Posts by Cassius

Quote from Little Rocker

I don't want to be Pollyanna here, but it seems you can both have this point--pleasure is pleasure, and all of it is good in itself--but only some strategies for pursuing it consistently bring about and sustain the most desirable state. As in the Letter to Menoeceus, all pleasures are good, but only some are choiceworthy.

Yes, I agree, BOTH points are true, but I do think it is important to observe that BOTH points are true.

And I agree that you are right that both 10 and 11 are parallel - but I would say that depending upon whether one is debating philosophy, or giving personal advice to a friend, either perspective could be appropriate to emphasize.

And if I were an Epicurus or a Diogenes of Oinoanda seeking to etch "in stone" a summary of my message to all future generations, and to point out why virtually everyone else has things upside down, I'd find at least as much reason to come at this from a "grand philosophical point" perspective as I would from a "here's my personal observation, your mileage may vary" perspective.

Quote from Don

I don't think the language supports that interpretation, especially in light of the letter to Menoikeus. It seems to me he's giving practical advice in PD10, not necessarily making a grand philosophical point. I

Yes, that is exactly the point we have generally differed in the past, and continue to differ (respectfully!) While I agree with the practical observation that a life of profligacy will not generally lead to a good result, to me the "grand philosophical point" (a good way to describe it) is the overriding "take-away" that justifies its inclusion as a principal doctrine.

PS - I am not sure who Epicurus would have pointed to as someone who at least seems to provide such an example of profligacy being rewarded, but I gather that some later Romans might have cited Sulla, who apparently lived a pretty dissolute life and yet arguably never suffered for it, at least not in any proportion as he apparently deserved.

Quote

As promised, when his tasks were complete, Sulla returned his powers and withdrew to his country villa near Puteoli to be with his family. Plutarch states in his Life of Sulla that he retired to a life spent in dissolute luxuries, and he "consorted with actresses, harpists, and theatrical people, drinking with them on couches all day long." From this distance, Sulla remained out of the day-to-day political activities in Rome, intervening only a few times when his policies were involved (e.g. the execution of Granius, shortly before his own death).^[143][144]

His public funeral in Rome (in the Forum, in the presence of the whole city) was on a scale unmatched until that of Augustus in AD 14. Sulla's body was brought into the city on a golden bier, escorted by his veteran soldiers, and funeral orations were delivered by several eminent senators, with the main oration possibly delivered by Lucius Marcius Philippus or Hortensius. Sulla's body was cremated and his ashes placed in his tomb in the Campus Martius.^[150] An epitaph, which Sulla composed himself, was inscribed onto the tomb, reading, "No friend ever served me, and no enemy ever wronged me, whom I have not repaid in full."^[151] Plutarch claims he had seen Sulla's personal motto carved on his tomb on the Campus Martius. The personal motto was "no better friend, no worse enemy."

Don I wish you had been at our Zoom last night to discuss with Kalosyni her Boeing astronaut / rocket ship question. Pursuing that at some point would advance this discussion too, because she has a position on what Epicurus would say to those astronauts that raises a lot of questions.

I think this current issue of how to look at virtue and psychological hedonism is in the same category.

It appears to me that we have to accept that Epicurus was using the terms "pleasure" and "gods" and even "virtue" in a totally nonstandard way, and that he was asserting that changing the paradigm on how those terms are used is essential for happy living.

That's why I see the "logical extreme" interpretation of PD10 as so important -- I see Epicurus as saying that "IF we look at things his way," then a "pleasurable life" is a "pleasurable life" no matter what type of pleasure it contains, because we are using the term pleasure in a logically consistent way. From that perspective PD10 is an in-your-face assertion that pleasure is pleasure is pleasure.

I interpret your view of PD10 as focusing on the "but it won't work because it is not possible part." Yes in practical terms that is true, but stopping there does not advance the philosophical argument.

Looking at things in a conceptually rigorous way, "IF a life of debauchery did in fact bring a pleasurable life" means that for purposes of discussion we are accepting that result -- and thus we would have no problem with such a person.

Staying with the "But it won't work" never gets you to the point - which is that pleasure must be seen as pleasure no matter what type of pleasure it is, if we are going to be able to discuss these things coherently.

Similarly, "gods" must be seen as non-supernatural and non-omniscient and non-omnipotent, no matter how many people disagree.

"Pleasure" must be seen as *every* experience of life that is not specifically painful, no matter how vigorously Cicero disagrees.

And "virtue" must be seen as totally contextual (that action which leads to pleasure) regardless of how strongly the religious and rationalist absolutists object.

Yes Don and I sound like we are very far apart but I don't think we really are. I think we're mainly talking "context" of when certain words are appropriate and when they are not.

Quote from Little Rocker

I've never quite known what to do with Epicurus' insistence that virtuous people will experience the greatest pleasure and that people who experience the greatest pleasure must be virtuous.

I can't figure out any way to reconcile that other than to conclude that Epicurus is drastically modifying the usage of the term "virtue" just like he is drastically modifying the usage of the terms "gods" and "pleasure." It seems to me that the only way to make sense of it is that Epicurus is deleting the "absolute" aspect that everyone else alleges to be a requirement of virtue, and declaring classification of a thing as virtuous to be relative to the result that it brings. His view seems to me to be that If an action does not in fact lead to "pleasure," then that action is by Epicurean definition not "wise," or "just," or "courageous," or any other usage of a term of virtue.

Quote from Don

Someone may say they're doing it because of "duty" but my contention will continue to be that they're doing because it feels good to say "I did my duty."

Yes your contention will remain that, and the professor of psychological hedonism can say that to his patient all day long as a means of diagnosing that person's psychology. And in turn the person who is being accused of being a "psychological hedonist," but who in fact sees himself as a person of strong religious or humanist belief, can deny that label all day long.

In the meantime, in the real world of people who want to think about options as to how they can change their beliefs and thought processes in order to live better, rather than just talk past each other, it is useful first and foremost make this basic conceptual / philosophical point:

1. Duty is not inherently pleasurable.
2. Piety is not inherently pleasurable.
3. Virtue is not inherently pleasurable.
4. Only pleasure is inherently pleasurable.

Then afterwards if a professor wants to discuss a clinical diagnosis of erroneous behavior, for example as to why a person might consider himself to be devoted to "duty," then terms like "psychological hedonism" will allow that professor to write cool articles for "Psychology Today."

But for ordinary people who just want plain talk about how to live better, the approach found in pages of "Psychology Today" are not the first place to start. The writers in Psychology Today will talk themselves in circles about different ways to diagnose conditions, without ever taking a firm position on what "mental health" actually looks like.

The place to start is for example the letter to Menoeceus: "[129] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good."

Clarification: I am not criticizing your particlar use of the term, Don, or saying that you are talking past anyone. I have this same problem whenever the term "psychological hedonism" comes up in any context. It seems to me that applying the term "psychological hedonism" rarely if ever leads to anything useful. For much the same reason I really don't like the term "hedonism" either. It conveys all the wrong implications in modern usage that even the word "pleasure" does not have, so I personally never like to talk about Epicurean philosophy as "hedonism" or "hedonist." I understand the technical labels in a technical context but I find them very harmful in regular usage. Adding "psychological" to "hedonism" to me just adds a "deterministic" overlay that, from an Epicurean point of view, just digs the hole deeper.

I think before I comment further I better read back into the history of the thread more closely because:

Quote from Don

What I'm trying to convey is that humans don't make decisions based on "evolutionary" considerations. Humans make decisions based primarily on self-interest, or perceived self-interest, what they feel will lead to pleasure for them. That's the root of psychological hedonism as I understand it.

And yes psychological hedonism came up last night too so I definitely see that term as related, but I continue to find the term confusing at best. Just because people make decisions based on what they think is in their self-interest does not in my mind advance the analysis of whether they are in fact acting to pursue "pleasure." And the analysis of whether they are in fact acting to pursue pleasure, rather than in pursuit of "duty" or "piety" or some other consideration, is the main issue worth discussing because it's the way to practical changes in behavior. We can discuss "duty" or "piety" in terms of the pleasure they bring all day long, but in the end what we're trying to accomplish is to decide if "duty" or "piety" are in themselves pleasurable, or whether they or anything else is worth pursuing only because they bring pleasure as a result of pursuing them.

Yes this whole sidebar discussion may be more confusing and awkward than it is worth.

Confession: I have been distracted and not read each post in this thread thoroughly. However I did read Don's last post and had this immediate question:

Quote from Don

While we are the products of evolution, we don't make choices and rejections based on evolutionary considerations in the here and now in this one life that we have.

Would that not be better worded with some kind of caveat that "we need to be cautious in making choices based on evolutionary considerations..." rather than "we don't...." because:

- in fact many people often "do" make choices that way, even though it "may" be shortsighted.... and

- in an Epicurean perspective without fate or necessity or a providential god force, '"sometimes" a decision to go against the generally-observable rule (I gather we all agree that the general rule is to the effect that blindly following evolution in every case is generally a bad idea) will in fact work out and be the proper choice in some circumstances?

I suspect Don's wording in context probably presumes that this is a "general rule" and not an "ironclad rule" but I tend to worry that there are too many people who think that Epicurus' observations about how behavior generally but not always leads to particular results are intended to be "ironclad" rules from which never to deviate, which I think would not be likely to be the way he intended them.

I also say this in context that I think Don and I sometimes come across as interpreting PD10 differently on this very point I am bringing up here, even though I don't think our positions are actually very different. I see PD10 as emphasizing the very point that I want to be sure is not misunderstood here.

Also, for those who were on the Zoom call last night, I raise this also because of the example we discussed about the current Boeing astronauts who are having difficulty getting launched into space. We "generally" don't undertake high-risk activities that could lead to death, but "sometimes" we consider the reward in pleasure / reduction of pain worth the risk, even of death.

I suspect Don and I here too are in full agreement, but we express the issue slightly differently.

A "laughing Epicurus" by Kalosyni -- can you post the AI generator and code used to produce this?

Post

RE: The Facial Expression of Epicurus

Just for fun I put into an AI image generator: "laughing Epicurus" and this is what I got, and these strike me as being not very photogenic. Others who posted here in this thread above have way much better stuff (especially those which are human made art), but I decided to post these anyway because these bring up the human quality of emotions. Even though we see and think of the stern face of Epicurus in carved busts, he was a human being with emotions.

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/4794/

Kalosyni

June 3, 2024 at 8:22 AM

I agree that the result is not particularly flattering, but the overall look and feel of the AI generation is very impressive.

We need a thread giving information on what AI generators are used, and listing the "instructions" given to the generator, so that more people can get experience in making these as foundations for new meme material.

Update: We already have one. It would be highly desirable to get this conversation going with specific tips on how to do this.

Thread

Using New Technology To Produce More Effective Memes

In addition to the new graphics that Nate's wife has been producing, I see that @Bryan has produced some new work that apparently also uses new technology.

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/gallery/image/726/

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/gallery/image/725/

When I combine my reaction to these new images with Kalosyni's recent efforts towards "motivational posters" and "pamphlets" it seems like we ought to be able to combine the two to produce striking presentations not only of persons but also…

Cassius

November 27, 2023 at 10:54 AM

Over the years I've noticed that our "Quiz" section is pretty popular, even though we've done very little to improve it or promote it. If you have the time, I'd like to encourage you to consider compiling a list of questions and answers that we can use to expand the Quiz section and make it more useful.

All we really need to make it better are new questions of general interest, followed by a set of three or four multiple choice answers, only one of which is correct.

If you have the time and interest to work on such a project, send me a message in the conversation system, or post below, and we'll gladly incorporate your suggestions into new quizzes. I can't promise to incorporate all suggestions, as no doubt some will be better than others, but even suggestions that require modification will be fuel for improving the system.

Especially if you're new to reading Epicurus and are finding new discoveries to be particularly interesting, let us know your suggestions as those will no doubt help others as well.

Welcome To the EpicureanFriends Quiz Page! - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Martin and I discussed this briefly yesterday from the viewpoint of the possible "weirdness" of feeling empathy for a non-living being, with there being a question of exactly what is at the root of that feeling. It seems like a very interesting question to me and I plan to look up and watch both movies, neither of which have I seen at this point (which sort of limits my commentary for the moment).

Happy Birthday to Plantpierogi! Learn more about Plantpierogi and say happy birthday on Plantpierogi's timeline: Plantpierogi

We've recently been working on a new "Getting Started" page to feature here at the forum. When you get a chance please look it over and post below if you can think of suggestions for additions, clarifications, or corrections to any part. I think we currently have "most" of our major resources listed, but in going through them I'm pleased to say that we have so many that some of them may be missing.

Let us know any suggestions:

Getting Started - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

After we go through a couple of revisions we'll probably add a banner for a while to highlight the new page. The page will also always be findable as the first item in the "Home" drop-down menu.

I noted this morning thanks to joshua that the main forum logo was not centered on the home page for the "Colorplay Blue" style. I am not sure why that was the case as I thought I fixed it during the last style upgrade. I have fixed it now, but the fact i didn't fix it already makes me worry there might have been a reason why i didn't fix it before

At any rate, if anyone has any issues with the main logo placement (left-justified vs center justified) in any theme they are using, please let me know and I will fix that.

Most people are probably using cell phones most of the time and this isn't much of an issue, but on laptop or larger screen people might have a preference.

Here's an outline of where we are going in this and the next several episodes:

• It is wrong to allege that pure spirit can join with matter to produce the universe, because why would spirit mutilate itself by joining with mortal matter, if spirit were able to exist separately?
  1. Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God, and that he was generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as if air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most beautiful form. Besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject to mortality?
  2. [XI] Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaximenes, was the first who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be contrived and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in which infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction of sense and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature herself could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort of animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence that animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more internal than the mind? Let it, therefore, be clothed with an external body. But this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any substance annexed to it.
  3. Alcmæon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he was ascribing immortality to mortal beings.
  4. Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part of the Deity must likewise be afflicted, which cannot be. If the human mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how could that Deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused into, the world?
  5. XII. Empedocles, who erred in many things, is most grossly mistaken in his notion of the Gods. He lays down four natures84 as divine, from which he thinks that all things were made. Yet it is evident that they have a beginning, that they decay, and that they are void of all sense.
• Allegations that infinity is an attribute of divinity are also wrong.
  1. Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite.
  2. Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat around the heavens; this he calls God; in which there is no room to imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honor he gives to the stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here, having already done it in another place.
• It is useless to look to someone who says that he does not even know if gods exist.
  1. Protagoras did not seem to have any idea of the real nature of the Gods; for he acknowledged that he was altogether ignorant whether there are or are not any, or what they are.
• Those who say that gods are not everlasting destroy the true concept of divinity.
  1. What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle through which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies likewise our knowledge and understanding. Is he not involved in a very great error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he denies that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely destroy the Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him?
• Those who attribute sense to formlessness are also wrong.
  1. Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it?
• The Academy, including Plato and Xenophon and Antisthenes held ideas of the gods that were inconsistent and unintelligible.
  1. It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato’s opinion; for, in his Timæus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one great father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he thinks we ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of the Deity. And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being without any body—what the Greeks call ἀσώματος—it is certainly quite unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true; for such a God must then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence, and pleasure; all which things are comprehended in our notion of the Gods. He likewise asserts in his Timæus, and in his Laws, that the world, the heavens, the stars, the mind, and those Gods which are delivered down to us from our ancestors, constitute the Deity. These opinions, taken separately, are apparently false; and, together, are directly inconsistent with each other.
  2. Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the Deity, and makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him likewise as affirming the being of one God only, and at another time of many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took notice of in Plato.
  3. [XIII] Antisthenes, in his book called the Natural Philosopher, says that there are many national and one natural Deity; but by this saying he destroys the power and nature of the Gods. Speusippus is not much less in the wrong; who, following his uncle Plato, says that a certain incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavors to root out of our minds the knowledge of the Gods.
  4. From the same school of Plato, Heraclides of Pontus stuffed his books with puerile tales. Sometimes he thinks the world a Deity, at other times the mind. He attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars. He deprives the Deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the same book again, he makes earth and heaven Deities.
• Aristotle and the Peripatetics, like Plato, were self-contradictory, and wrong in holding that a god has no body.
  1. Aristotle, in his third book of Philosophy, confounds many things together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master Plato. At one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another he asserts that the world is God. Soon afterward he makes some other essence 222preside over the world, and gives it those faculties by which, with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it. Then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be God; not perceiving the firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had described as God. How can that divine sense of the firmament be preserved in so rapid a motion? And where do the multitude of Gods dwell, if heaven itself is a Deity? But when this philosopher says that God is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being. Besides, how can the world move itself, if it wants a body? Or how, if it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy?
  2. Xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear much wiser on this head, for in his books concerning the nature of the Gods no divine form is described; but he says the number of them is eight. Five are moving planets;85 the sixth is contained in all the fixed stars; which, dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are one single Deity; the seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. But in what sense they can possibly be happy is not easy to be understood.
  3. The unsteadiness of Theophrastus is equally intolerable. At one time he attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations. Nor is his disciple Strato, who is called the naturalist, any more worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution, but that it has no sense nor form.
• The Stoics were wrong in holding that “the law of nature” is a divinity, and they are otherwise wrong in thinking that the sky is a god, or that rationality is a god, and in defending the ancient myths as allegories, and in holding that the form of a god is inconceivable, and other ways too.
  1. [XIV] Zeno (to come to your sect, Balbus) thinks the law of nature to be the divinity, and that it has the power to force us to what is right, and to restrain us from what is wrong. How this law can be an animated being I cannot conceive; but that God is so we would certainly maintain. The same person says, in another place, that the sky is God; but can we possibly conceive that God is a being insensible, deaf to our prayers, our wishes, and our vows, and wholly unconnected with us?
  2. In other books he thinks there is a certain rational essence pervading all nature, indued with divine efficacy. He attributes the same power to the stars, to the years, to the months, and to the seasons.
  3. In his interpretation of Hesiod’s Theogony, he entirely destroys the established notions of the Gods; for he excludes Jupiter, Juno, and Vesta, and those esteemed divine, from the number of them; but his doctrine is that these are names which by some kind of allusion are given to mute and inanimate beings.
  4. The sentiments of his disciple Aristo are not less erroneous. He thought it impossible to conceive the form of the Deity, and asserts that the Gods are destitute of sense; and he is entirely dubious whether the Deity is an animated being or not.
  5. Cleanthes, who next comes under my notice, a disciple of Zeno at the same time with Aristo, in one place says that the world is God; in another, he attributes divinity to the mind and spirit of universal nature; then he asserts that the most remote, the highest, the all-surrounding, the all-enclosing and embracing heat, which is called the sky, is most certainly the Deity. In the books he wrote against pleasure, in which he seems to be raving, he imagines the Gods to have a certain form and shape; then he ascribes all divinity to the stars; and, lastly, he thinks nothing more divine than reason. So that this God, whom we know mentally and in the speculations of our minds, from which traces we receive our impression, has at last actually no visible form at all.
  6. [XV] Persæus, another disciple of Zeno, says that they who have made discoveries advantageous to the life of man should be esteemed as Gods; and the very things, he says, which are healthful and beneficial have derived their names from those of the Gods; so that he thinks it not sufficient to call them the discoveries of Gods, but he urges that they themselves should be deemed divine. What can be more absurd than to ascribe divine honors to sordid and deformed things; or to place among the Gods men who are dead and mixed with the dust, to whose memory all the respect that could be paid would be but mourning for their loss?
  7. Chrysippus, who is looked upon as the most subtle interpreter of the dreams of the Stoics, has mustered up a numerous band of unknown Gods; and so unknown that we are not able to form any idea about them, though our mind seems capable of framing any image to itself in its thoughts. For he says that the divine power is placed in reason, and in the spirit and mind of universal nature; that the world, with a universal effusion of its spirit, is God; that the superior part of that spirit, which is the mind and reason, is the great principle of nature, containing and preserving the chain of all things; that the divinity is the power of fate, and the necessity of future events. He deifies fire also, and what I before called the ethereal spirit, and those elements which naturally proceed from it—water, earth, and air. He attributes divinity to the sun, moon, stars, and universal space, the grand container of all things, and to those men likewise who have obtained immortality. He maintains the sky to be what men call Jupiter; the air, which pervades the sea, to be Neptune; and the earth, Ceres. In like manner he goes through the names of the other Deities. He says that Jupiter is that immutable and eternal law which guides and directs us in our manners; and this he calls fatal necessity, the everlasting verity of future events. But none of these are of such a nature as to seem to carry any indication of divine virtue in them. These are the doctrines contained in his first book of the Nature of the Gods. In the second, he endeavors to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer to what he has advanced in the first, in order that the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of these things, may seem to have been Stoics. Diogenes the Babylonian was a follower of the doctrine of Chrysippus; and in that book which he wrote, entitled “A Treatise concerning Minerva,” he separates the account of Jupiter’s bringing-forth, and the birth of that virgin, from the fabulous, and reduces it to a natural construction.

Great post Onenski

Quote from Onenski

Now, for more clarification, the paragraph you quote form Wikipedia takes the metaethical sense of the naturalistic fallacy. The basic idea is that in a naturalistic ethical project (like the Epicurean one, for example), holding that pleasure (or any other natural entity) is good, implies that there's something in pleasure that makes it good. The question is, which property is that and why pleasure has it? For them, it implies that pleasure is a privileged entity, because it has the property of being ethically good. Here, people like Pigliucci may say that pleasure has an evolutionary and instrumental origin, so it can't have the privilege of being the entity with the property of THE Good.

As you may see, this approach looks suspicious, because is taking the naturalistic Epicurean theory in a kind of platonic terms. And then, for surprise of no one, falsify it.

For most of my life if I had read a paragraph like that - even your explanation of it, and not just someone like Pigliucci asserting it - I would have cursed under my breath and walked away convinced that such a person had nothing worthwhile to say whatsoever.

Nowadays my attitude is very different. I see that the word games involved are leaving probably 98% of the people of the world totally defenseless against the arguments of supernatural religion, nihilism, and all sorts of other depressing perspectives. And given that that is my firm conclusion that those arguments cause great practical harm, I don't think "cursing under my breach and walking away"is the appropriate response at all.

The proper response involves (1) recognizing that it doesn't matter whether the arguments are prompted maliciously by fraud or innocently in error, and (2) working appropriately to clearly state an articulate response.

That's where Epicurus comes in.

Welcome to Episode 231 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com.

For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not the same as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In the Epicurean theory of knowledge, all sensations are true, but that does not mean all opinions are true, but that the raw data reported by the senses is reported without the injection of opinion, as the opinion-making process takes place in the mind, where it is subject to mistakes, rather than in the senses. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts show that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius, beginning at the end of Section 10.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here. The text which we include in these posts is the Yonge version, the full version of which is here at Epicureanfriends. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will be maintained here.

Today's Text

XII. Empedocles, who erred in many things, is most grossly mistaken in his notion of the Gods. He lays down four natures as divine, from which he thinks that all things were made. Yet it is evident that they have a beginning, that they decay, and that they are void of all sense.

Protagoras did not seem to have any idea of the real nature of the Gods; for he acknowledged that he was altogether ignorant whether there are or are not any, or what they are.

What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle through which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies likewise our knowledge and understanding. Is he not involved in a very great error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he denies that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely destroy the Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him?

Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it?

It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato’s opinion; for, in his Timæus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one great father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he thinks we ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of the Deity. And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being without any body—what the Greeks call ἀσώματος—it is certainly quite unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true; for such a God must then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence, and pleasure; all which things are comprehended in our notion of the Gods. He likewise asserts in his Timæus, and in his Laws, that the world, the heavens, the stars, the mind, and those Gods which are delivered down to us from our ancestors, constitute the Deity. These opinions, taken separately, are apparently false; and, together, are directly inconsistent with each other.

Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the Deity, and makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him likewise as affirming the being of one God only, and at another time of many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took notice of in Plato.

This is to provide a link for people finding this forum to know that we began a series of podcast discussions of "On The Nature of the Gods" here:

Thread

Episode 226 - Cicero's On The Nature of The Gods - Epicurean Section 01 - Introduction

Welcome to Episode 226 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread…

Cassius

April 21, 2024 at 11:31 AM

I could find ways to nitpick, especially in the area of where she is more willing to link Epicurus to current politics in ways that could be argued in multiple ways, but yes I agree it is up to her normal standards of very pleasant and interesting delivery.

Listening now. I am hoping for the best and will report back - but I always find Catherine Wilson's voice and method of presentation to be attractive - and she's usually pretty negative about the Stoics too.

Interesting to hear her say that she's more into the history of science than in general classical philosophy - not sure i have heard her say that before.