Posts by Cassius

One more cite - this is the Lucretius1743 edition, in the 100's

Nor are you to believe that the sacred mansions of the gods are placed in any parts of this world of ours, for the nature of the gods is so subtle, and at so remote a distance from our senses, that it can scarce be apprehended by the mind. Since therefore it cannot be touched or felt by our hands, it can touch nothing that it is the object of our senses, for nothing has a power to touch that is incapable of being touched itself. For this reason the abodes of the gods must be far different from ours; they must be subtle, and answerable to their own nature. But the truth of this I shall more fully prove in another place.

Issues I want to be sure to include in this episode:

1. Is "pattern" correct usage in the context of prolepsis? Is the Latin "exemplum" (see Lucretius below)? Is "example" or "notion" a better term? Does "pattern" imply intelligent designer?
2. Is "recognition" correct usage?
3. Are any "patterns" innate at birth? (beavers and dams?)
4. Relationship of "patterns" and "images"
5. Does the mind itself create patterns?
6. Lucretius 5:181, see post 40 above: [181-Bailey] Further, how was there first implanted in the gods a pattern for the begetting of things, yea, and the concept of man, so that they might know and see in their mind what they wished to do, or in what way was the power of the first-beginnings ever learnt, or what they could do when they shifted their order one with the other, if nature did not herself give a model of creation? For so many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way, and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, that it is no wonder if they have fallen also into such arrangements, and have passed into such movements, as those whereby this present sum of things is carried on, ever and again replenished.
   1. Martin Ferguson Smith - Furthermore, how was a model for the creation of things implanted in the gods? How did they obtain the conception of human beings, so that they might know and perceive in their minds what they wished to produce? And how did they ever recognize the capacity of the primary particles and the potential effect of their different arrangements, if nature herself did not furnish them with a pattern for creation? The fact is that from time everlasting countless elements, impelled by blows and by their 190 own weight, have never ceased to move in manifold ways, making all kinds of unions and experimenting with everything they could combine to create. 17 It is not surprising therefore that they have at last fallen into such arrangements, and acquired such movements, as those whereby this aggregate of things is maintained and constantly renewed.
   2. MFS Note 16 - 16. 181-186: The same argument is used in 1046 1049, where Lucr. is maintaining that language cannot have been an artificial invention. The point is that neither the gods nor the inventors of language can have had a conception of what they wanted to create, if nature had not already created a world or language that they could use as a model. The argument depends on an important principle of Epicurean epistemology, which is that repeated reception of sense impressions creates in the mind a general conception of each class of things, and that without these conceptions, to which further sense impressions arc referred, scientific knowledge would be impossible. On (pre)conceptions as a criterion of truth, see p. xxv.
   3. MFS Note page xxv - "Sensation by itself is irrational and incapable of memory, but the repeated reception of sense impressions creates in the mind general
      conceptions or all classes or things. Both in Greek and in Latin these general conceptions arc often (though not by Lucretius) called "preconceptions," because, once created in the mind, they remain there, and further sense impressions are referred to them for testing and identification. However, it is imp0l1ant to understand that the (pre)eonceptions are not innate, but derived from sensation. Indeed it is because they are derived from sensation that they arc valid. Without them, memory, thought, and knowledge would be impossible, and they are the second criterion of truth.
7. 

Welcome to Episode 235 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com.

For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not the same as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In the Epicurean theory of knowledge, all sensations are true, but that does not mean all opinions are true, but that the raw data reported by the senses is reported without the injection of opinion, as the opinion-making process takes place in the mind, where it is subject to mistakes, rather than in the senses. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts show that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius, beginning at the end of Section 10.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will be maintained here.

Today's Text

XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that prenotion was called πρόληψις by Epicurus; an appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in these words is true: “That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail.” We have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question.

For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity.

XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and partly by reason. All men are told by nature that none but a human form can be ascribed to the Gods; for under what other image did it ever appear to any one either sleeping or waking? and, without having recourse to our first notions, reason itself declares the same; for as it is easy to conceive that the most excellent nature, either because of its happiness or immortality, should be the most beautiful, what composition of limbs, what conformation of lineaments, what form, what aspect, can be more beautiful than the human? Your sect, Lucilius (not like my friend Cotta, who sometimes says one thing and sometimes another), when they represent the divine art and workmanship in the human body, are used to describe how very completely each member is formed, not only for convenience, but also for beauty. Therefore, if the human form excels that of all other animal beings, as God himself is an animated being, he must surely be of that form which is the most beautiful. Besides, the Gods are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form; the Gods, therefore, must be acknowledged to be of human form; yet that form is not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but something like blood. Though these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend; yet, depending on your understanding, I shall be more brief on the subject than otherwise I should be. Epicurus, who not only discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets of nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and nature of the Gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the mind; nor are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or reducible to number, like those things which, because of their firmness, he calls Στερέμνια; but as images, perceived by similitude and transition. As infinite kinds of those images result from innumerable individuals, and centre in the Gods, our minds and understanding are directed towards and fixed with the greatest delight on them, in order to comprehend what that happy and eternal essence is.

Happy Birthday to Scott! Learn more about Scott and say happy birthday on Scott's timeline: Scott

Episode 234 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we deal with Marcus Aurelius' views of fate and the gods, and we discuss the canonical basis for the Epicurean view of divinity.

For those of you who follow channels on Youtube, please note that the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available in full as a Youtube Channel:

We're still all audio, of course, but Youtube has "ingested" (their term) the full podcast archive, so now those who use Youtube as their main media center will be able to subscribe and listen to old episodes and follow new episodes as they are released directly in Youtube.

It also looks like closed captioning is operational, so that means Youtube has processed the audio into text, which should make the content of the episodes more "findable" than before.

There may be some hiccups as the "ingestion" settles in, but I've tested it briefly and it looks to be fully operational.

If anyone tries this out and sees any modifications that need to be made to the settings, let us know!

If anyone gets a chance to listen to Dr. Glidden again, I suggest listening closely to the way the phrases the "pattern" facility. To be fair to Dr. Glidden, we're asking him about papers he wrote 30 years ago, so i wouldn't expect him to be ultra-precise in his wording.

For example, I think a lot of us like the idea of "patterns" being involved. But is a prolepsis actually 'recognizing" a pattern, or "detecting" that a "shape" is involved, or exactly what?

For example in the the "stick" vs "snake" example that Don asks about - By the time we get to discussing "sticks" and "snakes" are we already past prolepsis and at the "conceptual" level?

I think Dr. Glidden is saying in significant part that the "anticipation' aspect involved is the "matching" or some other "processing" of "patterns," such that as with animals there is an "intuitive leap" that preserves the safety of the organism by guesswork at what the pattern or shape is going to reveal before it is fully recognized, and thus that helps preserve us from walking on snakes and the like, before we can consciously identify the words stick or snake or dynamite stick or anything else.

So the "anticipatory / matching / guesswork / intuitive" aspect of a process is probably at least partly involved.

By asking this question I am trying to continue to focus on identifying a word or a description of what it is that prolepses are processing: "For example in the the "stick" vs "snake" example that Don asks about - By the time we get to discussing "sticks" and "snakes" are we already past prolepsis and at the "conceptual" level?"

I think most of us agree that prolepses are working (1) before concepts are involved, and (2) somewhat "jumping ahead" so as to match and create reactions before conscious conceptual thought takes place.

I can see the likelihood of more than one source of these "patterns" - (1)conscious consideration of images as we grow up, as is the example of oxen used by Laertius, and also (2) "inborn" detection of certain patterns which accounts for how animals and babies and similar living being develop (or are born with) a pattern/shape-detection ability before they are exposed to any patterns/shapes in the first place. (As to item 2, I think we have to consider instinct such as bird migration (?) and beaver dam-building (?) in that discussion.)

This current episode will not likely include, but i will be sure next week's episode includes, discussion of Lucretius 5:181, which I see as important light on this question, as mentioned in post 40 above

Quote

[181] Further, how was there first implanted in the gods a pattern for the begetting of things, yea, and the concept of man, so that they might know and see in their mind what they wished to do, or in what way was the power of the first-beginnings ever learnt, or what they could do when they shifted their order one with the other, if nature did not herself give a model of creation? For so many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way, and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, that it is no wonder if they have fallen also into such arrangements, and have passed into such movements, as those whereby this present sum of things is carried on, ever and again replenished.

At the end of this episode (to be released soon) Joshua makes the recommendation that it would be helpful to review our interview with Dr. David Glidden in our prior Episode 166.

I agree with that recommendation, and I have been listening to it again myself. I think Dr. Glidden's approach has a lot of merit, and his viewpoint of prolepsis as being related to processing of patterns, and being pre-conceptual, largely goes against the platonic and stoic-influenced orthodoxy, and shares a lot of commonality with what i think a lot of us here are thinking.

I have a slight caution, however, to anyone who might be listening to the episode for the first time. You'll find that Dr. Glidden has a very strong Buddhist streak, so it should not be presumed that every aspect of what Dr. Glidden says is something with which all of us at EpicureanFriends would agree with. Those aspects of his commentary should be self-evident, and just like with all guests and all statements made on the podcast, people can accept or reject those as they like.

It's the 'materialist' nature of his analysis of Epicurus' view of prolepsis which is the focus of the discussion, and in that aspect I think his comments are uniformly helpful. Perhaps at some point we can get Dr. Glidden back on the show because he's a delightful and intelligent man, and his views on prolepsis are useful for thinking "outside the box" on prolepsis.

In an uncharacteristic bout of self-discipline, we stayed with the plan today and limited ourselves to finishing up on Marcus Aurelius and then reviewing basic Epicurean canonics theory before digging too far into Velleius' proleptic argument for the Epicurean view of gods.

Editing on the podcast is going well so it will be released possibly as soon as Monday night, but certainly no later than Tuesday. That will give us, one more week before memorializing in Podcast form next Sunday our attempt at unwinding the full argument.

I have gotten the feeling that you have been under the weather for longer than usual so I hope you feel better soon. The issue of prolepsis will still be there after you recover!

This is sort of a "fun" category because it calls for continued investigation and research, something that some of our participants are very good at! I've set up several topics here, moving them from other areas, and there are other topics to be added, such as the identity of the author of the 1743 Edition. I'll let Joshua start that one as he has been the lead researcher on it and has the best ideas.

A good example of a long-standing thread that has been moved here is the "Where is Epicurus in the School of Athens?" artwork.

If anyone thinks of prior threads that would be better off here than where they are, let us know and we will move them or at least post a "redirect" notice.

There are plenty of "unsolved questions" about philosophic issues, but let's restrict this forum to more "historical" or "fact" questions rather than general philosophic questions, which go better under the existing forum categories.

Check the link below to go to the new forum and see the list of threads:

"Unsolved Mysteries" of Epicurean History

This topic has already been referenced in the link below, but we can use this thread for the more specific tracking down of the question.

Post

RE: Lucretius' Appearance - Research into What He Looked Like

Here's another cameo in plaster that is supposed to be Lucretius.

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/3376/

c. 1820, Pietro Paoletti

As for Munro's ring, I have now traced its history for a period of more than 50 years. I will present my findings tomorrow evening

Joshua

January 24, 2023 at 5:52 PM

Yes every person probably needs a different percentage, depending on their background. As a general expectation, however, I doubt that much progress in the understanding of the ethics can occur without dealing with the canonics. And since the issue of "gods" is generally treated under physics/canonics, that another reason not to underestimate their importance.

I agree with Don's post and analogize to pattern recognition, and also suggest that we can go further based on other citations.

In addition to the Centaur analogy, but I am convinced we also have to take into account what Lucretius said in Book 5 as to why the gods could not have created the universe:

Quote

[181] Further, how was there first implanted in the gods a pattern for the begetting of things, yea, and the concept of man, so that they might know and see in their mind what they wished to do, or in what way was the power of the first-beginnings ever learnt, or what they could do when they shifted their order one with the other, if nature did not herself give a model of creation? For so many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way, and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, that it is no wonder if they have fallen also into such arrangements, and have passed into such movements, as those whereby this present sum of things is carried on, ever and again replenished.

Seems to me that Lucretius is arguing that the gods could not have created the universe because (if they pre-existed the universe) then they would never have been exposed to any "pattern" that gave them the idea of a universe.

And that sounds like a very good argument to me that remains valid today.

Carrying the point forward, where do these "patterns" come from? It isn't sufficient to say that they are "etched" into us at birth, or for us to just say that this is precursor to genetic encoding and that that answers our concerns. How did that "etching" come about? Did the gods etch us, as the Stoics would probably argue? Or did it just "randomly" happen, which I think is equally untenable?

It looks to me like Epicurus would have said that in an eternal universe, nothing can be said to come absolutely "first." Instead, what has always eternally been happening is the flow of atoms through void.

From that perspective the sequence would be more like:

Atoms have always flowed through void naturally, combining into bodies, from which emergent properties and qualities have arisen. There was never a "first body."

As bodies grow they give off from their surfaces flows of atoms, which flows are in the shape of their surfaces. These flows of atoms in the shape of their surfaces are images.

The images are constantly flowing through the universe, some images combining with each other in ways that do not reflect their true origins (such as images of centaurs). Other images largely or fully retain fidelity to their original source, and thereby conveying to us sensations of concrete objects which we can be confident have independent existence external to us.

The atoms have always combined into bodies, and so this flow of images has also always existed. Simultaneously, along with these filmy flows, more solid bodies have combined into living beings. These living beings have thus always been exposed to the flows of images. Over time, individual species of living beings develop, as a result of their continued impact with flows of atoms, an ability to think, and over time the repeated exposure to light and dark and eventually trees and stars become exposure to trees and universes and more abstract relationships, one of which abstract relationships becomes identified as "divinity."

So to say simply that "prolepsis is the faculty that allows us to recognize the shapes or forms of the images that strike us" (which is pretty close to saying that it is "pattern recognition") is helpful. But the rest of the story seems to me how they are tied to the flow of images, which arise from the atoms themselves turning into bodies and in turn giving off images, thus eliminating any concern about divine origin of the whole process from start to finish. The "flow of images" would explain both the origin of the proleptic faculty and how it sharpens over time.

And it seems to me that "flows of images" remains a valid way to look at the situation, even though we don't think exactly in those terms today. We don't talk about "atoms" in quite the same way either, but the word continues to be useful, and the word "images" can be useful too if we are careful about what it means.

As we get close to recording I definitely want to be sure we go over citations as to what the Epicureans meant by "true" or "real." Including what Bryan just quoted, several are:

Diogenes Laertius [31] Logic they reject as misleading. For they say it is sufficient for physicists to be guided by what things say of themselves. Thus in The Canon Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings; the Epicureans add to these the intuitive apprehensions of the mind. And this he says himself too in the summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Principal Doctrines. For, he says, all sensation is irrational and does not admit of memory; for it is not set in motion by itself, nor when it is set in motion by something else, can it add to it or take from it. [32] Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations. For a similar sensation cannot refute a similar because it is equivalent in validity, nor a dissimilar a dissimilar, for the objects of which they are the criteria are not the same; nor again can reason, for all reason is dependent upon sensations; nor can one sensation refute another, for we attend to them all alike. Again, the fact of apperception confirms the truth of the sensations. And seeing and hearing are as much facts as feeling pain. From this it follows that as regards the imperceptible we must draw inferences from phenomena. For all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something. And the visions of the insane and those in dreams are true, for they cause movement, and that which does not exist cannot cause movement.

U244

Sextus Empiricus, _Against the Logicians_ II (_Against the Dogmatists,_ II).9: Epicurus said that all sensibles were true and real. For there is no difference between saying that something is true and that it is real. And that is why, in giving a formalization of the true and the _false_, he says, “that which is such as it is said to be, is true” and “that which is not such as it is said to be, is false.”

Letter to Herodotus [51]: For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real, and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses. And error would not exist unless another kind of movement too were produced inside ourselves, closely linked to the apprehension of images, but differing from it; and it is owing to this, supposing it is not confirmed, or is contradicted, that falsehood arises; but if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true.

Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, I.7.22: Turn next to the second division of philosophy, the department of Method and of Dialectic, which its termed Logikē. Of the whole armor of Logic your founder, as it seems to me, is absolutely destitute. He does away with Definition; he has no doctrine of Division or Partition; he gives no rules for Deduction or Syllogistic Inference, and imparts no method for resolving Dilemmas or for detecting Fallacies of Equivocation. The Criteria of reality he places in sensation; once let the senses accept as true something that is false, and every possible criterion of truth and falsehood seems to him to be immediately destroyed. {lacuna} He lays the very greatest stress upon that which, as he declares, Nature herself decrees and sanctions, that is: the feelings of pleasure and pain. These he maintains lie at the root of every act of choice and of avoidance.

U247 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, I (Against the Dogmatists, I) 203: Epicurus says that there are two things which are linked to each other, presentation and opinion, and that of these presentation (which he also calls 'clear fact') is always true. For just as the primary feelings, i.e., pleasure and pain, come to be from certain productive factors and in accordance with productive factors themselves (for example, pleasure comes to be from pleasant things and pain from painful things, and what causes pleasure can never fail to be pleasant, nor can what produces pain not be painful; but rather, it is necessary that what gives pleasure should be pleasant and that what gives pain should, in its nature, be painful), likewise, in the case of presentations, which are feelings within us, what causes each of them is presented in every respect and unqualifiedly, and since it is presented it cannot help but exist in truth just as it is presented […lacuna…] that it is productive of presentation. And one must reason similarly for the individual senses. For what is visible not only is presented as visible but also is such as it is presented; and what is audible is not only presented as audible, but also is like that in truth; and similarly for the rest. Therefore, it turns out that all presentations are true. And reasonably so. For if, the Epicureans say, a presentation is true if it comes from an existing object and in accordance with the existing object, and if every presentation arises from the object presented and in accordance with the presented object itself, then necessarily every presentation is true.

Peter Konstans very helpfully collected some cites for us on this point here:

Post

RE: Pros and Cons Of Considering Epicurean Philosophy To Be A "Religion"

I recommend reading the academic book

Pleasure, Mind, and Soul, Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy by C. C. W. Taylor

The second chapter examines the Epicurean thesis that all perceptions are true, arguing that what it means is that every instance of sensory presentation (widely construed, to include dreams, hallucinations, and imagination as well as perception proper) consists in the stimulation of a sense-organ by a real object, which is represented in that perception exactly as it is in…

Peter Konstans

March 25, 2024 at 4:13 AM

Quote from Julia

I agree. It might be worthwhile shifting more activity towards building/growing the wiki and other more organised knowledge bases. I already got in trouble for how much time I spent on some forum posts, so I doubt I'll be editing much myself, but I think that would be the way to go

Yes further Wiki / knowledge base development is where I plan to spend much of my time. But you should *never* consider yourself "in trouble" for lengthy contributions! They are welcome and needed, no matter how long they are! We really need more "articles" here that address things in longer form, and we can feature them accordingly so people won't treat them in the same way as they treat the ongoing "discussions." You and everyone are invited to contribute things like that! Currently our "Articles" section is really sparse, and that needs to change. We've had some good material in the past, such as Elayne's "On Pleasure, Pain, And Happiness," and we need more of it.

Related to this is the question of priorities. Lately I've devoted a lot of time to discussing Prolepsis and other detailed aspects of the gods issue. Those are enjoyable to me and are helping to fill in some gaps that need filling, but at the same time, the overall goal of the forum is more oriented to providing understandable and persuasive explanations of the "core issues" (such as the full list of 11 that are currently featured on the front page of the forum) which are of more interest to and needed by the vastly larger number of people.

I would like us to always try to steer our activities so that we always keep that in mind, not only because it helps us meet new people and expand our circles of friendships, which Epicurus emphasized, but also because it helps us focus on issues where we either do or should agree, rather on details where we are inevitably left to speculation and therefore less unanimity of opinion.

There's obviously also a lot of turnover among are participants - the majority of people drop by and stay for a relatively short while and then fade away. it's much more important for us to identify and focus on the clear core issues that have "staying power" - and that keep people coming back - than it is to blaze new trails on relatively obscure issues.

Our biggest challenge is to develop ongoing activities and interactions that lead to greater sense of community so that the effort as a whole can have the kind of staying power that is needed.

Quote from Remus

This confirms, once again, that everything sounds better with a posh English accent.

I very much agree with Remus - I feel exactly that way myself.

However Kalosyni's post reminds me of something I started to post this morning but held back. Now I'll go ahead:

The seductiveness of the posh English accent is not without its problems, and I actually prefer a strong "neutral" "midwestern" or other accents to the Academic English style in many cases.

I am exaggerating here, but the posh English approach scares me when I think about how they can read "Tea and crumpets at Two is Delicious" with exactly the same poshness and diffidence and tone of voice as when the read: "So great is the power of religion to prompt men to evil deeds."

However I see it perfectly suited to Cicero and Plato and even Aristotle!

Done and thanks Joshua! We can eventually delete posts 4 and 5 from this thread....

As usual, lots of caution, but this is an interesting recent article on one particular target of interest:

James Webb detects signs of life on exoplanet K2-18b

Webb Telescope's study on K2-18b reveals potential but inconclusive signs of extraterrestrial life; advanced technology needed for certainty.

www.earth.com

Lots of good photos here:

Webb Image Release- Webb Space Telescope GSFC/NASA

The Latest NASA Released Webb Image is featured on this page. The James Webb Space Telescope's revolutionary technology will study every phase of cosmic…

webb.nasa.gov

I can't determine when this went online but it looks very recent.

Well done in how it provides both closed caption and an on-line outline of the topic being discussed.

And interesting graphics too --

Very well done and thanks Julia for making us aware of this!