Posts by Cassius

Let's continue the discussion of arguments in favor of supernatural gods here:

We can eventually split that thread too down into separate subthreads by argument, but let's start a general thread first so we can create the list that needs to be addressed.

I haven't refreshed my reading recently enough to know if Cicero includes a similar argument in "On The Nature of The Gods," but he might. We can discuss this in the same way that we can include Epicurus' "riddle," even though it is not explicitly in the text.

Might as well save people clicking on the link to see this very depressing chain of fallacious reasoning. Here it is - we might branch this out into a thread "Epicurean Responses to the Ontological Argument For God" and we can decide in which episode to include this discussion. We will probably want to develop this into a thread and be sure Joshua is ready for it before we decide which episode to include it in.

In fact, I am fine with listing out all major / similar logical arguments for the existence of supernatural gods and including them, or at least mention of them, as the episodes proceed. I suspect many of them will indeed be covered in what Velleius has to say, either explicitly or by implication.

a. The Argument Described

St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury (1033-1109), is the originator of the ontological argument, which he describes in the Proslogium as follows:

[Even a] fool, when he hears of … a being than which nothing greater can be conceived … understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding.… And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.… Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

My preliminary comments are:

At the very least one observation that goes along with the discussion is that Epicurus was long dead even when that was written, so he was not around to give orders, nor does there seem to have been a strict passing of "authority." I would certainly personally not trust a subsequent head of the school as much as I would trust Epicurus himself. The more time that passed after Epicurus died, the more and different arguments that would have arisen requiring variations on the original responses.

I would also see an analogy to seeing Epicurus as "a god" or even a "father figure" as Lucretius discusses -- gods don't intervene to tell us what to do, they serve as examples that we emulate as best we can. Father's sometimes try to intervene, but the "father figure" I would suggest is generally associated with the idea of giving wise advise to be followed as best the child can apply it. And when Philodemus was writing Epicurus wasn't around to be the kind of father who demands to be obeyed.

At the same time, there is no doubt in my mind that some kind of uniformity of message is necessary if one is to be logically thought of as an Epicurean. Epicurus' logic was as rigorous as anyone else's, and once a core doctrine was established with confidence (as opposed to subsidiary ideas where "waiting" and keeping an open mind between apparently valid alternatives is appropriate) then logical consistency requires general acceptance of those views. It's very possible to be friendly and accepting of those with differing views in many subjects, especially with students during a learning process. But if being considered an Epicurean means anything, it means some kind of agreement with core doctrines. And if one is running a school or any kind of organization, then it's inherent in the organization that there is going to be some kind of line between what is and what is not acceptable. I can't imagine Romans and most Greeks taking much of anything "on authority." The Pythagoreans seem to be an exception, and we see Cicero himself arguing against that point of view in his philosophical works. But at the same time, words and ideas have to mean something, and we do the best we can to be clear when we use them. The word "Epicurean" is not infinitely flexible, nor does it mean only that one wants to be "happy" or that one finds "pleasure" enjoyable.

We're going to rightly recoil against aggressive claims of authority since for 2000 years we've lived in a world ruled by oppressive religions. But the remedy to oppression isn't total abandonment of standards, randomness, and absence of consistency, it's well thought out standards based on sound evidence and sound reasoning. And that does mean eventually coming to conclusions, not reverting to skepticism and holding that no conclusions are possible.

• Topics For This Week:

  • Cicero says that the greater part of mankind is united in what Nature leads us to suppose, which is that there are gods.
  • Protagorus and Diagorus the Melian and Theodorus of Cyrene entirely believed that there are no gods.
    • Protagorus [ ]Protagoras (/prəʊˈtæɡəˌræs/; Greek: Πρωταγόρας; c. 490 BC – c. 420 BC)[1] was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher and rhetorical theorist. He is numbered as one of the sophists by Plato. In his dialogue Protagoras, Plato credits him with inventing the role of the professional sophist. Protagoras also is believed to have created a major controversy during ancient times through his statement that, "Man is the measure of all things," interpreted (possibly wrongly, since he disagreed) by Plato to mean that there is no objective truth; Protagoras seems to have meant that each person's own personal history, experiences and expectations, developed over their lifetime, determine their judgments, opinions, and statements regarding "truth" (which is the title of the book in which Protagoras made this statement). When a person makes a judgment about a certain thing—good or bad or beautiful or unjust—that person will differ from other people's judgments because their experience has been different.]
    • Diagorus the Melian Diagoras "the Atheist" of Melos (Greek: Διαγόρας ὁ Μήλιος) was a Greek poet and sophist of the 5th century BC. Throughout antiquity, he was regarded as an atheist, but very little is known for certain about what he actually believed. Anecdotes about his life indicate that he spoke out against ancient Greek religion. He allegedly chopped up a wooden statue of Heracles and used it to roast his lentils and revealed the secrets of the Eleusinian Mysteries. The Athenians accused him of asebeia (impiety) and banished him from their city. He died in Corinth.
    • Theodorus of Cyrene [Theodorus of Cyrene (Greek: Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος) was an ancient Greek mathematician who lived during the 5th century BC. The only first-hand accounts of him that survive are in three of Plato's dialogues: the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman. In the former dialogue, he posits a mathematical construction now known as the Spiral of Theodorus. Little is known as Theodorus' biography beyond what can be inferred from Plato's dialogues. He was born in the northern African colony of Cyrene, and apparently taught both there and in Athens.[1] He complains of old age in the Theaetetus, the dramatic date of 399 BC of which suggests his period of flourishing to have occurred in the mid-5th century. The text also associates him with the sophist Protagoras, with whom he claims to have studied before turning to geometry.[2] A dubious tradition repeated among ancient biographers like Diogenes Laërtius[3] held that Plato later studied with him in Cyrene, Libya.[1] This eminent mathematician Theodorus was, along with Alcibiades and many other of Socrates' companions (many of whom would be associated with the Thirty Tyrants), accused of distributing the mysteries at a symposium, according to Plutarch, who himself was priest of the temple at Delphi.]
  • Those who affirm that gods exist are divided on many details, but the most important question that divides them is whether the gods are active in the affairs of our world or inactive.
    • How many people today hold to that view of "inactive" gods? Why?
  • If the gods are inactive there is no reason to worry about piety, but it is possible that if we cast off piety then the virtues - including the most excellent, which is justice, may perish with it!
    • Note: This is specifically rejected in Diogenes of Oinoanda Fragment 20 -
      • Fragment 20 - [So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.
      • On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?
      • So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [not does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before. That not only [is our doctrine] helpful, [but also the opposite doctrine harmful, is clearly shown by] the [Stoics as they go astray. For they say in opposition to us] that the god both is maker of [the] world and takes providential care of it, providing for all things, including human beings. Well, in the first place, we come to this question: was it, may I ask, for his own sake that the god created the world [or for the sake of human beings? For it is obvious that it was from a wish to benefit either himself or human beings that he embarked on this] undertaking. For how could it have been otherwise, if nothing is produced without a cause and these things are produced by a god? Let us then examine this view and what Stoics mean. It was, they say, from a wish to have a city and fellow-citizens, just as if [he were an exile from a city, that] the god [created the world and human beings. However, this supposition, a concoction of empty talking, is] self-evidently a fable, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher’s argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense. Yet even if, in the belief that he was doing some good [to himself, the god] really [made the world and human beings], .............
  • Other philosophers believe the whole world is directed and governed by the gods, and they consult and provide for the preservation of mankind.
    • Carnaedes rejected this. What do we know about Carneades? [ Carneades (/kɑːrˈniːədiːz/; Greek: Καρνεάδης, Karneadēs, "of Carnea"; 214/3–129/8 BC[2]) was a Greek philosopher,[3] perhaps the most prominent head of the Skeptical Academy in ancient Greece.[3] He was born in Cyrene.[4] By the year 159 BC,[citation needed] he had begun to attack many previous dogmatic doctrines, especially Stoicism and even the Epicureans,[5] whom previous skeptics had spared.]
  • Then Cicero explains why he turned from politics to philosophy, and why he took up the Academic School as his own since it has been long neglgected and foresaken and buries things in a kind of artificial night.
    • In truth, he has been studying philosophy and associating with philosophers all his life.
    • The practical reason why he started writing is that the republic had been taken over by Caesar, and he wanted to reproduce in Latin the learning of the Greeks.
    • Also death of his daughter and other things led to melancholy disposition.
  • People should not care about his opinion, they should care about what is reasonable, and they should reject the custom of the Pythagoreans to refer all questions to whether the master (Pythagorus) said it himself.
  • As to why he chose the Academy, we should look to his book on the "Academic Questions." The custom of the Academy is to "dispute all things and assume nothing certainly" and was begun by Socrates and reinvigorated by Carneades.
  • Cicero denies that he thinks that nothing whatsoever is true, but that there is so much falsehood blended with truth that there is no certain rule for judging what is true, and it follows that many things are probable enough, even though not evident to the senses, that a wise man chooses to direct his conduct by them.
  • So he is going to go through all the opinions of the major schools about the nature of the gods, and if we find that all of them agree on something, or that what any one says is absolutely true, then he will give up the Academy!
  • The scene then of the dispute will be home of Gaius Aurelius Cotta, who was talking with Senator Gaius Velleius, the Epicurean. Quintus Lucillius Balbus was also there, taking the Stoic side. Cicero says that if Marcus Piso were present, no school would lack an advocate. It appears that Piso would have represented the Peripatetics, because Cotta says that Antiochus held that the Peripatetics did not differ from the Stoics in substance but only in words. Cotta says this is actually a significant difference, but says more on that later.
  • Velleius is asked to repeat what he is previously said for Cicero to hear it. Velleius replies with a smile that Cicero will not be fair but an advocate for Cotta's views, because just like Cotta, Cicero had learned from Philo to be certain of nothing. In response, Cicero proclaims his impartiality and lack of bias.

  
  

Today we updated Archive.org so that all episodes up through the current episode 225 are now available.

The Lucretius Today Podcast : EpicureanFriends.com : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

The Lucretius Today Podcast, sponsored by EpicureanFriends.com

archive.org

Looks like the total download is now up to about 11.2 gigabytes.

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Roman dictator Sulla destroyed the Platonic Academy in 86 BCE,

I am not familiar with this episode. Did he destroy all of the schools or did he play favorites? Sulla has always been an enigmatic figure in my mind.

Plato's final resting place revealed using 'bionic eye'

New imaging techniques crack open the Herculaneum papyri, the famously indecipherable scroll from the the Villa dei Papyri.

interestingengineering.com

This article is very ambiguous and unclear as it appears they are talking about scrolls that may be from Philodemus, but the article is about where Plato is buried:

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A “bionic eye” enabled his research team to read about 1,000 words from the history of the Academy by Philodemus of Gadara, an Epicurean poet and philosopher. With this new technology, they penetrated layers of carbon with optical coherence tomography (OCT) and infrared hyperspectral imaging techniques.

The emerging technology known as OCT performs high-resolution cross-sectional imaging commonly used to take pictures of the back of an eye using reflected light. Infrared hyperspectral imaging has a variety of subsets from near to mid to far. Simply put, it can reveal hidden features of an object that may not be visible to the naked eye. These techniques brought 2,000 year old text to the surface.

Details from Plato’s life uncovered

Researchers believe that they have identified the location of Plato’s burial site.

According to their findings, his final resting place appears to be in a private area in a garden in the academy, near a shrine to the Muses. Roman dictator Sulla destroyed the Platonic Academy in 86 BCE, but archeologists rediscovered it in the 20^th century. Currently open to the public, archeologists have thoroughly examined the site, but we always seem to uncover something else.

Lucretius Today Podcast Episode 225 - "Cicero Argues That Commitment To Virtue Is A Bar To Pleasure" Is Now Available -

Earlier today I was asked a couple of questions that would be good to toss around, since it's a common question:

What does Epicurus offer to the world (common people) today?

1. Don't you have to be rich to be an Epicurean?
2. Epicureanism doesn't offer anything "positive" like Stoicism or Buddhism offers. What do you offer to compete with those?
3. What if your life isn't "together" and you don't have time to read philosophy? Why would someone like that spending any time discussing Epicurus?
4. Why don't you ever discuss "meaningfulness" because I've been convinced that's what I should want out of life?
5. How do you expect me to understand Epicurus when he approaches so many things so differently than what I am familiar with at church or in the workplaces?

Those are just samples but we've heard similar questions many times before.

If we are really profiting from studying Epicurus, we ought to be able to answer such questions confidently and concisely.

I will give my own thoughts but let's throw this out for discussion.

I have updated the first post above with the text from the first seven sections of Book One of "On the Nature of the Gods." We'll go through that only in summary form, but there is important information in it about the state of religious views in Cicero's time, and where the views of Epicurus fit into that spectrum.

So she's not offering just pleasure, but getting pleasure by apparently unjust means:

"Nay; you shall have the fruits of others' toil, and refrain from nothing that can bring you gain. For to my companions I give authority to pluck advantage where they will.’"

But interesting:

“Now when Heracles heard this, he asked, ‘Lady, pray what is your name?’

“‘My friends call me Happiness,’ she said, ‘but among those that hate me I am nicknamed Vice.’

And this does not strike me as simple "virtue" but more "common sense" or "the way things are" -

For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to man without toil and effort. If you want the favour of the gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do good to your friends: if you covet honour from a city, you must aid that city: if you are fain to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do good to Hellas: if you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must cultivate that land: if you are resolved to get wealth from flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you essay to grow great through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practise their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat.’

And this is NOT the Epicurean approach to Pleasure:

[30] ‘What good thing is thine, poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do nought to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day.

So at least at this point I wouldn't see the ancient Epicureans seeing Hercules as an enemy, but someone else whose story has been distorted by religion and virtue.

Not sure about the rest.

So this is Socrates speaking to Aristippus himself?

Thank you Don! So is the Greek indeed "Vice" rather than Hedone / Pleasure?

i am in the middle of editing this podcast and my attention is turned back to this:

We mention in the podcast that the very last argument that Cicero makes against Epicurus in Book 2 concerns how we should look to Hercules for the proper model of life rather than to Epicurus. We haven't talked much about "The Choice" between virtue and pleasure that Hercules was reputed to have made, but I think this deserves a lot more attention. The story was obviously of very great influence in the ancient world, but when we discussed it in the podcast none of us were very familiar with it and we had to rely on a quick read of Wikipedia. I think we can do a lot better than that, and I suspect that exploring the story would reveal why Lucretius chose to talk so much about Hercules in listing some of his explouts and comparing his accomplishments to those of Epicurus. Cicero speculates that if had given Torquatus time to answer that Torquatus would have argued that Hercules did what he did for pleasure, just as Torquatus answered that his own ancestors had fought wars for pleasure.

Given this story is apparently so central in ancient thought, I think we ought to explore it more. If anyone has anything to say before the podcast comes out, add it here, and we will probably in the end split of "The Choice of Hercules" or "Hercules at the Crossroads" into a separate thread of its own.

Is the choice that between "Virtue and Vice" or "Virtue and Pleasure?"

We will want to articulate the proper Epicurean response to this.

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RE: Episode 225 - Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 30 - Cicero Argues That Commitment To Virtue Is A Bar To Pleasure

Of relevance to this Episode:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hercules_at_the_crossroads

Cassius

April 21, 2024 at 10:17 AM

Definitely Lucretius says that, and maybe Cicero does too, but I am not quick enough to cite the references on the spot

I know there's discussion in Cicero too about the task of the translator - it may be in the opening section of "On the Nature of the Gods," but I think it's where he discusses his method of compiling the existing texts into his "dialogue" form.

On Nature of Gods near beginning:

We probably have multiple threads on illusions throughout the forum and over time we can try to reposition them here, because this is a topic that is discussed extensively in Lucretius Book 4, and it's interesting to talk about. It needs to be clear and emphatically understood that it is core Epicurean doctrine that error lies in opinion, rather than the senses, and that the senses report "truthfully" in the sense of "honestly" and that those who reject the senses are talking nonsense -- or "upside down" as Lucretius says.

This thought was spurred on by seeing this photo below cross my feed this morning. I'm not particularly pleased with the thought that is no doubt behind it, but I have to admit that this is an interesting illusion! And no, it's not anything of questionable underaged nature!

The point generally being - ultimately the way to correct inaccurate opinions is through repeated and more precise use of the senses, not through rejecting the senses in favor of abstract logic or other non-sensual means.

I don't think I have seen one like this before -- interesting to think about how this was created.

I have a feeling this category could be very popular, so I encourage others to post similar illusions and discussions. Feel free to start new threads on each significant example.

I noted this section in the Standford Encycopedia of Philosophy On Hedonism when we talked about psychological hedonism the other night. This carries the point to an extreme, and it's a little concerning that the writer seems to have so many more words for pain than pleasure, , but it does provide an illustration of the point (I added the underlining):

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In general, pleasure is understood broadly below, as including or as included in all pleasant feeling or experience: contentment, delight, ecstasy, elation, enjoyment, euphoria, exhilaration, exultation, gladness, gratification, gratitude, joy, liking, love, relief, satisfaction, Schadenfreude, tranquility, and so on.

Pain or displeasure too is understood broadly below, as including or as included in all unpleasant experience or feeling: ache, agitation, agony, angst, anguish, annoyance, anxiety, apprehensiveness, boredom, chagrin, dejection, depression, desolation, despair, desperation, despondency, discomfort, discombobulation, discontentment, disgruntlement, disgust, dislike, dismay, disorientation, dissatisfaction, distress, dread, enmity, ennui, fear, gloominess, grief, guilt, hatred, horror, hurting, irritation, loathing, melancholia, nausea, queasiness, remorse, resentment, sadness, shame, sorrow, suffering, sullenness, throb, terror, unease, vexation, and so on. ‘Pain or displeasure’ is usually stated below just as ‘pain’ or just as ‘displeasure’.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/#ArgForPsyHed

Quote from Don

how thorny of a problem it is trying to translate ideas across languages using a single word.

I can't help thinking that this is the reason why Lucretius seems to me to be saying the same thing over and over in various passages, just using different words, as if that's not just poetry but the way to triangulate on precise meanings:

For example four ways of saying atoms: "These we are accustomed in explaining their reason to call matter and begetting bodies of things and to name seeds of things and also to tern first bodies, because from them as first elements all things are."

I think it does make sense when explaining things to say it multiple ways.

Happy Birthday Pacatus!

I think I agree with everything there Don, and even the choice of words, with the possible exception of the very last word "content."

In describing what we would feel if we were running into a building to certain death to save our child, I don't know that I would describe it as "content" without more, but the meaning would be more like "confident that I had made the best choice among the agreeable (or less disagreeable) available alternatives." (With 'best" defined not in terms of "virtue" or "duties" or "goodness" or "piety" or "holiness" or "logic" but in terms of the dominance of pleasure over pain that I would anticipate experiencing depending upon the choice I decide to take.)

In evaluating why I say that, I think my concern is the one I always have in evaluating flatly-stated terms like content / satisfied / calm / tranquil. I see those terms as overused in the philosophical world by people who are attitudinally more Buddhist or Stoic and who base their perspectives on acceptance of fate and passivity in the face of forces they feel unable to control or influence, or duty-bound to follow. I don't think that is an Epicurean attitude, and I see that attitude as destructive to identifying the attitude toward life that led to the success of the ancient Epicureans.

If I were Epicurus running into the burning building I would not use any of those words to describe the emotions I would be experiencing at the many aspects of the situation. Very likely I would be hot with anger I might have against the circumstances that placed all of us in that position of needing to run into the building, especially if those circumstances were caused maliciously or recklessly by someone who acted improperly. (In many cases the circumstances could be purely accidental or other factors would change the situation, but we should not ignore the real possibility that the situation was caused by malicious forces deserving of anger.)

I wouldn't be content or calm or satisfied or tranquil while I was running to certain death in those circumstances, but for the very reasons that you state, "find[ing] - even in their imagination - the prospect of not doing everything to protect their child unbearable" - I would be "confident that I had made the best choice among the agreeable (or less disagreeable) available alternatives." I can make peace with using "content" in that context as part of the overall picture ("I am content that I did the best I could to choose among the available alternatives"), but I think in the current intellectual environment it probably makes sense to be clear about the full meaning of "content."

Happy Birthday to Pacatus! Learn more about Pacatus and say happy birthday on Pacatus's timeline: Pacatus