Posts by Cassius

Godfrey I would also draw an analogy to what DeWitt discusses (disapprovingly) here:

DeWitt talks several times about "faith in doctrine" as if he thinks Epicurus had gone too far in several cases. I think DeWitt is on the right course in observing that this kind of thing is exactly what Epicurus was doing, but DeWitt is wrong in his analysis of the result, because Epicurus' position is much stronger than DeWitt's assessment of it. I do think DeWitt's right in talking about it in terms of "faith," (confidence is probably a better word) but the "faith" issue is really more like: "I'm never going to know everything I'd like to know, so where do I place my confidence? Do I place it in Epicurean reasoning based on things I do observe, or do I allow any and all speculation, even that which has absolutely no evidence to support it?" Epicurus chose to place his "faith" about things that are unseen in reasoning based on things that are seen. To me that's a decision I can fully agree with.

Observing that pain is short if intense but manageable if long also seems like going too far when we think of how bad pain can be, but the best way to look at this seems to me to be that we NOT consider it "clinical medical advice," but as a philosophic statement that addresses the bigger philosophical issue, which is: While continuous pleasure is available to those who can figure the problem out, continuous pain can never hold us in its grip forever (we have death as an ultimate cure for that).

Seems to me Epicurus is frequently taking this kind of approach, he's using logical reasoning to explain the big picture to us as a way of organizing our lives, while also reminding us that there's no god or fate to magically solve all our problems, and that we have to work our way through them as best we can.

I might as well go ahead and observe that I see myself making this observation over and over in multiple discussions, probably not convincing many people, but becoming more confident of it myself:

In my view, Epicurus needs to be understood as first and foremost a philosopher attacking the big issues who wants to know the truth about them. Epicurus wants the truth more than he wants happiness, because he's convinced that happiness depends on having a logically consistent understanding of nature. That means Epicurus is committed to talking about everything in a rigorously logical way, and he embraces big-picture logical reasoning, so long as it is based on evidence. That's the starting point for understanding Epicurus, not seeing him as a modern psychologist who throws logic out the window in favor of looking haphazardly for whatever seems to work at the moment. A modern clinician is going to want to dissect "pleasure" into thousand different components, but for Epicurus the first step in making practical use of the issue is to observe the big picture and gain the confidence that comes from the highest level logical analysis, that comes from observing reality and then concluding that is is reasonable to classify all pleasures *as being by definition* the absence of pain.

Godfrey I would suspect that if there is a logical inconsistency here, it would be in DeWitt's description of "perfection" rather than in Epicurus' theory. Surely you are right that in fighting Plato's ideals, Epicurus would not then turn around and adopt the same problem in a new form.

No doubt there's a lot more investigation to be done into the background of the isonomia discussion, but I would expect this reasoning to be of the "nature never makes only a single thing of a kind" variety that is clearly described by Lucretius.

In that other case, it seems they were taking from the observation that here on earth there is nothing absolutely unique, but that everything belongs to a class of similars, and extrapolating that to the universe as a whole. That's a reasonable procedure it seems to me, and the burden of proof to refute a theory based on what we see here on earth is on someone who asserts that there IS something that is absolutely unique but which cannot be observed (a burden which cannot be met by observation) rather than on Epicurus' position, which rests deductions from what we do in fact observe.

We'd have to dive into whether in fact Epicurus was talking about "perfection" as a concept, but I would suspect more that he was (1) starting with the observation that there is nothing unique, all belonging to a class of similars, and then proceeding to (2) that within any class of similars, it is possible for us (probably by process related to preconception) to "rank" those similars in terms of varying characteristics.

Happiness and length of life being characteristics of the class of "living beings," it makes logical sense to conclude from the examples we observe that happiness and length of life exist on a spectrum from less happy to completely happy, and from short life to much longer life. Given that we see such spectrums of characteristics here on earth, it is logical to believe that in a universe that is eternally old and boundlessly wide, there exist examples within those classes that extend out in both directions (greater toward total happiness; longer life toward deathlessness).

We could probably compare what Philodemus is saying in "On Signs," but it does seem that the Epicureans were taking the canonical position that it is legitimate to reason in that way, from things that we observe here on earth to how those things might occur in wider variety in an infinite number of places.

Remember too, that the purpose of scientific investigation is not to latch onto a single true theory of everything, which is essentially impossible, but to determine what is both consistent with what we observe and not contradicted by that which we observe. Then, using sound reasoning, we then consider what is possible to be a real possibility, while "waiting" to reduce the number of possibilities if any new evidence arrives to contradict one of more of them.

This is very different, and in my view superior, to the modern arbitrary speculations that sometimes seems to be "if I can't see if for myself here then it didn't and doesn't happen," or that accept some theory that has absolutely no evidential proof behind it, but which makes sense in some logic-only analysis.

So I see this as an area where DeWitt has generally pointed in the right direction, but further research needs to follow his path and extend his observations more precisely.

And yes it's definitely a process that has limitations, but I see this as very similar to logically dividing all experiences of life into pleasure and pain, and then logically observing that the presence of one is the absence of the other. Epicurus wasn't willing to use logical processes to work with Platonic ideals that have no evidence in reality to support them, but he was willing to use logical processes to work with the evidence that the senses provide to us, and Epicurus seems to have been just as sharp a logician as any of his enemies, carrying his reasoning to its logical conclusions.

Quote from Twentier

Epicureanism is my religion, and there's not a goddamn thing anyone can do about it.

You know, when I combine my thoughts after reading that section of DeWitt on "Isonomy and the Gods," with our friend Twentier's statement, I have to comment that if ever in the future there is a resurgence of Epicureanism as a "religion," Norman DeWitt deserves a special place its "Hall of Apostles." No one else I know of is anywhere close to DeWitt in bringing the implications of the various texts out into the open for us to discuss.

1. The gods are not immortal, just deathless.
2. Isonomia
3. The principle that nature never creates only a single thing of a kind.
4. Prolepsis, as much or more so than images, as the basis of Epicurus' belief in the gods.
5. The importance of the implications of infinity.

All of these things are right there in the various texts, but the writers for laymen rarely seem interested in their significance. Laymen themselves don't have nearly the depth of reading to recognize how they fit together without some of DeWitt's training to bring them together. We'd never be able to bring all these to bear in our discussions here, and if we listened to most modern theorists, who seem to frown on "infinity" and "eternality," we'd never even get started.

Dewitt:

Quote

ISONOMY AND THE GODS

In spite of a supercilious opinion to the contrary, Epicurus was not a muddled thinker but a very systematic one. He enunciated his Twelve Elementary Principles and adhered to them closely. Two of these, the fifth and sixth, asserted the infinity of the universe in respect of matter and space. To this idea of infinity he ascribed fundamental importance. He exhorted the young Pythocles to study it as one of those master principles which would render easy the recognition of causation in details.⁶⁸ Cicero must have been recalling some similar exhortation when he wrote: "But of the very greatest importance is the significance of infinity and in the highest degree deserving of intense and diligent contemplation." ⁶⁹ He was quoting Epicurus.

It was from this principle that Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods. It was from this that he arrived at knowledge of their number and by secondary deduction at knowledge of their abode. He so interpreted the significance of infinity as to extend it from matter and space to the sphere of values, that is, to perfection and imperfection. In brief, if the universe were thought to be imperfect throughout its infinite extent, it could no longer be called infinite. This necessity of thought impelled him to promulgate a subsidiary principle, which he called isonomia, a sort of cosmic justice, according to which the imperfection in particular parts of the universe is offset by the perfection of the whole. Cicero rendered it aequabilis tributio, "equitable apportionment." ⁷⁰ The mistake of rendering it as "equilibrium" must be avoided.

The term isonomia itself, which may be anglicized as isonomy, deserves a note. That it is lacking in extant Epicurean texts, all of them elementary, and is transmitted only by Cicero is evidence of its belonging to higher doctrine and advanced studies. Epicurus switched its meaning slightly, as he did that of the word prolepsis. To the Greeks it signified equality of all before the law, a boast of Athenians in particular. It was a mate to eunomia, government by law, as opposed to barbaric despotism, a boast of Greeks in general. That Epicurus thought to make capital of this happy connotation may be considered certain. He was vindicating for Nature a sort of justice, the bad being overbalanced by the good. It is also possible that he was remotely influenced by the teachings of Zoroaster, well known in his day through the conquests of Alexander, according to whom good and evil, as represented by Ormazd and Ahriman, battled for the upper hand in mundane affairs.

Whatever may be the facts concerning this influence, Epicurus discovered a reasonable way of allowing for the triumph of good in the universe, which seemed impossible under atomic materialism. Thus in his system of thought isonomy plays a part comparable to that of teleology with Plato and Aristotle. Teleology was inferred from the evidences of design, and design presumes agencies of benevolence, whether natural or divine. Epicurus was bound to reject design because the world seemed filled with imperfections, which he listed, but by extending the doctrine of infinity to apply to values he was able, however curiously, to discover room for perfection along with imperfection.

That he employed isonomy as theoretical proof of the existence of gods is well documented. For example, Lactantius, who may have been an Epicurean before his conversion to Christianity, quotes Epicurus as arguing "that the divine exists because there is bound to be something surpassing, superlative and blessed."⁷¹ The necessity here appealed to is a necessity of thought, which becomes a necessity of existence. The existence of the imperfect in an infinite universe demands belief in the existence of the perfect. Cicero employs very similar language: "It is his doctrine that there are gods, because there is bound to be some surpassing being than which nothing is better." ⁷² Like the statement of Lactantius, this recognizes a necessity of existence arising from a necessity of thought; the order of Nature cannot be imperfect throughout its whole extent; it is bound to culminate in something superior, that is, in gods.

It is possible to attain more precision in the exposition. Cicero, though brutally brief, exhibits some precision of statement. The infinity of the universe, as usual, serves as a major premise. This being assumed, Cicero declares: "The nature of the universe must be such that all similars correspond to all similars." ⁷³ One class of similars is obviously taken to be human beings, all belonging to the same grade of existence in the order of Nature. As Philodemus expresses it in a book about logic, entitled On Evidences, "It is impossible to think of Epicurus as man and Metrodorus as non-man." ⁷⁴ Another class of similars is the gods. This being understood, the truth of Cicero's next statement follows logically: "If it be granted that the number of mortals is such and such, the number of immortals is not less." ⁷⁵ This reasoning calls for no exegesis, but two points are worthy of mention: first, Cicero is not precise in calling the gods immortals; according to strict doctrine they are not deathless, only incorruptible of body; the second point is that Epicurus is more polytheistic in belief than his own countrymen.

The next item, however, calls for close scrutiny. Just as human beings constitute one set of similars and the gods another, so the forces that preserve constitute one set and the forces that destroy constitute another.

At this point a sign of warning is to be raised. There is also another pair of forces that are opposed to each other, those that create and those that destroy.⁷⁶ The difference is that the latter operate in each of the innumerable worlds, while the former hold sway in the universe at large. For example, in a world such as our own, which is one of many, the forces of creation have the upper hand during its youthful vigor. At long last, however, the forces of destruction gradually gain the superiority and eventually the world is dissolved into its elements.⁷⁷

In the universe at large, on the contrary, the situation is different and the forces opposed to each other are not those that destroy and those that create but those that destroy and those that preserve. Moreover, a new aspect of infinity is invoked, the infinity of time. The universe is eternal and unchanging. Matter can neither be created nor destroyed. The sum of things is always the same, as Lucretius says. This truth is contained in the first two of the Twelve Elementary Principles. In combination they are made to read: "The universe has always been the same as it now is and always will be the same." ⁷⁸ This can be true only on the principle that the forces that preserve are at all times superior to the forces that destroy.

It follows that Cicero was writing strictly by the book when he made his spokesman draw the following conclusion from the doctrine of isonomy: "And if the forces that destroy are innumerable, the forces that preserve must by the same token be infinite."⁷⁹ This doctrine, it is essential to repeat, holds only for the universe at large. It is not applicable to the individual world and it does not mean that the prevalence of elephants in India is balanced by the prevalence of wolves in Russia. Isonomy does not mean "equal distribution" but "equitable apportionment." It does not denote balance or equilibrium. No two sets of similar forces are in balance; in the individual world the forces of destruction always prevail at last, and in the universe at large the forces of preservation prevail at all times.

By this time three aspects of the principles of isonomy have been brought forward: first, that in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist as well as imperfection; that is, "that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better"; second, that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals; and third, that in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction.

All three of these are direct inferences from the infinity and eternity of the universe. There remains to be drawn an indirect inference of primary importance. Since in the individual worlds the forces of destruction always prevail in the end, it follows that the incorruptible gods can have their dwelling place only outside of the individual worlds, that is, in the free spaces between the worlds, the so-called intermundia, where the forces of preservation are always superior. There is more to be said on this topic in the section that follows.

Display More

Let's see where is the observation that nature never makes only a single thing of a kind...... that might be in Lucretius rather than On The Nature of the Gods....

I would say this eliminates a "single god" from Epicurean consideration as well:

Lucretius 2:1077 -

[1077] This there is too that in the universe there is nothing single, nothing born unique and growing unique and alone, but it is always of some tribe, and there are many things in the same race. First of all turn your mind to living creatures; you will find that in this wise is begotten the race of wild beasts that haunts the mountains, in this wise the stock of men, in this wise again the dumb herds of scaly fishes, and all the bodies of flying fowls. Wherefore you must confess in the same way that sky and earth and sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, are not unique, but rather of number numberless; inasmuch as the deep-fixed boundary-stone of life awaits these as surely, and they are just as much of a body that has birth, as every race which is here on earth, abounding in things after its kind.

[1090] And if you learn this surely, and cling to it, nature is seen, free at once, and quit of her proud rulers, doing all things of her own accord alone, without control of gods. For by the holy hearts of the gods, which in their tranquil peace pass placid years, and a life of calm, who can avail to rule the whole sum of the boundless, who to hold in his guiding hand the mighty reins of the deep, who to turn round all firmaments at once, and warm all fruitful lands with heavenly fires, or to be at all times present in all places, so as to make darkness with clouds, and shake the calm tracts of heaven with thunder, and then shoot thunderbolts, and often make havoc of his own temples, or moving away into deserts rage furiously there, plying the bolt, which often passes by the guilty and does to death the innocent and undeserving?

Quote from Godfrey

Isonomia would also explain why there can't be just one god.

Probably also the rule that "nature never creates only one thing of a kind," which is probably related but probably separate.

On the Nature of the Gods:

“Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study; we must understand that it has in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals, and if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite."

On the "necessity" issue I think we would need to consider the issue of insomnia about which so little is left but which is mentioned by Velleius. It appears that there was some interesting deductive reasoning going on with that topic.

Yes thanks for the spelling correction Don -- "Isonomia" not "insomnia!"

These two questions about the gods are closely related, but we've already had a lot of discussion on them, and that will continue into the future. So from here on out, to the extent that people start new threads focusing on one aspect or the other, let's divide the posts this way:

1 - Questions regarding whether the gods exist, and their nature, and how we know about them, to this subsection of the "Physics" forum:

Nature Has No Gods Over Her - The Nature And Existence of Gods

2 - Questions regarding Epicurus' ethical advice as to how to think about the gods, and our attitude toward them, including questions of "religion," to this section of the "Ethics" forum:

The Proper Attitude Toward Divinity - Piety and "Religion"

I have already done some sorting of existing threads into the two divisions, and if other administrators see obvious candidates for switching threads between them, please do.

There's no doubt that threads in each section will blur into the other aspect, so we'll have cross-links from one forum to the other in the forum description. But at people will be looking for discussions of both issues in both contexts, so hopefully this will help.

Quote from Don

The god avoids anything that would go against its nature.

And I would say that "avoids" = "acting to avoid" and acting is what they have to do to maintain their deathlessness.

Quote from Don

The idea of a god floating in the intermundia with no world for it to stand on like some preserved specimen floating in a jar of formaldehyde holds no fascination for me

I'd say quite likely that's why we see the discussions of the gods having quasi-bodies, and speaking Greek, etc.

I think Epicurus would completely disagree with contentions that he did not have good evidence or reasoning to support his positions on the gods. My reading is that he was as confident on the basics of this subject as he was on atoms, which we also cannot perceive directly either, but about which we can make confident deductions based on things that we do perceive.

I don't know that I have any significant additional thoughts to add to comments such as those of Tau Phi that he doesn't find Epicurean theology valuable other than to emphasize Don's comments: Regardless of what some of us may think ourselves, Epicurus and the leading Epicureans found it valuable. Given that they clearly thought so, the theology is definitely an important part of the philosophy that someone studying the subject needs to know about if they want to understand Epicurus' conclusions before forming their own. "Epicurean philosophy without the theology" is not fully Epicurean philosophy.

To me, i think Epicurus saw this theology as essential for at least two major reasons beyond those discussed already in the thread above:

1 - As inoculation against the idea that humans are alone in the universe, and that we therefore occupy some kind of special and supernatural focus of existence. For most ordinary people who think that we are alone in the universe, that's a prescription for a slippery slide toward all sorts of mysticism.

2 - As important for understanding that while "pleasure is pleasure" from a conceptual point of view, there are important questions to be answered as to which pleasures to pursue in life. Contemplation of the nature of a truly blessed existence - one which even though "godlike" must act to sustain itself - is similar to Epicurus' views of reverence for men wiser than ourselves. It's an important aspect of our own drive to use our lives in the most pleasurable way, and not to settle for less than what we are capable of obtaining.

Lucretius Today Podcast Episode 219 - Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 26 - "Cicero Continues His Attack On Epicurus' Position On Pain" Is Now Available -

Thank you Peter. I have never heard of this writer or the book. Looks very interesting and i am sure I'll have some comments after reading rather than skimming it.

Welcome to Episode 220 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

Last week we focused on Cicero's allegations that Epicurus' views on pain and death were insufficient and contradictory. This week we pick up at the start of Section XXXI - REID EDITION -

XXXI. You and your friends, Torquatus, may twist yourselves this way and that; but you will find nothing in this noble letter from the hand of Epicurus, which harmonizes or accords with his dogmas. So he is refuted out of his own mouth, and his writings are put to shame by his own honesty and character. For from that commission about the children, from the remembrance of and tender feeling for friendship, from the observance of most important duties when at the last gasp, we learn that disinterested honesty was inbred in the man, and was not bribed into existence by pleasures, nor called forth by the wages of rewards. What stronger evidence do we want to prove that morality and uprightness are in themselves desirable, when we see such goodness displayed at the moment of death? But while I regard as creditable the letter which I have just translated almost word for word, though it was by no means in accord with the spirit of his philosophy, yet I am of opinion that this same philosopher's will is at variance not only with the seriousness becoming a true philosopher, but even with his own opinions. He wrote both many times in detail, and also shortly and clearly in the book I have just mentioned, that death is of no importance to us; for anything which has decayed is destitute of feeling; and what is destitute of feeling is of no importance whatever to us. This maxim itself might have been more neatly put and better. For when he puts it thus: what has decayed is without feeling, his statement does not explain sufficiently what it is that has decayed. Still I understand what he means. However, as all feeling is quenched by decay, by which he means death, and as nothing whatever remains which is of any importance to. us, I ask how it is that he provides and lays down with such care and minuteness that his heirs, Amynomachus and Timocrates, should, with the sanction of Hermarchus, give a sum ‘sufficient for the celebration of his birthday every year in the month Gamelion, and also money to provide each month, on the twentieth day after the new moon, a banquet for all those who studied philosophy along with him, that so the memory of himself and of Metrodorus may be reverenced. I am not able to deny that these directions shew us a man as nice and as kindly as you please, but to assume that any man has a birth- day is utterly unworthy of a philosopher, more particularly a natural philosopher (for by this name he desires himself to be called). Why, can the very day that has once been come round again and again? Assuredly it cannot. Or a day just like it? That is not possible either, unless after many thousands of years have intervened, so that there comes to pass a return of all the stars simultaneously to the point from which they set out. No one therefore has a birthday. But it is customary. And I did not know it, I suppose! But if it be, is the custom to be observed even after death? And is provision to be made for it in his will by the man who has uttered to us his almost oracular speech that nothing after death is of any importance to us? Such things do not recall the man who had traversed in thought countless universes and boundless tracts, without shore and without end. Did Democritus ever do anything of the kind? Passing by others, I appeal to the man whom he followed more than all the rest. But if a day was to be signalised, why the day on which he was born, rather than that on which he became a wise man? You will tell me he could not have become a wise man, had he not been born, Nor yet if his grandmother had never been born, if you come to that. The whole notion, Torquatus, of desiring that the recollection of one’s name should be kept fresh after death by a banquet, is entirely for unlearned men. Now I say nothing about the way in which you celebrate such festivals, or the amount of pleasantry you have to face from the wits; there is no need for us to quarrel; I only say thus much, that it was more pardonable for you to observe the birthday of Epicurus than for him to provide by will that it should be observed.

XXXII. But to return to our theme (for we were speaking about pain when we drifted into the consideration of this letter) we may now thus sum up the whole matter: he who is subject to the greatest possible evil is not happy so long as he remains subject to it, whereas the wise man always is happy, though he is at times subject to pain; pain therefore is not the greatest possible evil. Now what kind of statement is this, that past blessings do not fade from the wise man’s memory, but still that he ought not to remember his misfortunes? First, have we power over our recollections? I know that Themistocles, when Simonides, or it may be some one else, offered to teach him the art of remembering, said: Z would rather learn the art of forgetting ; for I remember even the things I do not wish to re- member, while I cannot forget what I wish to forget. He had great gifts; but the truth is really this, that it is too domineering for a philosopher to interdict us from remembering things. Take care that your commands be not those of a Manlius or even stronger; I mean when you lay a command on me which I cannot possibly execute. What if the recollection of past misfortunes is actually agreeable? Some proverbs will thus be truer than your doctrines. It is a common saying: Fast toils are agreeable; and not badly did Euripides say (I shall put it into Latin if I can; you all know the line in Greek): Sweet s the memory of toils that are past. But let us return to the subject of past blessings. If you spoke of such blessings as enabled Gaius Marius, though exiled, starving, and immersed in a swamp, to lighten his pain by re- calling to mind his triumphs, I would listen to you and give you my entire approval. Indeed the happiness of the wise man - can never be perfected, or reach its goal, if his good thoughts and deeds are to be successively effaced by his own forgetfulness,

But in your view life is rendered happy by the remembrance of pleasures already enjoyed, and moreover those enjoyed by the body. For if there are any other pleasures, then it is not true that all mental pleasures are dependent on association with the body. Now if bodily pleasure, even when past, gives satisfaction, I do not see why Aristotle should so utterly ridicule the inscription of Sardanapallus, in which that king of Syria boasts that he has carried away with him all the lustful pleasures. For, says Aristotle, how could he retain after death a thing which, even when he was alive, he could only feel just so long as he actually enjoyed it? Bodily pleasures therefore ebb and fly away one after another, and more often leave behind them reason for regret than for remembrance. Happier then is Africanus when he thus converses with his country : Cease, Rome, thy enemies to fear, with the noble sequel: For my toils have established for thee thy bulwarks. He takes delight in his past toils; you bid him delight in his past pleasures; he turns his thoughts once more to achievements, not one of which he ever connected with the body; you wholly cling to the body.

Quote from Bryan

The same Epicurus asserts that there are four other natural beings which are immortal: of this sort are (1) atoms, (2) the vacuum, (3) the infinite, and (4) the similar parts; and these last are called Homoeomeries and likewise elements." (Goodwin trans.)

Point 3 reminds me of DeWitt's comment about the forces of creation prevailing over those of destruction in the universe as a whole - individual worlds come and go, but the universe as a whole continues forever. To me that makes sense and is a useful point.

Point 4 seems to imply something else that isn't so immediately understandable, at least to me. So this is the same homoeomery that Lucretius argues against "going downward" from our level of existence (that men are not made of little men)? But since we aren't concerned about infinite division on a scale going upward, it is ok to observe that at some level bodies can be grouped together to form larger versions of the same bodies on an infinite or between-the-worlds or "god-level" scale? I think what you are implying Bryan is a grouping of similar particles, perhaps fractal-like - sustainable by flows of similar components, analogous to drops of water forming a waterfall or river or groupings of stars forming a milky way?

The point that even the gods require some form of activity to maintain their deathlessness would likely be a significant part of Epicurean theology, giving us another useful thing to consider as points of emulation. We too have to act properly to sustain our happiness just as they do - there's no supernatural state that "hands it to us free" for men or gods.

Or stated in the way that the death argument is made in Lucretius (if even Epicurus and Scipio had to die, we should not be offended that we too die), then the analogy would be something like: If even the gods must act properly to maintain their happiness, who are we to complain that we must do the same? We should emulate the gods not only in the result of being happy, but also in the process of getting there, with both gods and men acting property to perpetuate our happiness.

Note: I made some edits in the above paragraphs to try to be more clear.

I have to add as an aside to what I quoted from DeWitt above that I've never seen that argument anywhere else. If someone has seen it elsewhere, please let me know, because I tend to see this is one example of the value of DeWitt's approach. DeWitt charges ahead to explore important questions where few others seem to want to go. If I have a criticism it is as I said in a recent podcast, that sometimes I don't think DeWitt follows his own lead far enough. So if I had been him I would not have written the following to imply that Lucretius' approach was superior to that of Epicurus (if in fact it does; as I reread it, I think DeWitt is maybe just making the point that you need both):

Quote

The weakness of logic, of course, is its lack of dynamic. Men do not feel called to devote their lives to the propagation of syllogisms. The merit of romanticism, on the contrary, is the dynamic that goes with it. It is powered by emotion. Lucretius often handles the logic of Epicurus with clarity and skill, but the force of propulsion behind the logic is emotion, pity for the superstitious misery of man and eagerness to emancipate him. In respect of this enthusiasm Lucretius seems to surpass his master, and yet Epicurus is on record as saying: "[The wise man] will be more susceptible of emotion than other men and this will be no obstacle to his wisdom." ^6a Here we have the recognition of the chimerical blend of logic and romanticism. It is the latter, the emotion, the eagerness to emancipate men from fear and to show them the road to happiness, that leads Epicurus to extol the blissfulness of the gods as a perfection to contemplate and imitate. It is the logic of materialism that compels him to deny it to them as a birthright, so to say, and to impose upon them the necessity of preserving it.

DeWitt has himself pointed out that:

Quote

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing."

To me this logical reasoning about the gods sustaining their own deathlessness is very similar to the example of the logical reasoning behind concluding that if the feelings are only two, then the absence of pain *is* pleasure, and vice versa. Both are logical assertions that stand or fall on the precise meaning of words that are asserted to correspond with the actual facts of reality, and to the rejection of interpretations that contradict these conclusions.

The gods are composed of atoms and void and therefore they are not by nature immortal. The feelings are two and therefore the presence of one is the absence of the other. Granting the premises of these propositions, then, to paraphrase Torquatus, nothing can be more true than the truth of these propositions, and Epicurus was asserting them dogmatically as established beyond doubt.

Yes we need "emotion" and "romanticism" to give force to the conclusions, but the logical reasoning supports the emotion and romanticism, it doesn't undermine it. DeWitt pioneers the discussion of the gods not being naturally deathless, but then he unfortunately draws back from the conclusion, when he should follow each step out to the end.

Lucretius may have tripped up on calling the gods immortal (I say may because I see this as more likely an issue of connotation and translation / wording), but I don't think there's anything inconsistent at all about the emotion and drive of Lucretius compared to Epicurus. We don't have the texts but I feel sure Epicurus was at least as driven and intense as Lucretius himself.

Quote from Peter Konstans

However we can't assume that the gods are engaged in a struggle to 'feed' and preserve their bodies similar to that of biological beings. This would imply that they are not blessed but live in a state of at least partial insecurity. The idea that instead of dealing with issues of survival the gods engage in care-free creative activity (like creating works of art) and then in contemplation as a means of 'resting' from creative activity fits the image of blessedness better.

Here is the very interesting section in DeWitt that explains the "gods must preserve their deathlessness" issue, which begins on page 267:

Quote

At the outset it must be observed and kept diligently in mind that nowhere in his extant writings does Epicurus call the gods immortal. This might be thought an accident of the tradition were it not for the fact that other considerations rule out this possibility. If Lucretius does call them immortal repeatedly, this may be set down as an indication that he never really mastered the Epicurean lore of the gods and did not live to make an intensive study of it in preparation for writing about it.

The reasoning behind this doctrine of incorruptibility is readily discerned. From the doctrine that nothing exists except atoms and void it follows that the bodies of the gods must be corporeal. Gods are zoa, "animate beings." They are thus units in the ascending order of Nature, as is man. Being in this order and corporeal, they cannot be deathless. If deathlessness were inherent in their nature, they would be in another class by themselves. Since they do belong in the same class as man, it is a logical necessity to think of their incorruptibility as by some means preserved. Since in the cosmos of Epicurus, unlike that of Plato, this incorruptibility lacked a superior being to guarantee its continuance, the sole possibility was that the gods preserved it for themselves by their own vigilance. Thus it must be discerned that just as the happiness of man is self-achieved, so the happiness of the gods is self-preserved.

However astonishing this doctrine may seem, it is well authenticated. Plutarch, for example, who, though hostile, wrote with texts of Epicurus before him, has this to say: "Freedom from pain along with incorruptibility should have been inherent in the nature of the blissful being, standing in no need of active concern."⁵⁷ This manifestly implies that the Epicurean gods were unable to take their immunity from corruption for granted but must concern themselves for its perpetuation.

The incongruity between this selfish concern for their own bodily security and their indifference to the good of mankind was certain to elicit condemnation from believers in divine providence, and this has not escaped record. Thus the Christian Eusebius quotes his Atticus as saying: "According to Epicurus it's good-bye to providence, in spite of the fact that according to him the gods bring to bear all diligent care for the preservation of their own peculiar blessings."⁵⁸

When once it has been discerned that the gods are under the necessity of preserving their own blessings, the next step is to learn that this activity is ascribed to them as a virtue. The recognition of this fact will serve to explain a rather cryptic statement from the pen of Epicurus himself. Writing of the "false suppositions" of the multitude, who thought of the gods, now as punishing the wicked, now as having venal relationships with them, he concluded as follows: "for [the gods], being exclusively devoted to their own peculiar virtues, are partial to those like themselves, deeming all that is not such as alien."⁵⁹ The first half of this statement has been variously interpreted, but the recognition of our puzzling doctrine will make the meaning intelligible. Just as it is the virtue of men to achieve their own happiness, so it is the virtue of the gods to preserve their own blissfulness. This task so completely engages their attention that no participation in human affairs is possible.

This notion was so well known as to have been familiar to the dull Horatian commentator Porphyry, who lived early in the third century A.d. Horace had quoted freely from Lucretius: "I have learned the lesson that the gods live a life free from concern." ⁶⁰ The comment runs: "This derives from the doctrine of the Epicureans, who assert that the gods cannot be immortal unless enjoying leisure and immune from all responsibility."

This doctrine has two facets. The gods are characterized by two attributes, blissfulness and incorruptibility. Neither is inherent in their nature. They are incorruptible only because the contingency of destruction is avertible by their vigilance. If this seems subtle, the notion that keeps company with it is more so and also paradoxical. Let it be allowed that incorruptibility is tantamount to eternal life. Then, according to Epicurus, this eternal life is not to be thought a cause of happiness but rather the perpetuity of happiness is a cause of eternal life. The gods win eternal life by maintaining their own pleasures perpetually. This conceit appealed to Menander, who exploited it in his Eunuchus. It survives through transfer to the Andria of Terence, where the happy lover is made to exclaim: "I think the life of the gods to be everlasting for the reason that their pleasures are perpetual, because immortality is assured to me if no grief shall intervene to mar this joy." ⁸¹ This is labeled as "Epicurean dogma" by the Donatus commentary.

This curious conceit consists in a curious semantic shift. Since the life of the gods becomes immortal only through perpetuity of happiness, it follows that the word immortal comes to denote a quality of life, something superb or exquisite. This is the only sense in which it is employed in the extant remains of Epicurus. For example, the good Epicurean "lives among immortal blessings" and friendship is styled an "immortal good." ⁶²

The notion that this activity should be ascribed to the gods as a virtue seemed as weird to Plutarch as it does today: "This is not what we mean when we speak of virtue as strong and vice as weak; we do not apply the words to the perpetuation and dissolution of body; wherefore [the Epicureans] are at fault when they represent eternal life as accruing to the divine being through guarding against and dispelling the forces that would destroy." ⁶³ Manifestly the gods are not assured of their safety merely by dwelling in the spaces between the worlds. They must also be forever on the watch. This is the view satirically presented by Seneca: "[The divine being] in the space between this heaven and another . . . dodges the debris of the worlds crashing to ruin above it and around it." ⁶⁴

Very differently are described the divine abodes in the opening lines of the third book of Lucretius; all is at rest, no wind, no rain, no frost, no snow, and no clouds, but always serenity of sky; Nature unasked supplies all needs and nothing occurs at any time to mar the perfection of peace.⁶⁵

This contrast between Lucretius and Seneca marks a chimerical union in the thought of Epicurus between a relentless logic and a sort of romanticism. The logic can be made clear by a chain argument. It has its source in a tenacious materialism, which demands that the bodies of the gods be corporeal; by the same logic the corporeal cannot be immune from the hazard of destruction; the gods are consequently not deathless, only incorruptible; this incorruptibility, not being inherent, demands some sort of conservation, which can only be ascribed to the foresight and effort of the gods themselves. This, then, is their virtue, to preserve their own happiness and incorruptibility.

The weakness of logic, of course, is its lack of dynamic. Men do not feel called to devote their lives to the propagation of syllogisms. The merit of romanticism, on the contrary, is the dynamic that goes with it. It is powered by emotion. Lucretius often handles the logic of Epicurus with clarity and skill, but the force of propulsion behind the logic is emotion, pity for the superstitious misery of man and eagerness to emancipate him. In respect of this enthusiasm Lucretius seems to surpass his master, and yet Epicurus is on record as saying: "[The wise man] will be more susceptible of emotion than other men and this will be no obstacle to his wisdom." ^6a Here we have the recognition of the chimerical blend of logic and romanticism. It is the latter, the emotion, the eagerness to emancipate men from fear and to show them the road to happiness, that leads Epicurus to extol the blissfulness of the gods as a perfection to contemplate and imitate. It is the logic of materialism that compels him to deny it to them as a birthright, so to say, and to impose upon them the necessity of preserving it.

Strange as this contingent immortality may seem, a similar notion was entertained by Plato. According to him the eternity of the cosmos depends upon the will of the supreme demiurge; since he was the creator, he could also destroy. It is impossible, however, to think of him choosing to do so.⁸⁷ Thus the cosmos is eternal because it is subject to a contingency that will never occur. Even the immortality of the Christian falls in the same class: being the gift of God it could also be withdrawn by the same power, but perfect faith exists that this contingency will never occur.

Display More

Quote from Peter Konstans

Maybe the gods even have a blessed 'end' where they reach a stage of existence so high that they merge with God.

I can't imagine the phrase "merge with God" to be something Epicurus would find consistent.

Quote from Peter Konstans

The notion that reality has a divine foundation means theism. It means that divine beings in some form exist, that the universe is in some form a divine expression and that the whole of reality emanates in some way from ontologically superior planes.

No I don't see that as compatible with Epicurus at all. There is no implication whatsoever that the universe arises from the divinities, and in fact quite the opposite - any "divinities" that exist are purely natural.

Quote from Peter Konstans

Religions are false and harmful not because they accept the reality of a divine sphere (regardless of how they define this sphere) but because of their completely false notions about the divine.

Now that sentence I agree with as being exactly what Epicurus is saying.

Thank you for those suggestions TauPhi. Sharing info like that is a major use of the forum that I hope will grow over time. If people know they can ask and get help with suggestions, they are more likely to launch off on projects like this.

Quote from Peter Konstans

Following Epicurus we affirm that gods are a part of nature and as such not' supernatural' but since they are immortal we also affirm that they are 'supernatural' in the sense that the the matter that makes them up doesn't dissolve.

I don't think that is quite correct. There is no reason to consider that the particles that make up the gods are different from any other particles. The difference is that the gods "replace" their particles in such a way that their pseudo-bodies never deteriorate like ours do. That's not supernatural - that's working within nature to continue their preservation, and that requires effort on their part (as per fragments discussed by Dewitt).

Quote from Peter Konstans

Epicurus encourages us to believe about the Gods whatever upholds their blessedness and immortality. The idea that gods are engaged in contemplative activity similar to prayer is an idea that doesn't violate the notion of their blessedness in itself.

Certainly contemplation could be a part, but if you are suggesting that that is *all* that they do, I see no reason for that conclusion, and it might well contradict the position stated above that the gods must act to maintain their deathlessness.

Quote from Peter Konstans

The idea that reality has a divine foundation (i. e. that space and time are not the whole of reality but simply a part of it) is the only way to support the notion that the universe has existed forever and always will exist and it is the only way to counter cosmological nihilism.

This is totally fail to follow as a reasonable suggestion and see no hint of it in the way that Epicurus constructed his view of the eternality of fundamental particles.

Quote from Peter Konstans

Immortality and indestructibility are not observed anywhere in space and time. If the cosmos has no divine foundation then both the place of the gods in it and the notion of infinity run into logical problems.

The are not observed, they are *deduced* from what we do see, as explained in more detail by Lucretius, so I would disagree here as well.

Quote from Peter Konstans

That's why modern cosmologists tend to believe in a finite, one-shot, once-in-an-eternity universe that came from nothing i. e. 'quantum fluctuations'. I am not saying they are correct but if you assume that the universe has absolutely no divine foundation then it makes sense to think this way.

Again I wonder why you switch the term from "supernatural" to "divine." Do you mean to imply a difference? As to the point that modern cosmologists tend to go off in that direction, that's probably correct, and why I recommend people avoid them like the plague. I think Epicurus' deductive logic about an eternal and infinite universe, based on observations of what we do see every day around us makes much more sense than postulating a one-shot deal that violates that which we do see.

Wow it would be great to clean that up!

Quote from Kalosyni

(and which that makes me wonder about what the original Latin is actually like).

Which is why, although I am partial in favor of Humphries because I think his style fits very well, for most important uses I skip over all the poetic versions and go right to Munro or Bailey or 1743 or Martin Ferguson Smith to get the most literal possible translation.