Posts by Cassius

Leontium (wife of Metrodorus): wrote against Theophrastus https://en.wikisource.org/wiki…Female_Biography/Leontium

Philodenes of Laodicea - Wikipedia - DeWitt Reference

Philonides of Laodicea

Philonides (Greek: Φιλωνίδης, c. 200 – c. 130 BCE) of Laodicea in Syria, was an Epicurean philosopher and mathematician who lived in the Seleucid court during the reigns of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and Demetrius I Soter.

He is known principally from a Life of Philonides, which was discovered among the charred papyrus scrolls at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum.^[1] Philonides was born into a family with good connections with the Seleucid court.^[2] He is said to have been taught by Eudemus and Dionysodorus the mathematician.^[3] Philonides attempted to convert Antiochus IV Epiphanes to Epicureanism, and later instructed his nephew, Demetrius I Soter, in philosophy.^[2] Philonides was highly honoured in the court, and he is also known from various stone inscriptions.^[4]

He was renowned as a mathematician, and is mentioned by Apollonius of Perga in the preface to the second book of his Conics.^[3][5]

Philonides was a zealous collector of the works of Epicurus and his colleagues, and is said to have published over 100 treatises, probably compilations of the works he collected.^[6]

NewEpicurean Blog post from 4/5/14

Unsung Heroes of Epicureanism: Philonides of Laodicea

One of the more important proponents of Epicureanism in the ancient world, whose efforts are known but little remembered today, was Philonides of Laodicea. Philonides was an Epicurean philosopher based in Antioch some 150 years before Christ. Here is his entry in Wikipedia:

Philonides (c. 200 – c. 130 BCE) of Laodicea in Syria, was an Epicurean philosopher and mathematician who lived in the Seleucid court during the reigns of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and Demetrius I Soter. He is known principally from a Life of Philonides which was discovered among the charred papyrus scrolls at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum.^[1] Philonides was born into a family with good connections with the Seleucid court.^[2] He is said to have been taught by one Eudemus, and Dionysodorus the mathematician.^[3] Philonides attempted to convert Antiochus IV Epiphanes to Epicureanism, and later instructed his nephew Demetrius I Soter in philosophy.^[2] Philonides was highly honoured in the court, and he is also known from various stone inscriptions.^[4] He was renowned as a mathematician, and is mentioned by Apollonius of Perga in the preface to the second book of his Conics.^[3][5] Philonides was a zealous collector of the works of Epicurus and his colleagues, and is said to have published over 100 treatises, probably compilations of the works he collected

And here is a more expanded description from Chapter 15 of Norman DeWitt’s Epicurus and His Philosophy:

“The Epicurean school in Antioch is remarkable not only for its strategic importance but also for the fact that its existence is known only from a papyrus. By way of introduction to the story, however, certain warnings are in order, as happens so often in the history of Epicureanism. In spite of the fact that Epicurus seems to have recommended especially the method of extension from disciple to disciple for the propagation of his doctrine, it is quite usual to find his adherents among the teachers of grammar, rhetoric, and even mathematics. The prejudice of the founder against these branches has been greatly exaggerated, especially among modern scholars. Epicurus himself had been a privileged person, enjoying the endowments of generous friends, especially Idomeneus. The sordid necessity of earning a living was more often the lot of his later devotees. They taught their philosophy along with accepted subjects of study. If this judgment is rendered more credible by examples, the names of Epicureans who essayed to teach grammar or rhetoric in Rome may be found in Suetonius,27 while it is clear that men like Arnobius, Lactantius, and St. Augustine acquired their knowledge of the creed along with rhetoric.

It is in the light of such knowledge that we should read of the distinguished philosopher Philonides, who set up his headquarters in Antioch and surrounded himself with “a throng of scholars.” He made a convert of Antiochus Epiphanes (d. 164 B.c.) and enjoyed not only his patronage but also that of his successor, Demetrius Soter. It was manifestly the ambition of Philonides to make Antioch a capital of Epicureanism. He utilized his privileged position to assemble all the writings of Epicurus for the royal library. Like other leaders of the sect, he was busy with his pen, published 125 books, and rearranged the letters of Epicurus and his three colleagues according to names and subject matter.

That Philonides was also a man of force and persuasion is demonstrated not only by his influence over two monarchs but also by his services as a diplomat. His ability as an administrator was recognized by his appointment in charge of Laodicea on the Sea.

The unique interest that attaches to this school in Antioch is enhanced by other reasons, particularly two: it is probable that it served as a base of operations for the forcible introduction of Epicureanism into Judaea, and it was in this city that, according to Luke, the followers of Jesus were first called Christians. Attention should be drawn to the fact that the word Christian is a Latin and not a Greek formation. Since adherents of the older sect were already known by the name of their founder, it was natural for Roman residents, whether merchants or officials, to designate the adherents of the new sect in a similar way. To these neutral observers, when they heard of Epicureans ridiculing Christian prophecies and the Christians fighting back, the contenders would have been no more than two warring factions. It was manifestly the resident Romans who coined the word Christian.

As for Antiochus himself, his very name was loathsome to the Jews, because his adopted surname Epiphanes means “the god manifest.” He also waged vindictive warfare against them and attempted to force Greek culture upon them and, since Epicureanism was the court philosophy, there can be little doubt that this was part of his program. It is on record that a gymnasium was built in Jerusalem,29 abhorrent to the orthodox Jew not only as an alien institution but specifically because of nudity in sports and the threat of sodomite practices associated with it. It signified also the virtual licensing of public teachers free of priestly control. That some progress was made in this direction is evidenced by the word Ecclesiastes, which means public teacher. Moreover, the book that goes under this name is abundantly sprinkled with atoms of Epicureanism; it was squeezed into the canon only by drastic and incongruous editing.

It derives its startling literary quality from the combination of luminous Hebraic imagery with the stark materialism of Epicurus. Consider, for example, the following, 9:4-5: “A living dog is better than a dead lion, for the living know that they shall die but the dead know not anything.” Here we see transposed into the Hebraic idiom of thought the doctrine of the Garden that the most precious of all things is life itself and “that death is nothing to us”; it is anesthesia. The opinion has been expressed that the author was a Jewish physician of the time of Antiochus Epiphanes.

The hatred of the orthodox Jew for the heretical teaching is on record to this day in the rabbinical term apikoros, “unbeliever.” Jewish students were exhorted “to study the Law and know how to make answer to an unbeliever [lit. “Epicurean”].”

It may be added that, even apart from attempts at cultural regimentation, an opening had been afforded for the infiltration of Epicurean doctrines among the Jews by the division between Pharisees and Sadducees. The beliefs of the latter, as recorded by Josephus,32 including the denial of divine providence and the assertion of free will, exhibit an unmistakable coincidence with the teachings of Epicurus. This coincidence is the more noticeable because the reluctance of the Sadducees to hold public office is likewise mentioned. That Epicurus was in the mind of Josephus when penning his account of this sect, even if not mentioned by name, becomes the more probable when it is recalled that his defense of the prophet Daniel concludes with a spirited and extended diatribe against Epicurus and his views on the government of the universe. On this occasion the arch-heretic is specifically named.”

Colotes and Idomeneus of Lampsacus - "Also Colotes and Idomeneus, both of Lampsacus. They too were distinguished." [Diogenes Laertius 25]

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Colotes of Lampsacus (Greek: Κολώτης Λαμψακηνός, Kolōtēs Lampsakēnos; c. 320 – after 268 BC)^[1] was a pupil of Epicurus. He wrote a work to prove "That it is impossible even to live according to the doctrines of the other philosophers" (ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἐστιν) and dedicated it to Ptolemy II Philadelphus. Although this work is lost, its arguments are preserved in two works written by Plutarch in refutation of it: "That it is impossible even to live pleasantly according to Epicurus", and Against Colotes.^[2] According to Plutarch, Colotes attacked Socrates and other great philosophers in this work. Some fragments of two other works of Colotes have been discovered at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum: Against Plato's Lysis,^[3] and Against Plato's Euthydemus.^[4] According to Plutarch, Colotes, upon hearing Epicurus discourse on the nature of things, fell on his knees before him, and besought Epicurus to give him instruction. Plutarch claims that Colotes was a great favorite with Epicurus, who used, by way of endearment, to call him Koλωτάρας and Koλωτάριoς. Cicero also recounts that Colotes held that it is unworthy of the truthfulness of a philosopher to use fables in his teaching, a notion which Cicero opposes.^[5]

1. ^ Dorandi 1999, p. 51.
2. ^ Plutarch, Essays and Miscellanies: "That it is impossible even to live pleasantly according to Epicurus"; "Against Colotes".
3. ^ PHerc. 208
4. ^ PHerc. 1032
5. ^ Cicero, On The Commonwealth, vi. 7.

Colotes van Lampsacus

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Colotes van Lampsacus ( Oudgrieks : Κολώτης / Kolōtēs) was a student of Epicurus .

In several works he defended his master's teachings, sometimes fiercely attacking older philosophers - such as Socrates . ^[1] He was most likely a teacher of Menedemus of Lampsacus , which seems to be confirmed by two discussions between him and Menedemus about poetry preserved on papyri from the Villa dei papiri in Herculaneum . ^[2]

Zeno of Sidon - Scholarch (7th): (c. 166 – 75 BCE) Scholarch from 125 to 75 BCE

Zeno of Sidon

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Zeno of Sidon (Greek: Ζήνων ὁ Σιδώνιος; c. 150 – c. 75 BC^[1]) was a Greek Epicurean philosopher^[2] from the Seleucid city of Sidon. His writings have not survived, but there are some epitomes of his lectures preserved among the writings of his pupil Philodemus.

Life[edit]

Zeno was born in the city of Sidon. He was a contemporary of Cicero, who heard him when at Athens.^[3][4]

He was sometimes termed the "leading Epicurean." (Latin: Coryphaeus Epicureorum)^[3] Cicero states that Zeno was contemptuous of other philosophers, and even called Socrates "the Attic Buffoon (scurram Atticum)."^[5] He was a disciple of Apollodorus,^[6] and Cicero and Diogenes Laërtius both describe him as an accurate and polished thinker.^[7][3][8]

Philosophy[edit]

Zeno held that happiness is not merely dependent upon present enjoyment and prosperity, but also on a reasonable expectation of their continuance and appreciation.^[7][4]

Zeno's writings have not survived, but among the charred papyrus remains at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum, there is an Epitome of Conduct and Character from the Lectures of Zeno written by his pupil Philodemus. It contains the essays On Frank Criticism^[9] and On Anger.^[10]

Zeno also studied the philosophy of mathematics based on the derivation of all knowledge from experience. He criticized Euclid, seeking to show that deductions from the fundamental principles (Koinē Greek: ἀρχαί) of geometry cannot, on their own, be proved:

Quote

[Some] admit the principles but deny that the propositions coming after the principles can be demonstrated unless they grant something that is not contained in the principles. This method of controversy was followed by Zeno of Sidon, who belonged to the school of Epicurus, and against whom Posidonius has written a whole book.^[11]

Dionysius of Lamptrai - Scholarch (3rd): (c. 280 – 205 BCE) from 219/8 to 205 BCE Wikipedia

Dionysius of Lamptrai (Ancient Greek: Διονύσιος; fl. 3rd century BC) was an Epicurean philosopher, who succeeded Polystratus as the head (scholarch) of the Epicurean school at Athens c. 219 BC. He died c. 205 BC and was succeeded by Basilides.^[1][2]

References

[edit]

1. ^ Laërtius, Diogenes (1925). "Epicurus" . Lives of the Eminent Philosophers. Vol. 2:10. Translated by Hicks, Robert Drew (Two volume ed.). Loeb Classical Library. § 25.
2. ^ Dorandi, Tiziano (1999). "Chapter 2: Chronology". In Algra, Keimpe; et al. (eds.). The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 52. ISBN 9780521250283.

Polystratus - Scholarch (2nd): (c. 300 – 219/8 BCE) from 250 to 219/8 BCE. Polystratus (Greek: Πολύστρατος; fl. 3rd century BC) ; died 219/18 BCE) was an Epicurean philosopher, and head (scholarch) of the Epicurean school in Athens. He succeeded Hermarchus as head of the sect c. 250 BC, and was himself succeeded by Dionysius of Lamptrai when he died 219 or 218 BC. Valerius Maximus relates that Polystratus and Hippoclides were born on the same day, followed the sect of the same master Epicurus, shared their patrimony in common, and supported the school together, and at last died at the same moment in extreme old age. Fragments of two of his works survive among the scrolls found at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum. The first is On Irrational Contempt, which is a polemic directed "against those who irrationally despise popular beliefs." His opponents in the work may be the Cynics or the Skeptics. The second preserved work is entitled On Philosophy, of which only broken fragments can be deciphered. Wikipedia

"There was also Polyaenus, son of Athenodorus, of Lampsacus, a modest and friendly man, as Philodemus and his followers say.' [ Diogenes Laertius 24] Polyaenus was the son of Athenodorus. His friendship with Epicurus started after the latter's escape from Mytilene in 307 or 306 BC when he opened a philosophical school at Lampsacus associating himself with other citizens of the town, like Pythocles, Colotes, and Idomeneus. With these fellow citizens he moved to Athens, where they founded a school of philosophy with Epicurus as head, or hegemon, while Polyaenus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus were kathegemones. A man of mild and friendly manners, as Philodemus refers, he adopted fully the philosophical system of his friend, and, although he had previously acquired great reputation as a mathematician, he now maintained with Epicurus the worthlessness of geometry.[1][2] But the statement may be at least doubted, since it is certain Polyaenus wrote a mathematical work called Puzzles (Greek: Aπoριαι) in which the validity of geometry is maintained. It was against this treatise that another Epicurean, Demetrius Lacon, wrote Unsolved questions of Polyaenus (Greek: Πρὸς τὰς Πoλυαίνoυ ἀπoρίας) in the 2nd century BCE. Like Epicurus, a considerable number of spurious works seem to have been assigned to him; one of these was Against the Orators, whose authenticity was attacked both by Zeno of Sidon and his pupil Philodemus. The works attributed to Polyaenus include: On Definitions, On Philosophy, Against Aristo, Puzzles (Aporiai), On the Moon, Against the Orators, His collected Letters. Wikipedia.

Hermarchus - Scholarch (1st): (c. 325 – 250 BCE) Scholarch from 270 to 250 BCE. "Also Hermarchus, Epicurus’ successor, son of Agemortus, of Mytilene, the son of a poor father, and at first a student of rhetoric. His best books are said to be these twenty-two essays in the form of letters On Empedocles. On Science. Against Plato. Against Aristotle. He was a good man and died of paralysis." [ Diogenes Laertius 25]

"Epicurus had many disciples, but among the most distinguished was first Metrodorus, son of Athenaeus (or Timocrates) and Sande, of Lampsacus. From the time when he first came to know Epicurus he never left him, except when he went to his native city for six months, and then he came back. [23] He was a good man in all respects, as Epicurus too bears witness in prologues to his writings and in the third book of his Timocrates. Such was his character: his sister Batis he married to Idomeneus, and had for his own mistress Leontion the Athenian hetaera. He was imperturbable in the face of trouble and of death, as Epicurus says in the first book of his Metrodorus. They say that he died at the age of fifty-two, seven years before Epicurus, and of this Epicurus gives evidence, since in the will already quoted he makes provision for the care of his children, implying that he had already died. [He had also as a disciple Timocrates, Metrodorus’ brother, who has been mentioned already, an aimless person.] [24] Metrodorus’ writings were as follows: Three books Against the Physicians. About Sensations. To Timocrates. Concerning Magnanimity. About Epicurus’ Ill Health. Against the Logicians. Nine books Against the Sophists. Concerning the Path To Wisdom. Concerning Change. Concerning Wealth. Against Democritus. Concerning Nobility of Birth." [Diogenes Laertius 22-24]

"Epicurus, son of Neocles and Chaerestrata, was an Athenian of the deme of Gargettus, and the family of the Philaidae, as Metrodorus says in his work on Nobility of Birth. Heraclides in his epitome of Sotion and others say that the Athenians having colonized Samos, Epicurus was brought up there. In his eighteenth year, as they say, he came to Athens, when Xenocrates was at the Academy and Aristotle was living in Chalcis. After the death of Alexander of Macedon, when the Athenians were driven out of Samos by Perdiccas, he went to join his father in Colophon. Having stayed there some time and gathered disciples he returned again to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates. For a while he joined with others in the study of philosophy, but later taught independently, when he had founded the school called after him. He tells us himself that he first made acquaintance with philosophy at the age of fourteen. Apollodorus the Epicurean in the first book of his Life of Epicurus says that he took to philosophy because he despised the teachers of literature, since they were not able to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod. Hermippus says that Epicurus was at one time a schoolmaster and then after he met with the writings of Democritus, he took eagerly to philosophy." [Diogenes Laertius 01-02]

I think your observations are spot on, Titus. If we were to try to really put our fingers on the issue, I think it would be that "Humanism" is essentially Platonic-Aristotelian-Stoic in presuming that there is an ideal form of "the good" somewhere which they can identify and then conform to. And that's where Epicurus takes the fundamentally different position that no such thing exists, and that instead nature gives us only the feelings of pleasure and pain from which to determine what to choose and what to avoid.

Humanists certainly want to be "happy" too, but they have a fundamentally different view of the universe and think that they can identify a single "good" to which they can (and everyone should) conform. Ultimately I don't think the philosophy issue is any more complicated than that.

But on the social level there is an inbuilt absolutism in Platonism - Arostotelianism - Stoicism - Humanism which, when the chips are down, would not make them friendly to Epicurean perspectives.

Most of us are lucky enough to live at a time and place where we can pick and choose our friends and go our own way relatively easily. However I don't think that will remain the case forever. The tensions of the world that we won't discuss due to the politics rule have placed "censorship" issues front and center, and pressures that may be used today for purposes we find agreeable can very easily grow into pressures that can be used against anyone who dissents from the "party line."

And I think one deduction you can make about Epicurean philosophy is that it attracts people who do not adhere to party lines and encourages their independence..

Is that a fatal flaw that doomed organized Epicureanism in the ancient world and dooms to always be like herding cats in the shadows? I don't think so. I think we can reinforce the non political center of the philosophy and form a non political team that can survive even in the face of organized censorship from the opposing schools.

It's probable that certain tactics we associate with opponents of Epicurus, such as organized meetings and support structures, will be needed. But Epicurus built into the philosophy an inherent bias against radical skepticism and radical reductionism, and I think those enable us to find a common ground of core viewpoints that can bring a group of people together at least as well as Humanism or other social organizations.

This is likely to be a short thread because after thinking about it I am not sure the thought is very useful. However it might spur some thought that will be more productive.

We find justice pleasurable, do we not? So justice is a pleasure (?) What if we applied the reasoning about justice in PD33-38 to pleasure by substituting "pleasure" for "justice" and making just enough modification in the rest of the text to make sense. Would we see any useful parallels in terms of how both justice and pleasure are valuable and desirable but not measurable in absolute terms that apply across numbers of people?

I am not really satisfied with the following construction but this is a first draft of such an attempt:

33. Pleasure never is anything in itself, but in the experience of men, alone or with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of agreeable feeling.

34. Pain is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape unendurable pain.

35. It is not possible for one who disregards the nature of pain (that pain is light if long, short if sharp, and escapable by death) to be confident of living pleasurably, even if, at present, he escapes unendurable pain a thousand times. For up to the time of death he cannot be certain that he will indeed escape unendurable pain.

36. In its general aspect, pleasure is the same for all, for it is a kind of agreeable feeling in the experience of men; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a man, or a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be pleasurable for all.

37. Among actions which are sanctioned by the feeling of pleasure, that which is proved, on examination, to lead to more pleasure than pain has the guarantee of pleasure, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man chooses an action, and it does not turn out to lead to more pleasure than pain, then it no longer has the essential nature of pleasure. And even if the dominance of pleasurable result over painful result shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the dominance of pleasure, it is nonetheless pleasurable for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered pleasurable have been shown not to lead to more pleasure than pain in actual practice, then they are not to be chosen. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which produced more pleasure than pain no longer lead to that result, those actions were to be chosen at the time, when they were of advantage in producing more pleasure than pain, but subsequently they are no longer to be chosen, when no longer productive of more pain than pleasure.

-----

Does the analogy hold up at all? If so what might it help clarify? If it doesn't hold up, why not? -- Seeing why it does or does not hold up might itself lead to a helpful observations about both justice and pleasure.

That looks great Nate! I don't see a button where a printed version can be purchased but I presume that you are working on that?

I think it could be fruitful to look at the words being translated as "intensity" to see if they might perhaps be more related to issues of quantity or limit rather than what we might term "sharpness" or "depth of feeling."

I see, for example, that one of the phrases currently on the top of the forum uses the word intensity:

On Ends Book 2, III - Rackham / Loeb

Cicero: Still, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?" Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible."

But according to the Rackham Loeb edition, the Latin word there is "maxima" .....

... and given our discussions lately I think we need to be careful about how we are interpreting what "maximum pleasure" refers to.

It seems to me that it is easy to understand that if we are talking about "all our awareness" then if 100% of our awareness is engaged in feeling pleasure, then that would be the limit of pleasure.

However (and this of course the point we are discussing now) if there are various types of pleasure, and we aren't specifying whether 100% of our awareness is occupied with fingernail clipping or joy of mind in conversing with our friends, then we need to be aware that there might be varying types of maximum pleasure.

Again this is easy to see I think in regard to thinking about the example that Epicurus on his last day was experiencing both pleasure (of mind) and pain (of body) and offsetting one against the other. We're constantly in day to day life offsetting pleasures against pain. There is no 'salvation' or "sum of it all" moment in which everything gets added up to a "final" tally. it seems to me that there is no "Total absence of pain" except as a thought construction that doesn't happen unless you sit around thinking about your life in summary, and doesn't exist except in your conceptualization of it.

So if Epicurus was equating "absence of pain" with "pleasure" he was likely referring at least as much to everyday discrete experiences as he was to some theoretical summary of a person's life (if indeed he ever thought in those terms at all).

If all or a significant part of this reasoning is true, then I think that when we do choose to talk about 100% pleasure = total absence of pain we should be talking about discrete "slices of life," and that would mean that "absence of pain," even though described as 100% and therefore at a maximum of quantity, is saying nothing regarding the quality of what I think most of us mean when we use the word "intensity."

At the hazard of this being a tangent I am reminded of color controls on a televison (at least old style CRT TVs I grew up with). Televisions have controls for Color/Hue, Saturation and Brightness. Is there a possible analogy that "pure pleasure" is like "pure yellow" in that it is 100% yellow? The yellow control may be set at 100% yellow, yet the various settings of "saturation" and "brightness" of the yellow make the different settings readily distinguishable. So my question to throw out there would be:

When PD09 refers to "intensity," location, and duration, are we talking about how pleasures differ from one another and how saying "absence of pain = 100% pleasure" does not tell us all we need to know about which pleasure to choose?

PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another. [3]

Edit: I am saying several things in this post so let me separate them:

(1) I am doubting that "intensity" is the best word for us to use in saying that "the total absence of pain is the most intense pleasure." Most people don't translate PD03 as saying "the most intense pleasure is the absence of pain," they say "limit of quantity of pleasure." Seems to me that the more likely analogy is that "the total absence of pain is the "purest" pleasure, and whether we perceive it to be the most "intense feeling " needs to be a subject of discussion over what "intense" really means. I doubt most people consider "intense" feeling to be the same as the most "pure" feeling.

(2) The related point is that when the Epicureans were making statements to the effect that "the highest pleasure is the total absence of pain" that word "highest" is not meant to imply that there is an absolute scale of pleasure that everyone experiences in the same way. What is highest for one person may be totally different for another person, and whether we are talking about "ataraxia" or "the highest pleasure" status for even a single person may be different for that same person at different times and circumstances (and therefore we should act accordingly to distinguish and pursue the type we feel to be most pleasurable to us).

Maybe this all resolves down to the question: "Is 'the limit of pleasure' the same experience for everyone?" Maybe the answer to that is clearly no, and I am simply feeling the need to make the issue clear because I am under the continuing influence of the religious and romantic and egalitarian idea that everyone has access to the same type of "salvation experience" basking in the presence of god." At this point in my efforts to apply Epicurus' views consistently, I cannot imagine that he held that to be the case, but the issue seems so important that this conclusion should not be left to implication.

I was not aware that there was a major Greek movie dramatizing the story of Iphigenia. I have not watched it so I cannot recommend it, but I thought I would create a thread about it and see if anyone has (or takes) the time to see it.

Might be an in interesting way to internalize a major scene from De Rerum Natura.

Greek language with English subtitles:

Quote from Don

Those feelings are going to be either pleasurable or painful (positive or negative).

But within "pleasurable" and "painful" are there not obviously degrees or pleasurable or painful? And are we not going to choose those pleasures which we find to be more pleasurable than others?

Saying that 100% pleasure is the height of pleasure is one thing, but is "height" the same for everyone in all circumstances? 100% is, yes, but what if two vessels that are 100% full are different sizes? Are the different sizes and therefore quantities and qualities of pleasures they contain of no relevance?

Quote from Pacatus

I forgot this, and just wanted to say that, although Utilitarianism influenced neoclassical economics (efficient choice based on “marginal utility”), the notion of cardinal utility (“utils”) was dropped. Constrained choice, based on relative preference, became the model. And in no way am I advocating for that former utilitarian position.

I haven't read far enough into this to know the history, and I am not sure that I have the time to go there. But you're not stating why the notion of "cardinal utility" was dropped, and I suspect I am in agreement that "cardinal utility" is indeed something worthy of discussion that should not be dropped. If "relative preference" is a reference to how "other people" view pleasure and that leads to "the greatest good for the greatest number," then I would say that is the erroneous track, and the right track is to indeed analyze what "for you" brings you the greatest pleasure.

I think we're still on the same initial question. Some pleasures are more pleasing to me/you/everyone than others, correct, and should we not discuss the reasoning as to why that is the case?

Yes, that's exactly my read and reaction too Don. The writer of the handout was taking the position that the Epicurean response to attacks on "pleasure" was to redefine pleasure as painlessness/tranquility/ataraxia. That's the prevailing view, which we have seen many places, that the only purpose of kinetic pleasure is to achieve katastematic pleasure, because of course it is, because painlessness can't mean ordinary pleasure, can it? That would fly in the face of our stoic-friendly view of Epicurus that all we want in life is tranquility!

Yikes:

I don't think that's the Epicurean response at all! But presuming that this comment reflect's the writer's opinion (I am unclear about that) I do think this illustrates the dangers of the modern anti-Epicurean / pro Cicero position very well!

As background material on one of the issues raised today, the following is a collection of material from Cicero that gives background to the "animality" objection he is raising against Epicurus. This is a handout I received many years ago, and I gather that it was written by someone not supportive of Epicurus, and I don't endorse the commentary in it. For example: "Cicero portrays the Epicurean account of pleasure as a dialectically unsatisfying and empirically problematic muddle. Cicero thinks that Epicureanism is fully committed to denying intrinsic value to everything other than painlessness, and he objects to this in two ways. In both respects, Cicero's critique seems entirely fair and plausible.") Saying that I don't endorse the commentary is an understatement!

But it's an excellent collection of quotes and does a good job of bringing together Cicero's argument against looking to the infants, which will help us as we do our own analysis.

Today's episode contains some very challenging material, but the final result should be worthwhile. We're covering a section where Cicero lays out various options on what the goal of life could be (1 - pleasure, 2- virtue, 3 - absence of pain) and how those options might be chosen singly or combined with one or more of the others. Cicero also brings up Epicurus' argument that we should look to young living things for help in making this decision, and whether pleasure is a "primary natural endowment." Once we release the episode we'll see the need to bring more clarity to some of these issues, and we'll want to discuss here in the thread what we think Cicero really means. We'll be appreciative of your comments - I will get this edited and posted over the next several days and we'll have lots to talk about.