Posts by Cassius

Julia that last post #3 does make your question very clear. I was thinking given the title of the thread that your focus was on replacing the word "Choice."

This isn't likely to be satisfactory, but I am tempted to suggest that we might sort of parallel the view that DeWitt suggested - that "life" rather than "pleasure" was Epicurus' greatest good. We might observe that from an Epicurean perspective the meaning of "pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain" comes down to a proper perspective on the verb "to live!"

I am reminded of that Latin poem by Catullus which contains "Vivamus mea Lesbia, atque amemus..."

Let us live, my Lesbia, let us love,
and value the rumors of dour old men
at just a single penny.
The sun falls and rises again:
but for us, once falls the paltry light,
ours is a sleep that lasts forever.
Give me a thousand kisses, then a hundred,
then another thousand, and a second hundred,
then even another thousand, and a hundred—
then, after so many thousands,
we will throw them in disorder, losing count,
so that no one evil can envy,
knowing the count of our kisses.

I'm easily reminded of it cause I've never gotten it out of my mind after seeing this:

Quote from Bryan

I'd say that an anticipation must be involved for every word we use -- we would have no idea what any particular word indicated unless we have some general stereotype that we access before we start thinking or speaking about any object or relationship.

I agree with that so long as the emphasis stays on the word "involved" - because I suspect a lot of people will read what Diogenes Laertius wrote and conclude that anticipations ARE concepts. I think we all or mostly all agree here that anticipations are *not* in themselves concepts, but something that is PRE-concept.

it's awfully tempting to try to boil things down to "I see 5 men. I form a concept of a man. The next time i see a man I match what I see to the concept and conclude 'That is a man.'" But I think that that would be an error to conclude that is the complete picture.

The complete picture contains something before "I see 5 men." Because from before you ever saw your first man, you had some kind of pattern-assembly faculty going on that told you to associate the head and body and arms and leg into a single "thing." I am thinking that labeling that "thing" as a "man" is something your mind does in forming an opinion AFTER the prolepsis has presented to your mind the perception that the mind needed to organize this particular relationship into something to name and then remember.

Quote from Don

By definition, that means there is no world, no world-system, no ordered part of the universe on which a human-shaped god could reside. By definition, the intermundia/metakosmos has no "world." Are we to imagine them floating around like bubbles?

I understand why you are arriving at that conclusion, but I don't think it's necessarily the only conclusion to draw, given the ambiguity of what a "world" or a "space between worlds" would really mean.

Perhaps as a theme for a "First Monday" session, or perhaps just as an independent "special event," let's see if there is any interest in a "Technology For Epicureans" Zoom meeting.

At the moment I am thinking mainly of a discussion of research and writing tools that we use in the study of Epicurus, but that's something to discuss. Either in the same session or later sessions we could discuss other aspects of how we use technology productively in our lives.

I am thinking many of us share similar interests in "privacy," in using "open source" and/or "free" software that keeps us as independent as possible from spying and potential censorship, and similar considerations.

And not a lecture by me or by anyone else but a "sharing" session where we talk about what tools and methods we find productive.

So let's talk about whether this is a good idea. I suspect at the very least TauPhi and Cleveland Okie will agree that it is.

I am not sure that I have enough information to agree or disagree Martin, but your comment is on point to why I posted the thread, so if someone pursues this enough to find more cites or references please let us know.

Quote from Twentier

I continue to have suspicions about the "Idealist" interpretation:

What good is a god that is just a dream?

This says to me that Twentier has the same observation I do - that when people say "the idealist interpretation" they mean flatly "Epicurean gods do not have a physical reality."

And I don't think the "idealist" interpretation as we are defining it here is persuasive for that reason.

It would be easier to talk about the "Voula Tsouna interpretation" or the "David Sedley Interpretation" and then define what that is, because at least then you could quantify exactly what that means if you tried hard enough. For all I know (and I gather that they do) David Sedley or others have some version of a compatibilist view where gods of a type are both real and serve as important idealist models which are worth talking about because they are models.

It sounds like perhaps the issue you just touched on is what is referred to here:

Quote from On Ends Book 1

[31] There are however some of our own school, who want to state these principles with greater refinement, and who say that it is not enough to leave the question of good or evil to the decision of sense, but that thought and reasoning also enable us to understand both that pleasure in itself is matter for desire and that pain is in itself matter for aversion. So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is fit for us to seek, the other to reject. Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too confident about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings.

Would be good to discuss this and get opinions on this from Joshua and Bryan and anyone else who is interested in contributing so we can compare, as it sounds like it was a controversy among the ancient Epicureans.

This (So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is fit for us to seek, the other to reject) sounds pretty close to something in which "prolepsis" is involved.

At least at this moment I would entertain the notion that "good" and "pleasure" are indeed matters in which prolepsis is involved in forming as a conception. To me "Good" is clearly an opinion or concept that has to be pulled together from relationships/patterns and not just purely abstractly. When "Pleasure" is taken to refer not just to a single experience/feeling, but to the "concept of pleasure" referring to all particular pleasures, I would say the same thing - the opinion as to what "pleasure" means as a concept comes from pulling together relationships/patterns of discrete pleasurable experiences.

I would say we need to add "justice" to the same list of conceptual definitions that contains "the good," "gods," and "pleasure" (and no doubt the list goes on). One version of that list might be something like:

Seems to me we have a similar problem involved in accepting the definitions of "gods" and "pleasure." it is so ingrained in us to accept "gods" as supernatural, and to accept "pleasure" as "limited to sensory stimulation" that we kick back against accepting the obvious meanings. The definitions are simple: "Gods" are simply any being that is totally happy and deathless, and "Pleasure" is any experience in life where pain is not present in that experience. The requirement of life, however, is that we apply these definitions to particular experiences, and that's a constantly moving target of dealing with particulars that don't always exactly fit within our conceptual definitions. But if we didn't have the conceptual definitions we couldn't discuss or think or possibly make any progress toward them.

Last night in our Zoom meeting, when we were discussing Rhetoric, we returned to the question of "Dialectic."

Thanks To TauPhi for pointing out this reference:

Quote

Ruth CA Higgins

"Zeno the Stoic suggests that while dialectic is a closed fist, rhetoric is an open hand (Cicero, De Oratore 113). Dialectic is a thing of closed logic, of minor and major premises leading inexorably toward irrefutable conclusions. Rhetoric is a signal toward decisions in the spaces left open before and after logic." ("'The Empty Eloquence of Fools': Rhetoric in Classical Greece." Rediscovering Rhetoric, ed. by J.T. Gleeson and Ruth CA Higgins. Federation Press, 2008)

That will lead us back to Cicero's De Orator and here is a section from that general area. I have underlined something that we discussed last night as one of the possible reasons that this subject of whether something is an "art" or not is so important -- the question of "natural endowment" vs "ability that can be improved by practice and skill":

Quote

{24.} [110] L Antonius then observed, that he was very strongly of the same opinion as Crassus; for he neither adopted such a definition of art as those preferred who attributed all the powers of eloquence to art, nor did he repudiate it entirely, as most of the philosophers had done. "But I imagine, Crassus," added he, "that you will gratify these two young men, if you will specify those particulars which you think may be more conducive to oratory than art itself." [111] "I will indeed mention them," said he, "since I have engaged to do so, but must beg you not to publish my trifling remarks; though I will keep myself under such restraint as not to seem to speak like a master, or artist, but like one of the number of private citizens, moderately versed in the practice of the forum, and not altogether ignorant; not to have offered anything from myself, but to have accidentally fallen in with the course of your conversation. [112] Indeed, when I was a candidate for office, I used, at the time of canvassing, to send away Scaevola from me, telling him I wanted to be foolish, that is, to solicit with flattery, a thing that cannot be done to any purpose unless it be done foolishly; and that he was the only man in the world in whose presence I should least like to play the fool; and yet fortune has appointed him to be a witness and spectator of my folly. ** For what is more foolish than to speak about speaking, when speaking itself is never otherwise than foolish, except it is absolutely necessary? " [113] "Proceed, however, Crassus," said Scaevola; "for I will take upon myself the blame which you fear."

{25.} "I am, then, of opinion," said Crassus, "that nature and genius in the first place contribute most aid to speaking; and that to those writers on the art, to whom Antonius just now alluded, it was not skill and method in speaking, but natural talent that was wanting; for there ought to be certain lively powers in the mind ** and understanding, which may be acute to invent, fertile to explain and adorn, and strong and retentive to remember; [114] and if any one imagines that these powers may be acquired by art, (which is false, for it is very well if they can be animated and excited by art; but they certainly cannot by art be ingrafted or instilled, since they are all the gifts of nature,) what will he say of those qualities which are certainly born with the man himself, volubility of tongue, tone of voice, strength of lungs, and a peculiar conformation and aspect of the whole countenance and body ? [115] I do not say, that art cannot improve in these particulars, (for am not ignorant that what is good may be made better by education, and what is not very good may be in some degree polished and amended;) but there are some persons so hesitating in their speech, so inharmonious in their tone of voice, or so unwieldy and rude in the air and movements of their bodies, that, whatever power they possess either from genius or art, they can never be reckoned in the number of accomplished speakers; while there are others so happily qualified in these respects, so eminently adorned with the gifts of nature, that they seem not to have been born like other men, but moulded by some divinity. [116] It is, indeed, a great task and enterprise for a person to undertake and profess, that while every one else is silent, he alone must be heard on the most important subjects, and in a large assembly of men; for there is scarcely any one present who is not sharper and quicker to discover defects in the speaker than merits; and thus whatever offends the hearer effaces the recollection of what is worthy of praise. [117] I do not make these observations for the purpose of altogether deterring young men from the study of oratory, even if they be deficient in some natural endowments. For who does not perceive that to C. Caelius, my contemporary, a new man, the mere mediocrity in speaking, which he was enabled to attain, was a great honour ? Who does not know that Q. Varius, your equal in age, a clumsy, uncouth man, has obtained his great popularity by the cultivation of such faculties as he has ?

After that part of the discussion, we further attempted to distinguish "dialectic" from "dialog," but we need to make more progress on that.

Is it not likely that Epicurus was objecting most directly and primarily to "dialectic" rather than to "the dialog form of presentation?" No doubt he did not think that the "dialog" conversation / back and forth style is the best to use to present philosophy - we have Torquatus saying pretty much exactly that, apparently based on the idea that dialog isn't as clear as single-person narrative presentation.

But the objection to dialog format sounds to me like its more a question of efficiency. if Ruth Higgins is right that "Dialectic is a thing of closed logic, of minor and major premises leading inexorably toward irrefutable conclusions. Rhetoric is a signal toward decisions in the spaces left open before and after logic" then you can definitely see Epicurus more likely to be suspicious of anything that claims to be so close to "necessity" as to "lead inexorably toward irrefutable conclusions." Yes, strict logic does do that, but except in the world of abstractions in our minds, the "forms" of A+B =C don't exist in necessary ways that can easily be translated to the real world.

Very well stated Don!

The only caveat I would have is that when one of us refers to the "idealist" position, the implication is that "the idealist position" means that "gods are a mental construction but they don't really exist."

I think the better view in slightly different words is that what Epicurus is doing is providing a "definition" of a god.

The important problem with what is being referred to as "the idealist view" is that "the idealist view" contains a non sequitur in that it appears to presume that the thing defined does not exist. I would submit that this presumption is false and has no place in describing Epicurus' position, and it is error to refuse to honor the definition that Epicurus is stating. The question of whether beings which fit the definition actually exist is entirely separate.

It is as "the idealist position" is taking the position that "I can define for you what it means to be a Ford Model T, but Ford Model T's do not exist." It does not follow from the definition of a Model T that they do not exist, even though we know separately today that they are very hard to find.

The correct position is "I can define for you what it means to be a Ford Model T, but the question of whether you can find a real Ford Model T is entirely separate, and depends on whether you have access to a car museum."

Or to refer to centaurs, the right formulation would be: "I can define for you what it means to be a centaur, but the question of whether centaurs exist is separate. In the case of centaurs, it is biologically impossible for humans and horses to interbreed, so therefore we are confident that centaurs do exist except in our imagination and artwork."

So I would submit the correct position as to gods is best not described as realist or idealist, but described taking that Epicurus is saying what he means and meaning what he says, which taken all together is something like:

I can define for you what it means to be a god, which is that gods are living beings who are blessed and imperishable. We have formed this opinion as to the proper definition based on our faculty of prolepsis, through which we detect patterns and arrangements within the perceptions that we have received throughout our lives through our five senses, our feelings of pain and pleasure, and our mental reception of images. But our opinion of the definition of a god is not itself a prolepsis, any more than our definition of a god is itself a real god, or our eyes relaying to our minds that it sees the light given off by a candle is itself a real candle.

There are many opinions of the proper definition of a god, and many people who assert the existence of many particular gods. Some people hold the opinion that stars are gods, and that gods take an interest in humanity and that gods choose some people as friends and others as enemies. The question of whether any particular asserted god really exists is not answered by stating a definition of gods in general.

For you to maintain that a particular god exists, you will need to provide more than an opinion without evidence. And I can already tell you as a rule of evidence (and we need rules of evidence such as consistent definitions if we are to communicate clearly) that if the description you are asserting conflicts in any way with our definition, which you will recall is to be (1) living, (2) totally blessed, and (3) incorruptible, then what you are describing is not a god. What you are describing may exist, if you have proof of it, but whatever it may be, it is not a "god." Alexander the Oracle-Monger's fake snake does exist as puppet that can be touched and viewed, but it is certainly not a "god."

Going further, I can also tell you that if what you are describing is (4) in any way impossible under the laws of physics we have previously set forth, then what you are describing not only is (A) not a "god," but (B) does not exist as all, because it is physically impossible. That is how I know that your assertions of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence are false, because they are physically impossible.

I think I agree generally with what you have written Julia. One text to keep in mind is XVII from the Torquatus section of book one:

(4) But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain.

Quote from Godfrey

The kitchen example falls apart because there is only one "thing:" food. Absence of food leaves nothing. Absence of pain involves two "things:" pain and pleasure. So if there is no pain there is pure pleasure.

Yes that's a good point to make about any hypothetical in this arena. The Epicurean texts are very clear that there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and when you don't have one you have the other. Any hypothetical that seeks to be a true analogy has to stipulate that there are only two classes of items possible, and that if you don't have items from class1 then you by definition have items from class2, and vice versa.

Quote from Julia

To me, the plainest statement of a negative implicitly refers to the broadest interpretation (any → not one).
Example: "There is an absence of food" means that my kitchen is entirely empty. It does not mean "I ran out of rice" or "I have no more soda." Instead, the "absence of food" means I have nothing whatsoever left at all.

I think you're approaching things properly, but you're stating the absence of a positive (food), which clearly means that the kitchen when absent of food has absolutely nothing in it -- the broadest possible interpretation, as you say.

But in the case that is the rule for most modern Epicurean discussion, we're not talking about a positive thing, but a negative thing (pain). So when someone says "the Epicurean goal is the absence of pain," due to the prominence of Stoic and Buddhist and Judeo-Christian "anti-pleasure" views, it is not immediately obvious to many people what should come to mind when the statement "i am feeling no pain" is said. It is unacceptable to many people to include "the whole pantry of possible pleasures" when someone says the kitchen is "without pain." What is immediately presumed to be the case by the "pro-ascetic" world is that when you say "I am free from pain" what you really mean is essentially "I have reached a state of nirvana - nothingneses - and I am FREE from all desire and all attachment to the world!" --- Because that is what THEY think "freedom from pain" should mean!

It is impermissable to them to think that when someone says "all pain is gone" that the kitchen is then FULLY STOCKED - with all sorts of pleasures of body and mind, both pleasures that are stimulating to the senses and those pleasures of consciousness of *anything* without pain attached to it. Such people want to drain the experience of absence of pain down to what a normal active person would call a "near-death" experience -- because that is the way THEY - such ascetic-minded people - interpret the best life due to their Stoic/Buddhist/Judeo-Christian orientation.

Of course I am not saying that *everyone* does this, and we've collected quite a group of people who would never think that way.

But I will contend to you that behind the writing of 90% or more of modern Epicurean commentators (primarily in the Academy, including most **major** recognized books OTHER than "Epicurus and His Philosophy" and "Living For Pleasure") that that is the orientation. Their definition of pleasure and absence of pain is the type that any Buddhist or Stoic or Judeo-Christian would love -- and if that is the case, you have virtually a canonical guarantee that that version is *not* what Epicurus was teaching.

I will repeat the caveat that i hope everyone constantly remembers:

I'm not representing that I have everything figured out, and I welcome challenges and disagreements (at least when stated constructively )

The benefit that the podcast is providing, as Joshua also states in Episode 241, is that it is very helpful to challenge oneself to articulate these issues precisely. Unless you do get pretty deep in the weeds (another term Joshua used today) then it can sometimes be hard to see how important some of these issues are.

And this thread is a good example too - starting out talking about a Stoic chart, but now wrestling with some extremely deep conceptual issues that need to be resolved before we can adequately construct an alternative presentation.

I perceive that where we are in the discussion is a question that has to be answered before we can delete the "does it concern virtue?" and replace it with a question relating to "Pleasure." This dual perspective on Pleasure, as both a category and a particular experience, has to be understood before one can see that "absence of pain" is being used by Epicurus as a term that is an EXACT equivalent of "pleasure," and not a separate and unique category that some set out as so unique and perceptive that even Buddhists and Stoics would envy. I would say more confidently here in August of 2024 than every before that the truth is nothing of the kind. "Absence of pain" is simply a way of extending the definition of pleasure to ALL non-painful experiences, just as "gods" are defined as living beings who are blessed and incorruptible, and just as "the highest good" is defined to be "the standard by which we are bound to test all things by, but the standard itself by nothing."

"Pleasure" can only be understood as deserving of its place in the first rank of any "choice and avoidance" chart by understanding it in this wider way of: "all experience which is not painful." The problem is that we are so conditioned to see "pleasure" as "sex drugs and rock and roll" and therefore "bad," that we are intimidated away from putting the word "Pleasure" in its rightful position as the keystone of the whole analysis.

Quote from Julia

pleasure & pain: not fundamental units of experience themself, but innate categories of fundamental experiences. When undistorted by judgements of others (religion, society, …) and undistorted by scarring life experience (eg "fear of joy" as is possible in PTSD), pleasure is the set of fundamental experiences which humans by nature find agreeable (joy, relief, …) and pain is the set of fundamental experience which humans by nature find disagreeable (physical-pain, grief, …). (Moving away from pain is called avoidance. Moving towards pleasure is called play.)

What I am focusing on as potentially objectionable - depending on how one reads this sentence, is that I think it would be inappropriate if a reader where to say that "pleasure" cannot refer to an individual experience, but it always used as a "category' term to abstractly stand for the whole "set" of experiences.

I am emphatically agreeing that the word "pleasure" *can* be used that way, and at times *is* used that way by Epicurus (for example in formulations such as "by pleasure we mean the absence of pain," but I am ALSO saying that the word "pleasure" can be used to refer to a single experience, e.g., "Eatine peas today at lunch was a pleasure."

I am really focusing mainly on the "not fundamental units of experience themself." So as to be more clear I would prefer to reword that as:

pleasure & pain: These terms can be used to describe BOTH fundamental units of experience themselves, AS WELL AS innate categories of fundamental experiences, depending on the context of the discussion.

And then I would reword the rest of the paragraph in a way consistent with that.

I feel sure I should be making the same comment as to desire, when I read this:

Quote from Julia

desire: a fundamental unit of experience (cannot be divided into smaller experiences; is not made up of smaller units); by being fundamental in this way, it is simultaneously something we somehow just know (like "sweet taste", "feels warm") and yet very hard to define, to pin down with other words

But I confess I am losing track of some of the original detail of the thread as it started out. Maybe there is some reason that you are focusing on desire and pleasure as categories, and maybe you are putting the particular pleasures and the particular desires aside for some reason, but if so, I think that makes me want to emphasize the point of the podcast even more strongly.

These words - gods, good, pleasure, desire -- can be viewed equally correctly as either "concepts" standing for a particular class, or individual particular examples of experience within that particular class. Either viewpoint can be correct and useful and is valid, but it's essential to be clear as to whether you are talking about a class or a particular.

If you're NOT careful, then you run into this trouble that plagues Epicurean philosophy today: "Absence of pain" can be confused as referring to a particular experience that nobody can adequately define outside of a particular context, and thus a great source of confusion, rather than being seen as a definition of the "limit of quantity of pleasure" in which context it is a very useful and helpful definition.

Same with desire: If you view desires solely as a "group," and imply all desires should be minimized or eliminated, then you are on the straight path to Stoicism or Buddhism or worse. But if you take the common sense approach that desire is also a term that can be used to refer to many individual experiences, some of which are very healthful and beneficial and some of which are more like a disease and damaging, then you'll be able to productively realize that many desires are to be encouraged and pursued, while many others are to be suppressed.

Quote from Julia

pleasure & pain: not fundamental units of experience themself, but innate categories of fundamental experiences. When undistorted by judgements of others (religion, society, …) and undistorted by scarring life experience (eg "fear of joy" as is possible in PTSD), pleasure is the set of fundamental experiences which humans by nature find agreeable (joy, relief, …) and pain is the set of fundamental experience which humans by nature find disagreeable (physical-pain, grief, …). (Moving away from pain is called avoidance. Moving towards pleasure is called play.)

OK when stated as in post 36 quoted above (I added the emphasis on the first part), I have to state a reservation, particularly on the statement that pleasures and pains are "not fundamental units of experience themself, but innate categories of fundamental experiences."

I think the terms "pleasure" and "pain" are in fact properly used both to refer to "categories of experiences" as well as "particular experiences," and we have to be clear which perspective we mean when we discuss them.

This issue of the multiple meanings of words such as "good" and "gods" is largely the issue that ended up being the topic of our podcast Episode 241. Coincidentally, before reading this thread, I had just added an insert to assert that the discussion of the way Epicurus was approaching defining his terms before discussing particulars should be taken to refer to "pleasure" and "the limit of pleasure" as well.

If anyone gets a chance to listen to that discussion please let us know if you agree or disagree, either in this thread or preferably the episode thread, where it will probably be more findable in the future.

This episode turned out to have a different focus than was expected when I picked a preliminary title referring to atoms, so I've re-titled it to refer to what was actually discussed. This change occurred because the major focus turned out to be a comment Joshua introduced last week about a link between the way Epicurus approaches the subject of both "the gods" and "the good."

I should also note that I added the material which appears from 16:15 to 18:54 was an extension of the previous several minutes of recording that I added after the main recording was completed. Therefore the lack of any comment from Joshua or Kalosyni about that material is attributable mainly to the fact that they didn't hear that when we first recorded. As usual the merit or lack of merit of that section is entirely on me, so don't blame them for failing to correct me if that section is absolutely off base. (If anyone is tempted to go straight to 16:15 to start listening, I would warn that it would be difficult to evaluate that segment without hearing Joshua's discussion relating this back to last week, which starts close to the very beginning of the podcast.)

Lucretius Today Episode 241 - A Common Thread Between The Epicurean View Of "The Gods" and "The Good" - is now available:

Episode 241 will be posted before the end of today. In the meantime, I want to note a point that Joshua brought up right at the end of the episode, which boils down to the point that:

- taking the position "I don't accept anything without evidence to support it" is a good logical position to take as a general rule to avoid mistakes.

- however relying on that general rule may not be nearly helpful to obtaining confidence and therefore happiness as being able to say "I have looked thoroughly into this subject and based on what I have found I am confident that X is true and Y is not true.

I took the time to post this also in part because Joshua also reminds us at the end of the episode about Epicurus' emphasis on the importance of studying infinity and its implications, and i think those two points go hand in hand as core aspects of the Epicurean approach to the issue of divinity.

Julia I agree with the thrust of most of your post but as to this I am not completely clear on what you are saying:

Quote from Julia

In my opinion, getting fancy with "desire"/"desirable" and "pleasure"/"pleasurable" would be like getting fancy with emotion-words, like "happiness", or, more precisely, with experience-words, like "joy". When first grasping the word, it matters to be precise about the inner experience it refers to (eg something fun-but-forbidden may cause joy and guilt, pleasure and pain; it matters to delineate that honestly, precisely, without getting hung up on morals).

At the very least, as to pleasure, it seemed absolutely clear to Cicero, and I would say to Norman DeWitt and now to me also as the only logical way to read the texts, that Epicurus was in fact taking a very non-standard and radically different stance. He was redefining "pleasure" to include not only sensory stimulation but also all other experiences which are not painful, even if not normally considered by the majority of people to be included in pleasure. I see no other persuasive way to explain numerous statements by Torquatus, including his response to Chrysippus' "hand" argument.

I don't see you referring to that his expansion of the definition of pleasure in your comments so far. I think it's important to take a position on how Epicurus was using the word pleasure in a non-standard way to make any sense of many highly reliable texts, including but not limited to the Principle Doctrines and the letter to Menoeceus themselves.

The line from DeWitt that's right on point is from page 240 of his book:

Quote

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.