It's probably also a good way of looking at it to compare this to court.
If we're going to reach a conclusion about something, we have to tell the jury the standard of proof.
Telling them to just decide what's "probably" happened or happened "with a high degree of confidence" isn't what we do, especially in important criminal cases.
Yet, what is the problem with the phrase "a high degree of confidence"?
Within philosophy, that's exactly the position Cicero and other skeptics take -- that "probability" is all anyone can ask for, and to ask for anything more than "probability" is improper.
The problem is that most reasonable people are not going to find "it is probable that you aren't going to burn for hell forever" to be a sufficiently satisfying answer.
Same with "I have a high degree of confidence you are not going to burn forever in hell or miss out on eternal heaven."
in philosophy and especially for Epicurus we are focused on normal people who need normal degrees of help, and when life or death decisions have to be made, "probability" as ultimate motivation doesn't cut it rhetorically.
Sure there are some people who find debating probabilities in a technical academic sense to be satisfying. I'd say the texts are very clear that Epicurus was not among them.
Dave I would say that you are discussing the topic of the "conflict" between "science" and "philosophy."
Each of us has to decide what we think for ourselves, but from a philosophic perspective philosophy does not yield to anyone or anything to dictate to it how to approach truth.
Religion asserts that a god can be omniscient and know everything. Epicurus rejects the possibility of such an entity so the issue of knowing everything about everything is not on the table.
What is on the table is how we as individuals are going to live and what we individually take to be proven or not proven / certain or not certain.
Indeed Epicurus believed in gods with no evidence of their existence. Correct?
I would say that Epicurus would emphatically deny this so I would say this is incorrect. Circumstantial evidence is evidence, and Epicurus held that the circumstances of an infinite and eternal universe, with life throughout it, and with life at varying stages of success (isonomia) all strongly support the conclusion that gods who are deathless and live in a "blessed" way.
And to follow up on this point, Epicurean theory about atoms was more a hypothesis, than a theory since he had no direct evidence of the truth of his statements, much of which parenthetically he learned from Democritus. True or false?
Whether one calls it hypothesis or theory or knowledge or whatever, Epicurus held that the circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that indivisible particles exist and are the explanation for the regularity we see. On certain points he followed Democritus but on major issues (swerve / determinism / skepticism) he departed from Democritus.
And that opinion only give a high degree of confidence rather than an absolute certainty.
Certainly it is the skeptical position to set up "absolute certainty" as a knowingly impossible target and thereby argue that nothing can be known for sure through the senses, and thereby assert that only through something equivalent to "ideal forms" can be held to be true. Religions assert that, and whenever someone (particular scientists" or anyone else) they are doing the same thing.
The bottom line is that Epicurus was an opponent of radical skepticism as self-contradictory and self-refuting no matter what label is placed on it. It is totally illogical to assert with certainty that nothing can be known with certainty. Therefore you need another standard of truth, and that's what Epicurus finds in the sensations, anticipations, and feelings.
Welcome to Episode 324 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will will continue in Section 6
Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:
And these are those three kinds which most people believe the Peripatetics speak of: and so far they are not wrong; for this division is the work of that school. But they are mistaken if they think that the Academicians — those at least who bore this name at that time — are different from the Peripatetics. The principle, and the chief good asserted by both appeared to be the same — namely, to attain those things which were in the first class by nature, and which were intrinsically desirable; the whole of them, if possible, or, at all events, the most important of them. But those are the most important which exist in the mind itself, and are conversant about virtue itself. Therefore, all that ancient philosophy perceived that a happy life was placed in virtue alone; and yet that it was not the happiest life possible, unless the good qualities of the body were added to it, and all the other things which have been already mentioned, which are serviceable towards acquiring a habit of virtue. From this definition of theirs, a certain principle of action in life, and of duty itself, was discovered, which consisted in the preservation of those things which nature might prescribe. Hence arose the avoidance of sloth, and contempt of pleasures; from which proceeded the willingness to encounter many and great labours and pains, for the sake of what was right and honourable, and of those things which are conformable to the objects of nature. Hence was generated friendship, and justice, and equity; and these things were preferred to pleasure and to many of the advantages of life. This was the system of morals recommended in their school, and the method and design of that division which I have placed first.
But concerning nature (for that came next), they spoke in such a manner that they divided it into two parts,— making one efficient, and the other lending itself, as it were, to the first, as subject matter to be worked upon. For that part which was efficient they thought there was power; and in that which was made something by it they thought there was some matter; and something of both in each. For they considered that matter itself could have no cohesion, unless it were held together by some power; and that power could have none without some matter to work upon; for that is nothing which is not necessarily somewhere. But that which exists from a combination of the two they called at once body, and a sort of quality, as it were. For you will give me leave, in speaking of subjects which have not previously been in fashion, to use at times words which have never been heard of (which, indeed, is no more than the Greeks themselves do, who have been long in the habit of discussing these subjects).
James Randi was a famous skeptic of paranormal claims. In posting this I don't know how close his views were to those of Epicurus, but it would probably advance our canonics discussion to discuss the similarities and differences in approach.
Some of Randi's work is consistent with aspects of Lucian's comments on Epicurus in "Alexander the Oracle-Monger." On the other hand it sounds like Randi was more of a pure skeptic than was Epicurus.
If we have any people who have read about Randi in the past it might be interesting to compare his life and his approach to paranormal claims to those of Epicurus. At the very least it would probably be interesting to evaluate his challenges to paranormal claims as a method of evaluating what kinds of standards of proof are and are not appropriate to demand.
I see that Randi's views on the existence of a supernatural god are more "agnostic" than that of Epicurus, so there's already a bright line of division there. However there are probably many other aspects of Randi's public life and interfacing with religious claims that would be worth discussing over time.
Views on religion
Randi's parents were members of the Anglican Church but rarely attended services.[137] He attended Sunday school at St. Cuthbert's Church in Toronto a few times as a child, but he independently decided to stop going after receiving no answer to his request for proof of the teachings of the Church.[22]: 24:40 [c][138]
In his essay "Why I Deny Religion, How Silly and Fantastic It Is, and Why I'm a Dedicated and Vociferous Bright", Randi, who identified himself as an atheist,[139] opined that many accounts in religious texts, including the virgin birth, the miracles of Jesus Christ, and the parting of the Red Sea by Moses, are not believable. Randi refers to the Virgin Mary as being "impregnated by a ghost of some sort, and as a result produced a son who could walk on water, raise the dead, turn water into wine, and multiply loaves of bread and fishes" and questions how Adam and Eve's family "managed to populate the Earth without committing incest". He wrote that, compared to the Bible, "The Wizard of Oz is more believable. And much more fun."[140]
Clarifying his view of atheism, Randi wrote "I've said it before: there are two sorts of atheists. One sort claims that there is no deity, the other claims that there is no evidence that proves the existence of a deity; I belong to the latter group, because if I were to claim that no god exists, I would have to produce evidence to establish that claim, and I cannot. Religious persons have by far the easier position; they say they believe in a deity because that's their preference, and they've read it in a book. That's their right."[139]
In An Encyclopedia of Claims, Frauds, and Hoaxes of the Occult and Supernatural (1995), he examines various spiritual practices skeptically. Of the meditation techniques of Guru Maharaj Ji, he writes "Only the very naive were convinced that they had been let in on some sort of celestial secret."[141] In 2003, he was one of the signers of the Humanist Manifesto.[142]
Regarding his 2006 coronary artery bypass surgery, Randi was asked if he was tempted by religious ideas about an afterlife or if he went through it any differently than if he had been religious. Randi replied "I allowed Daniel Dennett to speak for me" referring to Dennett's essay "Thank Goodness", which Dennett wrote after a serious surgery. Summing up the essay, Randi continued:[143]
(...) when he was recovering in the hospital he had people coming in and saying "Oh, thank God, you're doing this, that and the other", and he wrote this little essay, he said "No, never mind 'thank god' but I'll accept thank goodness. Thank the goodness of the anaesthesiologist. Thank the goodness of the nurses who empty my bedpan. Thank the goodness of the intern who sweeps the floor regularly so that I don't have to breathe too much dust. Thank the designers and makers of Dacron."
All of these things, he said, "Yes, thank their goodness but don't thank a mythical being."
And, essentially that's a contraction of it, rather severely, but that's the way I feel, yes.
In a discussion with Kendrick Frazier at CSICon 2016, Randi stated "I think that a belief in a deity is ... an unprovable claim ... and a rather ridiculous claim. It is an easy way out to explain things to which we have no answer."[22]: 7:05 He then summarized his current concern with religious belief as follows: "A belief in a god is one of the most damaging things that infests humanity at this particular moment in history. It may improve, and I see signs that it may be improving, and I'll leave it at that."[22]: 7:40
Also don't forget the inherent ridiculousness of trying to reason with someone who rejects evidence-based reasoning. They are speaking nonsense and once they start down that road Lucretius says the ultimate response is not to engage with them further:
Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet.
In both the question of knowledge and of determinism you can point out to the other person that their position is self-contradictory, but ultimately in most cases they won't care about self-contradiction since they don't care about evidence.
I modified the title of the thread just slightly to make clear that there are two kinds of evidence that must be consided in evaluating when we can be dogmatic and reach a conclusion and when we cannot.
Direct evidence is direct observation. We determine honey is sweet and snow is white by direct observation through the senses.
Indirect evidence is also called circumstantial evidence. We conclude that atoms (indivisible particles) exist even though we cannot see or touch them directly because the things we do observe directly (the circumstances or indirect observation) are seen to operate consistently with atoms being the cause of the regularity of what we do see. We therefore know atoms exist only circumstantially, but we are nevertheless sure that they do exist. We do not "wait" for more information or hold open the possibility that "maybe rather than atoms there are supernatural forces we have not yet discovered" because to do so would be sheer speculation. The decision to reject sheer speculation is at the heart of what it means to be Epicurean.
You can easily be a Muslim, Christian, or Jew and understand that eating too much ice cream will bring pain that outweighs the immediate pleasure. You cannot easily be a Muslim, Christian, or Jew and reject "faith" - which is regularly understood to be belief without "evidence."
And as Joshua brought up in our recent conversation about reasoning in Lucretius, this issue is why it is important to be able to do more than give a blank stare when the Stoics or Thomas Aquinas or others start insisting that there is a supernatural realm based on "arguments from design" or "ontological arguments" that amount to assertions based purely on speculation or word games. It is essential to have a clear understanding of when it is proper to consider something as "conclusive" and when it is not.
It is sound to conclude that atoms exist. It is not sound to conclude that supernatural forces exist.
In the podcast we will eventually address this issue of "when is it appropriate to say that we know something" by covering Philodemus' "On Signs / On Methods of Inference." We've also already covered these issues in past discussions of Lucretius Book 4 as to the possibility of knowledge and in discussions of Principal Doctrines 23 and 24.
The Lucretius material is most focused starting around Book 4 line 462 -
Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain?
but for many lines before and after that the topic is the same -- we understand that illusions can occur but nevertheless we learn to use the senses properly and we still reach firm conclusions after we process multiple observations.
The words 'conclusive" and "conclusion" are key. Socrates alleged that he did not conclude anything except that he could not conclude anything. This conclusion is self-contradictory BS and Epicurus concludes firmly that it must be rejected. In doing so, Epicurus is illustrating that conclusions are possible even though we are not omniscient.
I agree with Martin but would add as to this that we must be clear about what "conclusive" means:
We should not wait until the evidence for this is conclusive because it will never be conclusive.
In the law we convict people and put them to death on a regular basis by holding to be conclusive the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." And we do so even though we do not "see" them commit crimes directly. We accept that circumstantial evidence is amply sufficient to reach reasonable conclusions, just as we conclude that "atoms" (indivisible particles) exist without seeing or touching them directly.
It would not be reasonable or proper to require "omniscience" as some people seem to want to equate to "conclusive." "Conclusive" should be read to mean that we have sufficient evidence - clear direct and/or circumstantial evidence which is not contradicted by other clear direct or circumstantial evidence - to reach a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise we create ambiguity and doubt where none should exist.
In those cases where the direct and circumstantial evidence is insufficient to support support a clear conclusion, we "wait." In cases where clear evidence supports multiple possibilities, we do not arbitrarily choose among them but hold them all to be possible.
But we never 'wait" on the grounds that we are not omniscient or based purely on speculation that "anything is possible" or "some other undiscovered evidence *may* exist." We wait only when we have clear reason to do so, and pure speculation or insistence on "omniscience" is not a clear reason to suspend judgment.
In this episode we spend most of our time describing the three divisions of philosophy and the three divisions of "good" that were the dominant ways of looking at these topics prior to Epicurus. Next week we will take this analysis much further and emphasize more of the differences in Epicurus' approach.
Episode 323 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "The Pre-Epicurean View: Three Divisions of Philosophy And Three Divisions of Goods"
Of course even more on point as to the disaster of not trusting the senses is Lucretius 4-500
And if reason is unable to unravel the cause, why those things which close at hand were square, are seen round from a distance, still it is better through lack of reasoning to be at fault in accounting for the causes of either shape, rather than to let things clear seen slip abroad from your grasp, and to assail the grounds of belief, and to pluck up the whole foundations on which life and existence rest. For not only would all reasoning fall away; life itself too would collapse straightway, unless you choose to trust the senses, and avoid headlong spots and all other things of this kind which must be shunned, and to make for what is opposite to these. Know, then, that all this is but an empty store of words, which has been drawn up and arrayed against the senses.
** I'm thinking of this being the analogy (admittedly not right on point but good for pointing out how abandoning the study of nature / confidence in the senses will open the door for a flood of other problems:
For on whatever side you maintain that the bodies fail first, this side will be the gate of death for things, by this path will all the throng of matter cast itself abroad.
Moreover, since they do not pretend that all bodies press towards the centre, but only those of earth and liquid, the moisture of the sea and mighty waters from the mountains, and those things which are, as it were, enclosed in an earthy frame; but on the other hand, they teach that the thin breezes of air and hot fires at the same time are carried away from the centre, and that for this cause all the sky around is twinkling with stars, and the flame of the sun is fed through the blue tracts of heaven, because all the heat fleeing from the centre gathers itself together there; nor again can the topmost branches grow leafy upon trees, unless from the earth little by little each has food [supplied by nature, their thoughts are not at harmony with themselves. There must then be an infinite store of matter], lest after the winged way of flames the walls of the world suddenly fly apart, dissolved through the great void, and lest all else follow them in like manner, or the thundering quarters of the sky fall down from above, and the earth in hot haste withdraw itself from beneath our feet, and amid all the mingled ruin of things on earth and of the sky, whereby the frames of bodies are loosed, it pass away through the deep void, so that in an instant of time not a wrack be left behind, except emptied space and unseen first-beginnings. For on whatever side you maintain that the bodies fail first, this side will be the gate of death for things, by this path will all the throng of matter cast itself abroad.
Since Epicurus saw himself as a healer, the Socratic/Platonic turning away from a deeper understanding of nature’s healing processes, would have horrified Epicurus.
I agree and I think "horrified" is in the vicinity of the right emotion. I don't think they considered this to be a mild disagreement to politely gloss over. It goes to the heart of everything, and in analogy to the way Lucretius describes theories that contradict the Epicurean view of the universe,** Socrates' approach opens the way to massive destruction and the Epicureans would have realized that.
**I'll have to look up that reference - can't remember it at the moment but it's something about positing the existence of something besides atom and void.
Happy Birthday to Zarathustra! Learn more about Zarathustra and say happy birthday on Zarathustra's timeline: Zarathustra
Cornelius - I presume you are aware of this statement by Torquatus in Cicero's "On Ends" to the effect that it is disgraceful not to have learned theses things as boys (children), but just in case you are not:
[72] You are pleased to think him uneducated. The reason is that he refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness. Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better? Was he, I say, to study arts like these, and neglect the master art, so difficult and correspondingly so fruitful, the art of living?No! Epicurus was not uneducated: the real philistines are those who ask us to go on studying till old age the subjects that we ought to be ashamed not to have learnt in boyhood.
Additional note to all:
I have moved the "Childhood Education and Parenting" subforum out of the "Ethics" section to the "Resources Activism and Engagement" section. Childhood Education and Parenting includes much more than just ethics, so it needs to be included as one of our primary "activism and engagement" topics.
Cornelius we currently have the following sub-forum on Childhood Education. There's not much there yet, but I'd love to see more. Please consider writing about your interests in this area:
Childhood Education and Parenting
an Italian student at the University of Rome in Primary Education (essentially, I'm studying to become an elementary and preschool teacher).
I am particularly glad to see this and hope you will at length contribute your thoughts on childhood education on Epicurean ideas.
The only comment I would add at this point is that this should include not only ethics but also canonics and physics, as those are the necessary foundations of the ethics.
I hope you'll expand your ideas in this area in future threads.
Welcome Cornelius!
Given your explanation of your user name and the questions that might be raised about the "prostitute" aspect I do think it would be best for you to shorten your user name in some way {perhaps CorneliusP but your choice...). Into the future most user who see "Peripateticus" will presume it is a nod to Aristotle and wonder how that fits into the forum purpose. Given your reasoning for the original choice this would appear to be a situation where the benefit of the inside joke is outweighed by the questions it willraise in the minds of others in the future.
Your enthusiasm is certainly welcome here, and your being Italian will no doubt be an asset. I look forward to hearing more from you as time goes by, and if you have any issues using the forum let us know.
