Posts by Cassius

That's a good start to the conversation. I too consider Epicurean philosophy to at the very least "stand in the place of" what passes for religion today, and I've even argued in the past that if censorship issues get worse we might want to consider claiming "freedom of religion" as protection for the Epicurean viewpoint.

But I am also aware that any discussion of "religion" strikes some people extremely poorly as they come from a very different paradigm. So I think its good to flesh out the details and the terminology publicly because there's no doubt there will be people who will object to it. I suspect in the end there are good ways to explain the issue that advance the ball, and I agree with your point number 7 - it's a core aspect of Epicurean philosophy to have a clear position on the nature of divinity.

Let's get out in front of some questions that people might ask about Nate's Hedonicon video. For example:

Quote from Nate

Second, I did it to consecrate (what I call) my religion.

What is an appropriate answer to someone who would criticize the idea of seeing Epicurean philosophy as a "religion?"

The answer would probably involve first dealing with the old problem of definitions and talk about what it means to be a "religion."

1. What is a fair definition of a "religion?"
2. Does the definition of religion itself require that all religions be "bad," or is it possible to have a "good" religion?
3. Did the ancient Epicureans see their own views of the gods as "true religion," or something else?
4. They clearly contended that having correct views about the gods is important.
5. Did they have "practices" that were a necessary part of those views?
6. Did those views and/or practices constitute a "religion?"
7. What relation should ancient Epicurean practices have on Epicureans today?

Another question would be:

1. If Epicurean philosophy were viewed as analogous to a religion, would there be "denominations" within the "religion?
2. To what extent would the religion be "uniform" across all Epicureans?

This FAQ answer has some age on it and needs to be improved, but we get this question all the time and prepared this some time ago:

To What Extent, If Any, Does Modern Physics Invalidate Epicurean Philosophy? - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

What part of modern physics do you have in mind as a problem? In general, the changes in understanding of how nature works do not change the conclusion that nature has no gods over her, or that there is no life after death, or that there are no absolute ideal forms to which we need to conform our conduct.

Great to see you "live" Nate! Very well and forcefully worded too. For those who may have questions about the Society of Epicurus, please see FAQ entry here.

Glad to have you Sanantoniogarden and thanks for replying to your welcome post!

Quote from Eggplant Wizard

I would be avoid taking at face value any claims of Jewish ritual cannibalism or blood-drinking or inferring that the metzitzah b’peh is a vestige of this.

Yes, pursuit of the truth or falsity of the specific allegations would not be the best use of this thread. The best use would be to pursue evidences as to whether the arguments of Apion in particular were being made from an Epicurean point of view, so we can consider whether we ought to include Apion among the list of ancient Epicureans.

Quote from Eggplant Wizard

Anyway the attitudes of Greek philosophers to Judaism is an interesting subject.

And yes the entire spectrum of Greek philosophers may be of some relevance, but we ought to keep the focus on those who may have been Epicureans and what light the subject can shed on our knowledge of the Epicureans in the ancient world.

In past discussions here on the forum we have used the analogy that "the map is not the territory."

A few minutes ago I just happened to come across this saying, attributed at least in its present form to statistician George Box, that seems to make a very similar point.

I suspect I will find this a useful saying in the future so wanted to post about it:

All models are wrong - Wikipedia

Welcome sanantoniogarden

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Please say "Hello" by introducing yourself, tell us what prompted your interest in Epicureanism and which particular aspects of Epicureanism most interest you, and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Episode 210 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we return to Book Two of On Ends.

Welcome to Episode 211 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week we move into Section XXI:

XXI. You must either blame these examples, Torquatus, or must abandon your advocacy of pleasure. But what kind of advocacy is this, or what sort of case can you make out for pleasure, which will never be able to call witnesses either to fact or to character from among men of distinction? While we are wont to summon as our witnesses from the records of the past men whose whole life was spent in noble exertion, who would never be able to listen to the name of pleasure, on the other hand in your debates history is silent. I have never heard that in any discussion carried on by Epicurus the names of Lycurgus, Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, Epaminondas were mentioned, men who are ever on the lips of all the other philosophers. Now however, seeing that we Romans also have begun to handle these subjects, what fine and great men will Atticus produce for us from his stores! Is it not better to say something of these men than to talk through such ponderous tomes about Themista? Let us allow such things to be characteristic of Greeks; though it is from them that we derive philosophy and all liberal arts; but still there are things which are not permitted to us, though permitted to them.

The Stoics are at war with the Peripatetics. The one school declares that there is nothing good but what is moral; the other that it assigns the highest, aye, infinitely the highest value to morality, but that nevertheless there are some good things connected with our bodies and also some external to us. What a moral debate, what a noble disagreement! In truth, the whole struggle concerns the prestige of virtue. But whenever you discuss with your fellow disciples, you must listen to much that concerns the impure pleasures, of which Epicurus very often speaks. Believe me, then, Torquatus, you cannot maintain your doctrines, if you once gain a clear view of your own nature and your own thoughts and inclinations; you will blush, I say, for that picture which Cleanthes used to paint, certainly very neatly, in his conversation. He bade his audience imagine to themselves pleasure painted in a picture as sitting on a throne, with most lovely raiment and queenly apparel; the virtues near her as her handmaidens, with no other employment, and no thought of other duty, than to wait upon pleasure, and merely to whisper in her ear (if only painting could convey such meaning) to guard against doing anything heedlessly, which might wound men’s feelings, or anything from which some pain might spring. We virtues, indeed, were born to be your thralls; we have no other function.

XXII. Oh, but Epicurus says (this indeed is your strong point) that no one can live agreeably who does not live morally. As though I gave any heed to what he affirms or denies! The question I ask is, what statement is consistent for a man to make, who builds his highest good upon pleasure. What do you allege to shew that Thorius, that Hirrius, that Postumius, and the master of all these men, Orata, did not live very agreeable lives? He himself, as I mentioned already, asserts that the life of sybarites is not worthy of blame, unless they are utterly foolish, that is, unless they are subject to passion and fear. And when he proffers a remedy for both these conditions, he proffers im- munity to sybaritism. For if these two conditions are removed, he says that he finds nothing to blame in the life of profligates. You cannot therefore, while guiding all actions by pleasure, either defend or maintain virtue. For a man who refrains from injustice only to avoid evil must not be considered a good and just man; you know of course the saying, no one ts righteous, whose righteousness...; well, never suppose that any saying is truer.

Sequence of Arguments In Book Two

1. Cicero alleges that Torquatus does not know what pleasure means. “As it is, however, I allege that Epicurus himself is in the dark about it and uncertain in his idea of it, and that the very man who often asserts that the meaning which our terms denote ought to be accurately represented, sometimes does not see what this term pleasure indicates, I mean what the thing is which is denoted by the term.” (End of Section II)
2. No one else talks about Pleasure this way
3. Epicurus is failing to be clear
4. No only do the words differ, but the THINGS differ - freedom from pain is not pleasure
5. In holding that pleasure is the supreme good Epicurus says that ANY kinds of pleasures are desirable, even depraved ones, if they banish pain, which is what he means by evil (Section VII)
6. Epicurus calls a profligate life desirable, and that is despicable. No reputable man speaks that way.
7. How can pleasure be the supreme good, when we can't even say that pleasure is the goal of a dinner? (IX)
8. The natural and necessary distinction is awkwardly worded.
9. Even Epicurus says that pleasure is not the goal, because what he really says is the goal is “absence of pain” (X)
10. Epicurus' defense of pleasure based on looking at babies and animals makes no sense because they are not authorities on the subject.
11. It may be difficult to determine whether pleasure is a primary endowment of man, but certainly there are others that are more important, such as man's intellectual ability, and the virtues.
12. The senses cannot decide as to the goal because they have no jurisdiction to answer that question.
13. If we do refute the claim that pleasure is the supreme good we must turn our backs upon virtue. (XIV)
14. The moral is that which, even if it had no utility, would be desired for its own qualities, regardless of its advantages. (XIV-45)
15. The classical virtues are seen to be lovely and beautiful in themselves.

This episode will be released later this afternoon. In the meantime, one of the topics we discussed was the issue of "self-approval" as discussed by Mark Twain in his essay "What Is Man?"

The Project Gutenberg eBook of What is Man? and Other Essays, by Mark Twain

Shahab also I think your question about the types of hormones raises another aspect that Epicurus would also expect us to understand:

if we were to consider that one of those hormones were associated with (for example) "sexual pleasure," and if we were to consider a situation where the patient were experiencing sexual pleasure, we would not expect "the height of sexual pleasure" to be the same as "the height of pleasure in general."

Even in conventional terms there are many different types of sensory stimulation pleasures, from foods to smells to sights, etc.. The "height of eating pleasure" would not be the same as the "height of olfactory pleasure." I don't think Epicurus or any fair-minded person would consider those experiences to be the same.

Epicurus' terminology takes this a step further and includes within "pleasure" all the other non-stimulative conditions of life, so the issue is even more important in evaluating what Epicurus says.

Just like the "height of pleasure" can't reasonably be identified with just sex, or just food, or just smells, it also can't be identified as "just healthy living" either. The commonality of these experiences is that they are agreeable to us and not painful, not that they feel exactly the same to us. Maybe they have similar biological conduits and maybe they don't, but philosphically in communicating ideas the thing that brings them under the same label for us is that they feel agreeable.

So if we avoid thinking of "the height of pleasure" as meaning 'the height of some particular pleasure" but rather think of it as "the height of experiencing pleasures of any type whatsoever" then I think we are more clear and logically consistent.

So I would say that when the Epicureans talked about the "height of pleasure" they really meant to be understood as referring to "height" in terms of "limit" in the sense of "completeness" or "purity," in that there is no mixture of pain and no further pain to be removed. To me that is why PD03 refers to the "limit of quantity of pleasure." "Height" doesn't necessarily imply "intensity" alone any more than it implies "length of time" or "location of the body." And it shouldn't be read to refer only to "appreciating being alive" any more than it would only refer to "sexual pleasure" or "olfactory pleasure."

So i would say that the height of pleasure when used as a standalone term should understood to refer to any types of pleasure, with no judgment implied as to what types of pleasure are included. The only thing being emphasized in "height of pleasure" is that whatever types of pleasures are present in your vessel, there is no pain mixed in among them.

Quote from shahabgh66

Thank you very much for your detailed answer. Problem solved!

I don't know about "problem solved," but the definition of "pleasure" is definitely a key to the issue!

It's my understanding that there is not much left of Apion other than what Josephus wrote against him to defend Judaism against Apion's attacks, and that Apion is largely viewed in that context alone.

However it strikes me that if we consider that Christianity had not arisen during Apion's time, and that Apion was living at a time of great Epicurean activity, it would be logical to look to see if Apion was criticizing Judaism from what would amount to an Epicurean point of view rather than simply as a Stoic or as a generic believer in the Greco/Roman gods.

I gather for example that Apion criticized Judaism for being impious, and that sounds consistent with what Epicurus says about incorrect beliefs about the gods.

At this point I don't have anything more but I've downloaded Josephus "Against Apion" and see what i can find.

Josephus; with an English translation by H. St. J. Thackeray, in nine volumes : Josephus, Flavius : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Translators vary

archive.org

Quote

So if someone is in a state of total inactivity, and thinks about nothing pleasurable or troubling and feels no pain in his body, the reward system of the brain is not working*

Quote from TauPhi

if none of the hormones and neurotransmitters are at work at any given time in one's body, wouldn't that be a strong indication that this individual is as alive as a dodo?

i agree Tau Phi, if the hormones and neurotransmitters are not working at all, then that sounds like death.

However, the tone of hypothetical questions like this seems to be that the person under discussion is simply sitting quietly and still and not receiving any stimulation, rather than being dead.

The part of the question about "thinks about nothing pleasurable" is also a problem. It appears that from Epicurus' point of view, "thinking" of any kind is itself pleasurable if it is not painful. One doesn't have to be "thinking about something pleasurable" in order for thinking to be pleasurable.

The hand analogy applies directly to the mind. So long as the hand is alive and not feeling pain it is feeling pleasure. So long as the mind is alive and not feeling pain it is feeling pleasure.

Shahab here is my answer to this excellent question. i think this part of your question leads to the answer:

Quote from shahabgh66

From a neuroscientific outlook, when brain produces any of these six hormones of Endorphins, Dopamine, Oxytocin, Norepinephrine, Cortisol and Adrenaline, one feels pleasure.

You'd have to to through each of those hormones to describe them more specifically, but for the moment let's consider those hormones to be the biological expression of what most people often refer to as the pleasure - an agreeable stimulation felt by the senses.

When you read through the discussion that remains in Diogenes Laertius and Cicero as to how Epicurus was defining his terms, Epicurus was not limiting pleasure to an agreeable biological stimulation felt by the senses. Epicurus was specifically taking the position that whether the feeling arises from stimulation or simple awareness, there are two and only two categories of feelings, pleasure and pain, with no middle ground or third condition. All feelings in life, whether stimulated or not, are considered by definition to fall within either one category or the other. If you are conscious of your condition at all, you are at all times feeling either one or the other. While you can feel many things at one time in separate parts of your mind and body, a single feeling at any part of your mind and body at a particular moment is one or the other never both or some third condition. For example as to the feelings being two:

Diogenes Laertius 10:34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“

On Ends 1:30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?

As to the assertion that you are feeling either one or the other at all times:

On Ends 1:38: Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“

As to the two conditions being separate and unmixed in any particular feeling:

PD03 : ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“

All of those taken together mean that Epicurus did not limit pleasure to what we generally think of as sensory stimulation, but included within pleasure all states of awareness of life that are not felt to be painful. You can see an explicit example of that here in regard to discussion of one's hand in its normal state of affairs, whenever it is not in some affirmative pain:

On Ends 1:39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.

You also see this position being asserted in comparing the conditions of two people who are not in pain, but who are seemingly in very different conditions: A host at a party who is pouring wine to a guest who is drinking it. Here is the example:

On Ends 2:16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?”   [Torquatus objects to the question as quibbling but the implicit answer is "yes" based on the condition of "not being thirsty" and "the thirsty man who drinks" both being conditions of pleasure."]

This means that Epicurus was defining all conditions of awareness where pain is not present to be pleasure. It's significant to remember "conditions of awareness" because he is not saying that a rock, which is not feeling pain, to be feeling pleasure. Only the living can feel pleasure or pain, but when you and aware of your condition all of your feelings can be categorized as either painful or pleasurable. You can see this sweeping categorization stated specifically here:

On Ends 2:9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”

On Ends 2:11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible.”

This is how Epicurus can say that the wise man is continuously feeling pleasure, and how he defines the absence of pain as the highest pleasure. He is not talking about the most intense stimulation, he is talking philosophically about the most pure and complete condition of pleasure where pleasure is defined as a condition where absolutely all pain is gone. The wise man is about to consider this condition to be the most complete pleasure even though it is not the most intense stimulation:

On Ends 1:56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.

On Ends 1:62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.

So as I see it your question is a variation of what gets asked all the time: How can a condition of absence of pain be considered pleasure? The answer is that absence of pain can be considered to be pleasure, and in fact the total absence of pain can be considered to be the highest pleasure, because we are considering pleasure to include not just sensory stimulation, but also to include all conditions of awareness of life, mental or bodily, which are not painful, regardless of whether those conditions result from stimulation or from simple awareness of pain-free existence.

One or more of those hormones you refer to may or may not be something that we can consider to be the result of awareness of non-painful existence. Or all of those hormones may be the result of some kind of "stimulation." Sort of like with the issue of the word "atom" being meant to refer to something that is indivisible, rather than specifically to atoms or subatomic particles I think Epicurus would say that no matter how you slice your hormones or any other parts of biological awareness, what we are doing in describing pleasure is not looking at the structure but at the effect that is felt. Atoms are "whatever matter is indivisible" and Pleasure is "whatever feeling is not painful."

This may appear to be a word game, but it is not. It is the assertion that the normal healthy default condition of life is and should be considered to be pleasurable whenever it is not painful. I think Norman DeWitt says it best:

“Epicurus And His Philosophy” page 240 (emphasis added)

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing."

So Shahab for me personally, when I think about the fact that for an eternity before I was born I felt nothing at all, and for an eternity after I die I will feel nothing at all, I have no problem at all considering to be pleasure all of my non-painful awareness in this brief period when I am alive.

Thanks for that information! Paperback much cheaper than ebook - that's pretty weird!

Welcome aragen !

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This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Wow all the way down to the detail of spitting in its mouth -- I presumed it was just spitting on anywhere! I am not so sure I would try to get close enough to aim for the mouth!

Sounds pretty "conclusive" (as the article says) to me!