Would You Rather Live For A Week As (1) Epicurus During the Last Week of His Life or (2) An Anonymous Shepherd Laying In The Grass In The Summertime With No Pain At All?

    Quote from Cassius

    Ok so it does in fact seem you are using ataraxia to describe a specific type of being untroubled (about gods and death primarily, but maybe including a few other things), and that you don't include the trouble of the sharp pain of advanced kidney disease to be within the scope of the word.

    Correct. Ataraxia appears to be achieved by rooting out fears and anxiety, leaving the mind to be free of those disturbances.

    PS. I would also include that it is achieved as well through an understanding of natural science and how the world works, including celestial and meteorological phenomena, and also living virtuously. It is having the mind in a secure harbor, undisturbed by fears and anxieties.

    So that would be an example of someone using ataraxia in a general sense, because he is saying that the Stoics could achieve their tranquility better through Epicurean views than through their own views. But doesn't that mean that ataraxia is being used as a generic term to refer to a general "peace of mind" rather than to a term that is uniquely Epicurean?


    The point of my question here is that I can see a lot of reason why "ataraxia" can be translated into a generic "peace of mind" or "absence of disturbance" that could apply to most anyone of any philosophy or religion at any particular moment. In contrast, I don't see it to be a good idea to consider that "ataraxia" has a specifically Epicurean meaning that justifies elevating it in the way that many writers today tend to elevate it. It's that elevation that I think we see over and over and is what I would expect would be behind the statement by Luc Schneider:


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    In fairness to Luc I think this is the way you will often see the term ataraxia used, which would be consistent with the analogy you used to the effect of "once wise always wise." Is ataraxia something that which, once achieved, is not lost?


    Or is ataraxia some particular point of achievement, like snatching a prize at the end of the race, that if achieved for a single moment, is worth all the other time and effort spent pursuing it?


    I would see Epicurus' statement as targeted toward those such as Socrates who effect to be unwise in their discussion and I would not see wisdom as something that "once achieved" cannot be lost. Do not wise men often act unwisely, even if only by mistake?


    And of course to bring this back to topic, I wouldn't think I would judge whether I wanted to be Epicurus or the shepherd for a week according to whether either one of them "had achieved ataraxia." Would you see that (whether the person as "achieved ataraxia" as a reasonable way to make that decision?



    Edit: "Or is ataraxia some particular point of achievement, like snatching a prize at the end of the race, that if achieved for a single moment, is worth all the other time and effort spent pursuing it?" << I like this way of framing the question as I think this presumption is getting closer to the real issue.

    Just by coincidence I see this article in my daily blast from Academia:


    Ataraxia: Tranquility at the End


    Pascal Massie

    In their investigation of “eudaimonia” (happiness, human flourishing) Hellenistic
    philosophers (i.e., members of the Epicurean, the Stoic, and the Skeptic schools) made
    frequent use of terms that were relatively new in the philosophical lexicon; among others:
    ataraxia (freedom from disturbance), hēsychia (serenity), tranquillitas and securitas
    (Seneca and Cicero’s Latin translation of euthymia), eustatheia (stability), athambia
    (quietness), adiaphora (indifference), and apatheia (the condition of being unmoved).

    Even though most of them did not simply identify eudaimonia with ataraxia, it still remains
    that the notion of happiness they proposed took on a new significance because of this
    emphasis on ataraxia and related notions. At stake is not simply a particular development in
    the history of ancient philosophy; the issue runs much deeper. It entails a transformation of
    the very meaning of philosophy. When eudaimonia is determined in terms of ataraxia the
    very purpose and meaning of philosophy also changes. To be a philosopher is first and
    foremost a matter of conquering fears and desires and the esteem one should bestow upon
    a philosophical school depends primarily on its ability to lead us to such an end. In other
    words, the emergence of ataraxia at the core of ethical discourse is deeply rooted in a
    renewed understanding of philosophy itself.



    ...


    However, during the Hellenistic era three new developments occurred: (a) It is
    argued that one can measure a philosophical system by its ability to lead its disciples to
    happiness. Thus, eudaimonia becomes a meta-philosophical criterion. Philosophy is
    instrumental to happiness just as medicine is instrumental to health. But on this count (b)
    both Plato and Aristotle have failed. Their followers are no closer to happiness than nonphilosophers. (c) The solution (if not in full, at least in a significant part) demands that the
    requirements for happiness be reevaluated. For the Epicureans and the Skeptics
    eudaimonia calls for the attainment of ataraxia. The Stoics held a rather similar view,
    although they prefer the term apatheia.


    568 What is striking in all these new terms (althoughnot perceptible in most translations) is that the determination of this requirement is, in its linguistic form, mostly negative (a-taraxia, a-patheia, a-diaphora). Happiness is not the achievement or the attainment of a human potential; rather, it is a release from worry, anxiety, and disturbance; a liberation that results from the therapeutic examination of our belief569. This new focus reveals that the inner conflicts of the soul have become the chief concern since they are now identified as the main obstacle to happiness. Thus, ataraxia seems to name an absence, a lack. Many, following Hegel’s pronouncement, have
    diagnosed this aim of life as a sheer renunciation of the world and a withdrawal into selfsatisfaction.

    Here's a particularly interesting passage comparing ataraxia to be a model, not a condition:


    Kinetic pleasures for their part remain by definition incomplete for so long as the animal keeps drinking it is still thirsty. In kinetic pleasures one experiences the progressive lessening of pain - which presupposes that some form of pain or discomfort is still there in the first place. By contrast, katastematic pleasures are stable and they are so because they are fundamentally finite in the sense that they repel the infinite frustration of ordinary kinetic desires. “The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, and as long as it is present, a
    feeling of pain, a feeling of distress, or their combination is absent.” (D L 10, Maxim 3).
    The little clause “as long as it is present” indicates that Epicurus does not posit the stability
    of katastematic pleasures as everlasting; for this reason the pursuit of ataraxia does not aim
    at a beatitude that would transcend our mortal condition. A state of supernatural
    blessedness is not an option. It is true that Epicurean texts often invoke the calm bliss the
    gods are said to enjoy, but for us the divine is a model, not a destination.     The end of human
    life must be compatible with the human condition but this condition entails being subjected
    to needs and lacks, the awareness of which constitutes an experience of pain and their
    satisfaction an experience of kinetic pleasure.



    ---


    But first what could it be to experience ataraxia? The Epicurean ataraxia is not simply a
    “state of mind” (pace Striker); it is a state of being that depends on the discovery of
    another form of pleasure, the pleasure of being rather than the pleasure of possessing or
    consuming. To pursue the arithmetical analogy, once could say that for all positive
    numbers there corresponds a negative number; 0 however admits of no opposite. Of
    course ataraxia is not a degree zero since, as we saw earlier, it is already pleasure and
    Epicurus’ insistence on the idea that ataraxia is a form of pleasure rules out a common
    objection according to which one who follows such an ethics would live a life of
    indifference. Instead, ataraxia corresponds to the pleasure of being that comes from
    knowing one’s limits.


    ----


    (Unfortunately there is no real concluding paragraph that summarizes the entire article.)



    Note: A very good line:


    Quote from Article

    but for us the divine is a model, not a destination.

    Once, when I was (legally) required to be in a meeting where I was going to be under (deceitful and unjust) attack, I sought the counsel of a wise friend (a social-worker clinical therapist with whom I did therapy for some time, who also became a valued friend). What he said was this: “Let me tell you what you are required to do: to put your body in that place for the prescribed time. That’s it. Make yourself comfortable – and do not engage. You don’t have to argue, you don’t have to even respond to their questions. You can let your mind go wherever you want – you can plan a vacation, you can imagine or remember a pleasant scenario in your life. And when the time is up, you can just leave.”


    Which is what I did. I did not engage my mind in any of the negativity.


    ++++++++++++


    With that said, Don has often stressed that ataraxia is not the be-all-end-all for an Epicurean: aponia is (on the negative side) the other blade of the scissors.* In the throes of severe pain, Epicurus may well have struggled to maintain ataraxia and enjoy the pleasures of the mind (and he may have drifted in and out of consciousness). But he had the tools make the best job of it.


    My therapist friend would recommend the same kind of tools.


    ++++++++++++


    * The Stoics seem to dismiss pone as something almost irrelevant to the apatheia of the sage. The Pyrrhonians simply stress ataraxia, without, as I recall, much attention to pone.

    "We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (Vatican Saying 48)

    Thanks 2 Like 1 Love 2

    Great find on the Massie paper, Cassius !

    I've read the Epicurean section specifically but should read the rest, too.

    However, I do find several excerpts very interesting, including:

    Quote

    Not only are kinetic pleasures unavoidable and should be welcomed, but in a sense katastematic pleasures are paradoxically the target that all quests for pleasure (even kinetic ones) secretly aims at. To see this, we need to ask whether the ultimate object of desire is really an object. Pleasure is commonly understood as delight

    in something, enjoyment of something. In other words, pleasure assumes an object and construes itself as a relation to this object. ... the common experience of pleasure is one in which desire recognizes its dependence on an object that, even when consumed, remains an alterity. For this reason all our common desires seek the impossible since they seek the unlimited. Epicurus’ answer, articulated in the concept of ataraxia, consists in seeking a pleasure without object, a pleasure without anything outside of itself; true happiness can only be construed in terms of self-sufficiency.

    With self-sufficiency, the need for another disappears insofar as one traces a limit within which one can maintain one’s own existence. As we saw, the problem inherent to any attempt to fulfill one’s desires is the endlessness of desire and ataraxia is meant to be the answer, the only form of pleasure that ends the madness of desire. Freedom from disturbance and suffering is a matter of putting a halt to the unlimited. This is possible

    because there is at least one formula which, in principle, could resolve the conundrum. To resolve the frustration of unsatisfied desire, the seeker of pleasure must discover in herself (in her own very existence), the object of her delight. The pleasure that is found in being (rather than in having or doing) is a pleasure beyond desire because it is a pleasure without object, or, if we must still talk of an object of desire, this object is not alien to the seeker anymore. Self-sufficiency (autarkeia) is therefore the hallmark of ataraxia and the search

    for happiness turns out to be a search for freedom, since it does not depend on anything but itself.

    I realize that's a rather lengthy excerpt, but I think it's a novel take on ataraxia as well as the katastematic/kinetic issue. There is nothing wrong with kinetic desires, in fact, they should be "welcomed." But Massie is positing that ataraxia, the katastematic pleasure, is something that only has the person's existence itself, the joy of being, as the source of its delight. I like that idea, and it bumps up against or is adjacent to DeWitt's "the greatest good is life itself" but avoids DeWitt's tautological conundrum since "If life is the greatest good, but the greatest good is that to which everything else points to, so life points to living,, etc." (I've been down this road many times so I'll let it lie there.) Massie has a novel take in that ataraxia is joy in living free from frustration, disturbance, and suffering in the mind. I would still maintain that ataraxia is achieved by getting rid of the fears of god, death, etc., etc., but once those are removed, ataraxia is the joy one gets from *being* in that *state* of freedom from fear, disturbance, etc. The one who is feeling ataraxia is self-sufficient in their own being, while continuing to enjoy the varied pleasures that come along from kinetic pleasures. Again, I like the "swimming in the ocean, surfing on the waves" metaphor that Godfrey helped refine a while back.

    So, did Epicurus experience ataraxia in his last week? Using Massie's approach, I would continue to say yes, to the extent that Epicurus was able to experience anything other than pain.

    The mention of ataraxia in the letter to Herodotus is noteworthy, too:

    Quote from Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus

    [82] ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελύσθαι καὶ συνεχῆ μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κυριωτάτων.

    [82] But mental tranquillity (ataraxia) means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths. (Hicks)

    And the real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being emancipated from all these things, and in preserving the recollection of all the principles which we have established, especially of the most essential of them. (Yonge)

    The troubles one is released from have to be fear and anxiety of gods, death, etc., since the section directly preceding this about the importance of atarxia is:

    Quote

    We must also recollect that that which principally contributes to trouble the spirit of men is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beings imperishable and perfectly happy, and that then one’s thoughts and actions are in contradiction to the will of these superior beings; they also,[454] being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity of evils, they fear the insensibility of death, as that could affect them. What do I say? It is not even belief, but inconsiderateness and blindness which govern them in every thing, to such a degree that, not calculating these fears, they are just as much troubled as if they had really faith in these vain phantoms. (Yonge)

    Thanks Don. Possibly for present purposes we are coming near to exhausting the ataraxia angle, with the immediate issue of ataraxia not being a transcendant state of epiphany or a final destination that once achieved either justifies the effort to that point or describes a particular experience of a particular activity which can be equated to "seeing the Mona Lisa before you die" or something specific like that. i am gathering that we both agree with this formulation from Massie:


    Quote

    the little clause “as long as it is present” indicates that Epicurus does not posit the stability

    of katastematic pleasures as everlasting; for this reason the pursuit of ataraxia does not aim

    at a beatitude that would transcend our mortal condition. A state of supernatural

    blessedness is not an option. It is true that Epicurean texts often invoke the calm bliss the

    gods are said to enjoy, but for us the divine is a model, not a destination.


    Quote from Don

    I like that idea, and it bumps up against or is adjacent to DeWitt's "the greatest good is life itself" but avoids DeWitt's tautological conundrum since "If life is the greatest good, but the greatest good is that to which everything else points to, so life points to living,, etc."

    And yes I agree too. I think Dewitt would have been better off saying 'life in the absence of pain is the greatest good" if he wanted to make a point that "pleasure" isn't the only way to describe the greatest good. If we are rigorously clear in defining and explaining how "life in the absence of pain" is pleasure, then we're all saying much the same thing.


    However the ones who *aren't* saying the same thing are the ones - I would think - who imply that "life in the absence of pain" is some specific esoteric and unique experience (like seeing the Mona Lisa) which requires some kind of higher plane of consciousness to understand and does not fall under the umbrella of the term "pleasure" as ordinary people can understand it. And there I would criticize those who simply say "pleasure is the absence of pain" without explaining the issue that we are discussing. I don't fault Epicurus in the letter to Menoeceus because I think his readers of the time would have had reams of other material which make the point clear. And I now think that the point remained clear through Cicero's time given a full reading of what is included in "On Ends."


    But over the last 2000 years Cicero's refusal to accept the terminology and his resulting argument that the framework makes no sense has won the day. The real fault is in us because we are so indoctrinated in a restrictive definition of pleasure that we can't see the wider point. So now we have to go back and explain how we got to where we are today and how everything fits together under an expansive definition of pleasure that is more than just "sex, drugs, and rock and roll."


    (Which come to think of it is what Torquatus spends so much time doing in his narrative in on ends where he links the virtues to being productive of pleasure.)


    I think one of the real challenges is how to convey a mindset such that it isn't shocking to think that if you tell your dentist: "Doctor my tooth does not hurt," then your dentist should justifiably say in return: "Then your tooth is at the height of pleasure!"


    Yes it's true that most people don't ordinarily think that way, but that doesn't mean that they can't think that way, or that they wouldn't be better off if they did so.


    To use a religious analogy, talking about "pleasure" in a truncated, restricted, narrow, and incomplete form (such as Cicero insists on doing) would be like a Christian talking about Jesus as a good carpenter.

    Quote from Cassius

    Possibly for present purposes we are coming near to exhausting the ataraxia angle

    Agreed... But have we answered your question about Epicurus?

    Quote from Cassius

    the immediate issue of ataraxia not being a transcendant state of epiphany or a final destination that once achieved either justifies the effort to that point or describes a particular experience of a particular activity which can be equated to "seeing the Mona Lisa before you die" or something specific like that.

    Agreed. Ataraxia is not some rarefied special "state of epiphany." I think I've outlined my position in this thread, but I would expand on that, however, to say that my interpretation is that Epicurus taught that we need both katastematic and kinetic pleasures for a complete life. I'm beginning to really like, if I may say, the formulation of something like "floating on the ocean, surfing on the waves" to convey that symbiotic relationship between katastematic and kinetic pleasures.

    We've been concentrating on ataraxia but I wanted to add a word for aponia. To me, aponia is NOT "feeling no pain." To complement the sense of ataraxia as being taking joy in living with one's disturbance-free mind , aponia to me is taking delight in the smooth functioning of the body, being in the flow with your body functioning well. Taking this tack, I can see how katastematic pleasure can come and go. I certainly only have fleeting feelings of aponia. I'm better at experiencing feelings of ataraxia, albeit it's a work in progress.


    I would agree that the common knowledge has become ataraxia is a special unique mystical state etc. Syncretism and conflation with other traditions is at play in my opinion. Additionally, I think Epicurus's philosophy is very practical and down to earth and open to all. People/academics don't want practical, down to earth. They want Ideal Forms, Essences, Prime Movers, the Logos, mystery, mysticism, and so on. Massie's paper gets us moving in a more practical, down to earth direction.

    Quote from Don

    I would agree that the common knowledge has become ataraxia is a special unique mystical state etc. Syncretism and conflation with other traditions is at play in my opinion. Additionally, I think Epicurus's philosophy is very practical and down to earth and open to all. People/academics don't want practical, down to earth. They want Ideal Forms, Essences, Prime Movers, the Logos, mystery, mysticism, and so on.

    Yes - very well stated. This is the foundation on which we move forward, and it needs to be understood as pretty much the "theme" of everything we are doing with EpicureanFriends.com. You've stated both sides that I think are important: (1) the common sense understanding that any person of normal intelligence can grasp Epicurean philosophy as a way of organizing the universe, and (2) the unpleasant fact that we're not just facing internal fears, anxieties, and understandings, but we're also facing an active, organized, opposition of which Cicero was not the first and definitely not the last. Cicero's opinion dominates today - maybe it always dominated, even in Epicurus's day. And today's Cicero's don't just have a limited audience of rich people for their opinions, they can broadcast them to everyone in seconds on Twitter and the like.


    So in the modern world Cicero's perspective is probably even more dominant and more dangerous. Another example is that in this week's podcast Joshua makes the point that to the extent that people today no longer have the same familiarity with death in our daily lives, we are worse off than in the past in the amount of knowledge most people have.


    Even though today most people have some basic knowledge of natural science, I don't believe that has translated at a mass scale into the fading away of religious superstition and fears of heaven and hell. The adoption of the position "God created the atoms" has anesthetized the majority into thinking they can have their cake and eat it too by blending superstition with "science." I think the key to counterattacking on that issue is already contained in the arguments in Herodotus and Lucretius, so we have plenty with which to work. That means not slighting the "physics" side of things on the mistaken idea that everyone understands atoms and void and that solves the problem.


    So in general I'd say that the circumstances of today with technology and social media making it easier for peer pressure to suppress unwanted ideas require creative responses -- analogous to Lucretius stepping "out of the box" to produce his poem. With the two points you raised and I quoted above being central to moving forward.

    Quote from Don

    Agreed... But have we answered your question about Epicurus?

    In terms of the original hypothetical question, I don't think we have answered that. I don't think there is an answer that applies to everyone except in general terms, but thinking through the problem does - in my view - help focus the mind.


    I would think it is crucial for people to realize that the pleasures of the body (the shepherd in the field) don't always or even most of the time trump the pleasures of the mind (Epicurus). The difficult aspect is the amount of physical pain Epicurus was in, and that leads us to examine how we personally want to measure physical vs mental pains and pleasures.


    The development of exercises to encourage people to focus on seeing how mental pleasures and physical pleasures combine to constitute the full goal of "pleasure" is probably a good idea. And in the meantime we can explain that, given there is no neutral state, if you are not in pain you are feeling pleasure, and if you truly are feeling "no" pain then you are feeling the most pleasure that is possible for you to feel.


    So the sentence I included above about the dentist needs to be seen as not a word game, but indicative of an organizing perspective on everything in life:


    Quote from Cassius

    I think one of the real challenges is how to convey a mindset such that it isn't shocking to think that if you tell your dentist: "Doctor my tooth does not hurt," then your dentist should justifiably say in return: "Then your tooth is at the height of pleasure!"


    Since "Pleasure'" is the flag that stands against religious superstition, idealism, nihilism, and the rest, it's important to think clearly about how sweeping a term pleasure is, and to then realize exactly how, and in what respect, "the absence of pain is pleasure." The wording is very defensible but cries out for further explanation, and if that explanation is not provided then under current circumstances very little is gained and even worse much is lost given the background static that distorts the message.


    Once that perspective becomes understandable and not seen as a call to ascetic transcendentalism, then the common sense application of the desires and pursuing those that are natural and necessary and looking to what will happen to us as a result of our choices and all the other advice falls into perfect consistency and common sense.

    Quote from Cassius

    The development of exercises to encourage people to focus on seeing how mental pleasures and physical pleasures combine to constitute the full goal of "pleasure" is probably a good idea.

    The way I read PD09, which is the way about half of the translations render it, is that pleasures and pains can be described by intensity, duration and location. Thinking about activities that expand the location of pleasures can then help with what's stated in the above quote.


    For instance, many pleasures are experienced both physically and mentally at the same time: relief at escaping trauma, the awe of a blazing sunset, the list goes on.... Thinking about this facet (location, or breadth as I also like to think of it) can be useful in understanding the nature of pleasure.

    New followup at Facebook:

    John Bramwell

    On the 9th September Cassius Amicus posed an interesting question wether I would prefer to be an ignorant shepherd lying in the grass or Epicurus in pain both with only a week to live.

    There is no easy answer to this poser as there is other factors to be contemplated. Did the young shepherd have an old widowed mother to take care of etc.

    But what if the period of time were different and what if they did not know the time frame at all.

    Had the shepherd been told of the horrors that might await him, all sorts of things.

    I am not going to give an opinion except that I think it is only human beings that have a concept of death and once this “cat” was out of the bag there was no going back.

    Perhaps I am being naive but I believe that Epicurus put the cat back in the bag, so to speak.



    CASSIUS REPLY:


    Hi John. The point in the hypothetical was to compare the life of an educated Epicurean, even with significant physical pain (Epicurus), to the life of an uneducated regular person who spends his or her time without significant physical pain (the hypothetical shepherd). As you say, there are all sorts of unknowns in the hypothetical, but the issue involves assessing what "absence of pain" really means in Epicurean philosophy and how we process that term as the goal of life.


    This is a subject on which Cicero criticized Epicurus extensively in Book 2 of Cicero's "On Ends," and that's the subject of our most recent Episode 195 of the Lucretius Today podcast.


    Ultimately I think there is no absolute answer to the question of which life is "best" or which "should" be preferred. There are no divine answers or Platonic absolutes which establish which is "better." We all have our own feelings of pleasure and pain as to what is most significant to us, and we can offset pleasures against pains and still find a predominance of pleasure even in situations involving significant pain.


    I respect anyone who answers differently from me as having a right to their own opinion, but I know which I personally prefer to choose in my own life. I frequently choose actions which bring some amount of pain in exchange for greater pleasure thereafter, and I do not obsess over avoiding all forms of pain every second of my life.


    I think the position we take on what Epicurus is saying on this point is the difference between considering Epicurus to be the greatest philosopher of the western world vs. considering Epicurus to be a ho-hum also-ran.


    Note: the podcast post is here:

    I actually changed my opinion on this, the lack of pain alone is actually still painful because it still an absence of pleasure. We are made to be filled with pleasure so the very lack of it is actually painful, I had this acutely after having a small procedure I was in basically a non state but then I remembered there is no non state it's always either pleasure or pain so the very absence of any pleasure DESPITE being completely pain free ended up being painful to me. So in the end I would be Epicurus for a week despite his pain.

    Quote from Eoghan Gardiner

    I had this acutely after having a small procedure I was in basically a non state but then I remembered there is no non state it's always either pleasure or pain so the very absence of any pleasure DESPITE being completely pain free ended up being painful to me.

    Eoghan I think I understand what you are saying, and I agree with your ultimate conclusion, but I wanted to throw this out there fore consideration: As I am reading Torquatus now, unless you are saying that you were "unconcious" in the condition you were in, I don't think the Torquatus interpretation of pleasure would allow someone to say that they were "completely free of pain" and not then - by virtue of those words - concluding that such a person was in a state of pleasure -- in fact, the highest state. Maybe you are saying you were unconscious, or numb (which is painful) but as I am reading the words now -- such as the quote which is currently at the top of the forum - it seems to me that the Epicureans were being rigorously logical in their word use: IF it is stated that a person is painfree, THEN - without any further need for information or deliberation - then that person is defined to be in pleasure, and in fact the greatest pleasure possible, since you are stating that they are "pain free."


    I know this type of analysis is striking some people as impractical and unusual, and that's in fact exactly how Cicero was describing it to Torquatus. But if we take Torquatus at his word, and I think we can, then this seems to be the way the Epicureans were thinking. Cicero's crimes against Epicurus come mostly in the omission of important explanations, but in my view when he places a clear statement in the mouth of an Epicurean - and in this case he does this with Torquatus over and over and over again - I think it can be trusted that this in fact was the Epicurean position.

    I still think the emotional circumplex is helpful in these discussions:

    Pleasant affect = what Epicurus calls pleasure

    Unpleasant= what Epicurus calls pain

    Activation & Deactivation equals the level of "excitement"

    There's really no 0,0 point .

    From the circumplex, I interpret what Eoghan Gardiner is describing to be near the bottom of the "Deactivation" axis. With such a low amount of "excitement", it would be very difficult to distinguish pleasure or pain even though the feeling is still there. Additionally from the circumplex, the feeling would not be very strong. But it would still be there as either a pleasure or a pain.


    This aligns with my intuition. But it's difficult to intuit the idea that the absence of pain is the greatest pleasure. It’s logically correct, but when I really dig into it, it's hard to wrap my head around. At first it makes sense at the macro level, but Eoghan Gardiner 's anecdote is at the macro level. After a while it makes my head spin!


    Of course, what Cicero loved to do was to find rabbit holes and dig away....

    To the extent a diagram like that is showing pleasure and pain to be on an opposite axis then it would be consistent and helpful to explain that the presence of one is the absence of the other.


    However to the extent that the diagram implies that "excitement" is on a scale of its own that is unrelated to describing pleasure and pain, it probably detracts from the ultimate philosophical point that if a person is conscious and aware at all, he is feeling either pleasure or pain with no zero / neutral point.


    Of course if you follow the descriptions around the circle the point is to read them together and you don't get confused.


    I'd say that there's not only no 0,0 point, but none of the points at all marked by the vertical line. If the two lines are "X" and "Y" there's no 0,Y point up and down the circle.



    Quote from Godfrey

    This aligns with my intuition. But it's difficult to intuit the idea that the absence of pain is the greatest pleasure. It’s logically correct, but when I really dig into it, it's hard to wrap my head around. At first it makes sense at the macro level, but Eoghan Gardiner 's anecdote is at the macro level. After a while it makes my head spin!


    Of course, what Cicero loved to do was to find rabbit holes and dig away...

    And yep this is the issue, but (1) there is good reason to believe that the Torquatus portion was coming straight from Epicurean textbooks, and (2) it's essential to point out that the criticism that this perspective is a rabbit hole is the Ciceronian anti-Epicurean position.


    It seems to me the key decision that every reader has to make is to choose from one of these two positions. Either: (1) Torquatus' formulation is a thorough misstatement of Epicurean philosophy, or (2) Torquatus' formulation is correct but appears foreign to our ears because Cicero does not allow Torquatus to include the full explanation of how "absence of pain is the greatest pleasure" arises from a necessary logical deduction, given the inverse relationship of pleasure and pain.


    Somebody's going to do a better job than my chart here, but hammering this point is going to be necessary to stop one's head from spinning on what Torquatus is saying.


    Words mean something. When you accept (1) that if you are aware of anything at all then what you are aware of is either pleasure or pain, and (2) someone has said that their life is "free from pain," then (3) the realization that what they have said is that they are at maximum pleasure follows like night follows day.


    In Eoghan's case I see him following Cicero's wording, which I would discourage, if the implication is that pleasure is associated with excitement / stimulation alone. The wider perspective is that excitement / stimulation is not a required component of pleasure, so it is an incorrect deduction to hold that the level of excitement/stimulation has any relationship to the total percentage of pleasure being experienced.