Posts by Cassius

I find this highly interesting and worth discussing, especially this:

The most influential is David Sedley’s thesis that for Epicurus the self is an emergent phenomenon that acquires a power of volition that transcends the laws that bind atomic motion and can even ‘reach down’ and cause changes at the atomic level. (As Sedley puts it, the self is radically emergent. ......

..... seems to me to be a very understandable and acceptable way of untying the knot of reconciling the two levels (atomic level and "our" level.

It may well be academically true that talking about "eliminative" terminology can bring greater precision to the specialist, but I doubt very much whether the normal person has any need to go that deep. The level at which Sedley is speaking seems to me to be the "practical" level of understanding how "our world" relates to "atoms," and that's the level of practical guidance that most people need.

Focusing specifically on the context that the purpose of this forum is to bring practical Epicurean philosophy to normal people who are not and are never going to be academic specialists, I'm interested in any comments anyone wants to make on that issue.

I'm not trying to be overly critical of Tim O'Keefe, either, because he's an academic writing for academics. Our goal here ought to be always focused on looking for practical constructions that deal with the great majority of a problem.

Not to say that any individuals here should not look for greater precision, but as a "group" we ought to swing for the sweet spot of aiming at the "middle class" that Cicero was complaining about picking up Epicurean philosophy on the crossroads of Rome.

We don't want to let the "perfect" explanation that Tim O'Keefe might be looking for become the proverbial "enemy of the good" -- in this case the good being defined as a practical and beneficial worldview for normal people.

Sedley seems clearly right in his broad strokes that excessive reductionism is akin to excessive skepticism and excessive determinism, and those are almost as much the enemy of Epicurean philosophy as supernatural religion. (And arguably more so, given what Epicurus said in the letter to Menoeceus.)

So if anyone disagrees specifically with where Sedley is coming from I'd definitely like to hear that commentary.

For those who might be lurking, what we're talking about (at least in part) is discussed in O'Keefe's "Epicurus on Freedom," which includes:

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6.3.2. Those Who Think Like David Sedley

Members of another family of interpretation, the ‘anti-reductionist’ interpretation, agree with the ‘traditional’ interpretation that Epicurus is dealing with the ‘traditional’ problem of free will and determinism, and that Epicurus finds this problem vexing because of his Democritean inheritance. 16 However, they think that Epicurus’ main concern is to combat the unacceptable consequences of Democritus’ reductionist atom ism – his contention that, in truth, only atoms and void exist. Epicurus denies that the mind and its powers can be exhaustively explained in terms of the motions of atoms, because doing so would lead to rejecting the reality of emergent psychological properties like volitions. (This supposedly parallels Epicurus’ response to Democritus’ skepticism: Democritus denies the reality of emergent qualities like colors, which leads him to doubt that the senses can be a source of knowledge, whereas Epicurus affirms their reality.) The remains of On Nature 25 that discuss psychological development provide the main textual support for anti-reductionist interpretations. This anti-reductionism is related to Epicurus’ denial of determinism in various ways by different advocates of anti-reductionism. The most influential is David Sedley’s thesis that for Epicurus the self is an emergent phenomenon that acquires a power of volition that transcends the laws that bind atomic motion and can even ‘reach down’ and cause changes at the atomic level. (As Sedley puts it, the self is radically emergent. For this reason, I label Sedley’s view the ‘radical emergence’ interpretation.) Okeefe P 17 …. Proponents of anti-reductionist interpretations include David Sedley (Sedley ( 1983 ) and ( 1988 a); Long and Sedley ( 1987 ) section 20 ); Julia Annas (Annas ( 1992 ) chapter 7 and ( 1993 )); and Philip Mitsis (Mitsis ( 1988 ) chapter 4 ).

And in turn there, O'keefe is talking about Sedley's article "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism," in which Sedley expands on an argument he first developed in "The Hellenistic Philosophers, and which he expanded to include this on page 34, which is at the heart of what Okeefe is objecting to:

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Epicurus' response to this is perhaps the least appreciated aspect of his thought. It was to reject reductionist atomism. Almost uniquely among Greek philosophers he arrived at what is nowadays the unreflective assumption of almost anyone with a smattering of science, that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be· capable of explaining the latter; but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth. (The truth that sugar is sweet is not straightforwardly reducible to the truth that it has such and
such a molecular structure, even though the latter truth may be required in order to explain the former). By establishing that cognitive scepticism, the direct outcome of reductionist atomism, is self-refuting and untenable in practice, Epicurus justifies his non-reductionist alternative, according to which sensations are true and there are therefore bona fide truths at the phenomenal level accessible through them. The same will apply to the pathe, which Epicurus also held to be veridical. Pleasure, for example, is a direct datum of experience. It is commonly assumed that Epicurus must have equated pleasure with such and such a kind of movement of soul atoms; but although he will have taken it to have some explanation at the atomic level, I know of no evidence that he, any more than most moral philosophers or psychologists, would have held that an adequate analysis of it could be found at that level. Physics are strikingly absent from Epicurus' ethical writings, and it is curious that interpreters are so much readier to import them there than they are when it comes to the moral philosophy of Plato or Aristotle.

Sedley's article was published in 1983.

The OKeefe article Bryan is referring to was published 2001.

O'Keefe's Epicurus on Freedom book was published in 2005.

Yep, and you've also got to know when good enough is good enough vs when the perfect becomes the enemy of the good. I think Sedley has that balance better struck in this case.

At this point I still side with David Sedley's view of the general issue as correct, and that OKeefe is risking muddying the water by introducing the term "eliminative.." But for someone really into the academic fine points probably the distinction makes sense.

My first view though is that Sedley's view covers at least 98% of the issue that is important for most people to know, and that the extra 2% probably isn't worth the effort. Here I am referring to the quote from Sedley's article (Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism) that there are truths at both levels and neither has a monopoly on the full picture.

I think you're referring to an article which I haven't read, and I am going on my review of OKeefe book that we mentioned in the recent podcast on determinism.

So maybe at some point I will find the article and see if it changes my mind.

Don and Bryan that site Elli is linking to looks interesting. Quite possibly we've seen it before but my memory doesn't recall at the moment, just wanted to be sure you saw it -

From Elli Pensa:

First of all, I would like to express my warm congratulations to all Epicurean friends who will participate in this special livestream! Indeed, this will be a great opportunity to clear up many misunderstandings surrounding the name of our beloved philosopher Epicurus.

I would also like to suggest an idea to our friends: as an introduction and just before this special livestream begins, there could be a nice "sound effect", for example, with this paragraph from Epicurus' letter to Menoeceus, which has been reconstructed in the ancient Greek-Attic dialect by Mr. Ioannis Stratakis.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bO2A01oI_ic

Also, as a conclusion and at the end of the livestream, we could ask our friend Bryan to read a small excerpt from Lucretius' DRN in Latin. In my opinion, it will be like hearing these two great figures, Epicurus and Lucretius, speaking to us live in their own languages!

The presentation by me will indeed be short!

Actually however the reason for the topic was intended to be related to "new year resolutions" -- setting goals for ourselves and similar "ambitions"

Here's a search result which gives some of Cicero's approach to translation that we need to keep in mind in reading his renderings of Epicurean material.

1. Literal versus Sense-for-Sense Translation

In De Optimo Genere Oratorum (14), Cicero famously contrasts verbum pro verbo (word-for-word) translation with his own approach:

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"Nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator; sententiis isdem et earum formis, tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis." Translation: "I did not translate as an interpreter but as an orator, preserving the ideas and their forms, as it were, but using language suited to our way of speaking."

Cicero insists that the translator must aim to render the spirit and essence of the text, ensuring that the translation resonates within the linguistic and cultural framework of the target audience. His purpose was not to reproduce the exact wording but to capture the rhetorical force of the original.

2. Adaptation of Greek Philosophical Terms

In Tusculanae Disputationes (Book 1), Cicero demonstrates the challenges of translating complex Greek philosophical terms into Latin. For example, he often struggles with terms like katastematicos (pleasure as a state of rest) and kinetikos (pleasure involving movement). Rather than force awkward direct translations, Cicero invents or adapts Latin terms, such as voluptas and tranquillitas, to approximate the Greek concepts while making them more accessible to Roman readers.

This principle reflects his belief that the translator should create terminology that aligns with the target language's intellectual and cultural framework.

3. Clarity and Accessibility

In De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (Book 1.1), Cicero justifies his translations of Greek philosophical texts by emphasizing his desire to make these works accessible to Roman audiences:

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"Graecos libros Latine vertere non ut interpres, sed ut auctor, ut tamquam aliud ex alia re formarem." Translation: "To translate Greek books into Latin, not as an interpreter but as an author, as though creating something new from the original."

Cicero saw translation as an act of creation, wherein the translator becomes a co-author who molds the source material into a new literary and cultural artifact.

Sometimes people are tempted to deal with conflicting translations of text by throwing up their hands and concluding that no certainty is possible. While that is definitely the right conclusion in some cases (such as texts which are clearly fragmentary or corrupted) it's not at all always true. Many times there are many texts making a similar point in a the different language, and the general point from many statements becomes so clear that you can be very confident what is being said even when a particular text is somewhat corrupted. At some point also the existence of many translators - especially those who are trained academics who compete against each other for accuracy and fluency - begin to converge on a consensus in which you can have confidence. It's necessary for us to have a reasonable approach on what can be trusted to be true and what cannot. To a large extent this is what "canonics" is all about.

If it were true that we had to be proficient in speaking a language ourselves before we could comment on a text, then no one could ever comment on a language that they did not grow up learning themselves. We're all relying on translators. Even when we take the trouble to learn a language ourselves, we're relying on the compiler's of the dictionaries. The compilers of the dictionaries we use today relied on generations of translators who came before themselves. We're all relying on what is essentially "hearsay" evidence - and that really applies to children learning, as well, because they are learning to use words as others tell them the words should be used.

This topic is dealt with in Lucretius and probably other places as well because it is o important. We are always relying to some extent on people more knowledgeable than ourselves.

We therefore need a logical system for approaching language or anything else that we don't already know ourselves. Just like with atoms, which we never see or touch, we have to make logical deductions from what evidence is available to us.

Especially in the case of relying on translations, we have to decide who we trust and who we don't. With translations, it seems to me that the general method is to validate as best we can what we're told by comparing translations against each other and against things we can validate -- perhaps for example against inscriptions where a picture accompanies a word. We never take anything totally on faith, but that means we have to compare translations and observations to see which are consistent and which are not and how everything compares with facts that we can observe ourselves. Ultimately that is as much a test as anything else for what we choose to believe.

I suspect that there's a parallel here with how "code-breakers" unravel encryption - they look for clues in the text and compare the text to experience on frequency of words and the like.

If we can't have some degree of confidence in our conclusions about translations and everything else, then we devolve into radical skeptics.

So I started this thread to discuss whether we can suggest a general approach to deciding what to have confidence in and what not to trust. Obviously the more time we spend trying to learn a language from standard dictionaries, the better off we are likely to be, because we have more points of contact by which we can check a translator's choices against literal text. On the other hand, i gather that it is widely recognized that familiarity with idiomatic terminology means that literal translation can sometimes be laughably off from the real meaning that was intended. Sarcasm and irony and all sorts of literary constructions cause meanings to shift.

Given that we are so heavily reliant on translators and the work of commentators who have come before us, is there any way we can develop a general approach that makes sense and responds to feelings of hopelessness that no conclusions we reach can be reliable?

Happy birthday Julia! Thanks for your many contributions in 2024!

Happy Birthday to Julia! Learn more about Julia and say happy birthday on Julia's timeline: Julia

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This would be one instance where I might not give Cicero's proximity in time quite so much credit. I am with DeWitt that Cicero probably had superior "knowledge" of Epicurus, on issues like prolepsis and images, given the proximity in time and probably number of teachers. But something like the name of an addressee of a letter doesn't require philosophic attention, and could more likely be a "slip of the pen" that wouldn't be reviewed so closely. \

But reading the comments above I am very strongly in the middle on what the real answer is and i have no confidence which is the right answer.

Happy new year to all EpicureanFriends. We're closing 2024 with one of our most detailed episodes on one of the most important Epicurean doctrines: "Death Is Nothing To Us." Thanks to all who tuned in this year, and we're looking forward to another strong year here at EpicureanFriends.com.

Would it make sense that Hermarchus was present and would not need a letter, while Idomeneus may have lived somewhere else?

Great catch!

The conversation has moved on somewhat from this point, but I just started another thread on a particular excerpt from Lucretius as to the logical possibilities as to how anything can be "eternal." I think that excerpt is relevant to this "gods" discussion as well, because if they are to be deathless they must somehow relate to one of those categories.

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The Logical Possibilities As To What Can Be Eternal (Applicable to Gods As Well)

In podcast 262 I was going through the ways that Lucretius was proving that the soul cannot be eternal, and came across this section in which Lucretius sets out the logical ways in which something could be eternal. In addition to the soul aspect I think this is helpful in the way it describes (1) the universe as a whole is eternal - by deduction from the fact that there is nothing "outside" the universe, and (2) that the atoms and void are eternal because they are able to "beat back assaults"…

Cassius

December 30, 2024 at 10:26 AM

Quote from Kalosyni

For me, I would take this to mean that god cannot be experienced apart from thought. ---> God exists only as a mental construct.

Just for clarity to lurkers, I think most everyone agrees with the first sentence, at least as having something to do with "images."

But as to the second sentence, that's the idealist position, and others take the realist position that they exist regardless of whether we think about them.

In podcast 262 I was going through the ways that Lucretius was proving that the soul cannot be eternal, and came across this section in which Lucretius sets out the logical ways in which something could be eternal. In addition to the soul aspect I think this is helpful in the way it describes (1) the universe as a whole is eternal - by deduction from the fact that there is nothing "outside" the universe, and (2) that the atoms and void are eternal because they are able to "beat back assaults" and suffer nothing from have anything come into contact with them.

In regard to Epicurean gods I find particular interesting the possibility that this section applies: "because it is fortified and protected from things fatal to life, or because things harmful to its life come not at all, or because such as come in some way depart defeated before we can feel what harm they do us..." Of course that's not the case for us as humans, but I would presume that the speculation about the location and makeup of the gods was intended to let them do exactly that.

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[800] Nay, indeed, to link the mortal with the everlasting, and to think that they can feel together and act one upon the other, is but foolishness. For what can be pictured more at variance, more estranged within itself and inharmonious, than that what is mortal should be linked in union with the immortal and everlasting to brave raging storms?

[806] Moreover, if ever things abide for everlasting, it must needs be either that, because they are of solid body, they beat back assaults, nor suffer anything to come within them which might unloose the close-locked parts within, such as are the bodies of matter whose nature we have declared before; or that they are able to continue throughout all time, because they are exempt from blows, as is the void, which abides untouched, nor suffers a whit from assault; or else because there is no supply of room all around, into which, as it were, things might part asunder and be broken up—even as the sum of sums is eternal—nor is there any room without into which they may scatter, nor are there bodies which might fall upon them and break them up with stout blow.

[819] But if by chance the soul is rather to be held immortal for this reason, because it is fortified and protected from things fatal to life, or because things harmful to its life come not at all, or because such as come in some way depart defeated before we can feel what harm they do us \[clear facts show us that this is not so\]. For besides that it falls sick along with the diseases of the body, there comes to it that which often torments it about things that are to be, and makes it ill at ease with fear, and wears it out with care; and when its evil deeds are past and gone, yet sin brings remorse. There is too the peculiar frenzy of the mind and forgetfulness of the past, yes, and it is plunged into the dark waters of lethargy.

I was looking for something today on my NewEpicurean page, and I came across this reference to a person who I don't think we have discussed here. Therefore I am adding the reference in case someone is interested in looking further into this:

Here is a reference to a work with strong Epicurean overtones by Aonius Palearius, who was executed for heresy in July, 1570. I hesitate to trust the accuracy of the following summary, especially as to the comment on ease and tranquility, but in order to be sure we will need to access the full original work. Anyone know where this can be found (preferably with English translation)? Here’s the summary:

“The end of man, says Palearius, is to live pleasantly; hence man must know that pleasure arises from the cooperation of the body and the mind. The fleshly pleasures are essential to contemplation and right living, and philosophers who deny this are not philosophers. The very fact that all sensual pleasures are readily available suggests that they have a purpose. We have health that we may think more vigorously, beauty that we may be loved, strength that we may fight, and wealth that we may know God, who is quite well-to-do Himself. It is difficult to define pleasure because people do not agree. Craftsmen will find the highest pleasure in work well done; scholars get so much pleasure out of research that they work during vacations. …. In one respect, Palaerius differs from the master; he does not think ease and tranquility true pleasures; for him pleasure is active, felt in the nerves and the heart.”

Source: The Rehabilitation of Epicurus and His Theory of Pleasure in the Early Renaissance, by Don Cameron Allen, Studies in Philology, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan., 1944), pp. 1-15

Good source for info on Palearius: A General Dictionary….