Posts by Cassius

Great topic to pursue. I will write more later but in my mind I think inmate " ideas" is a total nonstarter, and Dewitt was being sloppy when he used that reference.

My preferred explanation of what is innate is more on the order of pleasure and pain, extended to the innate ability to recognize relationships that then as we examine them are formed into ideas.

The best and even poetic presentation of such a position I have found is in the section from the work that Jackson Barwis wrote in the late 1700s against John Locke - the first of his "Dialogues on Innate Principles" found here: https://jacksonbarwis.com. (Specifically starting here: https://jacksonbarwis.com/DOIP-One/ )

In that work Barwis argues strongly against innate "ideas" but says that innate "principles" - such as feeling pleasure at the recognition of acts of benevolence - is a very different thing.

If I were forced to take a position on the direction Epicurus would likely have gone, that would be it.

Thanks for introducing yourself Remus! Looking forward to hearing more from you!

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This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Thanks Martin, I bet I know a setting for that. How wide a screen do you use? Super wide?

This weekend (June 8th) we are updating the default theme that new users will see when they visit the site. If you are a regular participant with an account, you should not notice this unless you log out. However theme changes have a way of creeping into unexpected places, and we have also made some menu changes and updates to the Home page at the same time.

The new theme is a "light" style and goes by the name of "Inspire Blue" if you check out the Styles by clicking on the "Change Style" link at the bottom of each page of the forum. "Inspire" comes in several color varieties (red, green, purple, etc), and you might want to check them out because as you know we all like variety!

The theme has a somewhat different design that you may find a pleasing update to the original, so if you've been using the existing "Woltlab Default" style, you might want to check out the new "Inspire Blue" default selection.

Feel free to let us know if you find any of the updates cause you any problems.

The current listing is here:

Articles - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Godfrey -- due to the differences in themes, it's not clear to me what exactly you are looking at in the page that you praise as being a good example. Could you attach a screenclip to show us what you are looking at?

We did not get very far in the text last week, but in this episode we'll turn to what Velleius has to say about Democritus and then about the Academy and the Peripatetics before getting to the Stoics:

• Those who say that gods are not everlasting destroy the true concept of divinity.
  1. What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle through which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies likewise our knowledge and understanding. Is he not involved in a very great error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he denies that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely destroy the Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him?
• Those who attribute sense to formlessness are also wrong.
  1. Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it?
• The Academy, including Plato and Xenophon and Antisthenes held ideas of the gods that were inconsistent and unintelligible.
  1. It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato’s opinion; for, in his Timæus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one great father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he thinks we ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of the Deity. And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being without any body—what the Greeks call ἀσώματος—it is certainly quite unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true; for such a God must then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence, and pleasure; all which things are comprehended in our notion of the Gods. He likewise asserts in his Timæus, and in his Laws, that the world, the heavens, the stars, the mind, and those Gods which are delivered down to us from our ancestors, constitute the Deity. These opinions, taken separately, are apparently false; and, together, are directly inconsistent with each other.
  2. Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the Deity, and makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him likewise as affirming the being of one God only, and at another time of many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took notice of in Plato.
  3. [XIII] Antisthenes, in his book called the Natural Philosopher, says that there are many national and one natural Deity; but by this saying he destroys the power and nature of the Gods. Speusippus is not much less in the wrong; who, following his uncle Plato, says that a certain incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavors to root out of our minds the knowledge of the Gods.
  4. From the same school of Plato, Heraclides of Pontus stuffed his books with puerile tales. Sometimes he thinks the world a Deity, at other times the mind. He attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars. He deprives the Deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the same book again, he makes earth and heaven Deities.
• Aristotle and the Peripatetics, like Plato, were self-contradictory, and wrong in holding that a god has no body.
  1. Aristotle, in his third book of Philosophy, confounds many things together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master Plato. At one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another he asserts that the world is God. Soon afterward he makes some other essence 222preside over the world, and gives it those faculties by which, with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it. Then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be God; not perceiving the firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had described as God. How can that divine sense of the firmament be preserved in so rapid a motion? And where do the multitude of Gods dwell, if heaven itself is a Deity? But when this philosopher says that God is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being. Besides, how can the world move itself, if it wants a body? Or how, if it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy?
  2. Xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear much wiser on this head, for in his books concerning the nature of the Gods no divine form is described; but he says the number of them is eight. Five are moving planets;85 the sixth is contained in all the fixed stars; which, dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are one single Deity; the seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. But in what sense they can possibly be happy is not easy to be understood.
  3. The unsteadiness of Theophrastus is equally intolerable. At one time he attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations. Nor is his disciple Strato, who is called the naturalist, any more worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution, but that it has no sense nor form.
• The Stoics were wrong in holding that “the law of nature” is a divinity, and they are otherwise wrong in thinking that the sky is a god, or that rationality is a god, and in defending the ancient myths as allegories, and in holding that the form of a god is inconceivable, and other ways too.
  1. [XIV] Zeno (to come to your sect, Balbus) thinks the law of nature to be the divinity, and that it has the power to force us to what is right, and to restrain us from what is wrong. How this law can be an animated being I cannot conceive; but that God is so we would certainly maintain. The same person says, in another place, that the sky is God; but can we possibly conceive that God is a being insensible, deaf to our prayers, our wishes, and our vows, and wholly unconnected with us?
  2. In other books he thinks there is a certain rational essence pervading all nature, indued with divine efficacy. He attributes the same power to the stars, to the years, to the months, and to the seasons.
  3. In his interpretation of Hesiod’s Theogony, he entirely destroys the established notions of the Gods; for he excludes Jupiter, Juno, and Vesta, and those esteemed divine, from the number of them; but his doctrine is that these are names which by some kind of allusion are given to mute and inanimate beings.
  4. The sentiments of his disciple Aristo are not less erroneous. He thought it impossible to conceive the form of the Deity, and asserts that the Gods are destitute of sense; and he is entirely dubious whether the Deity is an animated being or not.
  5. Cleanthes, who next comes under my notice, a disciple of Zeno at the same time with Aristo, in one place says that the world is God; in another, he attributes divinity to the mind and spirit of universal nature; then he asserts that the most remote, the highest, the all-surrounding, the all-enclosing and embracing heat, which is called the sky, is most certainly the Deity. In the books he wrote against pleasure, in which he seems to be raving, he imagines the Gods to have a certain form and shape; then he ascribes all divinity to the stars; and, lastly, he thinks nothing more divine than reason. So that this God, whom we know mentally and in the speculations of our minds, from which traces we receive our impression, has at last actually no visible form at all.
  6. [XV] Persæus, another disciple of Zeno, says that they who have made discoveries advantageous to the life of man should be esteemed as Gods; and the very things, he says, which are healthful and beneficial have derived their names from those of the Gods; so that he thinks it not sufficient to call them the discoveries of Gods, but he urges that they themselves should be deemed divine. What can be more absurd than to ascribe divine honors to sordid and deformed things; or to place among the Gods men who are dead and mixed with the dust, to whose memory all the respect that could be paid would be but mourning for their loss?
  7. Chrysippus, who is looked upon as the most subtle interpreter of the dreams of the Stoics, has mustered up a numerous band of unknown Gods; and so unknown that we are not able to form any idea about them, though our mind seems capable of framing any image to itself in its thoughts. For he says that the divine power is placed in reason, and in the spirit and mind of universal nature; that the world, with a universal effusion of its spirit, is God; that the superior part of that spirit, which is the mind and reason, is the great principle of nature, containing and preserving the chain of all things; that the divinity is the power of fate, and the necessity of future events. He deifies fire also, and what I before called the ethereal spirit, and those elements which naturally proceed from it—water, earth, and air. He attributes divinity to the sun, moon, stars, and universal space, the grand container of all things, and to those men likewise who have obtained immortality. He maintains the sky to be what men call Jupiter; the air, which pervades the sea, to be Neptune; and the earth, Ceres. In like manner he goes through the names of the other Deities. He says that Jupiter is that immutable and eternal law which guides and directs us in our manners; and this he calls fatal necessity, the everlasting verity of future events. But none of these are of such a nature as to seem to carry any indication of divine virtue in them. These are the doctrines contained in his first book of the Nature of the Gods. In the second, he endeavors to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer to what he has advanced in the first, in order that the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of these things, may seem to have been Stoics. Diogenes the Babylonian was a follower of the doctrine of Chrysippus; and in that book which he wrote, entitled “A Treatise concerning Minerva,” he separates the account of Jupiter’s bringing-forth, and the birth of that virgin, from the fabulous, and reduces it to a natural construction.

Welcome to Episode 232 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com.

For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not the same as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In the Epicurean theory of knowledge, all sensations are true, but that does not mean all opinions are true, but that the raw data reported by the senses is reported without the injection of opinion, as the opinion-making process takes place in the mind, where it is subject to mistakes, rather than in the senses. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts show that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius, beginning at the end of Section 10.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here. The text which we include in these posts is the Yonge version, the full version of which is here at Epicureanfriends. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will be maintained here.

Today's Text

XII.

...

What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle through which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies likewise our knowledge and understanding. Is he not involved in a very great error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he denies that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely destroy the Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him?

Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it?

It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato’s opinion; for, in his Timæus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one great father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he thinks we ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of the Deity. And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being without any body—what the Greeks call ἀσώματος—it is certainly quite unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true; for such a God must then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence, and pleasure; all which things are comprehended in our notion of the Gods. He likewise asserts in his Timæus, and in his Laws, that the world, the heavens, the stars, the mind, and those Gods which are delivered down to us from our ancestors, constitute the Deity. These opinions, taken separately, are apparently false; and, together, are directly inconsistent with each other.

Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the Deity, and makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him likewise as affirming the being of one God only, and at another time of many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took notice of in Plato.

XIII. Antisthenes, in his book called the Natural Philosopher, says that there are many national and one natural Deity; but by this saying he destroys the power and nature of the Gods. Speusippus is not much less in the wrong; who, following his uncle Plato, says that a certain incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavors to root out of our minds the knowledge of the Gods.

Aristotle, in his third book of Philosophy, confounds many things together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master Plato. At one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another he asserts that the world is God. Soon afterward he makes some other essence preside over the world, and gives it those faculties by which, with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it. Then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be God; not perceiving the firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had described as God. How can that divine sense of the firmament be preserved in so rapid a motion? And where do the multitude of Gods dwell, if heaven itself is a Deity? But when this philosopher says that God is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being. Besides, how can the world move itself, if it wants a body? Or how, if it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy?

Xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear much wiser on this head, for in his books concerning the nature of the Gods no divine form is described; but he says the number of them is eight. Five are moving planets; the sixth is contained in all the fixed stars; which, dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are one single Deity; the seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. But in what sense they can possibly be happy is not easy to be understood.

From the same school of Plato, Heraclides of Pontus stuffed his books with puerile tales. Sometimes he thinks the world a Deity, at other times the mind. He attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars. He deprives the Deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the same book again, he makes earth and heaven Deities.

The unsteadiness of Theophrastus is equally intolerable. At one time he attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations.

Nor is his disciple Strato, who is called the naturalist, any more worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution, but that it has no sense nor form.

Thanks for the lengthy post ScottW. I too find all that very interesting. Marcion is a fascinating figure.

Reading these references I am irritated at how these guys seem to think that " the gods have no interest in US (humans) " is the same as "the gods have no interest in anything" - i.e. they are totally listless and dull.

I have no interest in the ants crawling underneath my house (unless they are termites) or - better example - the microbes in the dust - but that does not mean I am totally inactive.

It's self-centered in the extreme to presume that Epicurus thought that just because the gods have no interest in humans they would have no interest in anything at all.

Great suggestions Godfrey and thanks for the time you spent making them. We'll go through each one and see what we can do!

Episode 230 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This we discuss Empedocles and take a general view of the implications of living life without supernatural gods or a belief in life after death.

Quote from Little Rocker

But maybe I've now come too close to the sex, drugs, and rock 'n roll interpretation.

I suspect the only thing that would possibly hold a time-transported Epicurus back from getting in one of these rockets might be the realization that he is so desperately needed by so many here on earth that he would not want to take the chance of not fulfilling his real "mission." However I would bet that if he thought there were a reasonable chance of coming back to finish his job here, he'd do both

Quote from Kalosyni

undue physical pain and mental distress

Always remembering that "undue" is subjective with the individual person, and not written in stone to be "forced" on everyone except as they themselves make the analysis. Without always including that qualification, what seems like a good idea to the person saying it an easily get changed into a moral imperative for everyone.

To me this bust from Herculaneum

File:Zeno - portrait for a library, Colosseum.jpg - Wikimedia Commons

commons.wikimedia.org

looks much more like the "Epicurean style" of the busts of Epicurus and Metroorus and Hermarchus than the second photo, which appears to me to have a longer face:

File:Zeno of Citium - Museo archeologico nazionale di Napoli.jpg - Wikimedia Commons

commons.wikimedia.org

But my real reason for the post is to remark that what is it that supposedly "does not look Epicurean" about him? Are they alleging that just because he has a "serious" look he does not look Epicurean? Despite the desire in some quarters to see a "smiling" version of Epicurus, as they think better befits his philosophy, it seems to me the intensely earnest look is much more fitting to an Epicurean, so I don't think the "expression" is very persuasive in pointing to a Stoic model, if that is the point being made.

Quote from Joshua

Given my historically lax approach to completing research tasks,

LOL. Your "laxness" is more efficient than me on my most efficient day.

Also:

Twentier's photo definitely has a different hairstyle and the Berlin information definitely gives an interesting lead so thanks to both of you for these posts.

Here's a new article and some brief observations about it. I don't think that this gets too close to "politics" as the article seems relatively neutral on those issues, and intended to be general advice for all police officers.

https://www.lawofficer.com/stoicism-for-police-executives/

Not a word, as far as I can tell, that would give a police officer a moral compass on how to do his or her job, just a standard recitation of "virtue" as "the only true good," as if virtue exists apart from a view of what good is being targeted for accomplishment:

Quote

Stoicism, at its most basic, is about practicing what the Greeks called Arete, or virtue – the only true good. Stoics divided Arete into these four categories:

1. Wisdom (Phronêsis) – One’s ability to employ the Dichotomy of Control and to identify and separate what they control from what they do not.
2. Courage (Andreia) – One’s fortitude in facing and overcoming fears.
3. Temperance (Sôphrosynê) – One’s self-discipline, self-awareness, and self-control.
4. Justice (Dikaiosynê) – One’s commitment to righteousness, kindness, fairness and equanimity.

As to the "dichotomy of control," why should anyone consider that Stoicism has a copyright on distinguishing what is within our control vs. what is not? Should Zeno be considered brilliant for copyrighting a fancy name for something that everyone of common sense can see?

As for the rest of the descriptions, how does it advance anything to discuss character traits divorced from an analysis of the goal that is sought to be achieved?

I'd say it's always dangerous to elevate process over a deeper moral analysis of goals, and police officers are among the last group of people who should detach themselves from deeper issues of morality.

It is unfortunate that some people are going to see these back-and-forths as uncomfortable or disconcerting but this is the only way we will get to greater clarity.

And more clarify is needed because I think there is a significant number of people who come at Epicurus in a modified-Cicero way.

They understand "pleasure" to mean the equivalent of "sex drugs and rock and roll," and they would like Epicurus to tell them how to experience that feeling all the time.

They understand that there are limits to sex, drugs, and rockandroll specifically, but they hear "pleasure" and they think that Epicurus is going to instruct them in a new experience, hither-to unknown and undiscovered by them, which they will find to be a feeling of stimulation equivalent to sex drugs and rockandroll, but without the "hangover."

So they concentrate on "removing pain" from their life, working toward asceticism, trying to be as "altruistic" and as "good" a person as they can, and they wait and wait for that transcendent moment when in a blinding flash of light they experience this new feeling that does in fact feel as strongly agreeable to them as sex, or drugs, or rockandroll.

Such a moment will never come, but it was never promised.

What was stated instead, is that if you *think* about life correctly (correctly meaning that there are no supernatural gods, platonic "good," or life after death), then you see that "life" allows you to participate in an unlimited number of mental and physical activities which are rewarding in all sorts of ways. With this attitude toward life it is much easier to experience all sorts of agreeable mental and physical activities. You don't have to live under the cloud of thinking that you are being watched by a supernatural god, or that you have to conform to some kind of Platonic ideal, or watch out for punishment or reward after death.

But this attitude toward life and and they way you conduct yourself under its influence is *not* in fact the same experience as continuous sex, drugs, and rock and roll. Those who study Epicurus expecting to find that result will get very disappointed and disillusioned. They will fall back into their old habits of looking for magical stimulative fixes that they think might actually allow them to experience those stimulations constantly.

Looking at your hand as feeling pleasure, when the world tells you that your hand is just sitting there doing nothing, does not magically make your hand feel as if it is being massaged. Looking at your hand or your life that way is more of a paradigm shift. The new paradigm allows you to appreciate it when your hand (or life) is healthy, and makes you realize that it is important for you to take proper actions to maintain that health, because when your hand and life are gone, they are gone forever, and they have no experience at all afterwards. You won't consider non-existence to be terrible, because it's not painful, but it is sure as heck is preferable to be alive and experience the pleasures that are possible to the living.

I think if we don't make this clear then we end up talking past each other like Cicero ignoring what Torquatus was saying to him. Worse, we end up wasting a lot of time that we should otherwise devote to living our lives under the certainty that there are no supernatural gods telling us what to do, and that there is no life after death to cause us to worry about reward or punishment. Once we are sure of those things we don't withdraw into our private gardens as if we are fleeing from pain, but we engage prudently with life according to our circumstances and make the most of it.

So I think these discussions are very helpful to clarify these questions.

Quote from Don

There are innumerable "feelings" and emotions within those two categories, but every sensation is either pleasurable or painful. That seems to be a very insightful discovery, and seems to be born out by current psychological affective research... but we're not going down that road

This statement helps clarify the difference in perspective, because i do not see this as a "discovery" at all -- it's not like he "observed" or "put his finger on" some previously overlooked characteristic that is inherent in certain activities that makes them agreeable. He "decided" or "defined" all agreeable things (as determined by mental and bodily feelings / reactions at any moment) would be called "pleasure" (or hedone or voluptas or whatever language) and all disagreeable ones would be called "pain."

Epicurus could have chosen any number of words / divisions that he liked ( e.g. he could have called some "noble pleasures" or "worthy pleasures") and so established some kind of arbitrary hierarchy within the term "pleasure." But he instead said (decided / defined) "I need one word to describe all that I feel to be agreeable" and I shall call it "pleasure." i would say that is a "philosophical choice" which makes for a "worldview" rather than a "discovery." Many other people - Cicero and essentially all philosophers besides Epicurus - choose to assign the labeling differently. Rather than calling the standard non-stimulated condition of life by the term "pleasure," they assess that standard condition differently, and they call it "neutral" or some other in-between word suggesting a less positive assessment.

Quote from Don

Finally, I don't think Epicurus is necessarily redefining "virtue". It seems to me that "virtue" to Epicurus still means generally "to do what society feels is the excellent/noble thing to do" but for Epicurus we do it because it brings us pleasure, both as the feeling and leading to a more pleasurable life (i.e., PD05) Virtue has no intrinsic value *other than* to serve as an instrument leading to pleasure. And now pleasure is widely defined!

Now that one I doubt we'll be able to bridge very easily, because I cannot see Epicurus holding a "virtue" (such as wisdom) to be "what society feels is the excellent/noble thing to do." I would think that Epicurus would have deferred to "society" in defining the attributes of "virtue" exactly as much as he deferred to "society" in defining the attributes of a "god."

But yes regardless of where we end up this discussion is extremely helpful toward bringing clarity to the questions!

The term "grand philosophical point" was introduced by Don in post 31:

Quote from Don

I'll have to dig back in, but I don't think the language supports that interpretation, especially in light of the letter to Menoikeus. It seems to me he's giving practical advice in PD10, not necessarily making a grand philosophical point. I see this as directly countering the Cyrenaic position.

Here's the way I would unwind the reason this dance seems to continue, because I think it's a deep issue that we see in many forms, including the nearby "astronaut" discussion.

As I perceive why Don used that term, there is an ongoing perspective question about Epicurus' use of concepts and whether he is primarily making practical points or clinical points. Is he giving personal advice about pleasure and how to pursue it moment by moment, or is he giving philosophical advice about how Plato et al are wrong, so that by examining the words that people are using we can make the differences between the schools clear. Or is he (more likely) working on both goals, since the statements he is making can be seen as true on both levels.

The point that I think generates the controversy is that there is a certain perspective held by many people that manifests itself (rightly!) in the reluctance to engage in hypotheticals or to adopt non-standard usages of words. Epicurus himself apparently refused to acknowledge the necessity to prove the desirability of pleasure, presumably for that very reason. On the other hand, Epicurus insisted on talking about "gods" as really existing, even though he sliced away from them most of the defining characteristics that most people consider to be essential about them (supernatural, omniscient, omnipotent).

It seems to me that Epicurus clearly did "both" because f you're going to engage in philosophy you've got to explain your terms to at least some degree. Right after Torquatus noted Epicurus' reluctance to prove the desirability of pleasure by logical philosophical debate, he goes off on a long discourse that sounds very much like a logical philosophical argument. I would say that's a necessity of engaging in philosophical debate, rather than a departure from Epicurean precedent, and that Epicurus himself was doing the exact same kind of combination of logic and "pointing attention to" in statements like PD10-12, and the letter to Menoecus.

It seems to me that this is the only realistic way to account for the "flatness" of Epicurus' choice to categorize all the many shades of feelings (which Cicero and everyone else in the world recognizes as different from each other) into only one of two categories, pleasure or pain. It seems to me that this flatness is a logical necessity when you accept the challenge of using only a single word to distinguish what is desirable, and a single word to distinguish what is undesirable. Rather than "virtue" or "piety," "pleasure" has to stand in that position of the single word that constitutes the placeholder for all that is desirable.

That's how it seems to me it makes most sense to read these flat "either-or" positions:

Diogenes Laertius 10:34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“

And I see that as the only reasonable way to understand the flatness of the exchanges between Torquatus and Cicero in On Ends:

On Ends 1:30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?

On Ends 1:38: Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“

On Ends 1:39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.

On Ends 2:9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”

On Ends 2:11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be..”

Those are flat uses of the word "pleasure" that defy common usage, and yet they are logically consistent with defining pleasure as "everything in life that is desirable" as opposed to "everything in life that is undesirable."

Since Torquatus seemed to take the position that it is essential to use the terminology in this way, and since Torquatus had access to the teachers and the books that we do not, it seems to be it is reasonable to interpret the letter to Menoeceus, the PD's, and the other original writings in the same way that they were being interpreted by the people who had reason to know the intent behind them.

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But I will agree that taking words in these unusual ways is a tough nut for a lot of people to follow. It's normal to object to hypotheticals, and normal to object to non-standard uses of words. In the end I think we're really wrestling with questions of how to communicate when we are using words in non-standard ways. One logical way to do that is to state things in extremes: we come up with formulations that sound like We have no cause for complaint about those who actually achieve pleasure even if we consider that pleasure to be depraved. This second statements rings the same way: We woud have no need for anything - even natural science that we all love - and which I've told you brings me my greatest pleasure - if we were to be able to achieve a life of pleasure without it. Those seem to me to be stated in extreme ways, not to focus on the practical (there are a lot better ways to give practical advice than to cite extreme situations) but to make exactly the point that "pleasure" should be understood in the widest possible way as everything in life that is desirable, and pain everything in life that is undesirable.

Extreme and hypothetical formulations appear absurd to those who focus on the "practical" side alone, but maintaining the philosophical side is essential to understanding the difference between the schools is really as deep as it is - it's the only way to come up with a logically rigorous worldview.

The "astroanaut" hypothetical comes into play because the common perception is that Epicurus is all about being satisfied with what you have and not asking "too much" out of life -- which I don't think is an accurate characterization, but if accepted would make it extremely unlikely that anyone would strap themselves onto the top of a rocket -- even one made by a manufacturer with better recent luck than Boeing!

So to wrap this into a bow, one way of looking at the "grand philosophical point" is how to view Epicurus' use of the term "pleasure." When Epicurus was using it was he focusing on describing specific feelings of the moment at particular times and places, or was he using it philosophically (as his "grand philosophical point") to represent the ultimate good, as against the opposing alternatives of "virtue" or "piety" or "reason," or was he doing both?

Quote from Little Rocker

I don't want to be Pollyanna here, but it seems you can both have this point--pleasure is pleasure, and all of it is good in itself--but only some strategies for pursuing it consistently bring about and sustain the most desirable state. As in the Letter to Menoeceus, all pleasures are good, but only some are choiceworthy.

Yes, I agree, BOTH points are true, but I do think it is important to observe that BOTH points are true.

And I agree that you are right that both 10 and 11 are parallel - but I would say that depending upon whether one is debating philosophy, or giving personal advice to a friend, either perspective could be appropriate to emphasize.

And if I were an Epicurus or a Diogenes of Oinoanda seeking to etch "in stone" a summary of my message to all future generations, and to point out why virtually everyone else has things upside down, I'd find at least as much reason to come at this from a "grand philosophical point" perspective as I would from a "here's my personal observation, your mileage may vary" perspective.