Episode One Hundred Thirty-Nine - The Letter to Menoeceus 06 - Pleasure Part Two

    Welcome to Episode One Hundred Thirty-Nine of Lucretius Today.


    This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.


    I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.


    If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.


    Today we continue our discussion of Pleasure in Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus. Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:


    BAILEY:


    And again independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. And so plain savours bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed; and bread and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips.


    [131] To grow accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless of fortune.


    When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.


    [132] For it is not continuous drinkings and revelings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit.


    Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them.


    HICKS:


    Again, we regard independence of outward things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been removed, while bread and water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips.


    [131] To habituate one's self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.


    When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.


    [132] It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the other virtues, for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them.

    For those interested:

    Letter To Menoikeus: A New Translation With Commentary : Don Boozer : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive
    A new translation of the Letter to Menoikeus (Menoeceus) by Epicurus with commentary.
    archive.org


    Additionally, we believe αὐτάρκεια is a great good. Not so that we are furnished with the use of a few things; but, if we were to have many things, we would be content with few things. Those in need who are genuinely convinced of this find extravagance more pleasant, and that every natural desire is easily procured, and an empty desire difficult to get. For simple flavors bring equal pleasure to extravagant ways of life when once the pain of body and mind experienced through lack or deficiency is removed. [131] A simple meal of hearty, wholesome bread and spring water delivers the most extreme pleasure whenever food and drink have been brought to bear against hunger and thirst; and, when extravagant experiences do come up every once in a while, they are experienced more intensely by us, and we are better able to fearlessly face the vicissitudes of fortune.


    Therefore, whenever we say repeatedly that "pleasure is the τέλος," we do not say the pleasure of those who are prodigal like those who are ignorant, those who don't agree with us, or those who believe wrongly; but we mean that which neither pains the body nor troubles the mind. [132] For it is not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals, and not taking advantage of slaves and women, nor does an extravagant table of fish and other things bring forth a sweet life but self-controlled reasoning and examining the cause of every choice and rejection and driving out the greatest number of opinions that take hold of the mind and bring confusion and trouble.


    And so the foundation of all these and the greatest good is φρόνησις, practical wisdom. On this account, practical wisdom is prized more dearly than philosophy itself, and from practical wisdom springs forth all the remaining virtues, teaching us that a pleasurable life does not exist without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; nor do the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice without pleasure: because the virtues grow together with a pleasurable life and the pleasurable life is inseparable from these.


    Personally, one of the biggest epiphanies for me while doing my translation and commentary on the letter was the "bread and water" section in 131. Realizing that that was NOT an ascetic instruction but rather the basic meal of regular ancient Greeks was eye-opening.

    Another eye-opener for me was the vocabulary used in the "not taking advantage of slaves (or boys) and women" section.

    Feel free to read my commentary at Internet Archive and let me know if you agree with my conclusions. We're all here to grow.

  • Cassius

    Changed the title of the thread from “Episode One Hundred Thirty-Nine - The Letter to Menoeceus 06 - Pleasure Part Two - (Preproduction )” to “Episode One Hundred Thirty-Nine - The Letter to Menoeceus 06 - Pleasure Part Two”.

    Episode 139 - The Letter to Menoeceus 06 - On Pleasure (Part Two) - is now available!


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    Quote from Don

    A simple meal of hearty, wholesome bread and spring water delivers the most extreme pleasure whenever food and drink have been brought to bear against hunger and thirst

    You did a good job summarizing, Joshua :thumbup:


    Good job everyone! A solid episode!


    Joshua also mentioned my aversion to "profligate." Here's that section from my commentary:


    131h. οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν,

    • οὐ ...λέγομεν, "we don't say …"
    • τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς "the pleasure of those who are ἀσώτων"
      • ἀσώτων (genitive of ἄσωτος (asōtos)
      • LSJ defines ἄσωτος as "having no hope of safety, in desperate case; abandoned; spendthrift, profligate." The Latin synonym given is perditus "squander, dissipate, waste, throw away, lost"

    A quick diversion on ἄσωτος is in order. For those readers with a background in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the parable of the Prodigal Son uses this exact word to describe the lifestyle chosen by the wayward son: And not many days after the younger son gathered all together, and took his journey into a far country, and there wasted his substance with riotous living. (Luke 15:13, KJV) Here ἄσωτος is translated as "riotous living." The word also occurs in one other place, this time in the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew scriptures (known to Christians as the "Old" Testament) to describe a sex worker, calling her ἀνεπτερωμένη "inciting" and ἄσωτος "carnal." (Proverbs 7:11) The original connotation of "having no hope" or "lost" gives an extra dimension to the word. The word literally is formed from ἀ- (“not”) +‎ σῴζω (sṓizō “save”): "not saved, lost, desperate." That sense, along with the "extravagant, prodigal, profligate," gives me a much richer sense of what Epicurus's point was.


    It needs to also be pointed out that, unlike those Biblical references, there's no moral judgment being passed here. All pleasure is good. It's a question of the consequences. We'll discuss this after we examine how Epicurus describes the pleasure of those who are described as ἄσωτος.

    I don't think I expressed clearly enough in the podcast that removal of pain is the beginning or start of pleasure, and when the experience of pleasure has no mixed-in or co-existing feelings of pain then this is the pinnacle of pleasure and at this pinnacle we are living as the gods. In other words the highest form of sensual pleasure (at it's height) will also be free from mental pain (we will be free from worry and fear).

    Quote from Kalosyni

    In other words the highest form of sensual pleasure (at it's height) will also be free from mental pain (we will be free from worry and fear).


    Let me ask a question about this for Kalosyni or anyone:


    We have from three separate sources this well-attested statement of Epicurus about knowing "the good":



    If "freedom from pain" amounts to the highest sensual pleasure, would you expect that "freedom from pain" or "freedom from disturbance" could just as easily have been listed among these (taste / sex / sound / dance) that Epicurus chose to list? If so, why? If not, why not?

    Quote from Cassius

    If "freedom from pain" amounts to the highest sensual pleasure, would you expect that "freedom from pain" or "freedom from disturbance" could just as easily have been listed among these (taste / sex / sound / dance) that Epicurus chose to list? If so, why? If not, why not?

    Just to clarify -- I am not saying that when you don't feel pain that is exactly the same as pleasure. What I am saying is that if you have some pain mixed into your experience of sensuality then you are not yet experiencing the most pleasurable sensuality. The best experience of sensuality doesn't have pain mixed in to it.


    I am basing this on contemplation of the experience of feeling in the body as it arises. So I don't have any direct Epicurean source for this idea.


    But I believe that this is important to think about because I believe that this could be at the source of something getting lost in translation. The goal isn't a kind of "boring existence" of neutral feeling in the body which doesn't have pain and therefore qualifies as a state of pleasantness. But the goal is maximizing the sweetest sensations of pleasure by seeing that we haven't yet reached the "purest" feeling of pleasure if we are also still feeling pain in the body (over-indulgences) or the mind (anxiety/fear).

    Quote from Kalosyni

    In other words the highest form of sensual pleasure (at it's height) will also be free from mental pain (we will be free from worry and fear).

    Also, this has to do with a certain segment in time -- it isn't going to be at every moment of every day -- But rather it will unfold depending on a given situation. Ideally we will experience some parts of our day in this way -- we will have the experience of situations that feel very sweet and enjoyable.

    Quote

    “For my part I find no meaning which I can attach to what is termed good, if I take away from it the pleasures obtained by taste, if I take away the pleasures which come from listening to music, if I take away too the charm derived by the eyes from the sight of figures in movement, or other pleasures by any of the senses in the whole man. Nor indeed is it possible to make such a statement as this – that it is joy of the mind which is alone to be reckoned as a good; for I understand by a mind in a state of joy, that it is so, when it has the hope of all the pleasures I have named – that is to say the hope that nature will be free to enjoy them without any blending of pain.” And this much he says in the words I have quoted, so that anyone you please may realize what Epicurus understands by pleasure. (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III.18.41)

    Cassius --It does seem to be listed, and maybe this is the only location?

    Quote from Cassius

    If "freedom from pain" amounts to the highest sensual pleasure, would you expect that "freedom from pain" or "freedom from disturbance" could just as easily have been listed among these (taste / sex / sound / dance) that Epicurus chose to list? If so, why? If not, why not?

    By definition, "freedom from pain" = "filled with pleasure" so I don't think he *had* list specifically list it for it to be intrinsically there already. Note also that all three reference you give appear to be citing Epicurus's On the End-Goal (listed in Diogenes Laertius as On the Telos Περὶ τέλους. It just seems Cicero is quoting more of the text.

    Quote from Kalosyni

    The goal isn't a kind of "boring existence" of neutral feeling in the body which doesn't have pain and therefore qualifies as a state of pleasantness. But the goal is maximizing the sweetest sensations of pleasure by seeing that we haven't yet reached the "purest" feeling of pleasure if we are also still feeling pain in the body (over-indulgences) or the mind (anxiety/fear).

    I like that summary very much.


    Quote from Kalosyni
    Quote from Kalosyni

    In other words the highest form of sensual pleasure (at it's height) will also be free from mental pain (we will be free from worry and fear).

    Also, this has to do with a certain segment in time -- it isn't going to be at every moment of every day -- But rather it will unfold depending on a given situation. Ideally we will experience some parts of our day in this way -- we will have the experience of situations that feel very sweet and enjoyable.

    Well put again! I would add - from my perspective - one of the goals is to increase those "segments of time" to be both longer and more frequent. And - again from my perspective - that's why cultivating "tranquility" and "peace of mind" is important: it allows us to have a "tranquil" baseline and to be less easily perturbed/disturbed. We will experience the bites of anger, annoyance, etc., but we won't be swept away by them.

    Quote from Cassius

    Is it listed in the same way such that it appears to be parallel or could have been included in the original listing?

    I'm not quite sure of what you're asking here? Could you expand on that? One thought: there is not way to know what was in the original text by Epicurus - the "original listing" - which is lost except for these fragments.

    Quote from Don

    Well put again! I would add - from my perspective - one of the goals is to increase those "segments of time" to be both longer and more frequent. And - again from my perspective - that's why cultivating "tranquility" and "peace of mind" is important: it allows us to have a "tranquil" baseline and to be less easily perturbed/disturbed. We will experience the bites of anger, annoyance, etc., but we won't be swept away by them.

    Practically speaking, I completely agree with this. "Cultivating tranquility" is both mental and physical as well: it only makes sense since the mental is actually based in the physical. There's nothing mystical about this and such cultivation might include things like studying natural science, contemplating philosophy, doing deep breathing exercises, taking a hot bath, spending time in a hammock with a cold drink while feeling a breeze and observing the scenery. Or watching the stars and night. Or fully concentrating on a simple task... &c.

    The reason for the question is to harl back to the debate on "katastematic pleasure", which may may not be related to tranquility, and to ask whether indeed either or both of those terms is in fact a "sensual pleasure" at all. (This question is the theme of the Wentham essay in our files section.)


    There is a question as to whether it is indeed "sensual pleasure" which establishes how Epicurus recognizes the good, and whether "absence of pain" describes an identifiable sensual pleasure itself, or whether it describes instead a condition in which other / sensual pleasures are experienced without any mixture of pain or disruption.

    I know several of us have talked about this essay before, but I am not sure Kalosyni has and it relates to her points in the way I am raising so she may want to check it -


    File
    Mathew Wenham - On Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure In Epicurus
    The standard interpretation of the concept of katastematic pleasure in Epicurus .... leads to fundamental contradictions in his theory. I claim that it is not Epicurus, but the standard interpretation that generates these errors...
    Cassius

    I haven't reviewed Wenham's paper but my kinetic / katastematic opinion is that kinetic pleasures are predicated on external forces acting upon us, katastematic pleasures arise from within ourselves (within our own minds). I'll need to substantiate that with texts, but that's my starting point.

    Unwinding the katestematic/kinetic issue, and these issues that we are talking about in this section, could and would consume our entire attention if we let it. Here's another article that came through my email today on the same topic asking the same questions:



    We can and will continue to discuss this issue because it is like a veil over the whole of Epicurean philosophy, and unless we lift it we never get to actually living and applying the Epicurean worldview. That's one of the reasons I think I will always see Lucretius as the real starting point to Epicurus. Lucretius explains the nature of the world and our place in it in practical terms and he never gets lost in "absence of pain" or seems to consider this issue important at all. I don't really think that Epicurus or the founding Greek Epicureans did either, thus we don't see this issue obsessed over in the texts we have left, and there's no hint that it was a major topic in other texts that are lost.


    Our challenge, I think, is to articulate an understandable and coherent big picture overview of Epicurean philosophy and then get back to the original task: living life as happily as possible. That means spending as much time as possible with friends who also share the same perspective, and (given the nature of things) that in itself means that we have to train ourselves like Lucretius to be able to present the big picture in a persuasive way without being sidetracked by our philosophic enemies.


    In fact, it is tempting to trace the decline and fall of the Epicurean period to the time of Cicero and his elevation of these word-game arguments to the heart of the discussion. Very little confident forward-thinking successful Epicurean writing has emerged in the 2000 years since this the time of Lucretius and the philosophy got hijacked into this sidetrack of a discussion. Most of the ink spilled on this topic has been an absolute waste - which again I think was Cicero's intention, picked up by many others along the way.

    Joshua there were lots of good but short statements in these last two episodes and one that comes to mind is your "Epicurus in Romeo and Juliet" comment.


    We need at least one thread on that - maybe "Epicurus in Shakespeare" but maybe several by particular play. Please think about that - we may have some already but I don't think it is organized.

    Quote from Don

    I haven't reviewed Wenham's paper but my kinetic / katastematic opinion is that kinetic pleasures are predicated on external forces acting upon us, katastematic pleasures arise from within ourselves (within our own minds). I'll need to substantiate that with texts, but that's my starting point.

    I would point back to this post of mine:

    Post
    RE: Do Pigs Value Katastematic Pleasure? ( Summer 2022 K / K Discussion)
    This got longer as I continued to review this thread. This is enough for now! These are consolidated ancient and modern sources and some notes from my posts within this thread:

    Notes:

    Idea (revised): Biological homeostasis = aponia (freedom from pain in the body; everything is working as it should.

    Pathe "what is done or happens to a person or thing, opposite: πρᾶξις (praxis)" Praxis is the concrete aspect of pragma (genitive: pragmata).

    On perceived errors in Wikipedia: We can all be Wikipedia…
    Don
    Quote from Cassius

    The reason for the question is to harl back to the debate on "katastematic pleasure", which may may not be related to tranquility, and to ask whether indeed either or both of those terms is in fact a "sensual pleasure" at all. (This question is the theme of the Wentham essay in our files section.)


    There is a question as to whether it is indeed "sensual pleasure" which establishes how Epicurus recognizes the good, and whether "absence of pain" describes an identifiable sensual pleasure itself, or whether it describes instead a condition in which other / sensual pleasures are experienced without any mixture of pain or disruption.

    Thanks for that clarification, and mea culpa for not addressing your response earlier!

    Quote from Cassius

    the debate on "katastematic pleasure", which may may not be related to tranquility

    To that, I would say there doesn't seem to be much a debate to me. "Tranquility" = ataraxia = katastematic pleasure. Tranquility is usual/often translation of "ataraxia" which is specifically listed as a katastematic pleasure.

    Quote from Cassius

    to ask whether indeed either or both of those terms is in fact a "sensual pleasure" at all

    I'll admit I haven't read Wenham yet, but to your specific question there, I'd have to point back to:

    "Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is without consciousness / sensations / perception, and that which is without consciousness / sensations / perception is nothing to us."


    Above being a statement of why to be free from the fear of death, I think PD2 is also a retort to the Cyrenaics: "Pleasure and pain are both ‘movements,’ according to the Cyrenaics: pleasure a smooth motion, and pain a rough motion. The absence of either type of motion is an intermediate state which is neither pleasurable nor painful. This is directed against Epicurus’ theory that the homeostatic state of being free of pain, need and worry is itself most pleasant. The Cyrenaics make fun of the Epicurean theory by saying that this state of being free of desires and pain is the condition of a corpse." (Source) (NOTE: The commentator here says "this state of being free of desires and pain" but I don't believe Epicurus said a "state of being free from desire" but free from disturbance. They're NOT the same thing.)


    Once Epicurus posited that there was no "neutral state," he had to basically say that any pleasure MUST be "sensual" in the sense (no pun intended) that it is sensed, it is perceived, that we are conscious of it. I don't think there can be such a thing as a non-sensual pleasure. It's an oxymoron. What would that even mean? Even if it is a pleasant memory, we *feel* the pleasure of the memory.

    Quote from Cassius

    There is a question as to whether it is indeed "sensual pleasure" which establishes how Epicurus recognizes the good, and whether "absence of pain" describes an identifiable sensual pleasure itself, or whether it describes instead a condition in which other / sensual pleasures are experienced without any mixture of pain or disruption.

    Again, I think that "absence of pain" is something that is sensed but it doesn't arise from outside influences or causes. It is something felt "from inside." Felt. Sensed. Aponia "No pain" is a "state" or "condition" in which one feels untroubled in the body. Aponia and ataraxia are "things" felt in and of themselves, as much as joy (khara) and mirth/ good cheer (euphrosyne).

    Quote from Don

    Again, I think that "absence of pain" is something that is sensed but it doesn't arise from outside influences or causes. It is something felt "from inside." Felt. Sensed. Aponia "No pain" is a "state" or "condition" in which one feels untroubled in the body. Aponia and ataraxia are "things" felt in and of themselves, as much as joy (khara) and mirth/ good cheer (euphrosyne).

    Revising and extending my remarks:

    I implied in that quote that aponia = "absence of pain." I don't think that's right. Aponia and ataraxia are katastematic pleasures, just as khara and euphrosyne are kinetic pleasures. Hence, in my remarks above, they are all four sensed, perceived, etc.

    The actual description of "absence of pain" is usually spelled out in full, and it's not always that phrase in the original:

    Fragment 422. We need pleasure when in pain because of its absence; but when we are not experiencing such pain, and are perceiving stably, then there is no need for pleasure. For it is not the needs of nature which, from outside us, create harm, but desire driven by groundless opinions.


    Fragment 423. What brings unsurpassed joy is the removal of a great evil (μέγα κακόν mega kakon "great evil; ie, pain"); and this is the nature of the good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about chattering emptily.


    Fragment 445. We must not blame the body for the greatest evils nor attribute our troubles to mere circumstance. Instead we seek their cause within the soul (psykhē "mind, soul, psyche"): for by giving up every trifling and fleeting desire we give birth to a confidence perfect in itself.


    I think I've looked at "every trifling and fleeting desire" recently in another thread, but the importance here is that "we seek their cause within the mind/soul." That fragment to me seems to say that the greatest pains/evils are generated from within the mind, and, to me, that implies that we also have access to the greatest pleasures from within our minds (as Metrodorus and Epicurus say in their texts).


    I think the sensation /recognition and enjoyment of the "absenceof pain" is itself ataraxia and aponia. The sensation of being in the condition or state of absence of pain in the body and freedom from disturbance in the mind is aponia and ataraxia. Just as engagement in a physical activity brings joy (khara) and mirth (euphrosyne).