Posts by Cassius

This is going to sound nit-picking but I'm just illustrating the limits of any single term.

"Physicalism," like "materialism," is a word that says nothing about:

(1) canonics - doesn't tell you anything much about the role of logic and reason and how to think.

(2) ethics - doesn't tell you anything about the role of pleasure vs virtue, and really doesn't say much even about the gods, because some (even the Stoics apparently) take the position that supernatural gods are physical.

(3) and it also doesn't tell you anything much, even in physics, about whether the universe is subject to "hard determinism" or whether there is any degree of free agency.

This kind of analysis can be done with probably any single word, because I'm not aware that anyone has come up with essentially the same (or even closely similar) combination of crucial elements that are combined into the philosophy of Epicurus.

Quote from Julia

Bit of a tangent, but I've been wondering for a while: Which adjective (like "orthodox") would best describe the Epicurean philosophy predominant here, on EpicureanFriends? Is there a list contrasting the main branches of Epicurean philosophy somewhere?

On the website I try to refer to it as "Classical Epicurean Philosophy" to distinguish it from the various brands of "neo-Epicureanism" that comes from the major commentators being much more Stoic or Buddhist friendly than down-the-line Epicurean. But that's just an approximation.

There really aren't many people devoted to reconstructing Epicurean philosophy in a pure form in the world today, so it's probably fair to draw the dividing line between those who make an effort to be across-the-board Epicurean, including in issues such as determinism and canonics, vs those who leave issues like that in the dust in favor of focusing on what "they" view as the central theme, which is to them "tranquility" / calmness, which usually boils down to a form of minimalism / asceticism which most any Stoic or Buddhist would be happy to embrace.

Given the open lack of desire of most commentators to embrace the whole sweep of the philosophy, "Classical Epicureanism" has seemed to be a workable label so far.

Quote from Julia

I used to not follow daily news at all. Through various ways, I slipped into this, and am now slowly, step by step quitting the vice again. The constant, instigated series of scandals and drama isn't worth my time and attention; it's just silly.

I think this is an area where it is very easy to go to unhealthy extremes. You're right there is a lot of silliness and total unproductiveness in following day-to-day politics. On the other hand I think it's important for everyone to have *some* idea of what is going on around them, because world events can definitely impact our daily lives, some of us more than others. And for those who are young enough and/or so inclined, I think there is plenty of evidence and precedent in Epicurean history to support just about any level of involvement that one wants to pursue in politics. The trick is knowing how much is productive and how much is not in your individual case, but contextual questions like that are always involved in all decisionmaking.

Your goal is to use your life and your time as productively as you can to live as happily as possible, and happiness involves both physical and "mental" pleasures. Only you can make the final decision on how far to get involved in following or participating in politics will enhance your overall mental and physical well-being / happiness / pleasure. Some will want nothing to do with politics, and some won't be able to live with themselves if they aren't "doing what they can."

Quote from Julia

Somehow, the group of thoughts which happen in that diagram remained unconnected to there being limited time only.

I think orthodox Epicurean focus is partly to blame for this. I don't think Epicurus was focused on running from pain like a frightened cat. He was setting the playing field so we can *begin* the analysis of how we spend our time, and after we discuss supernatural interference in PD01, there's really no reason to look back and continue worrying about heaven or hell or anything after death. The focus is on what we do during life!

Quote from Julia

I wonder how I might go about establishing that habit.

A number of years ago I worked in an office building right next to a very old cemetery, and many days at lunch we would walk through the cemetery to get to restaurants downtown. I miss doing that because looking and at reading the tombstones is one of the best reminders that we will be there someday too!

I am not prepared to say that this does or should work for everyone, but I know what works best for me. So in regard to this:

Quote from Julia

On some days, it is very tempting to give up, because the self-defeating backward momentum/pull to try less, work less hard, exert myself less is always there, and always easy – unpleasant results, but easy to do! – and the only reason I don't give up is because I know full well how painful things get down that road.

When I am in those moods, the thing that works best for me is to do something to remember that the clock is ticking (even something like looking at a clock!), that I will never get lost time back, that I have a very limited time to do what I want to do before I die. Some will say this increases anxiety and should not be done for that reason. I reject that assertion because I reject that Epicurus taught "tranquility" as the goal of life. I believe he taught "pleasure," which means a full life in which any pain is more than compensated for by the rest. Pain isn't always bad, and it's there for a reason, and in my case reminding myself of limited time may be temporarily painful, but it is the ultimate motivator.

So among the passages that I find most motivational in these circumstances are:

PD02. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us. (Which I do not interpret primarily as a relief from fear of hell, since I already know from PDO1 that any kind of supernatural hell is impossible. Instead, I see this primarily a reminder that after death there is nothing, so everything that I want to do has to be done in this life, before death.)

VS14. We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination, and each one of us dies while occupied. Note 14. The Bailey version ends "without allowing himself leisure."

VS10. Remember that you are mortal, and have a limited time to live, and have devoted yourself to discussions on Nature for all time and eternity, and have seen “things that are now and are to come and have been.”

VS30. Some men, throughout their lives, spend their time gathering together the means of life, for they do not see that the draught swallowed by all of us at birth is a draught of death.

VS31. Against all else it is possible to provide security, but as against death all of us, mortals alike, dwell in an unfortified city.

VS41. We must laugh and philosophize at the same time, and do our household duties, and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy.

VS47. I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and I have closed off every one of your devious entrances. And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who cling to it maundering, we will leave from life singing aloud glorious triumph-song on how nicely we lived.

I am sure there are others but those come to mind first. And if I am missing some obvious ones please let me know!

Unfortunately any single term (other than "Epicurean" itself) is going to have its own set of difficult associations. Hopefully over time the situation will improve as people talk about Epicurean philosophy more in "normal" circles.

Quote from Kalosyni

However I see a problem with that label because it has a double meaning (the belief that money and material possessions are the most important thing in life - which is not what Epicureans believe at all) and wondering if we could come up with a better label.

As for the "ghosts" issue, that strikes me as an example of how - despite the decrease in organized religion, at least in the USA - we still have a lot of people who refuse to give up on more generic "spiritual" ideas.

Quote from Eric

What are the philosophical implications if matter/energy is indivisible and what if it is not (other than whether Epicurus was right or not)?

As you indicated, I will answer this on a philosophical level without representing that I have any ability to argue the latest physics research. Keep in mind I don't represent that I am the reincarnation of Epicurus - I am just trying to do a reasonable job of reconstructing his thought processes, and offering one possible way of doing that. Your mileage will vary.

First, it is well document that Epicurus thought that taking positions on the implications of infinity was very important in constructing a rational view of existence in which we can hope to live happily. In doing so it seems he was as much concerned about the harmful implications of what I will call "inward" infinity as he was about the helpful implications of "outward" infinity.

The implications of "outward" infinity of the universe is first of all logical (as a matter of definition, what could possibly be "outside" of everything that exists?). This approach to infinity gives us a means of explaining how our particular world came into existence from an eternal universe without the intervention of supernatural forces. This is a very powerful antidote to the "intelligent design" and similar arguments based on complexity and similar reasoning.

On the other hand, "downward" infinity would imply something at or very close to a violation of the "nothing goes to nothing" observation. The presumption that there is at some point a "smallest" that has an unchanging nature gives us an explanation for the regularity of the universe that allows us to have confidence that the regularity need not be supernaturally created and sustained. It doesn't matter whether the source of the regularity is at what we call today the molecular or atomic or subatomic levels. What matters is that "somewhere" on the way down there is a point of unchanging nature which sustains the regularity that we see at our level. It appears Epicurus was thinking that it is as important to have a reasonable theory to give us confidence in regularity of nature without supernatural control both on the upside and the downside.

I would equate this to why Epicurus thought it was important to posit the existence of life in the universe other than only here on Earth. The implications of thinking that we are the only living things in the universe, or that we are the highest, are too profoundly disruptive to ignore without taking a position.

In the end you're right that it doesn't matter to some people whether the mechanism of natural regularity is different from the way Epicurus explained it. It also doesn't matter to some people if the Earth is the only place in the universe where life exists. But many people (and I would argue it's the large majority of people) find that leaving such questions without an answer that comports with the logic of what we see around us is a very unsatisfactory thing to do. They want to know that they are living their best life, to the best of their ability given the information available to them, and they want a logical foundation for their decision-making while they are alive. They can't afford to wait for next year's or next decade's or next centuries' scientific research.

We've had numbers of discussions in the past touching on the overall issue you are raising. Epicurus was not primarily a Physicist. He was a philosopher whose major concern was doing the best he could for himself and his friends and anyone who would listen to come up with a rational way of life that makes the most sense for people who reject supernatural explanations which have no evidence to support them. I wouldn't go to Epicurus to construct a nuclear reactor any more than I would go to him for brain surgery.

It's two separate contexts: If someone's primary interest is the very latest research in physics, you go one place. If you want a rational evidence-based way to live your life, you go to another place. Everyone has to pick their focus and their goal and decide what is most important to them. There's no necessary conflict between the two, but if the ever-changing opinions of the latest physics research leads someone into radical skepticism, then that's a very bad result.

New Article on Redshift analysis - final sentence: 'It is necessary to have observational evidence to validate any model. So the observational data like redshift periodicity of a galaxy–quasar pair gives rise to a new challenge in observational astronomy for extragalactic objects and Big Bang hypothesis. "

Quantized redshift and challenges to Big Bang hypothesis

A Doppler shift is defined as a change of frequency of light or sound when an object is moving toward or away from an observer. Edwin Hubble observed in 1929…

phys.org

Quote from Eric

As far as I can observe and reason, the universe consists of atoms, void, energy and forces.

I know you said you don't represent your views on this topic as orthodox Epicurean, but your phrasing here made me think of an issue that applies outside your routine:

I see a parallel between the best way to discuss tranquility and pleasure and that of discussing atoms and void:

In Epicurean terms tranquility and all other nonpainful experiences are thought of as falling under "pleasure."

Likewise, energy and forces are best thought of as falling under "atoms" since as Epicurus meant the term it was simply indivisible particle, and we use "atom" to refer to a particular arrangement of particles "above" atoms.

Not suggesting you need to think that way yourself.....just thinking out loud about terminology.

It came to my attention to day that there is another "Frequently Asked Ethical Question" to which we should have a thread presenting an answer in Epicurean terms. I will set up a FAQ question and link to this thread as well as to what develops into the most likely/consensus answer.

The Complaint/Question/Issue is generally stated in terms of "Is There No Justice In The World?" or "Life Isn't Fair!"

What would Epicurus say to such a person?

I think one reason we haven't seen that discussed much in the forum on the past is that most well-read Epicureans will immediately see the many issues with such a complaint, but it's a common concern about life in general, so let's see what we can do to formulate a general response.

Let's keep this thread in "General Discussion" for a while so that it gets attention and some responses, and we'll eventually move it to the Ethics forum.

Notes for the section to be discussed in this episode:

Section XXXII

1. Cotta accuses Velleius' argument of being based on logic - a technique that the Epicureans allegedly oppose - rather than on the senses.
2. Cotta agrees with Velleius that the gods are happy, that without virtue no one can be happy, and that virtue requires reason. Cotta disagrees with Velleius, however, that the gods are of human form, and he alleges that this is a leap which is not justified.
3. Cotta asserts that Velleius says that the gods are of human form, when he could just as easily have said that men are of godlike form. This is petty wordplay, because when two things are similar to each other, it makes no difference which order you state the things that are similar to each other.
4. Note that Cotta asserts that the gods always existed, which is required if they are immortal, and therefore existed first before men. It is not clear that this is Velleius' position, especially when you ask about "particular gods" rather than gods as a class, or human beings as a class. If "human beings" is a term that applies only to people of Earth, then yes that class had a beginning after the earth was formed, but that does not mean that there are not other human-like beings in the rest of the universe, or that the class of human-like beings has not always existed, just like the class of the gods.
   1. [Letter to Herodotus 73 ] - "And in addition to what we have already said we must believe that worlds, and indeed every limited compound body which continuously exhibits a similar appearance to the things we see, were created from the infinite, and that all such things, greater and less alike, were separated off from individual agglomerations of matter; and that all are again dissolved, some more quickly, some more slowly, some suffering from one set of causes, others from another. [74] And further we must believe that these worlds were neither created all of necessity with one configuration nor yet with every kind of shape. Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world; for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been."
   2. [ Lucretius 2:1048 ] [1048] *First of all, we find that in every direction everywhere, and on either side, above and below, through all the universe, there is no limit, as I have shown, and indeed the truth cries out for itself and the nature of the deep shines clear. Now in no way must we think it likely, since towards every side is infinite empty space, and seeds in unnumbered numbers in the deep universe fly about in many ways driven on in everlasting motion, that this one world and sky was brought to birth, but that beyond it all those bodies of matter do naught; above all, since this world was so made by nature, as the seeds of things themselves of their own accord, jostling from time to time, were driven together in many ways, rashly, idly, and in vain, and at last those united, which, suddenly cast together, might become ever and anon the beginnings of great things, of earth and sea and sky, and the race of living things. Wherefore, again and again, you must needs confess that there are here and there other gatherings of matter, such as is this, which the ether holds in its greedy grip. [1067] Moreover, when there is much matter ready to hand, when space is there, and no thing, no cause delays, things must, we may be sure, be carried on and completed. As it is, if there is so great a store of seeds as the whole life of living things could not number, and if the same force and nature abides which could throw together the seeds of things, each into their place in like manner as they are thrown together here, it must needs be that you confess that there are other worlds in other regions, and diverse races of men and tribes of wild beasts. [1077] This there is too that in the universe there is nothing single, nothing born unique and growing unique and alone, but it is always of some tribe, and there are many things in the same race. First of all turn your mind to living creatures; you will find that in this wise is begotten the race of wild beasts that haunts the mountains, in this wise the stock of men, in this wise again the dumb herds of scaly fishes, and all the bodies of flying fowls. Wherefore you must confess in the same way that sky and earth and sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, are not unique, but rather of number numberless; inasmuch as the deep-fixed boundary-stone of life awaits these as surely, and they are just as much of a body that has birth, as every race which is here on earth, abounding in things after its kind.

5. Cotta asks how this extraordinary good fortune (of the existence of men and gods) came about, because you Epicureans deny that reason had anything to do with the formation of things. What was this extraordinary fortune? Are we to suppose the divine seed fell from heaven upon earth? Cotta says that Velleius does not assert this (though Cotta would welcome it) - Cotta asserts that Velleius alleges that this happened "by chance." Surely you can't be serious! Cotta says in effect: "I wish it were as easy to show what is true as it is to show that what you say is false!

   
   

Section XXXIII

1. Cotta says that Velleius' history of philosophers regarding the nature of the gods is so good that he is surprised to see so much learning in a Roman. (Sort of weird statement - isn't Cotta Roman too?)
2. Cotta asks Velleius if he thinks those philosophers who held that gods can exist without human attributes (hand and feet) were madmen? Don't you understand that the gods have no need of hands and feet like humans do? (Cotta is alleging that gods are supernatural and don't need such things.)
3. Cotta says: "The same may be asked of the other parts of the body, in which nothing is vain, nothing useless, nothing superfluous; therefore we may infer, that no art can imitate the skill of nature." What does "No art may imitate the skill of nature" mean? Rackham translates "so that no art can imitate the cunning of nature's handiwork."
4. Cotta says he mentions tongues and teeth and jaws and heart, lung, liver, and says "I mention these because you place them in the Deity on account of the beauty of the human form." -- This is also petty - Velleius made no such specific assertions - only that the gods had some kind of bodies similar in appearance to humans -- not that the gods bodies contained the same exact characteristics as humans.
5. Cotta characterizes Epicurean reasoning as dreams, and calls Leontium a harlot who presumed to write against Theophrastus. The Garden of Epicurus *abounded* with these criticisms of the other philosophers. Cotta then gives a list of other philosophers Epicurus attacks, which would seem to imply confirmation of what Diogenes Laertius has to say about Epicurus calling the other philosophers names.

Yes this is an interesting question, even though detailed. It might be correct that he did not state what the "unit" was (in other words he didn't say it in feet or inches or millimeters or whatever) but he definitely, at least to me, appears to be saying that there is an indivisible limit - he just doesn't try to measure it or give it another name beyond indivisible.

Am I saying that correctly?

Quote from Eoghan Gardiner

Do you even accept the terms of things needing "meaning"?

Right, I would first question the terms of the debate. "Meaning" to whom? Jordan Peterson and others of either an explicitly religious or a "humanist" bent look for standards of moral worthiness in gods or idealism. Epicurus taught that nature gives us only pleasure and pain by which to determine what to choose and what to avoid. Therefore we don't look to supernatural gods or rationalistic ideals; instead we each individually have to look to the guidance that we feel inside as to physical and mental pain and pleasure for the ultimate answers to all questions of how to live.

I don't doubt that there is a "meaning crisis," but it is a crisis of the creation of the people you listed and their predecessor schools. They won't get past it until they abandon their search for answers in divine revelation and rationalistic idealism. The people you listed are highly unlikely to make that change, so they will just keep at their task of wringing their hands over their self-created angst.

And since I think it's an important part of this discussion I will restate it: the "secular humanists" are just as guilty of this problem as are those preaching supernatural religion. The secular humanists talk like they offer an alternative to revealed religion, but then they turn right around and adopt the central core of the morality of the people they claim to oppose. I think Epicurus would say that all attempts to replace the guidance of nature (through pleasure and pain) with some other standard is doomed to ultimately being unsatisfying.

I started to type "doomed to failure" in that last sentence, but I suppose since the people I am criticizing have been the viewpoint of a large majority of people for 2000+ years, it's hard to say that they have "failed" in their goal. The problem is that their goal is manipulation and suppression of people holding viewpoints not to their liking, and in that respect unfortunately they have largely been successful.

I doubt that I will pursue this myself much further, but since I wrote this up as a comment to graphic I thought I would post it separately in case someone thought it was helpful for their own thinking. I'm not at all sure that such a thing would be practical, but thinking about the factors that would go into any such system is probably a good exercise:

I wish we had some shorthand way of indicating a reasonable level of confidence for a particular passage of text. Maybe we ought to create a thread to explore some kind of ranking system that would include factors like:

1. A rating of how intact the text is vs how much is reconstructed.as a percentage of words and whether those reconstructions are of critical portions.

2. A rating as to whether they key point of a text is repeated in other reliable authorities.

3. A rating of the reliability of the supposed original author (with Epicurus being the gold standard and someone like Horace being less reliable)

4. A rating of the "transmitter" that takes into account the viewpoint of the transmitter (those such as Diogenes Laertius being most likely to attempt to be correct while someone like Plutarch being inclined to cast negatively)

5. This would probably be hardest, but Perhaps even a rating of the "reconstructer" as to how well established they are or their level of "favorability" toward the point of view under discussion. For example the point of view of someone like David Sedley on the texts is more known, but that of others is less known (or so I expect). Another example is Bailey, who was personally pretty disdainful of Epicurus' ethics and therefore might not work as hard to present them sympathetically, despite his general professionalism and credentials. Another example is the John Mason Good translation of Lucretius, which very non-standard (and not in a way that seems reliable or insightful).

No system would be perfect but maybe would be helpful. Not at all sure it would be practical, but some kind of shorthand way to indicate when texts are doubtful and when not would be useful. Even a description of such a standard would make an interesting reference article.

Quote from Bryan

but it can be a bit confusing when those explanations are also in Greek!

Very good point - thank you!

Elli posted this link in the thread for this article at FB:

Original Post Link

Quantum Entanglement is a phenomenon in quantum mechanics where two or more particles become interconnected in such a way that the state of one particle directly depends on the state of the other, regardless of the distance separating them.

Key Characteristics of Quantum Entanglement:

1. Non-locality: Changes in the state of one particle directly affect the state of the other, even if they are far apart.

2. Superposition of States: Entangled particles are in a superposition, meaning they can be in multiple states simultaneously until measured. For example, if two photons are entangled and we measure the polarization of one, the polarization of the other will be immediately determined, regardless of the distance between them. This phenomenon has been experimentally confirmed and is one of the most impressive demonstrations of quantum mechanics.

Applications: Quantum entanglement is fundamental for the development of quantum computers, quantum communications, quantum cryptography etc.

From Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus, Paragraph 47 we read : «… ότι τα είδωλα ταις λεπτότησιν ανυπερβλήτοις κέχρηνται [ατόμοις], ουδέν αντιμαρτυρεί των φαινομένων· όθεν και τάχη ανυπέρβλητα έχει (ως άνω κινούνται ισοταχώς και κατά παρέγκλισιν) πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον έχοντα …»

«Nothing contradicts the phenomena that the images (in the atoms) are extremely fine (which) move with unsurpassable speed (and as above said move at equal speed and by swerve), always maintaining every of their path symmetrical ...»

Artificial Intelligence said: "The idea of Epicurus described in the above excerpt can be paralleled to the concept of quantum entanglement to some extent. In quantum entanglement, two or more particles become interconnected in such a way that the state of one directly affects the state of the other, regardless of the distance separating them".

And of course, if Plato heard this, his face would turn green and Aristotle's hair would stand on end (see photo)... because only with their methodology of dialectics and endless verbosity, we Greeks would have become the laughingstock of the ecumene (as the Great Democritus says in the photo)!

Because nothing contradicts the phenomena that the Titan Epicurus, in his letter to Herodotus, was the first to conceive in a seminal/fruitful way (even before it was experimentally confirmed) the uniform-equal speed (of light) as well as the two most important principles of quantum theory, namely:

With the swerve of atoms is meant the superposition (see today Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) of which? The finest of atoms (see today photons) that are ALWAYS maintaining to each other a symmetrical path (see today the quantum entanglement).

"I recommend constant activity in the study of nature; and this way more than any other I enjoy calm to my life." (Epicurus letter to Herodotus)

----------------------------------------------------------------

[…Many years ago, I had the pleasure of a chance meeting with Werner Heisenberg. It was during an evening in the Beethoven-Saal in Bonn. July of 1972. In front of me stood an old man of 71 years. His eyes were light-coloured. They had a brilliance that was slightly suppressed by the rough weather, the tiredness and deep contemplation. An expression of treasured attentiveness.

Average in terms of height, attired in the subdued skin of the senior ages, yet standing straight, he emanated the impression of a forgotten cheerfulness. His movements were peaceful. His characteristics heavily set. In his expression you could almost perceive the reflection of a long victorious campaign in foreign lands. It was roosting there for all to see, like an evening owl. A feeling of serenity enveloped him. I approached, he held out his hand.

- “Oh! video hominem”, I said.

- “Ὁρῶ τὸν ἄνδρα. Ja, ich verstehe das Lateinische und antworte griechisch” (Yes, I understand Latin and respond in Greek), he replied.

Among the millions of the Agora of my century I saw, for a single instant, a man - and I had no need for a lantern in midday like the ancient Diogenes. On my way out I was floating with eyes closed, like Karajan conducting Beethoven's Pastoral. Hovering somewhere in between the stormy weather on the one side, and a pastoral song of simplicity on the other. Between the Gewitter-Sturm and the Hirtengesang…]

(the above excerpt is by Dimitris Liantinis from his book “Gemma” - translated from Greek into English by our friend Yiannis Tsapras).

Welcome to Episode 247 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 27 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to insist that gods are supernatural and not at all similar to humans. We will, in turn, respond to Cotta's particular and general arguments.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXXII. ...Nor can I conceive why Epicurus should rather say the Gods are like men than that men are like the Gods. You ask what is the difference; for, say you, if this is like that, that is like this. I grant it; but this I assert, that the Gods could not take their form from men; for the Gods always existed, and never had a beginning, if they are to exist eternally; but men had a beginning: therefore that form, of which the immortal Gods are, must have had existence before mankind; consequently, the Gods should not be said to be of human form, but our form should be called divine. However, let this be as you will. I now inquire how this extraordinary good fortune came about; for you deny that reason had any share in the formation of things. But still, what was this extraordinary fortune? Whence proceeded that happy concourse of atoms which gave so sudden a rise to men in the form of Gods? Are we to suppose the divine seed fell from heaven upon earth, and that men sprung up in the likeness of their celestial sires? I wish you would assert it; for I should not be unwilling to acknowledge my relation to the Gods. But you say nothing like it; no, our resemblance to the Gods, it seems, was by chance. Must I now seek for arguments to refute this doctrine seriously? I wish I could as easily discover what is true as I can overthrow what is false.

XXXIII. You have enumerated with so ready a memory, and so copiously, the opinions of philosophers, from Thales the Milesian, concerning the nature of the Gods, that I am surprised to see so much learning in a Roman. But do you think they were all madmen who thought that a Deity could by some possibility exist without hands and feet? Does not even this consideration have weight with you when you consider what is the use and advantage of limbs in men, and lead you to admit that the Gods have no need of them? What necessity can there be of feet, without walking; or of hands, if there is nothing to be grasped? The same may be asked of the other parts of the body, in which nothing is vain, nothing useless, nothing superfluous; therefore we may infer that no art can imitate the skill of nature. Shall the Deity, then, have a tongue, and not speak—teeth, palate, and jaws, though he will have no use for them? Shall the members which nature has given to the body for the sake of generation be useless to the Deity? Nor would the internal parts be less superfluous than the external. What comeliness is there in the heart, the lungs, the liver, and the rest of them, abstracted from their use? I mention these because you place them in the Deity on account of the beauty of the human form.

Depending on these dreams, not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermachus declaimed against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, but that little harlot Leontium presumed to write against Theophrastus: indeed, she had a neat Attic style; but yet, to think of her arguing against Theophrastus! So much did the garden of Epicurus abound with these liberties, and, indeed, you are always complaining against them. Zeno wrangled. Why need I mention Albutius? Nothing could be more elegant or humane than Phædrus; yet a sharp expression would disgust the old man. Epicurus treated Aristotle with great contumely. He foully slandered Phædo, the disciple of Socrates. He pelted Timocrates, the brother of his companion Metrodorus, with whole volumes, because he disagreed with him in some trifling point of philosophy. He was ungrateful even to Democritus, whose follower he was; and his master Nausiphanes, from whom he learned nothing, had no better treatment from him.

XXXIV. Zeno gave abusive language not only to those who were then living, as Apollodorus, Syllus, and the rest, but he called Socrates, who was the father of philosophy, the Attic buffoon, using the Latin word Scurra. He never called Chrysippus by any name but Chesippus. And you yourself a little before, when you were numbering up a senate, as we may call them, of philosophers, scrupled not to say that the most eminent men talked like foolish, visionary dotards. Certainly, therefore, if they have all erred in regard to the nature of the Gods, it is to be feared there are no such beings. What you deliver on that head are all whimsical notions, and not worthy the consideration even of old women. For you do not seem to be in the least aware what a task you draw on yourselves, if you should prevail on us to grant that the same form is common to Gods and men. The Deity would then require the same trouble in dressing, and the same care of the body, that mankind does. He must walk, run, lie down, lean, sit, hold, speak, and discourse. You need not be told the consequence of making the Gods male and female.

Therefore I cannot sufficiently wonder how this chief of yours came to entertain these strange opinions. But you constantly insist on the certainty of this tenet, that the Deity is both happy and immortal. Supposing he is so, would his happiness be less perfect if he had not two feet? Or cannot that blessedness or beatitude—call it which you will (they are both harsh terms, but we must mollify them by use)—can it not, I say, exist in that sun, or in this world, or in some eternal mind that has not human shape or limbs? All you say against it is, that you never saw any happiness in the sun or the world. What, then? Did you ever see any world but this? No, you will say. Why, therefore, do you presume to assert that there are not only six hundred thousand worlds, but that they are innumerable? Reason tells you so. Will not reason tell you likewise that as, in our inquiries into the most excellent nature, we find none but the divine nature can be happy and eternal, so the same divine nature surpasses us in excellence of mind; and as in mind, so in body? Why, therefore, as we are inferior in all other respects, should we be equal in form? For human virtue approaches nearer to the divinity than human form.

Quote from Eric

since, for me, making sex worth

I think that's always the framework. People are different and always at different points in their lives and have different priorities. The best choices are always a matter of evaluating your own personal circumstances.

Yes that is helpful, thank you!

Because it's not limited to "gods" I think it's worth spelling out the reasoning issue. As I see it:

1. Cotta is alleging that Epicurus said that in order to understand something, you have to have seen a prior example and understood the prior example. Implicitly the point is "you have to have examined it here on earth in your own experience and understood it before you can apply the generalization to a new example."

2. Cotta alleges that there is nothing like the sun, moon, or stars here on earth, so Epicurus has had no examples to examine.

3. Cotta alleges that since Epicurus had no examples, and under Epicurus's rules that we require examples on which to reason, we cannot make any reliable statements about the sun moon or stars. But Cotta knows that Epicurus DOES claim to know that the sun and stars and planets are not gods.

4. Cotta says this position that the suns and stars and planets are not gods is contradictory. Since Epicurus has had no examples of suns or moons or planet to examine, Epicurus (allegedly under his own rules) should not be making any representations about the sun and stars and planets at all. Cotta thinks he has Epicurus in a trap, so he says "Epicurus if you are willing without evidence reach the conclusion that sun stars and planets are not gods, why don't you go ahead and admit without evidence the sun stars and planets are gods, and that gods can exist in other than human form?"

So I see Cotta as trying to take advantage of the argument that we also see in Lucretius, where Lucretius says "the gods could not have made the universe because they had no pattern to go by." It was apparently understood that the Epicureans argued regularly that you must have a pattern from experience in order to understand something and work with it.

Any skeptic who thinks that Epicureans demand examples before they believe in something will attack any Epicurean position on the sun moon and stars by saying : "Under your own theory of reasoning, you can't say anything at all about something unless you have seen a prior example of it, so you shouldn't be talking at all about the sun moon or stars."

And that sounds like a reasonable argument against someone who is alleging you can only reason based on analogy from sensory experience. But it's not a persuasive argument against Epicurus, because the Epicurus' position is not that you reason based ONLY on past experience, your reason can also be based on reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. In that way it is permissible to make conclusions about things you haven't seen, because you can infer new possibilities that you haven't seen based on other examples of what we have seen.

This is how the difference plays out in court:

If a judge in court only allows "direct evidence," then he will allow into evidence a witness who says "I saw Tom Jones strangle Sally Smith in the jail cell."

If a court allows only direct evidence, the judge will EXCLUDE the testimony of a witness who says: "I saw Tom Jones and Sally Smith alone in the jail cell, and then I left, and ten minutes later I came back and Sally Smith was dead with red marks around her neck, and no one had disturbed the lock on the cell."

The latter testimony is not "direct" evidence" but "circumstantial evidence." Circumstantial evidence is controversial and has to be treated carefully. But our legal system has decided that it is reasonable to ally juries to consider circumstantial evidence in court, because sometimes direct evidence is not available but circumstantial evidence is very strong.

The answer to Cotta is that Epicurean philosophy doesn't require direct evidence all the time, such as in the case of the existence of atoms or what happens to self-consciousness after death. Epicurean philosophy allows inference based on circumstantial evidence, and it considers the conclusions of persuasive amounts of circumstantial evidence to be as worthy of reliance, even in life-and-death decisionmaking, as evidence from that which has been observed directly.

Therefore I see it as essential to point out that Cotta's is wrong to allege that Epicurus requires direct evidence to support decisionmaking. After that, we also need to take the next step of discussing the proper use of circumstantial evidence, so we can explain how he's misrepresenting Epicurus, because that's not obvious to everyone.

And it's also worth pointing out another inconsistency in Cotta:

Why, Cotta, if you are a skeptic and don't think anything is knowable, do you agree with Velleius that gods are happy, and gods have virtue, and gods use reason? Where do you come by that knowledge?

In fact we need to ask that question of both Cotta and Epicurus in order to understand the big picture of how their reasoning differs. If we just stop and say "this topic is about gods and I don't care about gods" then we will cut ourselves off from major aspects of how Epicurean reasoning works on everything, not just gods.

Quote from Bryan

Yes, Cicero is forgetting that, per Epicurus, a consideration is true -- both "if it is not contradicted " by evidence as well as "if it is affirmed." (51c)

Thanks Bryan. Also: We have PD24 for a similar point:

Quote

PD24. If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

But I'd like to make clear from our existing quotes something to the effect that the opinion, in order to be suggested in the first place, must pass an initial threshold of being based on some kind of existing evidence. In other words it isn't sufficient to say "I can imagine an omnipotent god....."

I'd like to see what we can do to come up with a pithy statement of the ultimate point. Something first has to get the opinion started as reasonable based on existing evidence.

What's the best way to take something like "Reasoning about the nature of the imperceptible must be based on and consistent with the nature of the perceptible" and modify it to a form in which you would teach a child?