Posts by Cassius

Episode 253 will be released later today. As I complete editing I am struck by Joshua's summation on a subject that isn't expressed in the episode title but which I am increasingly convinced is the heart of Epicurean philosophy: it's not Epicurus' precise conclusions about gods, or even about pleasure, that Lucretius and others seemed to see as his greatest achievement. It was Epicurus' "canon of truth" - the volume that they talk about as celestial or falling from the heavens, that is the real core to understanding Epicurus. And the core of that approach was the response that Epicurus developed to the great challenge of radical skepticism.

Coming up soon.

Does the article state that quantum foam really doesn't have any existence? Leaving aside the issue of the necessity of some kind of void in order for things to change place, Just skimming the article I thought the direction of the writer was that even as you bore down to lower levels there's still "something" there(?)

Thanks to Kalosyni for this link. I don't agree with a premise of this article (that the universe as a whole will come to an end) so in the end it doesnt deal with true infinity. But still it's new and on point with the discussion so throwing it into the hopper

'Infinite monkey theorem' challenged by Australian mathematicians

Australian researchers have poked holes in an old thought-experiment known as the "infinite monkey theorem".

www.bbc.com

Yes. That will work, and we will repost the link tomorrow night too

Thank you for letting us know Eric. Good luck to you and drop in anytime!

Two things to add at the moment:

1) So where does that "WHY CALL HIM GOD?" structure come from in the English formulation? Are we not seeing that in any of the authorities, even Hume?

2) As to the Academic Skeptics wanting to construct arguments against the Stoics as much as against the Epicureans, we not only have that setup in Humes Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion, where one of the main speakers is named Cleanthes, and the anti-Stoic sections (which we have not covered) in On Ends and On The Nature of the Gods, but also this from the opening sections of Cicero's Academica (Yonge translation). He's previously in the text referenced conflicts between the Academics and Epicureans and Stoics, and then says this:

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... For those men are so simple as to think the good of a sheep and of a man the same thing. While you know the character and extent of the accuracy which philosophers of our school profess. Again, if you follow Zeno, it is a hard thing to make any one understand what that genuine and simple good is which cannot be separated from honesty; while Epicurus asserts that he is wholly unable to comprehend what the character of that good may be which is unconnected with pleasures which affect the senses. But if we follow the doctrines of the Old Academy which, as you know, we prefer, then with what accuracy must we apply ourselves to explain it; with what shrewdness and even with what obscurity must we argue against the Stoics!

Just in terms of our own discussions in the podcast and the forum, there is a lot of background evidence that would justify re-orienting our thoughts to how Cicero considered the Stoics to be almost as wrong-headed as the Epicureans, but since Cicero didn't quarrel with the Stoic ethics Cicero isn't as remembered today for being anti-Stoic. And in our discussions we haven't scratched the surface of Carnaedes, who appears to have been oriented against the Stoics similarly as Cicero.

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Even a brief review of the first book of the Academic questions helps a lot to put the relationships between the Academics, the Peripatetics, the Stoics and even the Epicureans into perspective, with everything revolving around the issue of knowledge and when (or if) we are ever justified in claiming it:

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Then I replied—Arcesilas, as we understand, directed all his attacks against Zeno, not out of obstinacy or any desire of gaining the victory, as it appears to me, but by reason of the obscurity of those things which had brought Socrates to the confession of ignorance, and even before Socrates, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and nearly all the ancients; who asserted that nothing could be ascertained, or perceived, or known: that the senses of man were narrow, his mind feeble, the course of his life short, and that truth, as Democritus said, was sunk in the deep; that everything depended on opinions and established customs; that nothing was left to truth. They said in short, that everything was enveloped in darkness; therefore Arcesilas asserted that there was nothing which could be known, not even that very piece of knowledge which Socrates had left himself. Thus he thought that everything lay hid in secret, and that there was nothing which could be discerned or understood; for which reasons it was not right for any one to profess or affirm anything, or sanction anything by his assent, but men ought always to restrain their rashness and to keep it in check [pg 021] so as to guard it against every fall. For rashness would be very remarkable when anything unknown or false was approved of; and nothing could be more discreditable than for a man's assent and approbation to precede his knowledge and perception of a fact. And he used to act consistently with these principles, so as to pass most of his days in arguing against every one's opinion, in order that when equally important reasons were found for both sides of the same question, the judgment might more naturally be suspended, and prevented from giving assent to either.

Related article by David Sedley cited in the Medium article posted above:

The atheist underground

The atheist underground

www.academia.edu

and a little David Sedley humor:

Third in the catalogue was Critias. Epicurus’ is the earliest evidence for attributing to Critias, rather than to Euripides, what has come to be known as the Sisyphus fragment, in which the speaker explains the origin of religion as a political device, the gods having been invented to convince would-be miscreants that they are under 24-hour satellite surveillance.

and from the article an interesting chart, based on Plato's reference to atheist views:

To be clear this is based on Plato and not Epicurus, and as such David Sedley doesn't present it as consistent with Epicurus.

Good article with background cites:

‘Then why call him God?’— Epicurus never said what everyone thinks he did

Why everyone is wrong about Epicurus

sylvesterreport.medium.com

We'll be recording our podcast in which the Riddle will appear tomorrow morning. If anyone has any last minute thoughts on any aspect of the Riddle, please let us know and we will incorporate into the episode.

Quote from Pacatus

And this is where I think the Meno Paradox becomes a sophistic misapplication of deductive syllogistic

We've used the term sophism many times in this thread , but as part of writing for the future it's likely that there is no common understanding among normal people what that term really means either, other than the vague connotation that the person labeled a Sophist is somehow a bad person. It's a continual struggle to make all this clear and that's why we ultimately take it back to the senses and a general description of thinking processes with as little jargon as possible.

And Don I think you're remembering Rumsfeld rather than Weinberger

Part of the issue seems to be that while you are discussing in the last post "investigating" or "making progress" toward greater understanding, the problem is that you don't really know when you have arrived. The problem reeks more of "black" and "white" resolution. Talking about shades of grey can be fun, but how do we find the full and complete definition of black or white by trial and error. If you don't watch out for the implications you end up like Cicero or other academic skeptics saying that the "probable" is the best you can do, and from there you are in a slippery slope toward total skepticism.

And to repeat the point made in the videos, this is not a question that derives from issues of "virtue" alone. That is merely an interesting example. The problem is that of coming to grips with whether it is ever possible to "know" anything - and that is exactly what Lucretius is addressing in Book 4. But there are all sorts of other references to the same problem scattered throughout.

Quote from Don

So, if you're saying that the "high-level summary of the details" is that "sensation and consciousness is the result of knowable physical processes" then, okay, that's not wrong.

Yes, that is what I am saying, just like I would still argue that it is useful to talk about "atoms" even though we use that term today to mean something other than what Epicurus would have meant.

Quote from Don

So, it seems to me he felt the broad outline was important to keep in mind at all times, but investigating how the world worked with "continuous energy" gives one the confidence to have "calm enjoyment of life."

Yes, I agree here too, but I would say that just like Polyaneus apparently pulled back from total focus on geometry / mathematics, it's only a certain type of person, and a relatively small number, who are going to want to focus on bleeding edge research as their primary focus. It looks to me like even Epicurus himself spent most of his time on higher-level / logical questions on how to fit the big picture together, and communicate the results to normal people so they could all live better lives in the time that they had. And I do think there's a theoretical problem that can occur from bleeding edge research. In a universe that is either actually infinite or essentially infinite, it needs to be understood and accepted at the start that it is absolutely impossible to know *everything* about *everything*. We therefore need a realistic attitudinal framework to incorporate that fact - that while we know we are not an never will be omniscient, we understand that some level of higher-level accuracy is "good enough," and that it is absolutely unnecessary and counterproductive to constantly doubt the big picture that has come into focus already.

Quote from Don

But like Alexander the Oraclemonger's snake god, I'm sure, in the end, there's a rational physical explanation for them...

That passage is one of the best examples from the ancient texts that we can cite. The mechanism of the snake may elude us now, or for a very long time, or even to our last moment of our life, but all the way through to that last breath we ought to be confident that there is a non-supernatural explanation for what we are seeing.

That's where we are going here - we're articulating a persuasive framework for understanding the nature of the universe that gives us that confidence. To get back a question raised in another recent thread, we're not pursuing pleasure because we have arbitrarily and unthinkingly decided that "pleasure" sounds good. We're pursuing "pleasure" because we have thoroughly considered the alternatives and decided that even though we need to be clear about what pleasure means and how to pursue it, the term "pleasure" - properly understood in a much wider sense than simply the sensual pleasures of the moment - is the best description that reflects the reality of nature.

Quote from Don

BUT we also need to understand why it was wrong, how it was wrong,

Along the lines of the Asimov quote that Pacatus listed, I would not admit that Epicurus was "wrong" at all. Incomplete as to details, yes, but that does not make the overall theory "wrong." We don't need the details nearly as often as we need the overall outline. When necessary we will correct the outline, but, again per the Asimov quote, it is not the latest formulation of the details that is all that matters. The higher level outline, so long as it can be interpreted as a high-level summary of the details, is the place we normally live our lives.

In philosophy it's going to be the conceptual framework, the broader outline, that matters, not the details of implementation. I would leave the details to those who want to follow the day to day revisions of the science, and I would teach people the overall correctness of the logical basis and the factual outlines (the nature worlds through particles and material means) of Epicurus's approach. The final details of implementation will always be revised, and in the meantime we have to have a firm conceptual framework to live our lives. The conceptual framework of particles striking our senses, and then the body processing them in natural logical ways toward conclusions we can be confident about, is the key.

But again, my reasoning her is based on the premise that we are looking to build Epicureans who can live happily, not the latest particle physicists or neurosurgeons. If and when they think they have found something supernatural, then we would need to take special notice of that (and refute them), but as to the day to day advancement of their individual techniques those aren't really relevant to most human beings. I don't mean to be overly presumptuous in saying this and of course some people will want to devote themselves to being physicists and neurosurgeons, but they will confront the problem Polyaenus ran into -- and they will want to reflect on whether they are pursuing science for the sake of science alone, and in doing so, failing to live the best life that would be possible to them if they would listen to philosophy.

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I had fallen victim to the fallacy of the 'growing edge;' the belief that only the very frontier of scientific advance counted;

The main problem posed by the Meno question is a logical one, and so I would say that it has to be met on logical grounds.

Another aspect of this issue of focusing on what is most important is as explained in Asimov's article "The Relativity of Wrong". The full article explains the point in detail and gives example after example to show how Asimov is correct, but this excerpt is probably the most concise statement of the Asimov's ultimate position:

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The young specialist in English Lit, having quoted me, went on to lecture me severely on the fact that in every century people have thought they understood the Universe at last, and in every century they were proven to be wrong. It follows that the one thing we can say about out modern "knowledge" is that it is wrong.

The young man then quoted with approval what Socrates had said on learning that the Delphic oracle had proclaimed him the wisest man in Greece. "If I am the wisest man," said Socrates, "it is because I alone know that I know nothing." The implication was that I was very foolish because I knew a great deal.

Alas, none of this was new to me. (There is very little that is new to me; I wish my corresponders would realize this.) This particular thesis was addressed to me a quarter of a century ago by John Campbell, who specialized in irritating me. He also told me that all theories are proven wrong in time.

My answer to him was, "John, when people thought the Earth was flat, they were wrong. When people thought the Earth was spherical, they were wrong. But if you think that thinking the Earth is spherical is just as wrong as thinking the Earth is flat, then your view is wronger than both of them put together."

Our problem is that the view of the "young specialist in English" is the predominant position among "educated" people today. They are not certain of anything other than that it is impossible to be certain of anything - that they are certain of. And as Azimov is echoing Epicurus in saying, that is the most nonsensical position of all. Yes we should adopt the latest terminology whenever the audience is looking to hear views on the latest terminology, but what the vastly larger audience needs to hear is Epicurus' explanation of how knowledge is possible. For that an approximation of the physical details is what is called for, not an explanation of how the science is constantly changing which plays into the "young specialist in English's" position.

We routinely say that the earth is a "sphere" even though technically it's not. Whether we can call photons or sounds "particles" or "images" or "waves" is something that we can explain when the context calls for it, and when we want to talk about the latest details. But the big picture is that vision and the other senses, and the processing of the mind itself, work though "material means" rather than through supernatural or incomprehensible means. That point needs to be hit on in new ways that don't require us to go to Scientific American for the best ways to discuss them, and as far as I can see we can profitably talk about both "atoms" and "images" today even though those words have been replaced in strictly scientific jargon.

The real tragedy would be if someone who is otherwise motivated to produce responsive youtube videos or general interest articles explaining the benefits of the Epicurean perspective decided not to do so because they were concerned that "atoms" and "images" are the equivalent of saying that the world is flat. No one in this thread would urge that, but we're writing these threads not only for ourselves but for readers we don't even know, and that's why I belabor this point. By all means explain the differences between atoms and images and modern terminology, but don't let that interfere with the basic point that of all the philosophers in western civilization it was Epicurus who first pointed the way to a rational system of knowledge-buiiding.

I don't think we have any major disagreement Don but as to this:

Quote from Don

saying that we do not sense things through the impact of eidola on our sense organs. Our bodies - all bodies - are not casting off "films of atoms" that travel through space. Yes, our eyes interact with photons. Our noses interact with molecules in the air. Our tongues interact with chemicals. And so on. Is it interesting to understand how Epicurus was reacting to his contemporaries' philosophical ideas? Sure. No argument there. However, Epicurus called his students to study nature and "how things work" in the materials world. On that track, I think it behooves Epicureans living in the 21st century to understand how sensations and the brain work to their best of our ability in the here and now as well.

As I see it, the important issue is whether the mind and the sense work through material / bodily means or through some other means. We aren't a biochemistry group, and it would be as unproductive for us to get into the details of biochemistry as it would be to get into the latest discussions of particle physics. Epicurus' general approach remains perfectly valid: the things we are talking about are happening as as result of the movement of physical "real" things of some kind, and are neither the result of supernatural forces nor are they essentially unsolvable (such as moving too fast for any apprehension, as referenced by Diogenes of Oinoanda). The task of philosophy is to get a reasonable understanding of the big picture, and the final details are best left either to others who want to spend the time exploring that, or simply to the theory of multiple explanations, in which so long as we have one or more reasonable non-supernatural theories, then we can dismiss the worst of the problems (gods, fate, zero regularity) and get on with living our lives as best we can.

To get too far into the details of whether a photon constitutes a particle or not isn't going to contribute much to that, although I am all in favor of reading about it in the appropriate place. I've always enjoyed reading science magazine and hearing the theories.

The real problem is that the majority of people who get exposed to philosophy are polluted with these false major theories, and they need to be provided responsive and persuasive theories that point the way to what is true. Whether the data that we receive through perceiving particles is encoded in "shape" (by means of film like the skin of a snake) or otherwise, the real issue is whether the data comes to us through the particles and our senses receive it and our minds interpret it, or not.

Yes you're probably right to say that the Meno paradox is sophistry. But simply saying that it is sophistry doesn't persuade the legions of normal people outside this group who need to be provided both an explanation as to why it is sophistry and an alternative that makes sense from an Epicurean point of view. There are reams of videos out there today further causing confusion on these issues, and it will be necessary for people who want more "Epicurean Friends" in their real world lives to go out an explain that the Meno problem does have one or more reasonable solutions.

Also, I think we can consider that concepts like "good," or "the good" or "the highest good" or "pleasure" (when viewed as a concept) or " the highest pleasure," or "gods" are, like virtue, good examples of the issue.

Determining what these things at the start of our quest is not an easy thing. People disagree on what those words mean, and it is exactly the definition of them that we don't have as a test. How will we know we are correct when we assert that "x" or "definition X" of the highest good is correct? Same with "absence of pain." If we knew we wouldn't have to ask, and if we don't know then how do we know when we have arrived at the correct definition?

One way to do it is to use our experience of "images" we have received in the past as the basis for extending out a definition. We can suggest formulations such as "a god is a living being blessed and imperishable" or "pleasure is the absence of pain," because these are reaonable extensions of more limited past experiences. Once extended as a formulation, we can then test those extensions logically against more actual experiences to confirm or contradict that formulation as a workable definition. But where did the proposed definition come from in the first place? From "extending out" descriptions of actual experiences received as images, either in our own past after birth or encoded in rudimentary fashion genetically before birth from past generations.

Experiencing men six feet tall and living 60 years allows us to conceive of the possibility of men 60 feet tall and living 600 years, even if we have never seen such ourselves. We have seen some men spend more of their time living pleasurably than others, so we can conceive of living beings who spend *all* their time living pleasurably.

But we cannot even conceive of anything coming from nothing because we have logically concluded based on much experience that this is not possible at all. And we cannot logically conceive of a totally happy being finding itself in a situation where its total happiness is interrupted by getting mad at enemies or feeling any lack to be filled by "rewarding" friends.

It's not necessarily supernatural to live 100 years or 600 years, but it would be supernatural to create anything from nothing, or to create the universe as a whole from scratch, or for the universe to have an end in space, or for a spirit to exist apart from a living body.

I presume Epicurus would point to prolepsis and your explanation of a sequence in which it would work as a much better approach than "recollection of knowledge from before birth" or "it's impossible to know anything so let's admit we know nothing," or "let's talk about it using the dialectical method."

Appealing to Prolepsis along the lines you describe (plus making clear that "images" are not limited to "visible images") gives us an approach that allows us to be confident of basic conclusions where evidence is strong. It also gives us a workable test to determine when evidence is insufficient, requiring us to "wait" before being confident a single opinion is true.

As Lucretius wrote, even the gods could not conceive of creating a universe if they had never previously received an image of a universe, therefore the gods could not predate and be the creator of the universe. But even we as humans can conceive of terraforming Mars, because that idea is a reasonable extension of images we have in fact received in human experience reshaping things here on Earth.

I think that's right, but all of that fits in the context of answering how it is we can know something without a pre-existing example or definition. .

I see that as a very good summary of the mechanics, with the significance that it all adds up to the replacement for "recollection" theory and the skepticism into which the Aristotelians and Academics fell - and still fall.

As far as making it understandable to larger numbers, the framework is that this Platonic attitude of seeing this as an unsolvable problem is why the world is so overwhelmingly skeptic. Epicurus was working on a rational clear explanation of how confidence in knowledge is possible.

It remains today to explain this in persuasive terms so that the campaign against skepticism and the implications that go with it (radical empiricism / nihilism) can resume.

Apparently there aren't many or any academic writers who accept this as a valid response to Plato. So even though changing their minds isn't our concern, the general attitude that this isn't an important part of Epicurean philosophy is a problem to be addressed. People don't care much about Plato anymore, but radical skepticism is a huge problem. Many people have been persuaded by radical skepticism they we never be sure of anything.

Part of the Cyclops references, this in a quote from Sextus Empiricus

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(Sextus Emp. AM IX 45-46)
The origin of the thought that god exists came from appearances in dreams, or from the phenomena of the world, but the thought that god is everlasting and imperishable and perfect in happiness arose through a process of transition from humans. For just as we acquired the thought of a Cyclops, who was not “like a corn-eating man, but rather a peak well-wooded High on the mountain-tops, when it loometh apart from its fellows” 50 by enlarging the common human being in imagination, so too having started to think of a happy human being, blessed with all the goods, then having intensified these, they thought of god as their highest point. (46) And again, having formed the impression of a long-lived human, the ancients increased their time-span to infinity by combining the past and future with the present; and then, having thus arrived at the notion of eternity, they said that god was eternal too.

If I recall correctly near the end of the article Gourinat extends this in regard to the gods in a way favorable to the Stoic "argument from design," which I think Epicurus would have rejected and would not be the best reading

In this context, it's hard to ignore that this quote from Aetius doesn't point in the same direction as other references which indicates that "images" are the driving force behind Epicurus' view of the ultimate source of prolepsis:

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Aetius Placata 4.8 On Sensation and Sense-Objects

§10 Leucippus Democritus Epicurus (say) that sensation and thought arise from images that approach from outside, for neither of these can occur to anyone without the image falling upon him.

And it therefore seems to me that an argument could be made that Epicurus is saying, not just in regard to gods but in regard to anything else, that it is the impact of images on the mind that give rise to the origin of prolepsis and therefore much of thinking. Were it not for the need to go beyond the visible images that are received by the eyes, and to incorporate Epicurus' view of non-visible images received directly by the mind, it might not even be very controversial to accept that this is still a correct view by the majority of empiricists today. This would be combined with the Cyclops example discussed in the Gourinat article (I will need to find a part of that to quote) as an example of how humans see things and extend their qualities (such as size in the case of Cyclops).