An Epicurean Study of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics

Quote from Don

So, yeah, I found book 1 both intriguing but frustrating in Aristotle's insistence on the subservience of the individual's "good", goal, telos being subservient to the state.

But is that my modern, Western bias or is that coming from a genuine Epicurean perspective

I could see Epicurus holding that for individuals who do in fact find their greatest happiness in being part of a particular group of people, then for those people they are pursuing pleasure by pursuing their collectively defined interests.

But I would also expect Epicurus to hold that for those individuals who do not find their greatest happiness in a particular group of people, or who find their greatest happiness in another or smaller or separate group of people than "the polis," then the interests of the polis would not be their primary concern.

To hold otherwise would be to allow for something else other than the feeling of the person perceiving the feeling to override the guidance of nature. I read Epicurus as being rigorously logical that there can be no possible exception to the general rule that Nature gives humans only feeling (pleasure and pain) for guidance. I do not think Epicurus would admit that polis / states are living brings which have feelings of their own.

States may be the most efficient method of organization of large groups of people for living happily, but they are not strictly necessary for human survival so I bet he would say that they don't count in the same way that "life" is a prerequisite to pleasure. Like "virtue"I would expect Epicurus to see states as a tool and not as an end in themselves.

I'm just starting Book 2, so you're comfortably ahead Don !

My very general take is that this is really interesting reading, reading it from an Epicurean perspective. If I was reading this with no other background I think it would drive me batty. There's a lot of value in this, but without a grounding in reality it would very easily lead off into the rabbit hole of absolutes. Epicurus did quite a service in building on the reasonable parts and excising the ungrounded.

I always find that in the Usener collections ... Let me look

Yep it's on this page here too:

Usener's Fragments Edited By Erik Anderson - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

As I was looking for that I am reminded that there is a lot of interesting material in that collection which we rarely if ever talk about but which is very worthwhile. Hard to assess the accuracy of some of it but still can be very helpful.

For example U417:

U417

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 3, p. 1088C: Epicurus has imposed a limit on pleasures that applies to all of them alike: the removal of all pain. For he believes that our nature adds to pleasure only up to the point where pain is abolished and does not allow it any further increase in magnitude (although the pleasure, when the state of painlessness is reached, admits of certain unessential variations). But to proceed to this point, accompanied by desire, is our stint of pleasure, and the journey is indeed short and quick. Hence it is that becoming aware of the poverty here they transfer their final good from the body, as from an unproductive piece of land, to the soul, persuaded that there they will find pastures and meadows lush with pleasures.

To me that variation makes clear in saying "adds to pleasure only up to the point where pain is abolished" that there's nothing different in kind when all pain is absent. The step from 99% pleasures 1% pains is simply the addition of 1% more pleasure -- the 100% level is not something different in and of itself.

That would be great - I think areas we've not hid hard enough so far include Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and the sections of Cicero on Epicurus outside of Book 1 of On Ends (where we've focused our attention on the Torquatus presentation).

And of course that doesn't even mention the works of Philodemus of which there are many we've barely touched.

There's certainly no lack of things to do!

I am kind of late to the party in saying this but i wonder if it might not be desirable to have some way to categorize these comments other than chronologically in this thread. Does your website allow for discussion comments by page? Or should we try to somehow find a way here to be able to reference, and make new comments, by section of the book?

I ask that because in going back and picking up i am about to make a very out-of-sequence comment to the very opening of book one:

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Nicomachean Ethics starts out with:

“Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim.”

This sets up the difference between “some good” ἀγαθοῦ and The Good τἀγαθόν. The latter is the exact word Epicurus uses in:

"I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form." (On the Ethical End)

Using Aristotle’s definition (and this appears to possibly trace back as far as Eudoxus of Cnidus (c. 400-350 BCE; Aristotle was 384-322 BCE) we could get:

"I know not how to conceive That at Which All Things Aim, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form."

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Why is it not objectionable to seem to presume, without proof, that such a thing as "THE good" ("it has been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim.") is not only NOT well said, but stupidly said? And why is not Epicurus' response ("I know not how to conceive....") best understood as a statement that such a thing as a single good does not really even exist at all except as a construct of the mind useful for debate but not as something which truly has an independent existence?

Combining that with the Plutarch comment it begins to seem to me like it is very important from the beginning to establish that Epicurus was drawing a bright line of warning against the entire endeavor of obsessing over the discussion that such a thing as a single good applicable to everyone even exists at all.

Within the confines of philosophical debate it may make sense to talk about a single concept ("Pleasure") but seen from this perspective the entire project of setting up a single word (even "pleasure") as some kind of semi-mystical conceptual goal has to be viewed with suspicion and limitation.

In saying this, to be clear, I am not criticizing Epicurus, but suggesting that what Epicurus was saying in large part is that in the initial discussion of setting up any words - pleasure or happiness or joy or tranquility or anything else - as goals, we need to first establish that the entire discussion must be kept in check lest we think that our words are in themselves capable of creating something from nothing.

It looks like a lot of Epicurus' point was to warn again, in the phrase we've been using, that while the map can be very useful the map is not the territory and we don't live in a map.

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So if I now or new people in the future come across Don's series of articles, should we just post comments here in thread order, or subdivide the thread somehow, or what would make sense? Because reviewing N.E. is something that lots of people are going to want to do in their study of Epicurus.

So maybe one huge topic is the question of what 'good' even means? For example:

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In 1094b15-20, Aristotle writes something that I think Epicurus would actually agree with:

“In many cases good things bring harmful results. There are instances of men ruined by wealth, and others by courage.”

Carrying on my last comment about challenging whether there is a single good, I think Epicurus might object that if you're being rigorous about the meaning of 'good' then wealth and courage (in that example) are in fact not good in themselves at all - that they are only contextually good - and that thus Aristotle was wrong in even talking about them as 'good' if he is going to be true to a single definition.

And is this not why we end up with the formulation that there is in fact nothing good but Pleasure, nothing bad but Pain? (Do we have that in Epicurus himself or is that Frances Wright's summary of his point?)

I think this points in the same direction:

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However, his next statement struck me and I’m going to quote Rackham’s translation at length:

“And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of pleasure is an experience of the soul, and a thing gives a man pleasure in regard to which he is described as ‘fond of’ so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond of the theater, and similarly just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice (δίκαια dikaia “just”), and acts conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue. [11] But whereas the mass of mankind take pleasure in things that conflict with one another,2 because they are not pleasant of their own nature, things pleasant by nature are pleasant to lovers of what is noble, and so always are actions in conformity with virtue, so that they are pleasant essentially as well as pleasant to lovers of the noble. [12] Therefore their life has no need of pleasure as a sort of ornamental appendage,3 but contains its pleasure in itself. For there is the further consideration that the man who does not enjoy doing noble actions is not a good man at all: no one would call a man just if he did not like acting justly, nor liberal if he did not like doing liberal things, and similarly with the other virtues. [13] But if so, actions in conformity with virtue must be essentially pleasant.”

To me Aristotle seems to be setting up an abstraction of the pleasures of "virtue" or "what is noble" as being somehow absolutely good in themselves all the time and for everyone.

OK maybe so if you want to talk in map-like terms, but again that's a map and doesn't really exist except in our minds as a construct that is useful when understood to be limited, deadly when imagined to be reality itself.

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And again the same thing here: This also sets up another stark distinction between Aristotle and Epicurus in that that latter insisted that no one was ever to young or too old to practice philosophy and let it benefit you! Aristotle seems to say, “Are you happy? Can you be happy? Well, certainly not until you’re dead I can’t say one way or the other.”

Aristotle is trying to set up the cold hard piece of paper as the standard by which we judge life itself, rather than recognizing it as a map that is useful for communication but a trap if considered to be handed down from a divine creator of the universe!

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Book 3 begins with more categorizing by Aristotle.

That "categorizing" is kind of a summary of the whole project isn't it?

Aristotle is at best a kind of mapmaker, which is all well and good if you remember the limitations of maps, but a fatal error if you start to worship maps and think that they were produced by someone drawing with god-like authority.

Reading through this after being aware of Epicurus' fundamental viewpoints is, as Don says, not really a very intimidating experience at all, because the limitations jump out at you. But I shudder to think at the negative impact to the world brought about by holding Aristotle up as some kind of paragon of god-like wisdom. And that's exactly what the "Objectivists" (and no doubt others) still do today.

OK as to this:

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Metrodorus asserts in his Reply to the Sophists: ‘Hence this very thing is the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν > τἀγαθοῦ), escape from the evil; for there is nowhere for the Good (τἀγαθὸν) to be put when nothing painful to the body or distressing to the mind is any longer making way for it.’ Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the Good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflexion and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: ‘For what produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the contrast of the great evil escaped; and this is the nature of good, (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν) if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about (περιπατῇ) prating meaninglessly about good (περὶ ἀγαθοῦ).’ Oh, the great pleasure and blessed state this company enjoy, as they revel in suffering no hardship or anxiety or pain! (Usener Fragment 423 (Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, Section 7, Greek text. See also here for Loeb.)

So, the Epicureans had a very clear definition of what The Good was. It was simple and direct, and they didn't see any need to "stroll about prating meaninglessly about good." And remember, especially in the context of the above Plutarch excerpt, that Epicurus said, "I do not think I could conceive of the good without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms." (Usener 67) If we are filled to the top with pleasure (The Good), "there is nowhere for the Good (τἀγαθὸν) to be put when nothing painful to the body or distressing to the mind is any longer making way for it." Aristotle's slicing, dicing, hair-splitting, micro-analysis becomes superfluous and "meaningless," literally κενῶς kenos "meaninglessly, emptily, vainly" (the same word Epicurus uses for "the void").

"So, the Epicureans had a very clear definition of what The Good was. It was simple and direct, " <<<<

I agree with that and I think maybe it is important to discuss how it is clear and simple and direct.

Isn't the reason it is clear and simple and direct something close to this:

Since there is not in reality some single good that everything is aiming toward, any any single definition of words, we can only define "the good" in hypothetical terms. Since we have to use words to communicate, we define "pleasure" as that which we feel to be pleasurable, and 'pain' as that which we feel to be painful. Thus there is no more accurate way to define 'the good' and 'the bad' in words other than as the opposite of one another. Since we are forcing ourselves to discuss what to choose and what to avoid, we can define "Pleasure" in words no more specifically than the absence of its opposite (pain). Likewise we can define 'pain' in words no more specifically than the absence of its opposite - pleasure. We can list examples of pleasures and pains til the cows come home but those examples always remain examples. We can never reduce pleasure and pain or good and bad to real experiences other than to point to individual instances, because rightly understood pleasure and pain are feelings, and our words aren't feelings - discussion of feelings as words or concepts is nothing more than artificial 'categorizing' or word-play. And wordplay is mapmaking -- fun and useful but not to be viewed as creating a kind of supernatural reality which we should defer to and worship.

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I think I have now caught up in my reading of Don's series so I look forward to more!

Quote from Don

I don't think Epicurus was doing that at all. I think Epicurus *was* in fact saying there is a "single" good - "the good" ταγαθον - and that good is pleasure.

Yes I think that we'll want to continue to discuss this point and discuss multiple layers of meaning, such as DeWitt does with "all sensations are true." I think that is a very clear example that words have to be defined in context. All sensations are reported honestly, for example, but all sensations do not reveal the full "truth" of the full context.

So I would say the same with "pleasure." Pleasure is considered as a feeling is absolutely the only positive guide given by nature to point to things to choose. But the word "Pleasure" can also be considered as a general concept (same with "happiness") and from that perspective the word is like a map that can be very useful but is not at all the same as the real world that it seeks to describe.

If someone wants a "map" and wants to drill down to a single word that is usable to describe all feelings of pleasure, then "Pleasure" fills the bill and within that philosophical framework is very useful. But the word "Pleasure" does not and cannot contain within it the full feeling of every experience of pleasure, and so people chafe under the idea that the single term embraces all instances of enjoyment.

So while I can agree with you that "there is a 'single' good ... and that good is pleasure" I think the problem that Epicurus is pointing to is that this statement has to be viewed in full context and not considered to be anything but a formulation of words. Words have meaning, but they only have the limited meaning that we give to them by definitions.

As I see it that's your whole problem (and I agree with you) about Aristotle: he's chopping words into definitions that suit his preferences. The problem is not that his preferences are "wrong," the problem is that there is in fact no absolute standard of right and wrong as to how to define words. Choice of language is only one of the first and most obvious problems - shades of meaning aren't defined by God or by ideal forms, so the definitions we choose to give to words are entirely up to us. And if we don't always keep that in mind, we start thinking that Aristotle is some brilliant genius of the ages who somehow figured out things that weren't there to be observed by anyone else who cares to take the time to pay attention.

That's what I think is being indicated by this sentence in the letter to Herodotus: "First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning." I think we all agree that Epicurus rejected Plato's version of "ideas" - the ideal forms - as being divine or absolute. If they aren't divine or absolute, then the logical conclusion is we assign them meaning according to our choice to describe what we observe through the senses.

I think we have previously had different opinions on this next statement, but this is what I think is also indicated by Diognes Laertius when he recorded:

"The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. Of investigations some concern actual things, others mere words. This is a brief summary of the division of their philosophy and their views on the criterion of truth."

So this is indeed a big issue and I think that you are rightly rejecting Aristotle's arbitrary categorization, but the next step - which I think that Epicurus was making clear - is that ALL categorization (all maps) are "artificial." I think Epicurus was that that in the end all we can do is assign words to what we observe. We always need to be clear that those assignments are our own choices. We work hard to make sure that the assignments are consistent across words and across sensory observations, but we always have to be clear that the assignments aren't universal or established by gods or even by Nature.

All leading back to when we decide to talk about a "single good" we're talking about a concept that we as humans have invented. We've hopefully defined it honestly based on our observations of the way nature works, but in deciding to use a single word to describe the way nature works we are making that formulation / drawing that map ourselves.

I would expect we'll see example after example of that as you go forward through the rest of N.E..