Posts by Cassius

Ha - the correction backtracks from what Godfrey praised but his point still stands that it's a good way of talking about gods

That's very helpful additional research Patrikios - thank you!

I have prepared an outline for our use in keeping track of where we are and where we are going as we go through Academic Questions. I am crossposting the current version into the Academic Questions thread here, but that version will fall out of date fairly soon.

I'll continue to make revisions as we go through the episodes and update the final version here at EpicurusToday.

The following is an outline I have prepared for our use in the upcoming series of Lucretius Today podcasts devoted to exploring Epicurean Canonics through Cicero's Academic Questions. The following version of this outline is going to be updated so over time please refer to it in its final location here.

Lucretius Today Series - "Exploring Epicurean Canonics Through Cicero's Academic Questions"

The Title Of This Series of Episodes Could Also Be: “The Question of Skepticism vs Truth, How It Destroyed Plato’s Academy And Plagues Humanity Even Today, And How Epicurus Answers The Problem.”

“Academic Questions” is a turn-off name for a book, but the issues discussed in it are critically important to everything else. it’s not particularly long but it provides an overview of the issues that led to Aristotle breaking away from Plato’s school and for many further divisions thereafter.

Throughout this discussion we are going to us the word “dogmatic” as meaning “holding that truth is possible.” This is not to be taken negatively as the word is used today. “Snow is white” and “Honey is sweet” are examples of a dogmatic statements. If you want to argue about those you’re in the wrong place and you will not be invited to participate in the following discussion unless and until you adopt a more reasonable non-contradictory position.

• PD22. We must consider both the real purpose, and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion.
• PD23. If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.
• Lucretius 4:469-521. Now, if someone thinks that nothing is known, one thing he doesn’t know is whether that can be known, since he admits to knowing nothing. I shall therefore not bother to argue my case against this man who has himself stood with his own head in his footprints. And anyway, even allowing that he knows this, I’ll still ask him: Given that he has never before seen anything true in the world, from where does he get his knowledge of what knowing and not knowing are? What created his preconception of true and false? And what proved to him that doubtful differs from certain? You will find that the preconception of true has its origin in the senses, and that the senses cannot be refuted. For something of greater reliability must be found, something possessing the intrinsic power to convict falsehoods with truths.

Key Points To Be Covered In The Lucretius Today Podcast Review

1. Cicero’s purpose in writing “Academic Questions” was to explain the main controversy that led to the disputes between the schools and to point Cicero’s view of the way to resolve them.
2. The book that comes down to us today apparently went through a number of revisions so it is not in its original complete form. What survives today is incomplete: Book 1 of the later version and substantial portions of the earlier version. As a result, the work does not come down to us in a single, original, complete form, and some structural and doctrinal inconsistencies reflect this compositional history.
3. The sides of the argument are:
   1. Varro speaking for Antiochus of Aschalon. Antiochus presents a reconstructed “Old Academic” position that blends Plato and Aristotle and incorporates some aspects of Stoic epistemology. This view affirms that certain truths can be grasped with certainty via sense-perception with great emphasis on reason and methods such as formal logic and geometry / mathematics.
   2. Cicero speaking for Philo of Larissa, representing the New Academy. Philo embraced much more skeptical view of truth. This view denies that certainty is attainable, even by the use of the Stoic criterion of the kataleptic impression, and maintains instead that judgments must be guided by what is probabile or verisimile (persuasive or likely). Even formal reasoning cannot guarantee certainty on this account.
   3. Atticus does not advocate a systematic philosophical position but helps structure the dialogue and prompt for clarifications.

Outline Of The Argument

BOOK I

I. Cicero Introduces The Topic And Gives The Method To Be Followed

Acad. I.1–12

• Cicero explains why the question of how to obtain knowledge (epistemology) is the foundational philosophical problem.
• Cicero justifies the Academic method by presenting opposing views without dogmatic commitment.
• Cicero emphasizes inquiry (quaerere) rather than assent (adsensus).

II. Cicero Relates the History Of The Academy

Acad. I.13–18

• Cicero says Plato aimed at truth through reasoned inquiry.
• Cicero says that the early Academy was engaged in serious investigation and not argument for the sake of argument.
• Cicero explains how this background led to later disagreements over certainty.

III. Varro Explains Antiochus’ Account of the “Old Academy”

Acad. I.19–29

• Varro introduces Antiochus’ reconstruction of Academic doctrine.
• Varro claims that Plato and Aristotle shared a fundamentally dogmatic epistemology.
• Varo says that knowledge is possible and this position was historically affirmed by the Academy.

IV. Varro Provides A Defense of The Possibility Of Cognitive Certainty

Acad. I.30–41

• Varoi argues that the senses, when sound and processed rationally, are capable of grasping truth.
• Varro argues that Reason confirms, organizes, and corrects the senses.
• Varro says that the wise man can assent securely to what is known.

V. Varro Criticizes Academic Skepticism

Acad. I.42–46

• Varro argues that Skepticism makes philosophy and life impossible.
• Varro argues that if nothing can be known, inquiry loses purpose.
• Varro says that Antiochus restored stability to philosophy.

VI. Cicero States His Initial Skeptical Reservations To The Possibility of Affirming Anything As True

Acad. I.47–49

• Cicero expresses admiration for the coherence of Antiochus’ system.
• But Cicero then raises doubts about whether certainty has actually been demonstrated.
• Cicero begins his argument for skepticism.

BOOK II

VII. Cicero Presents And Argue The Skeptical Position That True Knowledge Is Impossible

Acad. II.1–12

• Cicero restates the problem of knowledge in sharper form.
• Cicero focuses on the Stoic criterion of truth as the real target of his opposition.
• Cicero argues that Skepticism is not nihilism.

VIII. Cicero Attacks the Stoic Claim Of The Truth of “Kataleptic Impression”

Acad. II.13–32

• Cicero argues that no perception is so clear that it could not be false.
• Cicero argues that illusions, dreams, madness, and error undermine certainty.
• Cicero argues that the Stoic criterion of truth collapses under scrutiny.

IX. Cicero Asserts That Reason Itself Is Fallible

Acad. II.33–42

• Cicero says that logical inference and reasoning depend on premises drawn from perception.
• Cicero argues that memory and inference are equally fallible.
• Cicero argues that even disciplines like geometry rely on assumptions not immune to doubt.

X. Cicero Presents the Argument In Favor Of “Probability” Based on Carneadeas and Philo

Acad. II.43–60

• Cicero asserts that probability (probabile / verisimile) is the practical way to approach every issue.
• Cicero argues that degrees of plausibility allow rational discrimination without certainty.
• Cicero argues that the wise man gives his assent only cautiously, proportioned to evidence.

XI. Cicero Replies To The Argument That Skepticism Leads To “Inaction” (He Denies That It Is Impossible To Actually Live As A Skeptic)

Acad. II.61–67

• Cicero says that Skepticism does not prevent action.
• Cicero argues that ordinary life already proceeds on appearances, not certainty.
• Cicero asserts that rational agency requires judgment, not infallibility.

XII. Cicero Takes Sides With Carneades and Philo (The Academic Skeptics) And Criticizes Antiochus

Acad. II.68–78

• Cicero says that Antiochus offers reassurance but overreaches on the question of whether knowledge is possible.
• Cicero argues that skepticism preserves intellectual integrity while allowing action.
• Cicero argues that dogmatism mistakes psychological confidence for knowledge.

XIII. Cicero Gives His Closing Argument For Academic Skepticism

Acad. II.79–88 (end)

• Cicero aligns himself with the skeptical Academy in method and rejects the claim that knowledge is possible.
• Cicero says that philosophy is best practiced as disciplined inquiry without premature assent.
• Cicero claims that the highest philosophical virtue is restraint in judgment.

Good comments and they iliustrate why phrased it the way I did 🙂

Please vote and then explain.

Key Excerpts From "The inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics"

• This article makes important points about how Epicurus’ position that there are only two feelings (Pleasure and Pain) parallels his argument that there are only two ultimate constituents of the Universe (Atoms and Void)
• The article is divided in the following sections:
  • Outline of Epicurean Ethics
  • The Physics-Ethics Analogy
  • The Basic Division
  • The Division Defended
  • The Division’s Exhaustiveness
  • The Epicurean Good Life
  • The Instrumentality of Virtue - Epilogue
• After largely skipping over the first section we’ll take a closer look at the details of each section of the argument.
• All of these points are of course only my opinion. I highly recommend reading the whole article so you can judge for yourself

1. Outline of Epicurean Ethics

I find this section to be a disappointing start. Much of it is a good standard standard summary of Epicurean ethics. Unfortunately it is written from the point of view of those who assert the importance of the katastematic / kinetic distinction and that Epicurus’s ultimate goal was not “Pleasure” but “Katastematic Pleasure.” I believe this error manifests itself here, where Sedley states that “Katastematic pleasure is abence of pain” rather than “Pleasure is the absence of pain.”

This position causes Seldey to deprecate kinetic pleasures as if the only reason we require them is to produce katastematic pleasure. The obvious problems with this position cause Sedley to have to acknowledge that Epicurus does “apparently” consider kinetic pleasures a part of the good life.

It’s not the purposes of this presentation to argue this issue in detail, but it is important to note that Sedley’s position conflicts with Gosling & Taylor, who take the position in their detailed treatise “The Greeks On Pleasure” that Epicurus was focused on “Pleasure” as the goal. They argue that any attention to distinguishing kinetic and katastematic pleasure was at best secondary, and that katastematic pleasures are not inherently more important than kinetic ones. The Gosling & Taylor position was expanded at length by Boris Nikolsky in his article “Epicurus On Pleasure.” Emily Austin took sides with Gosling & Taylor in her footnote eight in Chapter 4 of “Living for Pleasure”:

Quote

[!quote] This is a non-specialist text, so I have chosen not to wade into the dispute about katastematic and kinetic pleasures in the body of the text. A specialist will recognize that I am adopting a view roughly in line with Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Arenson (2019). On my reading, katastematic pleasures are sensory pleasures that issue from confidence in one’s ability to satisfy one’s necessary desires and an awareness of one’s healthy psychological functioning; choice-worthy kinetic pleasures are the various pleasures consistent with maintaining healthy functioning, and those pleasures vary, but do not increase healthy psychological functioning. (emphasis added)

From here we can move on to the reason that his article is so helpful.

2. The Physics - Ethics Analogy

A. The Foundations of Epicurean Physics and Epicurean Ethics Are Analogous

B. In Physics, The Senses Tell Us There Are Bodies And Space

In physics Epicurus starts off with positions which he can argue to be self evident: that there are bodies and there is space within which the bodies move.

Epicurus does not attempt to discuss the underlying specific natures of atoms and void until he first establishes that these are the two categories that exclusively exist - that these are the sole constituents of the universe.

C. Where Does This Same Procedure Exist? Not In Menoeceus, But in Torquatus’ Presentation in Cicero’s On Ends Book One.

The letter to Menoeceus is a straightforward listing of doctrine, not argument.

We see that the ethics argument follows the pattern of the physics argument because Torquatus explicitly tells us that Epicurus’ argument starts with the establishment of the two possibilities - pleasure and pain.

3. The Basic Division

The Good Is Pleasure and The Evil Is Pain

Epicurus places the summum bonum in pleasure and the summum mallum in pain.

This is not a logical argument based on words but an appeal to the perceptions of the senses.

In His Argument To Establish “Pleasure” As The Goal, Epicurus Specifies Nothing At All About How Individual Creatures Conduct Their Pursuit of Pleasure

4. The Division Defended

Explaining Why Torquatus Says That Later Epicureans Differed As To How To interpret Epicurus’ Arguments In Light Of His Position That No Argument Is Needed To Establish Pleasure As the Good.

5. The Division’s Exhaustiveness

Any Feeling Which Is Not Painful Is Ipso Facto Pleasant And Vice Versa

6. The Epicurean Good Life

Three Parallel Stages Of Argument

Summum Bonum Means Simply “The Good”

7. The Instrumentality Of Virtue

8. Epilogue

Epicurus’ first focus is on establishing that in physics everything divides into bodies and void, while in ethics the duality is pleasure and pain.

In Physics It is both correct to say that (1) at the highest level of analysis everything is composed of matter and void and (2) the things we see around us differ vastly in all sorts of details in the way they affect us.

Seeing that everything from a physical perspective resolves into either matter or void is essential to understanding that there is no third supernatural nature. But as essential as that is as a starting point, you then have to figure out how the atoms and void combine in different ways to form different things if you’re going to work with physics successfully to see that everything happens naturally.

Seeing that everything from an ethical perspective resolves into either pleasure or pain is essential to understanding that there is no third middle or neutral state and no good and evil outside of pleasure and pain. But as essential as that is as a starting point, you then have to figure out how the pleasures and pains work together in different ways to produce different results if you’re going to work with ethics successfully to live happily.

Welcome to Episode 319 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
   
Last week we completed our series on Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations," and this week we start a new series that will help us with canonics / epistemology. We will eventually move to Philodemus' "On Signs" / "On Methods of Inference," and when we do we will refer to David Sedley's article on "On Signs," and the appendix in the translation prepared by Philip Lacey, both of which are very good but difficult.

To get us acclimated to the issues, we need a little more Cicero from his work "Academic Questions." This is much shorter than On Ends and Tusculan Disputations but gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and shows how Aristotle and the Stoics (and Epicurus) responded to those controversies.

Once we get that overview we'll be prepared to tackle Philodemus and get a deeper explanation of the Epicurean view. This wee will will start with a general introduction and get into Section 1.

Out text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Today we completed recording our final episode of the Tusculan Disputations series. It will be posted later this week.

Beginning next week we will be starting a new series. We have lots of material we'd like to cover, but at present I think we need to turn our attention to Canonics and eventually to Philodemus' "On Signs" / "On Methods of Inference." When we do that, we will refer to David Sedley's article on "On Signs," and the appendix in the translation prepared by Philip Lacey, both of which are very good.

However that's going to be very difficult material, and we have the serious problem that the remaining text from Philodemus start in the middle. We therefore don't have Philodemus' own explanation of the issues, and given that the topic is so unfamiliar to most of us it is hard to tell what positions belong to what parties in the remaining text.

For that reason I think we need a little more Cicero. Cicero proved very helpful in understanding Epicurean views of divinity in "On the Nature of the Gods" and Epicurean views of ethics in "On Ends" and "Tusculan Disputations.

Likewise, Cicero provides an overview of issues involving Canonics/Skepticism in his work "Academic Questions," which also incorporates discussion of Epicurus. AQ is not nearly as long as On Ends or Tusculan Disputations, but it will give us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and how Aristotle and the Stoics (and Epicurus) responded to those controversies.

Once we get that overview we'll be prepared to tackle Philodemus and get a deeper explanation of the Epicurean view.

I'll set out some notes over the coming week and we'll get set up for this next text. The title is off-putting but it is really very interesting, and the depth of the subject is well suited to the detailed review that we can provide over the podcast - so long as Joshua can find relevant color commentary!

Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge

We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Cicero - On The Nature of The Gods - Academica

archive.org

For anyone interested i am uploading the slides I made for today's Zoom meeting at the address below. I think these excerpts provide some of the key points of the article:

Quote from Bryan

Both are correct, and it may be more helpful to highlight the similarities in the interpretations.

As I read the article that is probably the main takeaway.

Sedley is saying that Epicurus' first focus is on establishing that in physics everything divides into bodies and void, while in ethics the duality is pleasure and pain.

In Physics It is both correct to say that (1) at the highest level of analysis everything is composed of matter and void and (2) the things we see around us differ vastly in all sorts of details in the way they affect us.

Seeing that everything from a physical perspective resolves into either matter or void is essential to understanding that there is no third supernatural nature. But as essential as that is as a starting point, you then have to figure out how the atoms and void combine in different ways to form different things if you're going to work with physics successfully to see that everything happens naturally.

Seeing that everything from an ethical perspective resolves into either pleasure or pain is essential to understanding that there is no third middle or neutral state and no good and evil outside of pleasure and pain. But as essential as that is as a starting point, you then have to figure out how the pleasures and pains work together in different ways to produce different results if you're going to work with ethics successfully to live happily.

Welcome to Episode 318 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
   
We are closing in on the end of those portions of Tusculan Disputations that are most relevant to Epicurean philosophy today, so we'll pick up this week with Section 34 of Part 5.

Cicero spends the next several sections trying to chip away at pleasure being the goal of life by discussing how luxury, honor, and riches are not required for happiness. He does so generically without direct mention of Epicurus, but we'll discuss his examples and how his argument actually proves Epicurus' point that pleasure is the goal: those who overindulge obtain do not in sum obtain pleasure, but in fact more pain than pleasure.

Happy Birthday EricR Hope you are staying warm in Canada!

Happy Birthday to EricR! Learn more about EricR and say happy birthday on EricR's timeline: EricR

I am unable to find an academic article on point, but I am sure that my searching is incomplete. Desire and Pleasure are such common topics that references to the point could be made any number of places, but we're looking for something very specific to the effect that Epicurus was looking at the topic differently from Plato and/or others. I'll keep looking!

Quote from Godfrey

Notice that Plato is discussing necessary/unnecessary pleasures, whereas Epicurus distinguishes necessary/unnecessary desires. As we've discussed elsewhere, this is an important distinction, specially since all pleasures are defined as good by Epicurus.

Yes that's why I highlighted that point in my post above. I do think the distinction makes sense, but when I see these respected translators seemingly using the words interchangeably, here and in Tusculan Disputations, I really don't know what to think. Certainly in English "desire" is a different word from "pleasure," but I hope as we continue to examine this those who are fluent in Greek and Latin will be alert to this question and point out how much reliance we should place on this distinction. I'd be a lot more confident in arguing this if we had an article by Sedley or Cyril Bailey or someone of that stature making the same point. With the new search tools available to us maybe we can find just that.

It's going to be very difficult to digest the context in which this appears, what use Plato was making of it, and how and why Epicurus objected. Nevertheless the subject is very clearly discussed by Plato in Book 8 of the Republic in reference to the best form of government. It's worthy of note that at least in this translation it is natural and necessary pleasures being discussed:

Quote

Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?

I should.

Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary, and cannot help it.

True.

We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?

We are not.

And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his youth upwards—of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good—shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary?

Yes, certainly.

Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?

Very good.

Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?

That is what I should suppose.

The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?

Yes.

But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?

Certainly.

And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?

Very true.

May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?

Certainly.

And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

True.

And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?

Very true.

....

After this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over—supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors—in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises none of them but encourages them all equally.

Very true, he said.

Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honour some and chastise and master the others—whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.

Yes, he said; that is the way with him.

Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.

Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.

Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many;—he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.

Just so.

Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the democratic man.

Let that be his place, he said.

Display More

Oh Ok good catch! I meant my comment only to apply to the issue of dividing all feelings (all good and bad, since there is nothing intrinsically good but pleasure nor bad but pain) into either pleasure or pain.

I would not want anyone to read that more broadly so glad you caught it.

Here's a link to Plato's Republic Book 8, which presumably is the start of the discussion that continues into Book 9 discussing Plato's views of natural and necessary

Joshua it would probably help people reading along if you could elaborate on these two when you get time:

Quote from Joshua

Not only do I reject the Ethical side of this argument except insofar as it is restricted exclusively to pathos, I also notice that this is exactly the kind of absolutism that Cicero employs himself:

At least as I am understanding the discussion, all we are talking about here is that Epicurus held there to be only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and every feeling of every kind falls within one or the other categories. That might be read by some people to be a form of absolutism, but you specifically say that you are not talking about pathos so I don't think you mean to be read as saying that Epicurus was engaging in the kind of absolutism to which we all object.. agree that Cicero is being an absolutist in his (and the Stoics) rankings of good and bad by a criteria other than pleasure and pain.

So it would probably be good to clarify what you mean in referring to "the ethical side of this argument (?)

Quote from Joshua

So I say again, it is no good blaming Cicero for this!

Again someone may ask what "this" refers to in terms of blaming someone for something.

I don't think Sedley is "blaming" Cicero and in fact he's endorsing his terminology. And if a Latin / Greek scholar like Sedley can say that using "summum bonum" for "the good" is good Latin, then I would not hazard to disagree.

So if there's any "blame" to go around as to "summum bonum," that blame doesn't belong to Cicero or Sedley or Dewitt but to modern confusion. if there's blame to assign, it is to those people who read "highest good" as "highest pleasure" and think that this means there's a specific pleasure that's the highest. That's what I read a lot of people to be doing with "katastematic pleasure" or "tranquility" or even "ataraxia" or "aponia" and that's why object so strongly to reaching those conclusions, which are almost everywhere in modern writing about Epicurus.

I'm reading Sedley's point to be that in using summum bonum Cicero was just intending to translate Epicurus saying essentially "the good is pleasure" in the sense of "the good is pleasure as a class of feelings."

The problem comes when people start reading "summum bonum / highest pleasure" to mean a particular type of pleasure when Epicurus has not said that. He's talking about pleasure as a class, not a specific mental or physical pleasure.

Now if there are sections in Cicero where he talks about "summum voluptatem" then that would require further discussion. I wouldn't be surprised if Cicero said exactly that when he debates Torquatus in Book Two of On Ends. But even there I would explain that terminology as referring to "the highest degree of pleasure as a class" or "the highest quantity of pleasure as a class" (as in PD03) rather than meaning that Epicurus was singling out a particular pleasure as the single best pleasure.