or opportunity for) personal meaning itself seems absurd.

I think we are together but i am not 100% sure. Any sense of "meaningfulness" is a pleasure, isn't it?

Once we strip "meaningfulness" of its aura of attempting to do an end-run around pleasure as the ultimate good, i see no problem with it or any of another ten thousand words that could be used to describe a particular aspect of a pleasurable life.

Aren't the issues revolving around "meaningfulness" the same as those around "virtue," with the devil being in the details of whether "meaningful" has some absolute ideal nature, or whether it has meaning only in terms of individual pleasure and pain?

"Virtue" in the hands of Epicurus is a wonderful word, and I see no reason why he wouldn't endorse "meaningfulness" either, as long as the word is clearly positioned within the framework of the Epicurean worldview in which there is nothing good that does not ultimately trace to pleasure and nothing bad which does not ultimately trace to pain.

Ok if we are going to make any progress in reading up on what Cyrano had to say that is related to Epicurus, we need to find sources for his works. I can go back into the first post in this thread an insert a table of links to translations of his works.

Just to start somewhere, I will add this link to A Voyage to the Moon. If others will add to the thread more suggestions then we'll build a table, which i have started here: Cyrano de Bergerac

A voyage to the moon : Cyrano de Bergerac, 1619-1655 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

An edition by C.H. Page of A. Lovell's translation, published with title: The comical history of the states and empires of the world of the moon

archive.org

I think Eikadistes 's latest graphic is applicable to our discussion here. When Democritus implied or stated that there's nothing in "reality" except atoms and void he should have taken greater care to explain what he meant by reality. If your definition of "reality" requires an unchanging and eternal existence, then darn right, nothing has that except atoms and void. But if your definition of "reality" is of relevance to human beings, and includes the kind of reality that includes railroad trains that will mow you down if you stand on their tracks when they come through, then to say that nothing exists "in reality" except atoms and void is the height of stupidity. I feel sure Democritus wasn't stupid, and I hope he made that distinction in real life. But regardless of that it does sound like Democritus got caught up in skepticism and hard determinism, so maybe he was in fact adversely influenced by his own theories. Rather than corrupt his ideas as Cicero accused Epicurus of doing, Epicurus straightened them out in some very important aspects.

You have a good memory! I think what I would say today to expand on what you quoted would be to clearly explain a definition of "certainty." If the word is defined to mean "godlike" certainty in that you are omniscient and omnipotent and have a full view of the universe through time and space, then you can never be certain (in that way) of anything, and that's the false standard that is foolish to seek.

If being certain is being used to me "I know this as well as an human can know it" then that definition of certainty is practical and usable.

So I think that's what Epicurus was talking about when he was using his canon. He set forth a set of tools that you can use, and if you use them appropriately then it is appropriate for you to say that you are "certain" of your conclusion. If you're talking to a priest and he says that he is certain of something, or that you can never be certain of anything, then I'd reject that proposition.

But just like when you're talking to Epicurus about "pleasure" you have to understand that he's talking about more than sensory stimulation, you can use the word "certain" in the proper sense of a human-style of certainty and be using the word acceptably.

I'd have to go back and see what else if anything I wrote at the time to see if I provided that context, but that's the context I would give it now. All the important words in Epicurean philosophy seem to have their own subtleties of meaning, and "knowledge" and "certainty" would be right in there with "pleasure," "virtue," "gods" and the rest!

Quote from Pacatus

Confidence is necessary, but absolute objective certainty is only available in deductive logic and pure mathematics.

I'm not sure that we should accept that "objective certainty" has a meaning unless we limit the term, should we? So I think I would be concerned about granting to deductive logic or pure mathematics the status of "objective certainty" either. I wouldn't want to go around casually implying that I think mathematics or logic have "objective certainty" when "objective certainty" sounds like a term that normal people would think applies only to that supernatural omniscient god whose existence we are rejecting.

My comment here isn't strictly related to the first post, but recently some things came to my attention to add to the negative side of my assessment of Cromwell and the Puritans. I recall Emily Austin and particularly Don talking in our podcast interview about this subject, but I've never pursued it. Given the considerable deference that most Americans seem to pay to the Puritans, especially around Thanksgiving, I hope over time we can develop more material on the unsavory side of Puritanism and how it would therefore relate to Epicurean views. Knowing thine enemy is generally a good thing.

It just occurs to me to add this. I'd like to think that there were some people here who, before they started reading Epicurus, were radical skeptics or radical hard determinists, and after reading Epicurus decided to change their minds. But come to think of it, I don't think I can name anyone like that. I wonder if there are any!

BTB I hope you will do more of the reading you indicated because I think you will get a lot out of it. However as you already indicate, the bottom line is that Epicurean philosophy is not consistent with radical skepticism, and someone who takes that position isn't ultimately going to be comfortable with Epicurus. That's very similar to how someone who is committed to radical hard determinism ultimately isn't going to be comfortable with Epicurus.

It's almost like clockwork and it's almost like we need a sign on the front page warning skeptics and determinists about the hazard. But we don't do that and probably won't because from the point of view I would expect Epicurus to take, people have a certain freedom of choice in determining their own futures, and they can change their minds even on skepticism and dogmatism. Even further, I would expect the ancient Epicureans to have said that a large part of the reason that radical skepticism and determinism is a problem is because those ideas aren't solely errors innocently arrived at, they are pushed as agendas by very influential parts of society with ulterior motives. Many people are "taken in" by them, innocently enough, because they have never had the opportunity to be exposed to a reasonable alternative like Epicurus provided.

So yes I realize that even though I am trying to write this considerately and compassionately, there are people who are going to take great offense to what I am writing here. They are committed to the view that no one can ever be "right" on anything, and that no one is responsible for anything because everything in the universe is just the current positioning of billiard-balls on the gaming table. And those people think that it's the greatest of offensiveness to suggest otherwise.

But if you're going to take Epicurean philosophy to heart and accept its foundations, that's just the way things are. You can't make everyone happy, and if you set out trying to do so you're on a fool's errand. Certain people are going to thing you're the greatest thing since sliced bread, and others are going to think that you're talking like you just came down from the intermundia to deliver the wisdom of the gods.

Many of the questions you've raised BTB need to be the subject of FAQ entries, and so you've done us a favor by reminding us of how much work there is to do in explaining the Epicurean position.

Oh my gosh this conversation was only two years ago but I had completely forgotten about it! Thanks for linking to it Cyrano!

The likelihood is that the primary addition regarding pleasure is going to come this way, by addition after the existing line 29, in the canonics section rather than the ethics section:

...

30. Instead, the faculties which constitute our Canon of Truth are our five senses, our preconceptions, and our feelings of pleasure and pain, for it is by means of these that we test those things which are true, and we determine which are obscure and need confirmation. For only when those things which are clear to us are understood is it time to consider those things which are obscure. [(Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus)]

31. By "preconception" we mean an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say, a recollection of what has often been presented from without, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. (Diogenes Laertius X:33; "On The Nature of the Gods" section___,)

32. By "pleasure" we mean the absence of pain, for there are two internal sensations, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and pleasure is akin to nature and pain is alien. There is no middle condition between pleasure and pain, so anyone who is conscious of his own condition is necessarily in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. (Letter to Menoeceus; Diogenes Laertius X.34: On Ends Book 2)

33. Whatever is free from pain is in pleasure, because wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once. And it is therefore as true as any proposition can be that "freedom from pain" and "the negation of pain" mean the same thing as "pleasure." (Principal Doctrine 3; On Ends Book 2:9-11)

34. So to he who asserts that there are vast multitudes of men who are neither in a state of pain nor a state of pleasure, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions, we say: "No, indeed, for all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in fact in the greatest pleasure." (On Ends Book 2:16)

35. And to he who asserts that if pleasure is the highest good every part of our bodies, even our hands, would constantly feel a longing for pleasure, we say that they feel no such longing because so long as they are free from pain they are in fact experiencing pleasure. (On Ends Book 1:39)

36. The wise man who understands these things will find that any pains he may encounter have never power enough to prevent him from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation, and he who is able to become completely free from all pain is experiencing the most complete pleasure that is possible to him. (On Ends Book 1:62)

37. Now, apply your mind, for a new question struggles earnestly to gain your ears, a new aspect of things is about to display itself. [(Lucretius Book 2)]

...

Note: To avoid overstressing this thread I will post interim revisions of the full text here:

Foundations Of Epicurean Philosophy

For the first time since 2015 I am about to undertake a significant update of this presentation. When I first put it together I did not think I had good enough quotations on "pleasure as the absence of pain" to include a clear meaning of that without perpetuating ambiguities, but I think now with the aid of our review of Book 2 of on ends I have sufficient succinct citations to include a brief explanation of that, probably inserting it right after item 100.

I also want to go through and try to add line numbers for as many citations as possible in addition to the general source reference already included.

But I am posting this note because of anyone has general editorial suggestions to make, this would be a good time to make them. Eventually we will do another multimedia version, including one with human voice and versions with and without background music. Also, importantly, a revised version ultimately needs much better graphics.

In the end the final result is deep and intense, and a lot to take in at one sitting, but hearing it all in context and clear progression I think makes for a very good reference point to check ones understanding of how everything fits together.

If you can tolerate the computer voice and the music (some hate it and some love it) I recommend this set of material as one of the most complete and well documented summaries of the philosophy that we have on the entire site.

There are many difficult decisions to be made in balancing understandability with keeping true to the texts, and I can't promise to address every suggestion, but all will be considered and appreciated.

Quote from Eggplant Wizard

Epicurean theology was dismissed by almost all the participants as a ruse to avoid persecution and attempts to talk seriously about it mostly ran into scorn.

As long as I am administrator of this group that (attempts to talk seriously about Epicurean theology running into scorn) will not happen here! If anything gets quashed, it's going to be insistence that Epicurean theology was a cop-out, because that's an insult to Epicurus personally and that's not something that "friends of Epicurus" should stand by and accept. No doubt it will pop up now and then especially with newer people, but if a gentle reminder to cut it out isn't sufficient then stronger action will be taken.

One thing we need to be able to agree on is that we are going to take seriously what the Epicureans discussed. We don't have to agree with all, but the forum isn't going to be a place for personal ridicule on theology or images or any other issue where we might disagree with the Epicureans. You can't understand what they were thinking as a whole until you take the parts seriously. They were doing the best they could, and they succeeded a surprising amount of the time. Even when they may have been in error, there is much to be learned from their thought process in getting to their position.

Quote from Eggplant Wizard

It was clearly important to the classical Epicureans.

It absolutely was, and by ridiculing they are foreclosing themselves from the benefits of understanding the full Epicurean point of view, agree with it or not.

Quote from BrainToBeing

For example, based on beliefs extant at the time, two thousand years ago humans sacrificed other humans, and many animals, "to the gods". I think it is important that we have a different view now.

Ah, there's an important distinction. NOT ALL humans two thousand years ago sacrificed other humans, only some of them did. And there are plenty of abuses going on today that people 2000 years ago could hardly have imagined. So it's not the time element alone, or even dominantly, that is the issue.

Quote from BrainToBeing

I think it is important to consider what we have learned philosophically in the last 2000 years.

Not many people are going to agree on what, if **anything** has been learned "philosophically" in the last 2000 years. Lots of ink has been spilled for sure, but has the conversation really progressed in substance since the Greco-Roman debates of 2000 years ago? I think a considerable number of people would argue that philosophy has *regressed* since that time. And that's the kind of question that needs to be addressed. Is spilling ink and chasing rabbits really progress showing that certain things have been learned? The big questions of life seem to remain the big questions of life from age to age.

As just to be clear, I think it is very helpful that you are posing these questions in the way you do. Not everyone is going to arrive at the same answers, but these are challenges that have to be considered and dealt with for any community to have confidence in its reason for being.

Cassius wrote a new article:

Article

Interview With Dr. David Glidden: "Epicurean Prolepsis"

In Episode 166 the Lucretius Today podcasters interviewed Dr. David Glidden, professor emeritus from the University of California - Riverside, about his articles "Epicurean Prolepsis" and "Epicurean Thinking.

Cassius

January 11, 2024 at 8:22 AM

Quote

In Episode 166 the Lucretius Today podcasters interviewed Dr. David Glidden, professor emeritus from the University of California - Riverside, about his articles "Epicurean Prolepsis" and "Epicurean Thinking.

I think that style would lend itself very well to a presentation encouraging people to look further into Epicurus. I'd probably expand it more in the direction of explaining some of Epicurus' / Lucretius' key positions (the only thing most people know seems to be to associate him with "pleasure"). Joshua seems to have a series of other good parallels that could be used to show the same ideas in both. A narrative like this over a series of slides, maybe even with background music, would be a very effective way of presenting those parallels. Probably the whole thing could wind up pointing to a place where we discuss a table of parallel Shakespeare/Epicurean references. I don't think we have a table anywhere do we Joshua ?