From The "Golden Mean" to tbe "Summum Bonum" - Useful or Deceptive Frames of Reference?

    This discussion (split from here: What do you mean from the "Golden Mean" of Aristotle? ) reminds me of two other recent things that have been in my mind:


    (1) i was discussing with someone a new sort of 'self-help' book that the person was reading, which focuses on what I perceive to be psychological self-help techniques geared toward reaching goals. My comment was to ask whether that person had first identified their real goals, as is makes sense to me that is usually would be appropriate to clarify in one's mind what one's proper goal IS, before launching off into generic goal-achieving activity.


    (2) I know I have probably spoken negatively in the past about articles which seem to say that we should not set pleasure or happiness as our goal, but rather something else, and look for pleasure and happiness as side affects rather than going after them directly. I still think negatively of that perspective BUT:


    I have always realized that the word "happiness" and even "pleasure" to a degree are conceptual abstractions. The word 'happiness' almost definitely is so, and we find "happiness" being used in totally different ways by different people, so much so that it takes fairly elaborate definition-building to be clear what we're talking about.


    "Pleasure" has some of the same issues, but it is a word that also more clearly denotes a "Feeling" - and i think that it is as a feeling that it takes its central role in Epicurean philosophy, as a part of the canon of truth by which we grapple with external reality.


    But it's also obvious that "pleasure" is no different from "hedone" or other words in other languages - it too is a concept for which we have to do some mental processing to identify what we mean when we use it.


    Epicurus was always clear that the feelings are TWO - pleasure and pain, and that we sometimes choose the pain in order to achieve more pleasure or avoid worse pain. But formulating it that way still requires you to identify in your mind what it pleasurable and what is painful to YOU, and if you don't think through the issues carefully you end up totally wasting your time - or in the words of Torquatus - "Surely no one recoils from or dislikes or avoids pleasure in itself because it is pleasure, but because great pains come upon those who do not know how to follow pleasure rationally."


    Here we have to keep in mind that "rationallly" doesn't mean using the syllogistic abstract logic detached from reality that Epicurus criticizes, but does mean "sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit." (Letter to Menoeceus).


    So we need to ask ourselves if we have really soberly reasoned through the details and searched out the motives and ways that we find pleasure and avoid pain in our own personal circumstances. If we have adopted faulty opinions from others, or from teachers, or culture, or religion, or whatever, have we banished those from our thoughts and clearly identified what is going to bring to us OUR greatest pleasure and OUR relief from pain?


    I gather that this is probably related to what Smoothiekiwi was talking about earlier. It is totally non-Epicurean to simply and blindly pursue "pleasure" without regard to what the action we engage in ultimately brings to us, and without banishing into the pit the false opinions about the nature of the universe that lead us in the wrong direction.


    VS46. Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits, as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm.


    That's why it's not good to think of this philosophy as Pleasurism, or Hedonism.


    This isn't either of those. This is EPICURUS.


    Sung to the tune of this

    Quote from Cassius

    Well I am not sure we need to pursue it, but what I was trying to focus in on is why what you stated led you to doubt Epicureanism....

    Sorry, I've read over it :)

    To be honest, I think that my biggest problem is to accept that there isn't any sort of abstract ideas flying around- universal norms and ideas. Platonism is so deeply anchored in our society that it's incredibly difficult to let it go. That's what I've discovered from Skepticism: I'm full of dogmas, absolute "right and wrong"-s etc. Just today, I had a discussion with my brother, who postulated that it's in the nature of each and every person to become better. And I've noticed that subconsciously, this idea is still in me. To let it go is an incredible amount of work.

    And at no moment did I think that the logic behind Epicureanism was bad or faulty- but the inner resistance against "letting it go" was (and is) incredibly strong. Probably that's the reason why so many people still are Christians, although we can now scientifically prove that the Bible is in many parts wrong: it's so, so difficult to let your concepts go with which you've grown up. I'm still very young and had only a few such dogmas; I don't want to imagine how a person 40, 50, 60 years of age must feel when he/she realizes that their life was built on a lie. Its better to still "sit in the cave", to speak of Plato's allegory, than to come out and realize the lie. It's really, really scary.

    Quote from Cassius

    So we need to ask ourselves if we have really soberly reasoned through the details and searched out the motives and ways that we find pleasure and avoid pain in our own personal circumstances. If we have adopted faulty opinions from others, or from teachers, or culture, or religion, or whatever, have we banished those from our thoughts and clearly identified what is going to bring to us OUR greatest pleasure and OUR relief from pain?


    I gather that this is probably related to what Smoothiekiwi was talking about earlier. It is totally non-Epicurean to simply and blindly pursue "pleasure" without regard to what the action we engage in ultimately brings to us, and without banishing into the pit the false opinions about the nature of the universe that lead us in the wrong direction.

    I completely agree, it's a good point. But that also means that one stands against much of the society- and for that, it' beneficial to have friends... and I remember that there was a post two days ago about how to make Epicurean friends ;)

    I think that such a forum is amazing- I'm very sure that I would run with misconceptions about Epicureanism without this place-, but it still cannot replace real life friends.

    Quote from smoothiekiwi

    , but it still cannot replace real life friends.

    You are absolutely right, we cannot ever forget that, and so we have to use this place as a start, not an endpoint, and move forward into organizing our local real worlds to find (or make from scratch!) Friends who are Epicureans or at least Epicurean-friendly.

    Quote from Cassius

    I have always realized that the word "happiness" and even "pleasure" to a degree are conceptual abstractions.

    From my perspective, the big difference between "pleasure" and, say, "virtue" as the goal is that pleasure is first and primarily a biological reality, then the concept is built in that. Virtue as a concept is built in a foundation of sand at the seashore. There's nothing there. It's a concept on a concept. Pleasure and pain, in contrast, in some form are present in all forms of life down to amoebas and tardigrades. Even plants exhibit some aspect of this. Humans move from this biological imperative of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain for survival to extrapolate mental pleasure and pain, to build concepts on top of this imperative, but there is always that sound foundation upon which those concepts point back to.

    Quote from Cassius

    But it's also obvious that "pleasure" is no different from "hedone" or other words in other languages - it too is a concept for which we have to do some mental processing to identify what we mean when we use it

    I would be careful about using phrases like "it too is a concept" in this context. It's maybe better to think of words as labels. All languages label reality in different ways, sometimes dividing it up finer or coarser. I'll have to go back again and read Book XXVIII.

    Quote from Cassius

    It is totally non-Epicurean to simply and blindly pursue "pleasure" without regard to what the action we engage in ultimately brings to us

    Yep. That's the job of the Cyrenaics.

    I find this thread discussion to be very enjoyable, and important for a correct understanding of Epicureanism. Without thoroughly understanding these issues it will be difficult to begin to create local Epicurean groups. Also, for reasons that come up in Smoothiekiwi post...


    Quote from smoothiekiwi

    ....biggest problem is to accept that there isn't any sort of abstract ideas flying around- universal norms and ideas. Platonism is so deeply anchored in our society that it's incredibly difficult to let it go....dogmas, absolute "right and wrong"-s etc. Just today, I had a discussion with my brother, who postulated that it's in the nature of each and every person to become better.

    Epicureanism exists with it's unique principles and paradigms in the midst of all previous philosophical constructs, and part of the work is sifting through it all to become very clear about what Epicureanism is.


    I think it will be difficult to establish local groups. A person must be predisposed to certain traits or habits or predispositions in order to be interested in Epicureanism...and I think that in our given times few people will be drawn toward Epicureanism...but does that mean we should give up? I am still moving forward with hope on this, that it will be possible. And this brings up the question of what sorts of traits/habits/predispositions must be present for a person to be interested in engaging with Epicurean philosophy? (a separate thread for this?).


    In the few most recent posts in this thread are important Epicurean ideas, and these ideas need to be collected and put into small books (or zines) which we can give to people that we think possess the traits required for Epicurean philosophy.


    Another idea comes up -- the need for "levels" within Epicureanism (a separate thread for this?)


    1) "Epicureanism lite" - for people with less time or inclination to study

    2) "Epicureanism engaged" - for people who want to put in serious study

    3) "Epicurean guardians and guides" - for people who want to maintain the accuracy of the teachings and teach others

    Quote from Cassius

    I have always realized that the word "happiness" and even "pleasure" to a degree are conceptual abstractions. The word 'happiness' almost definitely is so, and we find "happiness" being used in totally different ways by different people, so much so that it takes fairly elaborate definition-building to be clear what we're talking about.

    This is very important to think about. Happiness is always about a "story" that you are telling yourself. And it includes stories about the past and about the future, as well as the present moment. In Epicureanism, it includes ideas about the best way to bring about a happy life, and think we would all be on the same page to say that we know it can't be found in material possessions. But the "stories" we tell ourselve about our level(s) of happiness, are based on experiences that have a feeling tone of either generally pleasureable or generally painful. Of course life is a mix of feelings, but as Epicureans we hold to a goal of mainly pleasureable experiences which we would then label as "happiness".


    This morning as I write this, I notice...Oh what a difference a solid good night of sleep makes! As well as a sunny morning with crystal blue skies! But there is still more than these simple pleasures to discover and cultivate in Epicureanism.


    Everyone's comments here are so helpful, and for myself I will continue to contemplate these issues of pleasure, pain, happiness, and virtue.

    I'll need to go and read DeWitt's "summum bonum fallacy" (Where is that again?), but here's my take. I've ranted in similar themes before.

    To my understanding, summum bonum is the Romans' way of translations Greek τέλος into Latin. They're both trying to get at the same thing. Pleasure is the "highest good", the goal, etc. because it is that to which everything else points. It's at the end of the road (τέλος/goal) to which all roads lead. It's the "highest good" because it's at the top of the mountain, Pleasure Point, and the Virtue Trail, the Wisdom Trail, the Name Your Path Trail, all end up trying to get you to pleasure. You are virtuous because it, in the final analysis, brings you pleasure whatever you'll admit it or not. Summum bonum doesn't seem to me to be a value judgment (as in "Pleasure is the best among equals"), it's a difference in kind from other things judged "good." It's the good thing to which all other "good things" point. All other "good things" are instrumental in achieving pleasure. Pleasure itself is not instrumental (other than being a necessary component of well-being/ευδαιμονία/happiness).

    Quote from Don

    I'll need to go and read DeWitt's "summum bonum fallacy" (Where is that again?),

    I thought we already had it here somewhere, but apparently not. That has been remedied:


    I had forgotten that DeWitt marshals in support of this argument his interpretation of VS42, so this article places that in issue too. I have always thought that DeWitt's argument on VS42 makes sense, so it will be interesting to get comments on that too.


    File
    Epicurus: The Summum Bonum Fallacy
    The aim of this article is to show how the lack of a definite article in Latin obliterated the doctrine of Epicurus that life itself and not pleasure is the greatest good.
    Cassius

    Here are my thoughts on Norman DeWitt’s “Epicurus: The Summum Bonum Fallacy” (1950).


    Overall, I’m unimpressed with DeWitt’s aim of using a linguistic quirk between Greek and Latin to make a larger philosophical point. Numerous languages get by with no definite article and can convey as complex and nuanced as any language with a definite article: “Linguists believe the common ancestor of the Indo-European languages, Proto-Indo-European, did not have articles. Most of the languages in this family do not have definite or indefinite articles: there is no article in Latin or Sanskrit, nor in some modern Indo-European languages, such as the families of Slavic languages (except for Bulgarian and Macedonian, which are rather distinctive among the Slavic languages in their grammar, and some Northern Russian dialects[7]), Baltic languages and many Indo-Aryan languages. Although Classical Greek had a definite article (which has survived into Modern Greek and which bears strong functional resemblance to the German definite article, which it is related to), the earlier Homeric Greek used this article largely as a pronoun or demonstrative, whereas the earliest known form of Greek known as Mycenaean Greek did not have any articles. Articles developed independently in several language families.” (Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/…Crosslinguistic_variation )


    From all I can see, Latin simply translated Greek τελος into Latin summum bonum as the closest alternative. To compare the two definitions:

    Greek: telos: excerpt: “3. Philos., full realization, highest point. ideal” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h…1999.04.0057:entry=te/los

    Latin: summum bonum (summus): excerpt: “H.—Of rank or degree, highest, greatest, loftiest, first, supreme, best, utmost, extreme” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h…1999.04.0060:entry=summus


    I’m curious about his second paragraph where he says that “Epicurus is on record as assuming that "only Greeks are capable of succeeding in philosophy,"” He cites Usener 226 which comes from Clement of Alexandria’s Miscellanies, I.15. Here’s the full context of that source:

    And Plato does not deny that he procured all that is most excellent in philosophy from the barbarians; and he admits that he came into Egypt. Whence, writing in the Phædo that the philosopher can receive aid from all sides, he said: "Great indeed is Greece, O Cebes, in which everywhere there are good men, and many are the races of the barbarians."[128] Thus Plato thinks that some of the barbarians, too, are philosophers. But Epicurus, on the other hand, supposes that only Greeks can philosophise. (1.15.67.1 οὕτως οἴεται ὁ Πλάτων καὶ βαρβάρων φιλοσόφους τινὰς εἶναι, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔμπαλιν ὑπολαμ1.15.67.2 βάνει μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας δύνασθαι.) https://en.wikisource.org/wiki…/The_Miscellanies:_Book_1


    I wonder if this is also connected to the characteristics of the wise one in Diogenes Laertius (DL) X.117 when he talks about other nations: https://sites.google.com/view/…or-nationality?authuser=0 DL does not mention Greek or Greeks specifically in that text.


    Whether Cicero’s statement that “the Latin language is not only not lacking in copiousness but is actually richer than Greek" is more absurd than DeWitt’s contention that the lack of an article makes Latin somehow deficient is problematic from a scholar like DeWitt. As I said, I don’t find his basic thesis here convincing or compelling.


    DeWitt states that "In Greek the practice is to say "the greatest good" and not "the highest good," and to Epicurus "the greatest good" was not pleasure but life itself. In other words, to him the summum bonum was not the telos." This seems to me to be splitting the tiniest of hairs: greatest vs highest. Look at the Greek and Latin definitions above. Both words seem to show up in the definitions of each.


    DeWitt also claims that "Epicurus, holding body and soul to be alike corporeal, placed the two on a parity, and one of his definitions of happiness is "a healthy mind in a healthy body."" I had problems with this in his book, Epicurus and His Philosophy, but I can accept that Epicurus held a similar view. But here in this paper, when DeWitt is putting so much stock in the differences between Latin and Greek, he made me laugh out loud when I read the Footnote 8 (emphasis added):


    Footnote says 8 ***Not citable in Greek,*** but demonstrable: cf. Horace Carm.i. 31. 17-19; Juvenal x. 356 mens sana in corpore sano (Epicurean context); Petron. 61 bonam mentem bonamque valetudinem.


    And he goes on to cite Latin references for Epicurus’s supposedly Greek idea. That just seems sloppy to me.


    DeWitt tries to use DL X.126 to substantiate Epicurus's "reason for placing a higher value upon old age as against youth." I don't see that in 126. Instead, 126 seems to express Epicurus's insistence that one is never too old or too young to practice philosophy.


    [126] The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offence to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades.


    For those unfamiliar with Maecenas (as I was!), here’s his WP entry: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaius_Maecenas?wprov=sfla1


    DeWitt then discusses Vatican Saying 42 which is interesting on a number of levels. First of all, there is not agreement on what the Vatican Saying even says or, if it is correct in its transcription from some earlier texts. Here is the actual line from the early 14th century manuscript containing the Vatican Sayings: Vat.gr.1950.pt.2 https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0257

    9VpRBDmZhDbIVUZSaqPXk8ZWGZacw6oww6G0Ygta0OyY-nP-F6dTg4Arn5wD-UAi2NIWEsUqsJmeYpGxNUsmpSWmzYiMEfxSxw0QuiM8AL5-keDw-guyu6Zu5fzTzptzVbTIwjpc

    As written it appears to read: ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως

    However, some editors/scholars add to the end: ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως <τοῦ κακοῦ>. (e.g., Saint-Andre: https://monadnock.net/epicurus/vatican-sayings.html , http://wiki.epicurism.info/Vatican_Saying_42/ , and others)

    Bailey suggests the reading should be ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ απολαύσεως


    DeWitt's translation is "The same span of time embraces both beginning and end of the greatest good." I have problems with his use of the word “embraces”. I do not see that within the Greek. The Greek, as it stands, without the added on “evil” is literally something like:

    “At the same time, there is both the creation (γενέσεως) of the greatest good and the release/departure (ἀπολύσεως)" That last word is why some scholars advocate for adding on "of the greatest evil" so we would get "release/departure of the greatest evil." But evil isn't in the manuscript.


    Bailey's translation is "The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment." I have problems with Bailey’s use of “blessing.”


    Bailey cites απολαύσεως "having enjoyment of a thing" instead of ἀπολύσεως "release, deliverance from a thing" which the latter is suggested by Usener and evidently accepted by DeWitt since he cites Bailey in his paper. Neither Bailey nor DeWitt make use of the added <τοῦ κακοῦ> “the [greatest] evil” so it’s obviously not needed to make a decent translation. DeWitt’s putting so much stock into this saying to bolster his argument is problematic in that there is so much debate and discrepancy among scholars on VS42. It should be clearly stated that many of the Vatican Sayings, including this one, are without context.


    ἀπολύσεως http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h…%3Aentry%3Da%29po%2Flusis

    απολαύσεως http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h…3Aentry%3Da%29po%2Flausis


    I can see rationalizations for either translation, DeWitt’s or Bailey’s.


    So, in the end, I can’t see any reason for DeWitt to maintain that Epicurus had any “highest good” or telos other than pleasure.

    Thanks for this deep analysis!


    I'll just leave the point as is at the moment, because I am not nearly as qualified as DeWitt or even Don to parse the Latin and Greek. I will repeat that I do see differences between "good" and "goal" and I can imagine all sorts of confusion arising from those distinctions. I am reminded of the phrase in Book Two of Lucretius - " ...GUIDE of life, divine pleasure." (ipsaque deducit dux vitae dia voluptas)


    I am particularly not willing to say that I think DeWitt is definitely right, or definitely wrong, because it does appear to me that Epicurus was cautioning against walking around uselessly harping on the meaning of the good, and I see this as something that other philosophers are harping on rather than Epicurus. The danger to me only comes when we get fixated on the "greatest good" and presume that there is a single answer to that question that fits everyone. I am not sure that Epicurus accepted any real logical framework other than the observation that nature gives us only two signals by which to determine what to choose and what to avoid, and that is pleasure and pain. Torquatus himself seems to say that even in this same On Ends - only a few moments after he had framed the question in this very way.


    Is DeWitt correct to say that pleasure and pain have meaning only to the living, so that without life pleasure and pain are of no consequence to us? Certainly I would say that the answer to that is "yes."


    Does that make pleasure or life the "highest good?" I am afraid that I think that is a linguistic exercise that is fraught with many dangers. So at least for the moment I consider that to be a question that cannot readily be answered. And I remain uncertain that the question "What is the greatest good?" was a way in which Epicurus himself liked to frame his philosophy.

    Quote from Cassius

    The danger to me only comes when we get fixated on the "greatest good" and presume that there is a single answer to that question that fits everyone.

    I have to disagree with that characterization. There *is* a single answer for everyone's telos/summum bonum: The "greatest good" for everyone is pleasure.

    As a categorical answer for philosophical debate, I agree with you. And as a statement of the *guide* of life I would agree even more. But as a practical and discrete definition of "greatest good" that an average person can apply, I don't think that the single word is sufficient to convey the full meaning that Epicurus would convey if he were here to explain it in greater detail. And I am not yet convinced that he would even attempt to do so, beyond providing the example that he then used to show the futility of the Peripatetics efforts.


    Also, in discussion tonight on chapter 3 of A Few Days In Athens, Kevin brought up that it was the Stoics who postulated a single unified and unitary good - virtue - which is something that in his view even Aristotle did not do. (Kevin suggested that Aristotle spoke in terms of many goods in Nichomachean Ethics.)


    That makes me more concerned than ever that the search for a "greatest good" might not be Epicurean at all, despite Torquatus' framework.


    Then there is the question of whether pleasure is a "unity" such that pleasure can be considered singly in a way similar to the way the Stoics considered virtue to be a unity. And that would implicate the PD which refers to "if pleasure could be condensed.....". I am still not confident what that saying means at all, much less whether he is implying an affirmative or negative answer.


    I think this question probably has an answer that we can eventually come to terms on, but I am now thinking that being confident would require more knowledge of what the earlier philospher had done with the issue of single versus multiple goods than I presently have myself.


    When I combine the Lucretian reference to pleasure as a guide with what I see in the letter to Menoeceus, I see much more foundation for seeing pleasure as the GUIDE than I do for a specific "greatest good" analysis.


    Cause frankly I am pretty sure I know what a "guide" is, but I am not at all sure I know what a "greatest good" is.

    If I remember correctly from The Greeks on Pleasure, the earlier philosophers were searching for the most pleasant life, not the greatest good.


    Having said that, here are some of my notes from the book that might be pertinent (they're scattered throughout the book as shown by the reference numbers):


    8.3.1 Eudoxus of Cnidus (via Aristotle): pleasure is the good because:

    - all animals, including men, pursue it, and what all pursue is the good

    - all animals and men avoid pain as an evil, and what is opposite of an evil, pleasure, must be good

    - pleasure is never for the sake of something else: no one ever asks "why enjoy yourself?"

    - if pleasure is added to anything it makes it better.

    So at least some philosophers were discussing "the good".


    11.3.10 Aristotle is saying that to enjoy something is to bring a telos to the doing: to do it to the full.


    13.2.4 Telos is not a decisively purpose word like goal, but it equally means completion or perfection. Aristotle often uses it as actualization of natural potential.


    FWIW, I tend to think along similar lines as Cassius, that "the greatest good" is more of a philosophical argument carried on by others. In a materialist universe is it even possible to define a greatest good? For Epicurus I think that it's a functional guide as described in the Canon. But I'm wide open to correction on the issue!

    You posted another reply as I was typing this, but I think this address posts #33 and #35 above...


    As I said previously, saying "pleasure is the 'highest good' (summum bonum)" doesn't mean the "best among equally good things"; it means the highest, greatest, loftiest, first, supreme, best, utmost, extreme good thing - the one good thing that stands alone; the good thing to which all other good things points. It is the sum of all good things; the summit of all good things.


    I sincerely don't understand the hesitancy in this thread. Or the problem that is trying to be solved when it comes to calling pleasure either the "highest good" or the telos or even the guide. I would say pleasure is called the guide because it's the beacon at the summit to which we are trying to get at. It's the North Star by which we steer all our choices and avoidances. It's the goal and the guide.


    All the schools of philosophy in ancient Greece were arguing what was the purpose of a human life, what was it all leading up to, what was it for. I don't think Epicurus was any different in that respect. His revolution was in naming pleasure as that to which life pointed. But not Cyrenaic "sex, drugs, and rock n roll" momentary pleasures strung together - not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals - but something deeper and more long-lasting including being able to describe it as the health of the body and the tranquility of the mind. I think that was his revolution: to define pleasure wide enough for everyone to partake of it as the telos/guide/greatest good/The Good/T'agathon/etc.


    I know I don't have to quote chapter and verse to many here, but, for the record, here are some pertinent excerpts (at least from my perspective):


    PD25 Εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴ τε φυγὴν εἴ τε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλό τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.

    PD25 If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of nature, [pleasure] but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.


    Letter to Menoikeus: "The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, (i.e., the health of both our physical and our mental existence), since this is the goal (τέλος)of a blessed life.


    Letter to Menoikeus: "we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment, the beginning and end (ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος) of the blessed life."


    Letter to Menoikeus: "one who has rationally determined (ἐπιλελογισμένου) the τέλος of one's natural state." [which is pleasure]

    As I wake up this morning I think it is important to address Don's argument about "Why the hesitancy?"


    I am sure I have said written many times in the past, and will in the future, that pleasure is the greatest good. So why the hesitancy now?


    It's not just a matter of wanting to agree or disagree with DeWitt, that's for sure. I think what we are sensing as we drill down on the question is that we need to figure out why Epicurus seemed to be treating this question carefully, which even Torquatus seems to admit when he said that Epicurus denied the necessity to construct a logical argument that pleasure is good (if that was the point of Torquatus comment).


    Something similar seems to run through several questions. How can a thing be judged "good" unless it bring pleasure? Is virtue itself a pleasure, or is it something that brings pleasure?


    No one would argue, I think, that the words pleasure and good mean exactly the same thing. They don't . We define pleasure as a feeling (I think) but what is it that tells us that something is "good"? Is there some other quality besides feeling pleasure that defines good? If so what is it?


    I think Epicurus would clearly say that pleasure is the guide of life because we feel it to be so just like we see or hear.


    But to say that pleasure is "good" or especially "the greatest good" seems to require some other criteria - almost mystical in nature - which I can see good reasons to be careful about.


    Yes it is clear that pleasure is the only thing desirable in and of itself, and if we want to define "good" as desirable in and of itself" then pleasure is not only the highest but the only good. But is that so clearly what we mean by the word "good?


    We have the word guide which is clear. What is added by calling it "good" or calling pain "evil"?


    When talking to Plato and Stoics who insist on talking about good, it is natural to answer "pleasure".


    But very possibly Epicurus did not want to let THEM set the terms of the debate? And perhaps we should be careful as well?

    Another way of stating the issue:


    If you are going to ask the question "What is the greatest good?" The answer is "pleasure."


    But you also have to consider "Should you be asking that question?"

    Just in case someone reading this thread is not thoroughly familiar with these passages that are critical to this conversation:


    First Epicurus quoted by Plutarch:


    Quote

    U423

    Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their “thing delighted” – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: “That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good.”

    Ibid., 8, p. 1091E: Thus Epicurus, and Metrodorus too, suppose {that the middle is the summit and the end} when they take the position that escape from ill is the reality and upper limit of the good.


    Second Torquatus in Book One of On Ends, implying that he himself (Torquatus) disagrees with Epicurus as to what kind of proof is necessary:


    Quote

    IX. ‘First, then,’ said he, ‘I shall plead my case on the lines laid down by the founder of our school himself: I shall define the essence and features of the problem before us, not because I imagine you to be unacquainted with them, but with a view to the methodical progress of my speech. The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil; and he founds his proof of this on the following considerations.


    [30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that re is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?


    [31] There are however some of our own school, who want to state these principles with greater refinement, and who say that it is not enough to leave the question of good or evil to the decision of sense, but that thought and reasoning also enable us to understand both that pleasure in itself is matter for desire and that pain is in itself matter for aversion. So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is t for us to seek, the other to reject. Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too condent about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings.

    Quote from Don

    There *is* a single answer for everyone's telos/summum bonum: The "greatest good" for everyone is pleasure.

    I don't think that there is one summum bonum for everyone. For some people God is the summum bonum within Christianity and religions (except Buddhism).

    Quote from Godfrey

    "the greatest good" is more of a philosophical argument carried on by others. In a materialist universe is it even possible to define a greatest good? For Epicurus I think that it's a functional guide as described in the Canon.

    Quote from Cassius

    Another way of stating the issue:


    If you are going to ask the question "What is the greatest good?" The answer is "pleasure."


    But you also have to consider "Should you be asking that question?"


    I don't think that trying to prove one type of a "greatest good" as being the best will ever be possible, because it is like saying mashed potatoes are better than baked potatoes. They are both ways to satiate hunger, and some people will prefer the taste of mashed potatoes over baked potatoes.


    We have a hunger for happiness. But if nothing seems to satisfy us anymore and mild depression takes hold or mild substance abuse causes health problems, then we need some remedies. (btw...severe cases of these should seek professional help).


    God may work as a remedy for some, but for those of us for whom "God is dead" we need something else to focus on as our goal and our summum bonum. Also, the abstract idea of finding perfect flourishing as a summun bonum won't work when circumstances within any human life are so messy...we still must live even when we struggle to meet basic human needs of belonging and acceptance. So Epicureanism provides a way to live and seek happiness when "flourishing" is impossible. We don't have to wait till we are flourishing to be happy...we can seek pleasure right away.

    Quote from Cassius

    Epicurus seemed to be treating this question carefully, which even Torquatus seems to admit when he said that Epicurus denied the necessity to construct a logical argument that pleasure is good

    Yes!


    Quote from Cassius

    If you are going to ask the question "What is the greatest good?" The answer is "pleasure."


    But you also have to consider "Should you be asking that question?"

    Yes!

    Quote from Cassius

    We have the word guide which is clear. What is added by calling it "good" or calling pain "evil"?

    Yes!


    I'm so glad to see this shared out! I couldn't agree more - the "other" philosophers were setting the terms of the discourse. Its like a silly Mad Libs game where Epicurus is kind of forced into filling in the blank, and the only possible Epicurean word that could be suggested is "pleasure", but ...NO! This is a child's game! The "good/greatest good" is just an abstract idea, not a living reality! You're chasing after a ghost! 8| :P

    I was initially going to respond point by point to the comments posted in this thread. That, however, was going to take more work than I was willing to put in, but ya'll may recognize where I'm responding to specific points made elsewhere. We may end up breaking this out into a separate thread at some point as it seems we've strayed far from discussing Aristotle's golden mean. That being said, since I promised I'd have more to say, here is my further contribution to this thread.


    As I understand it, the major points of contention under discussion include:


    - What is actually meant by summum bonum vs telos.

    - Can we ask the question "Is there really one "greatest good?"?

    - Is there one "greatest good" for everyone?


    Feel free to respond if anyone sees there are more. Here are my responses to those three for now:


    As I've said, my understanding is that "summum bonum" is simply the Romans' attempt at translating the Greek word τελος [telos] into Latin. I see this as a reasonable attempt. The telos is the goal, end-point, fulfillment, the end, the highest point, etc. The summum bonum is the highest, greatest, supreme "good." I reject DeWitt's contention that Epicurus said "'the greatest good' was not pleasure but life itself." Of course we can only experience pleasure while alive by definition - by Epicurus's definition even: there is no sensation in death. That being said, living is simply a prerequisite for the practice of philosophy itself.


    But let's leave summum bonum for the side for a moment since Epicurus didn't speak or write in Latin. The wording he used was "we say pleasure is the telos" (Letter to Menoikeus) and referred to pleasure as "the good" in one fragment that was in Epicurus's work "On the Telos":

    "I know not how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of taste, and withdraw the pleasures of love, and withdraw the pleasures of hearing, and withdraw the pleasurable emotions caused to sight by beautiful form."


    In this fragment, he specifically refers to pleasure as ταγαθον [tagathon] "the good", the same word used in the 3rd line of the Tetrapharmakos: "And the good is easily obtained" again equating "the good" with "pleasure."


    This *exact* word - ταγαθον [tagathon] - was also used by Aristotle: https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/…eus%3atext%3a1999.01.0053

    τἀγαθόν οὗ πάντ᾽ ἐφίεται "the Good is That at which all things aim." (Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1094a)


    Epicurus is not shying away from a fight by using Aristotle's own word to define what The Good - ταγαθον - is. Epicurus is meeting Aristotle on the philosophical field of battle and throwing down the gauntlet of pleasure. "You want to know what The Good is? That at which all things aim? It's pleasure."


    It seems to me that Epicurus clearly equates pleasure with "the good" and with the telos - the goal/fulfillment/purpose/end - of a human life. And "the good" ταγαθον is "The Good", the good at which all other good things aim as in other goods are only instrumental to ταγαθον The Good which is pleasure according to Epicurus.


    That's why I contend that there is such a thing as a telos or "the good" (ταγαθον). Because Epicurus taught that. There is something that can be called "the good" and it is the telos of a human life. Pleasure is both the goal and the guide *in that* pleasure is the north star by which we guide our own small boat. Pleasure isn't a guide *in* the boat, it's the "guiding light" the beacon to which we steer. If we get off course, we steer back towards the "guide".


    This is exactly why I also contend that, yes, there is one telos, one good, The Good, for everyone. We are all humans. Humans - as natural animals - are human before they are Christian or Buddhist or Muslim or Humanist or any other creed or religion. However, the more I think about it, we are also - in many respects and by some definition - Epicureans in that humans, in our natural state, will steer themselves toward pleasure and recede from pain. Just because someone wants to see "God" as their guide, the reason they want to please God is because this brings them pleasure. They could just cut out the middle-man (or middle-deity, as the case may be) and seek pleasure for itself. So, while there are multiple ways to experience pleasure - pleasant forms, pleasant tastes, the joys of sexual passion, pleasant sounds, etc. - it is pleasure writ large which is the telos - The Good - of every human life whether they admit that to themselves or not.

    Quote from Scott

    The "good/greatest good" is just an abstract idea, not a living reality!

    I have to disagree. The Good (ταγαθον) is nothing more than "that to which all things aim." It couldn't be more concrete. Why do people do what they do? To seek pleasure. They can lie to themselves and say they're being virtuous or being responsible or being selfless or being [fill in the blank].... but they're all aiming at pleasure. The feelings are two. Either you're feeling pain or you're feeling pleasure. Pleasure *is* The Good, the Goal, the Guide. All other motives are instrumental in seeking pleasure whether people admit it to themselves or not. They can tie themselves into linguistic and psychological pretzels to convince themselves that they aren't aiming at pleasure - because most/all/many cultures have convinced people that pleasure is bad! Epicurus was one of the only - or maybe the only - person to stand up and tell people that they were fooling themselves... and just to embrace the pursuit of pleasure honestly, rationally, and wisely.