Posts by Cassius

Thanksgiving-appropriate philosophy as we partake in holiday meals:

A good time to think about how "he who, not thirsty himself, mixes mead for another, and he who, being thirsty, drinks the mead, are in just the same state of pleasure:"

While we are getting it filtered through a negative-sounding Cicero, sounds to me like this example was used to emphasize the viewpoint that the person who -- "thirsty himself" -- meaning not in pain, falls within the definition of pleasure just as much as the person who chases away the pain of thirst by drinking!

This variation does not stress the host and the guest being "totally without pain," but that might be implied too from the fact that no other aspect of their experience is mentioned.

So either way, from (1) the "whole person totally without pain" perspective (if we assume that) or (2) from the "discrete experience" perspective (that the experience of drinking while thirsty falls under the same label of "pleasure" as the person who is not thirsty at all) the point is being driven home that "absence of pain" can mean either stimulation or simply normal life without pain.

Good to hear from you Cleveland Oakie and Happy Thanksgiving to you too!

Quote from waterholic

This also explains the statement that pleasure and pain cannot be mixed. Additionally, this removes the uneasy breakdown of "types of pleasure". There are no types of pleasure, there are different activities and stimuli, each contributing "atomic units" of pleasure and pain.

Yes I can see that would be one of the implications - a further terminology change in the meaning of "pleasure" -- especially if pleasure includes "health" and "normality" and everything that is not a pain unit.

We presumably will run into the issues that the Utilitarians did as to dolors etc, but I have not read into that well enough to comment. Probably that's relevant and needs to be included eventually. I don't even know if they considered that to be problematic themselves, or only their enemies did. I can see how "greatest good for the greatest number" fails because these units aren't transferable in measure from person to person.

But as a model of how a SINGLE person can view the issue within themselves, I've never really seen the big problem. As long as you keep firmly focused on how subjective the issue is, and how the same acitivity can change from pleasure to pain and back by time, place, etc. then I think the analysis is helpful.

What it REALLY needs to help with is making clear that:

1. You don't have to get rid of ALL pain in order to experience ANY pleasure
2. There's nothing "magic" that happens when you move from 99.9% to 100% -- 100% is not a different transcendent "type" of pleasure different from 99.9%. But's that's the inference that I think far too many people are drawing from "absence of pain is the height of pleasure." The correct implications need to be clearly separated from the incorrect implications.

We crossposted but you see my prior comment. I *do* think exploring this in mathematical terms is helpful. If we reach a limit to its usefulness then identifying that limit will itself be useful. So please continue

It's been a good year and lot to be thankful for and not the least of which is the participation and contributions here on the forum of Don!

His list of projects just keeps on growing! He'll need the "loci method" to remember them all!

Waterholic going further with your comment, are you speculating that pleasure and pain can indeed be reduced to fungible units?

I sometimes got that impression from DeWitt's "unity of pleasure" chapter but not sure he stated that explicitly.

That cite to Cicero looks interesting enough to find the original.

I see that the full work is at Attalus:

Cicero, De Oratore : index of translation

Now to find the cite

Waterholic I am not sure about the impact of the "all."

When the Epicureans reference removal of "all" pain don't they immediately equate that with "the height of pleasure"?

You raise the issue we are discussing: does "all" pain have to be removed before any pleasure is experienced? I presume the answer is "no."

Probably worth restating that these two aren't inconsistent from my personal point of view:

1 - From my point of view, everyone has a right to make up their minds and do whatever they want to do, and I think in general we want maximum freedom of expression and action in the world. I know that I want that for myself, and so I don't think it's a good idea to do anything to deny it to others.

2 - On the other hand, from my point of view as well, every "group project" in life requires some degree of agreement among the members of the group on what he project is and how to attain it. This website is all "I" (our core people) can really speak for, and we have a right and obligation to set out clearly what we're doing so that people who invest their time and effort in it will know the ground rules before they start making that investment -- so that they can count on their investment meaning something as they themselves set out to contribute.

We'll do our best here at the forum to balance both those considerations, but (2) is going to take priority over (1) because we're just one website, one location, and it's easy for alternative views to coalesce elsewhere.

Now having repeated that again about what "WE're" doing, there is still a "philosophical" issue with questions such as Eoghan raised in terms of:

1 - When we say "eclectic" and "eclecticism" what do we really mean? In my view what we're really talking about is a semi-philosophical position that "consistency' is not important or that it is secondary to a particular result. In a sense we all agree, after concluding that pleasure/happiness is the goal, that "whatever works in our case" is actually the right way to look at things. However from the Epicurean viewpoint there are in fact unchanging and unchangeable aspects of the universe that derive from the atoms that we can't change no matter how much we mix and match ideas. It's at that level I think that it's most worthwhile to talk about "eclecticism" as a controversial viewpoint.

2 - That still leaves huge variety of alternative choices in how one lives an Epicurean life, and I think most all of us encourage experimentation and variety, but it's not experimentation or variety for the sake of experimentation or variety, it's calibration of alternatives in the pursuit of pleasure, within boundaries that we agree on such as no supernatural gods and no life after death and the primary role of the senses over abstract propositional logic -- things like that which serve as boundaries that we can all know about and understand through reading Epicurus.

Probably worth restating that these two aren't inconsistent from my personal point of view:

1 - From my point of view, everyone has a right to make up their minds and do whatever they want to do, and I think in general we want maximum freedom of expression and action in the world. I know that I want that for myself, and so I don't think it's a good idea to do anything to deny it to others.

2 - On the other hand, from my point of view as well, every "group project" in life requires some degree of agreement among the members of the group on what he project is and how to attain it. This website is all "I" (our core people) can really speak for, and we have a right and obligation to set out clearly what we're doing so that people who invest their time and effort in it will know the ground rules before they start making that investment -- so that they can count on their investment meaning something as they themselves set out to contribute.

We'll do our best here at the forum to balance both those considerations, but (2) is going to take priority over (1) because we're just one website, one location, and it's easy for alternative views to coalesce elsewhere.

Now having repeated that again about what "WE're" doing, there is still a "philosophical" issue with questions such as Eoghan raised in terms of:

1 - When we say "eclectic" and "eclecticism" what do we really mean? In my view what we're really talking about is a semi-philosophical position that "consistency' is not important or that it is secondary to a particular result. In a sense we all agree, after concluding that pleasure/happiness is the goal, that "whatever works in our case" is actually the right way to look at things. However from the Epicurean viewpoint there are in fact unchanging and unchangeable aspects of the universe that derive from the atoms that we can't change no matter how much we mix and match ideas. It's at that level I think that it's most worthwhile to talk about "eclecticism" as a controversial viewpoint.

2 - That still leaves huge variety of alternative choices in how one lives an Epicurean life, and I think most all of us encourage experimentation and variety, but it's not experimentation or variety for the sake of experimentation or variety, it's calibration of alternatives in the pursuit of pleasure, within boundaries that we agree on such as no supernatural gods and no life after death and the primary role of the senses over abstract propositional logic -- things like that which serve as boundaries that we can all know about and understand through reading Epicurus.

Great thread starter Eoghan!

One aspect of this that should be said is that according to our forum rules and reason for the forums existence, we're not going to promote a general eclectic approach here as that is inconsistent with our reason for being here.

But having said that, there is a general issue that everyone faces of putting together one's own life from whatever elements are available, and it's great to discuss in general how to go about thinking of the meaning of consistency and when fo deviate from it.

Certainly Epicurus iris himself was a strong deviator from the consensus that existed when he started!

So this issue touches on questions of skepticism and "waiting" and when and how to make course corrections.

Great thread starter Eoghan!

One aspect of this that should be said is that according to our forum rules and reason for the forums existence, we're not going to promote a general eclectic approach here as that is inconsistent with our reason for being here.

But having said that, there is a general issue that everyone faces of putting together one's own life from whatever elements are available, and it's great to discuss in general how to go about thinking of the meaning of consistency and when fo deviate from it.

Certainly Epicurus iris himself was a strong deviator from the consensus that existed when he started!

So this issue touches on questions of skepticism and "waiting" and when and how to make course corrections.

Yes it is worthy of discussion! Would you be willing to do the honor and start the thread?

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In this episode our podcasters had apparently been away from the intermundia for too long, and so they had to express some doubt -- not about Epicurus, but about what Cicero was arguing in his animality objection.

As discussed in the episode we particularly invite comment on this one to help us unwind some of the subtlety of Cicero's objection to Epicurus' looking to the young for the best mirror of nature and therefore source for the ultimate good.

The citations in post 3 above should help in untangling some of this.

Happy Thanksgiving, and let us know your thoughts!

In the end I think this unwinds quite neatly. Working through it isn't obvious on first glance, but once it begins to dawn how Epicurus is folding *every non-painful experience in life" under the umbrella of pleasure, a lot of clarity begins to dawn on the subject.

Quote from Joshua

When Antony was slain and with him her last hope for her people's freedom and security, she died, a martyr in Chaucer's words, at her own hand.

I've traditionally also held Antony in low repute but I can't remember if it was the Boeri book or another that made the point that Antony himself had some Epicurean characteristics, so maybe the jury should continue to deliberate on Antony as well.

Episode 202 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is Now Available!

Yes, 1 is unlikely, 2 is more likely, and 3 is desirable and sort of where we currently are. (At least we're still online right now!)

Luckily I think the things we need to do under scenario 2 or 3 are about the same.

Quote from Eoghan Gardiner

Can't wait to get to the arguments for friendship, my translation says the Wiseman should love friends as himself (paraphrasing) interesting to hear the discussion.

Eoghan I wonder if you are referring to the Torquatus section in Book 1 where we got into the main discussion of friendship.

If so, that was perhaps Episode 109?

Thread

Episode One Hundred Nine - The Epicurean View of Friendship

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Nine of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself,…

Cassius

February 11, 2022 at 7:45 PM

Something else that will play into this episode is that Cicero introduces Carneades as having a significant position on the relationship of pleasure and virtue.

Carneades' name has been mentioned here on the forum superficially for a long time, because Boris Nikolsky argues that Carneades' division of types of pleasure likely influenced Cicero's argument. We don't get into it too far here, but Cicero mentions that Carneades opposed the Stoics. Here Cicero seems to say that Carneades argued in favor of a dual good of both pleasure and virtue, but when you read the Wikipedia article and see how much of a skeptic Carneades was, it seems unlikely that he ultimately took a position on anything. If we can presume that Cicero was taking cues from Carneades, and it seems so after comparing this Wikipedia article to what Cicero says his own position is, then this is additional reason to go back and pick up Nikolsky's commentary on exactly what Cicero might have picked up.

For the moment I will just cite the Wikipedia article but if anyone has any insight into Carneades that might be helpful for us unwinding some of the material in this episode.

Carneades - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Carneades (/kɑːrˈniːədiːz/; Greek: Καρνεάδης, Karneadēs, "of Carnea"; 214/3–129/8 BC[2]) was a Greek philosopher,[3] perhaps the most prominent head of the Skeptical Academy in ancient Greece.[3] He was born in Cyrene.[4] By the year 159 BC,[citation needed] he had begun to attack many previous dogmatic doctrines, especially Stoicism and even the Epicureans,[5] whom previous skeptics had spared.[citation needed]

As scholarch (leader) of the Academy, he was one of three philosophers sent to Rome in 155 BC where his lectures on the uncertainty of justice caused consternation among leading politicians.[6][7][8] He left no writings.[9] Many of his opinions are known only via his successor Clitomachus. [10] He seems to have doubted the ability not just of the senses but of reason too in acquiring truth. His skepticism was, however, moderated by the belief that we can, nevertheless, ascertain probabilities (not in the sense of statistical probability, but in the sense of persuasiveness)[11] of truth, to enable us to act.[12]

Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philokomus, was born at Cyrene, North Africa in 214/213 BC. He migrated early to Athens. There he attended the lectures of the Stoics, learning their logic from Diogenes of Babylon and studying the works of Chrysippus. He subsequently focused his efforts on refuting the Stoics, attaching himself to the Platonic Academy, which had suffered from the attacks of the Stoics. On the death of Hegesinus of Pergamon, he was chosen scholarch (head) of the Academy. His great eloquence and skill in argument revived the glories of the Academic Skeptics. He asserted nothing (not even that nothing can be asserted), and carried on a vigorous argument against every dogma maintained by other sects.

In the year 155 BC, when he was fifty-eight years old, he was chosen with the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and the Peripatetic Critolaus to go as ambassadors to Rome to deprecate the fine of 500 talents which had been imposed on the Athenians for the destruction of Oropus. During his stay at Rome, he attracted great notice from his eloquent speeches on philosophical subjects. It was here that, in the presence of Cato the Elder, he delivered his several orations on justice. The first oration was in commendation of the virtue of Roman justice. The next day he delivered the second oration, in which he refuted all the arguments he had made the day before. He persuasively attempted to prove that justice was inevitably problematic, and not a given when it came to virtue, but merely a compact device deemed necessary for the maintenance of a well-ordered society. This oration shocked Cato. Recognizing the potential danger of Carneades' arguments, Cato moved the Roman Senate to send Carneades back to Athens to prevent Roman youth from being exposed to a re-examining of Roman doctrines. Carneades lived twenty-seven years after this at Athens.

Carneades is known as an Academic Skeptic. Academic Skeptics (so called because this was the type of skepticism taught in Plato's Academy in Athens) hold that all knowledge is impossible, except for the knowledge that all other knowledge is impossible.

Carneades left no writings, and all that is known of his lectures is derived from his intimate friend and pupil, Clitomachus; but so true was he to his own principles of withholding assent, that Clitomachus confesses he never could ascertain what his master really thought on any subject.[citation needed] In ethics, which more particularly were the subject of his long and laborious study, he seems to have denied the conformity of the moral ideas with nature. This he particularly insisted on in the second oration on Justice, in which he manifestly wished to convey his own notions on the subject; and he there maintains that ideas of justice are not derived from nature, but that they are purely artificial for purposes of expediency.[citation needed]

All this, however, was nothing but the special application of his general theory, that people did not possess, and never could possess, any criterion of truth.

Carneades argued that, if there were a criterion, it must exist either in reason (logos), or sensation (aisthêsis), or conception (phantasia). But then reason itself depends on conception, and this again on sensation; and we have no means of judging whether our sensations are true or false, whether they correspond to the objects that produce them, or carry wrong impressions to the mind, producing false conceptions and ideas, and leading reason also into error. Therefore, sensation, conception, and reason, are alike disqualified for being the criterion of truth.[citation needed]

But after all, people must live and act, and must have some rule of practical life; therefore, although it is impossible to pronounce anything as absolutely true, we may yet establish probabilities of various degrees. For, although we cannot say that any given conception or sensation is in itself true, yet some sensations appear to us more true than others, and we must be guided by that which seems the most true. Again, sensations are not single, but generally combined with others, which either confirm or contradict them; and the greater this combination the greater is the probability of that being true which the rest combine to confirm; and the case in which the greatest number of conceptions, each in themselves apparently most true, should combine to affirm that which also in itself appears most true, would present to Carneades the highest probability, and his nearest approach to truth.[17]