Posts by Cassius

Considering this from Diogenes of Oinoanda in the same context, when he says "But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end," It seems legitimate to ask whether "happiness" is really that much different from a "virtue" such as "wisdom" and whether it constitutes anything more than an ongoing assessment of your personal mix of pleasures and pains, in which the mix of pleasure is always subject to increase of decrease but which should never go less than 50% (in the sense that the wise man always has more reason for joy than vexation, according to Torquatus). And if so the complete pleasure of the gods hardly seems different than human pleasure in anything more than that for the gods they have the confident expectation that a 100% life of pleasure will continue without end, while ours comes to an end with death.

Fr. 32

... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.

I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.

Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naive question, «who is it whom these virtues benefit?», obviously the answer will be «man.» The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist.

It seems to me that for the most "global" answer to questions like "Are Epicureans always happy?" or "Is it possible for some Epicureans to be always happy?" we are going to have to parse this from DIogenes Laertius:

They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures.

And we're going to need to take a position "living as a god among men" and perhaps similar references mean that "complete happiness, such as belongs to a god" is something that is possible to a human being, or whether that kind of happiness only to a true Epicurean god in the intermundia.

Plus the term "complete happiness" may not necessarily tell us how long that happiness lasts (?)

That's a question where i am very interested in any comments anyone has to offer.

As prep for this thread and for continuation thereafter I have set up this thread for posting of additional texts and discussion.

Thread

Is the Epicurean Always Happy?

I am posting this to assist in our discussion of Lucretius Today Episode 215. We talked about this in our Zoom of 2/14 and a lot of scepticism was expressed, as we did also in Episide 214. However here are some texts which indicate that Epicurus might say the answer to this question is "yes," provided that we have a correct understanding of "happiness" (see especially DIogenes Laertius at 122 below). If people have comments or additional texts for us to consider for Episode 215 and thereafter,…

Cassius

February 17, 2024 at 2:18 PM

I am posting this to assist in our discussion of Lucretius Today Episode 215. We talked about this in our Zoom of 2/14 and a lot of scepticism was expressed, as we did also in Episide 214. However here are some texts which indicate that Epicurus might say the answer to this question is "yes," provided that we have a correct understanding of "happiness" (see especially DIogenes Laertius at 122 below). If people have comments or additional texts for us to consider for Episode 215 and thereafter, please add them here:

Diogenes Laertius

Here are some relevant excerpts from Diogenes Laertius, starting around line 117

[117] As regards the principles of living and the grounds on which we ought to choose some things and avoid others, he writes the following letter.

But before considering it let us explain what he and his followers think about the wise man. Injuries are done by men either through hate or through envy or through contempt, all of which the wise man overcomes by reasoning. When once a man has attained wisdom, he no longer has any tendency contrary to it or willingly pretends that he has. He will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom. A man cannot become wise with every kind of physical constitution, nor in every nation.

[118] And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy. Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence. Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament. The wise man will not have intercourse with any woman with whom the law forbids it, as Diogenes says in his summary of Epicurus’ moral teaching. Nor will he punish his slaves, but will rather pity them and forgive any that are deserving. They do not think that the wise man will fall in love, or care about his burial. They hold that love is not sent from heaven, as Diogenes says in his . . . book, nor should the wise man make elegant speeches.

Sexual intercourse, they say, has never done a man good, and he is lucky if it has not harmed him.

[119] Moreover, the wise man will marry and have children, as Epicurus says in the Problems and in the work On Nature. But he will marry according to the circumstances of his life. He will feel shame in the presence of some persons, and certainly will not insult them in his cups, so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in public life, as he says in the first book On Lives. Nor will he act the tyrant, or live like the Cynics, as he writes in the second book On Lives. Nor will he beg. Moreover, even if he is deprived of his eyesight, he will not end his whole life, as he says in the same work.

Also, the wise man will feel grief, as Diogenes says in the fifth book of the Miscellanies.

[120] He will engage in lawsuits and will leave writings behind him, but will not deliver speeches on public occasions. He will be careful of his possessions and will provide for the future. He will be fond of the country. He will face fortune and never desert a friend. He will be careful of his reputation in so far as to prevent himself from being despised. He will care more than other men for public spectacles.

[121] He will erect statues of others, but whether he had one himself or not, he would be indifferent. Only the Wise man could discourse rightly on music and poetry, but in practice he would not compose poems. One wise man is not wiser than another. He will be ready to make money, but only when he is in straits and by means of his philosophy. He will pay court to a king, if occasion demands. He will rejoice at another’s misfortunes, but only for his correction. And he will gather together a school, but never so as to become a popular leader. He will give lectures in public, but never unless asked; he will give definite teaching and not profess doubt. In his sleep he will be as he is awake, and on occasion he will even die for a friend.

[122] They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity, that health is a blessing to some, but indifferent to others, that courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage. That friendship too has practical needs as its motive: one must indeed lay its foundations (for we sow the ground too for the sake of crops), but it is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure. They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures. Now we must proceed to the letter.

Other Fragments (Bailey)

LETTERS TO INDIVIDUALS.

To Anaxarchus.

23. But I summon you to continuous pleasures and not to vain and empty virtues which have but disturbing hopes of results.

On Ends Book Two

Section XXV: REID EDITION

XXVII. But we dwell too long upon very simple matters. When we have once concluded and demonstrated that if everything is judged by the standard of pleasure, no room is left for either virtues or friendships, there is nothing besides on which we need greatly insist. And yet, lest it should be thought that any passage is left without reply, I will now also say a few words in answer to the remainder of your speech. Well then, whereas the whole importance of philosophy lies in its bearing on happiness, and it is from a desire for happiness alone that men have devoted themselves to this pursuit, and whereas some place happiness in one thing, some in another, while you place it in pleasure, and similarly on the other side all wretchedness you place in pain, let us first examine the nature of happiness as you conceive it.

Now you will grant me this, I suppose, that happiness, if only it exists at all, ought to lie entirely within the wise man’s own control. For if the life of happiness may cease to be so, then it cannot be really happy. Who indeed has any faith that a thing which is perishable and fleeting will in his own case always continue solid and strong? But he who feels no confidence in the permanence of the blessings he possesses, must needs apprehend that he will some time or other be wretched, if he loses them. Now no one can be happy while in alarm about his most important possessions; no one then can possibly be happy. For happiness is usually spoken of not with reference to some period of time, but to permanence, nor do we talk of the life of happiness at all, unless that life be rounded off and complete, nor can a man be happy at one time, and wretched at another; since any man who judges that he can become wretched will never be happy. For when happiness has been once entered on, it is as durable as wisdom herself, who is the creator of the life of happiness, nor does it await the last days of life, as Herodotus writes that Solon enjoined upon Croesus. But I shall be reminded (as you said yourself) that Epicurus will not admit that continuance of time contributes anything to happiness, or that less pleasure is realized in a short period of time than if the pleasure were eternal.

These statements are most inconsistent ; for while he places his supreme good in pleasure, he refuses to allow that pleasure can reach a greater height in a life of boundless extent, than in one limited and moderate in length. He who places good entirely in virtue can say that happiness is consummated by the consummation of virtue, since he denies that time brings additions to his supreme good; but when a man supposes that happiness is caused by pleasure, how are his doctrines to be reconciled, if he means to affirm that pleasure is not heightened by duration? In that case, neither is pain. Or, though all the most enduring pains are also the most wretched, does length of time not render pleasure more enviable? What reason then has Epicurus for calling a god, as he does, both happy and eternal? If you take away his eternity, Jupiter will be not a whit happier than Epicurus, since both of them are in the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is pleasure. Oh, but our philosopher is subject to pain as well. Yes, but he sets it at nought; for he says that, if he were being roasted, he would call out how sweet this is! In what respect then is he inferior to the god, if not in respect of eternity? And what good does eternity bring but the highest form of pleasure, and that prolonged for ever? What boots it then to use high sounding language unless your language be consistent ? On bodily pleasure (I will add mental, if you like, on the understanding that it also springs, as you believe, from the body) depends the life of happiness. Well, who can guarantee the wise man that this pleasure will be permanent? For the circumstances that give rise to pleasures are not within the control of the wise man, since your happiness is not dependent on wisdom herself, but on the objects which wisdom procures with a view to pleasure. Now all such objects are external to us, and what is external is in the power of chance. Thus fortune becomes lady paramount over happiness, though Epicurus says she to a small extent only crosses the path of the wise man.

Letter to Menoeceus

[122] Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul. And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away. Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come. We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it.

...

Meditate therefore on these things and things akin to them night and day by yourself; and with a companion like to yourself, and never shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you shall live like a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like unto a mortal being.

Welcome to Episode 215 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week before we go forward we are going to go back over the question of whether Epicurus held that the wise man can always be happy.

Here are some relevant excerpts from Diogenes Laertius, starting around line 117

[117] As regards the principles of living and the grounds on which we ought to choose some things and avoid others, he writes the following letter.

But before considering it let us explain what he and his followers think about the wise man. Injuries are done by men either through hate or through envy or through contempt, all of which the wise man overcomes by reasoning. When once a man has attained wisdom, he no longer has any tendency contrary to it or willingly pretends that he has. He will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom. A man cannot become wise with every kind of physical constitution, nor in every nation.

[118] And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy. Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence. Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament. The wise man will not have intercourse with any woman with whom the law forbids it, as Diogenes says in his summary of Epicurus’ moral teaching. Nor will he punish his slaves, but will rather pity them and forgive any that are deserving. They do not think that the wise man will fall in love, or care about his burial. They hold that love is not sent from heaven, as Diogenes says in his . . . book, nor should the wise man make elegant speeches.

Sexual intercourse, they say, has never done a man good, and he is lucky if it has not harmed him.

[119] Moreover, the wise man will marry and have children, as Epicurus says in the Problems and in the work On Nature. But he will marry according to the circumstances of his life. He will feel shame in the presence of some persons, and certainly will not insult them in his cups, so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in public life, as he says in the first book On Lives. Nor will he act the tyrant, or live like the Cynics, as he writes in the second book On Lives. Nor will he beg. Moreover, even if he is deprived of his eyesight, he will not end his whole life, as he says in the same work.

Also, the wise man will feel grief, as Diogenes says in the fifth book of the Miscellanies.

[120] He will engage in lawsuits and will leave writings behind him, but will not deliver speeches on public occasions. He will be careful of his possessions and will provide for the future. He will be fond of the country. He will face fortune and never desert a friend. He will be careful of his reputation in so far as to prevent himself from being despised. He will care more than other men for public spectacles.

[121] He will erect statues of others, but whether he had one himself or not, he would be indifferent. Only the Wise man could discourse rightly on music and poetry, but in practice he would not compose poems. One wise man is not wiser than another. He will be ready to make money, but only when he is in straits and by means of his philosophy. He will pay court to a king, if occasion demands. He will rejoice at another’s misfortunes, but only for his correction. And he will gather together a school, but never so as to become a popular leader. He will give lectures in public, but never unless asked; he will give definite teaching and not profess doubt. In his sleep he will be as he is awake, and on occasion he will even die for a friend.

[122] They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity, that health is a blessing to some, but indifferent to others, that courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage. That friendship too has practical needs as its motive: one must indeed lay its foundations (for we sow the ground too for the sake of crops), but it is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure. They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures. Now we must proceed to the letter.

OTHER FRAGMENTS

LETTERS TO INDIVIDUALS.

To Anaxarchus.

23. But I summon you to continuous pleasures and not to vain and empty virtues which have but disturbing hopes of results.O

Then we move further into Section XXV:

REID EDITION

XXVII. But we dwell too long upon very simple matters. When we have once concluded and demonstrated that if everything is judged by the standard of pleasure, no room is left for either virtues or friendships, there is nothing besides on which we need greatly insist. And yet, lest it should be thought that any passage is left without reply, I will now also say a few words in answer to the remainder of your speech. Well then, whereas the whole importance of philosophy lies in its bearing on happiness, and it is from a desire for happiness alone that men have devoted themselves to this pursuit, and whereas some place happiness in one thing, some in another, while you place it in pleasure, and similarly on the other side all wretchedness you place in pain, let us first examine the nature of happiness as you conceive it.

Now you will grant me this, I suppose, that happiness, if only it exists at all, ought to lie entirely within the wise man’s own control. For if the life of happiness may cease to be so, then it cannot be really happy. Who indeed has any faith that a thing which is perishable and fleeting will in his own case always continue solid and strong? But he who feels no confidence in the permanence of the blessings he possesses, must needs apprehend that he will some time or other be wretched, if he loses them. Now no one can be happy while in alarm about his most important possessions; no one then can possibly be happy. For happiness is usually spoken of not with reference to some period of time, but to permanence, nor do we talk of the life of happiness at all, unless that life be rounded off and complete, nor can a man be happy at one time, and wretched at another; since any man who judges that he can become wretched will never be happy. For when happiness has been once entered on, it is as durable as wisdom herself, who is the creator of the life of happiness, nor does it await the last days of life, as Herodotus writes that Solon enjoined upon Croesus. But I shall be reminded (as you said yourself) that Epicurus will not admit that continuance of time contributes anything to happiness, or that less pleasure is realized in a short period of time than if the pleasure were eternal.

These statements are most inconsistent ; for while he places his supreme good in pleasure, he refuses to allow that pleasure can reach a greater height in a life of boundless extent, than in one limited and moderate in length. He who places good entirely in virtue can say that happiness is consummated by the consummation of virtue, since he denies that time brings additions to his supreme good; but when a man supposes that happiness is caused by pleasure, how are his doctrines to be reconciled, if he means to affirm that pleasure is not heightened by duration? In that case, neither is pain. Or, though all the most enduring pains are also the most wretched, does length of time not render pleasure more enviable? What reason then has Epicurus for calling a god, as he does, both happy and eternal? If you take away his eternity, Jupiter will be not a whit happier than Epicurus, since both of them are in the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is pleasure. Oh, but our philosopher is subject to pain as well. Yes, but he sets it at nought; for he says that, if he were being roasted, he would call out how sweet this is! In what respect then is he inferior to the god, if not in respect of eternity? And what good does eternity bring but the highest form of pleasure, and that prolonged for ever? What boots it then to use high sounding language unless your language be consistent ? On bodily pleasure (I will add mental, if you like, on the understanding that it also springs, as you believe, from the body) depends the life of happiness. Well, who can guarantee the wise man that this pleasure will be permanent? For the circumstances that give rise to pleasures are not within the control of the wise man, since your happiness is not dependent on wisdom herself, but on the objects which wisdom procures with a view to pleasure. Now all such objects are external to us, and what is external is in the power of chance. Thus fortune becomes lady paramount over happiness, though Epicurus says she to a small extent only crosses the path of the wise man.

XXVIII. Come, you will say to me, these are small matters. The wise man is enriched by nature herself, whose wealth, as Epicurus has taught us, is easily procured. His statements are good, and I do not attack them, but they are inconsistent with each other. He declares that no less pleasure is derived from the poorest sustenance, or rather from the most despicable kinds of food and dink, than from the most recherché dishes of the banquet. If he declared that it made no difference to happiness what kind of food he lived on, I should yield him the point and even applaud him ; for he would be asserting the strict truth, and I listen when Socrates, who holds pleasure in no esteem, affirms that hunger is the proper seasoning for food, and thirst for drink. But to one who, judging of everything by pleasure, lives like Gallonius, but talks like the old Piso Frugi, I do not listen, nor do I believe that he says what he thinks. He announced that nature’s wealth is easily procurable, because nature is satisfied with little. This would be true, if you did not value pleasure so highly. The pleasure, he says, that is obtained from the cheapest things is not inferior to that which is got from the most costly. To say this is to be destitute not merely of intelligence, but even of a palate. Truly those who disregard pleasure itself are free to say that they do not prefer a sturgeon ‘to a sprat; but he who places his supreme good in pleasure must judge of everything by sense and not by reason, and must say that those things are best which are most tasty. But let that pass; let us suppose he acquires the intensest pleasures not merely at small cost, but at no cost at all, so far as I am concerned; let the pleasure given by the cress which the Persians used to eat, as Xenophon writes, be no less than that afforded by the banquets of Syracuse, which are severely blamed by Plato; let the acquisition of pleasure be as easy, I say, as you make it out to be; still what are we to say about pain? Its agonies are so great that a life surrounded by. them cannot be happy, if only pain is the greatest of evils. Why, Metrodorus himself, who is almost a second Epicurus, sketches happiness almost in these words; a well regulated condition of body, accompanied by the assurance that it will continue so. Can any one possibly be assured as to the state of this body of his, I do not say in a year’s time, but by the time evening comes? Pain then, that is to say the greatest of evils, will always be an object of dread, even though it be not present, for it may present itself at any moment. How then can the dread of the greatest possible evil consort with the life of happiness? Someone tells me: Epicurus imparts to us a scheme which will enable us to pay no heed to pain. To begin with, the thing is in itself ridiculous, that no attention should be given to the greatest of evils. But pray what is his scheme? The greatest pain, he says, ts short. First, what do you mean by short? Next, what by the greatest pain? May the greatest pain not continue for some days? Look to it, that it may. not continue some months even! Unless possibly you refer to the kind of pain which is fatal as soon as it seizes any one. Who dreads such pain as that? I wish rather you would alleviate that other sort, under which I saw that most excellent and most cultivated gentleman, my friend Gnaeus Octavius, son of Marcus, wasting away, and not on one occasion only or for a short time, but often and over quite a long period. What tortures did he endure, ye eternal gods, when all his limbs seemed on fire! Yet for all that we did not regard him as wretched, but only as distressed, for pain was not to him the greatest of evils. But he would have been wretched, if he had been immersed in pleasures, while his life was scandalous and wicked.

As we mentioned tonight in our Wednesday discussion, Diogenes Laertius says that according to Epicurus or the Epicureans:

[118] And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy.

So next week as we continue to discuss these issues we will want to revisit whether we agree with Cicero's expecting that happiness for an Epicurean is something that is always under our control.

Episode 214 of the Lucretius Today Podcast Is now available. Today we take up Cicero's challenges that friendship cannot be friendship if it can be terminated for advantage, and happiness cannot be happiness if it is not completely under our control and we have the possibility of losing it.

Another note while editing:

We have previously pointed out by referencing Philebus and Seneca that the anti-Epicureans argue that pleasure cannot be the goal of life because it has no limit - it can allegedly (when viewed in non-Epicurean terms) be made better by the addition of "more."

In this section of the text, Cicero makes a related argument: pleasure cannot be the basis of happiness because a man cannot be truly happy if he is constantly concerned about losing his happiness. In other words, since happiness allegedly cannot be "permanent," then we need to be constantly afraid of losing it, so the Epicurean cannot be truly happy because he is constantly afraid.

I don't think we've done enough to treat that argument, and I think it jumps out at you when you think about it that this is a large part of what PD04 (there are others, but especially PDO4) is all about:

PD04. Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.

This observation, combined with the observation that seeing pleasure broadly as both stimulative *and* non-stimulative activities (seeing it broadly as "absence of pain") is how (as Torquatus says) the wise man is always going to have more reason for joy than for vexation.

CIcero stating the issue for us in this way is, and alleging the Epicureans are wrong in thinking that we can be confident of remaining until death in a condition of more pleasure than pain, is extremely helpful I think.

I am concerned that I am reading these sections of Cicero a little too quickly than they deserve to be read, especially at the beginning of the episode, but once you get past that into our discussion I think there is some extremely helpful material in this episode.

Quote from Nate

His grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, was positively Lucretian in his allegiances. Charles seems to have adopted a number of Epicurean propositions from his grandfather, but he did not identify as an explicit Epicurean or Lucretian in the tradition of the Garden.

So Charles Darwin's grandfather was heavily engaged with Lucretius but Charles Darwin himself stated that he had not read Lucretius. Ok so he didn't sit down and "read" the book but presumably he was aware of his grandfather's activities? Or is it possible they were estranged? Not sure that this makes much difference but kind of weird nonetheless.

Elli posted this video and her commentary on the Facebook Group today:

Today I noticed this video at youtube that is created by a lady who is philosophized and she is introduced her self (in a comment below) as a "neoplatonist". So, I left to her a comment based on Epicurus and his philosophy, and for the purpose to make some things more CLEAR.

<<Hello, dear lady. I am an epicurean-greek lady, and I have noticed somewhere that you wrote: "Ninon de Lenclos (1620, Paris - 1705) and her libertine approach - according to the famous hedonist thinker Epicurus of Samos - to a new philosophy of love".

Hold on a second dear, Epicurus was not a hedonist thinker as introduced by the many. Epicurus was not a hunter of all the pleasures/hedones. Since, we read in his epistle to Meneoceus the following important excerpt:

<<And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good>>.

As for "romantic love", imo, is to love the IDEA of love (similar to Platos' world of IDEAS) and not the love that exists in reality of life with such thoughts and actions, and is balanced when is based on the MUTUAL BENEFIT, that is the balance to offer and taking pleasurable activities and things i.e. to share time and all goods that have quality and are called as values. E.g. the greatest value - good for Epicurus is friendship "φιλία" and this word is synonym with the word "αγάπη" i.e. LOVE - any kind of LOVE.

When any relationship is based on friendship ( love ) includes such gifts as : TRUST, CARE, HONESTY, and PRUDENCE, and prudence is higher than philosophy (as Epicurus said) that is the root of all virtues, and these choices- virtues are the means that are leading to a pleasurable living i.e. Eudaemonia that is the goal of all greek philosophers.

Pleasure/hedone, for Epicurus, and as long as pleasure exists, it means to not have agitation in the mind and pain in the body.

As for Ninon that claims that any romantic love is based on hypocricy she got used on this in accordance with the circumstances of her life to have company with all hypocrites and kings. Moreover, when someone proclaims that any kind of love is based on hypocricy, it is the same that when someone fears death in anticipation. Ninon fears love in anticipation, because she hung back and did not want to run risks to offer herself without hesitation, since she had in mind that men loved her because she was very beautiful. We see beauty sometimes is a curse and not a bless. But anyway, the hesitation of Ninon and her claims that "romantic love" is based on hypocricy, it is similar with the following saying on friendship, by Epicurus.

VS 28. We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship’s sake we must run risks.

And finally we have the epicurean Lucretius that was against the IDEALISM and the IDEA of love as introduced by Plato. But I see, that somewhere you claim that you are a "neoplatonist" and at the sametime your're introducing to the public Ninon de Lenclos as an epicurean? This leads to confusion my dear, and thank you very much!

From Lucretius DRN 4.1278-1287. [...And not through divine effect and the arrows of Venus it sometimes happens that a woman of inferior form is loved (i.e a woman that is not so beautiful like a mannequin). For sometimes a woman herself brings it about through her own actions and compliant ways (morigerique modis) and neatly groomed body that she easily accustoms you to live your life with her. For the rest, familiarity creates love (amor); for that which is beaten by a frequent blow, however lightly, yet after long lapse of time is conquered and gives way. Do you not also see that drops of water falling onto rocks after long lapse of time beat through the rocks ?...]>>

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He closes mentioning lack of "feeling" and then lack of "hope"

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We come now to the final test of these systems in their application to that feeling of Hope which is native and imperishable in man, and to that cheerful and beneficent working that should realize the hopes of Humanity. It may fitly characterize the system of Lucretius to say, there is no hope in it; and it was a fitting commentary on such a system that he who framed it, seeing nothing to live for and nothing to hope for, should end his life by his own hand. Not that I would charge the suicide of Lucretius as a crime upon his system or himself. So far from being put under the ban of priestly superstition, or the more mercenary ban of Life Insurance companies, the suicide should be looked upon with a tender, even sacred pity, as the victim of mental or moral disease. Yet when Lucretius was so tempted, we find in his system nothing of the hope that could have restrained the hand which had written “alter death there will remain no self”—that is no conscious personality-—and “no one wakes up upon whom the chill cessation of life has once come.." Thus we see this proud master of the material universe succumbing to the fate that befalls his atoms.

And then winds up for the close:

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But the scheme of Lucretius admits of no expansion. It is shut down within its own horizon—rather it is shut up within a cavern of endless gloom, where those who enter must bid farewell to Hope. The scheme of Paul has made peoples wiser and better in the degree that they have accepted it; it wants but to be accepted in its completeness, to ll the world with light and peace and joy. It carries in itself the future of all poetry and prophecy, and they who teach it are messengers of gladness and joy. But how can the followers of Lucretius exult in such a system‘? Does the physician put on airs of mirth and exultation when he tells his patient there is no hope? Yet this message of despair is what the priests of Materialism bring from the arcana of nature. One would think they would go forth in sackcloth and ashes, with inverted torches, to the grave of all things. Against a nature of such origin and end, I pit my own manhood, and do not fear the issue. Would I cherish the tender, graceful sentiment of gratitude? then must I follow Paul, and not Lucretius. Would I yield to the noble impulses of patriotism? then must l follow Paul, and not Lucretius. Would I rise to the magnanimous heights of philanthropy? then must I follow Paul, and not Lucretius. Would I help Mankind in their sorrows, deliver them from their superstitions, raise them from their sins? then must l follow Paul, and not Lucretius. Would I lift myself and my race to immortal hopes? then must I drop Lucretius, and follow Paul to the life everlasting.

Thompson goes on at length on pages 25 - 30 about gratitude, and alleges that it would have no part in a Lucretian view of things. It is interesting to consider that Epicurus wrote to the effect that we should be grateful to nature and had other things to say about gratitude, as if Epicurus understood that gratitude was an issue that had to be addressed.

He then mentions patriotism as being impossible, even though Epicurus mentioned those who were "enemies of Hellas" and his whole system of "friendship" can be extended to social groups.

He then mentions philanthropy, and even mention's the opening of book 2 of the poem as totally inconsistent with philanthropy! We've dealt with that before and this shows the need to be uncompromising on it

Oh give me a break - this is why Epicurus warned against poets and he probably should have warned explicitly against hallucinogenic drugs too!

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There is a certain grandeur and beauty in these conceptions, and l confess that when first I had mastered Lucretius, I felt a touch of awe at the majesty of a soul thus blindly bowing to its fate, and Samson-like dragging down men and gods together in its own destruction. But as I looked upon such a universe, in which destruction is the ever-recurring law, and death alone is immortal, from this background of darkness and despair, I saw rise before
me that marvelous vision of Wordsworth;

“In my mind’s eye a temple, like a cloud
Slowly surmounting some invidious hill
Rose out of darkness: the bright work stood still;
And might of its own beauty have been proud,
But it was fashioned, and to God was vowed
By virtues that ditfused, in every part,
Spirit divine through forms of human art;
Faith had her arch - her arch when winds blow loud,
Into the consciousness of safety thrilled;
And Love her towers of dread foundation laid
Under the grave of things; Hope had her spire
Star-high, and pointing still to something higher;
Trembling I gazed, but heard a voice,-—it said,
Hell-gates are powerless Phantoms when we build.”

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This is why Epicureans can't ignore canonics and can't rely solely on superficial statements about "the senses" without explaining how reasoning based on the senses works:

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We must now keep in mind how strongly Lucretius insists that “from the senses first proceeded the knowledge of the true, and the senses can not be refuted.” Yet he here assumes several successive stages of motion by the impact of bodies before either body or motion becomes cognizable by the senses. That is, for the foundation of his atomic theory he reasons back from the seen to the unseen: — the reasoning may be valid, but the existence of the atom is not attested by the senses. Yet now-a-days, to reason from the seen to the unseen, from phenomena to cause, from adaptation to intelligence, is forsooth made an offense in the metaphysician, though Lucretius arrived at his atom by deduction, and then assumed the atom as the basis of his materialistic universe! Next, having inferred the motion of invisible atoms from the perceived motion of visible particles, he makes the bold assumption of self-originated motion for the first-beginnings. This is sheer assertion, since his senses had shown him only motion by impact, and neither the senses nor logic could derive from this motion without “blows” to start it.

Lot's could be said about this following paragraph - most of it negative. This is what Frances wright attacks under the name "imagination" -

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For the constitution of a material universe, it is true that matter and space or body and void are alike essential, and so .far as we know are all; but the question is, whether the material universe is all; and that question cannot be settled by purely physical observation upon the nature of bodies or the contents of space. That incessant striving of man’s nature after something above and beyond, a striving that grows the more impatient with his mastery over nature and his accumulating stores of knowledge;—— that mighty unrest in which a Prometheus, a Lucifer, a Faust are but projected types of our inner selves—the unrest that urges man on to think the unthinkable and to know the unknowable — that makes poetry, philosophy, music so much higher and worthier representations of humanity than the recorded observation of phenomena - what is this but an attestation of that “third thing” that Lucretius could not feel nor see, but that Paul had attained to when he spoke of “body, soul and spirit,” and found not only a third element in the constitution of man and of the universe, but also a “third heaven” in which spirit might abide?

Ok I cannot resist getting started. Thompson seems very admiring of Lucretius, and his extended discussion of how Lucretius is using the deductive method about atoms that have been and never will be seen by the unaided eye emphasizes the point that DeWitt makes, that Epicurus and Lucretius were not strict "empiricists" as that term is often used.

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Now, the point I make, and would insist upon, is, that these were not lucky guesses or coincidences of Lucretius, but results of the deductive method to which scientific materialism is compelled to do homage by its own discoveries. But remarkable as are these correspondences of experimental physics and chemistry with the atomic theory, the atom itself is simply assumed. It never has been, and never can be, brought within the range of the senses.

The atomic theory is evidenced by experiments as to atomic weights, volume, heat, and combining capacity, and as to isomerism, and chemical molecules and homogeneity; but the theory is still stoutly contested by some, and the very existence of the atom is disputed by others.3) Yet we are called upon to accept the materialistic doctrine of the universe, and to receive nothing as knowledge which does not come to us through the senses, while forsooth the foundation of this sensible universe lies utterly beyond the senses, is not at all a physical fact that any one has seen or handled, but a theoretical deduction, an assumption of the mind to explain facts that are seen. Let the atomic theory have all due acceptance as an ingenious and subtile theory, but let it not be thrust upon us as a dogma by a hierarchy of physicists —— which, in the name of human freedom, is as much to be resisted and detested as an ecclesiastical hierarchy. Most heartily and gratefully do I welcome all facts ascertained by physical science; nor do I see, upon theistic grounds, any solid objection to the nebular hypothesis, the atomic theory, the doctrine of the correlation of forces, or of natural selection. But should all these be established upon the physical basis of experimental observation, I pray men of science to be honest enough to own that it was not physics but Metaphysics that first suggested and sought to demonstrate them, each and all. Materialism can not repudiate its own parentage; can not steal the name of Lucretius and scorn his method. Materialism was begotten not of Nature, but of Mind through metaphysics.

Thank you Don! that looks to be fascinating! i am not going to be able to read it tonight so if others get a chance before I do please let us know if you think it is a worthwhile read!

In the process of editing this episode I want to call out an interesting aspect of the discussion:

Joshua makes the point that, like Justice, friendship arises through natural experience over time. We brought that up initially on the point that some Epicureans argued that friendship arises from advantages, but changes over time. However I want to pursue another aspect of the analogy, insofar as it may shed light on the question: From the Epicurean perspective, does "friendship" necessarily mean "to the death"? We need to consider not only the question as to whether every friendship should mean that we should die for that friend (most of us would probably say "of course not"). But we also need to consider the general question: "Is it ever appropriate to terminate a friendship? Under what conditions?

PD37 and PD38 go on at great length to explain how, when circumstances change and mutual advantage no longer exists, justice itself no longer exists. Should we take by analogy that when mutual advantage of friendship no longer exists, that friendship also can or should terminate?

I think we tend to underestimate the implications of PD37 and PD38, as we find it very hard not to "deify" justice and think that justice has a life of its own and should never be terminate or violated, despite what PD37 and PD38 say.

Do we have the same problem with friendship? Are we seduced by Cicero's examples of Orestes and others that if we are not willing to die for a friend then we are not true friends at all?

This possibility of terminating friendship when advantage changes seems to be at the heart of Cicero's attacks on Epicurean friendship, so attractive as Cicero's romantic notions might be (as to both friendship and justice) is Epicurus telling us to be ruthlessly practical and not to consider either justice or friendship to exist when the mutual advantage is no longer there?

I think we have here a very interesting question to unwind. Our discussion in the episode should be helpful, but is by no means the last word.

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...the areas of active pleasure in my body have been limited to specific places and to specific times. Most of the time, most parts of my body are not feeling [stimulative] pleasure.

My response to that would be that your view of pleasure is incomplete. If you are alive and aware of anything at all, what you are aware of is pleasure or pain. Stimulative pleasure is only one type of pleasure, and all other experiences of life which are not stimulative and not painful are also pleasure.

So when you say "Most of the time, most parts of my body are not feeling [stimulative] pleasure," what you are saying is that most of the time most parts of your body are not feeling either pain or stimulative pleasure. But you have not completed the description: it is right and proper to label what those parts of your body *are* feeling at those times as pleasure.