Compassion in Epicurean Philosophy

  • In a recent book discussion on Frances Wright's A Few Days in Athens, Scott was quite right to bring up the question as to whether 'compassion' was truly evident in Epicurus' teachings in the classical texts. Kalosyni had likewise raised the question in a forum post in the thread for the discussion. My purpose here is twofold; first, to thank both of you for raising the question (thank you!); and second, to reopen the discussion here with a handful of preliminary citations.


    It is quite easy to demonstrate that Epicurus was motivated at least in part by concern for his fellow man; and clear, too, that he extended his concern beyond the pale of the professional philosopher. His introduction to the letter to Pythocles states his intent:


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    Therefore, as I have finished all my other writings I now intend to accomplish your request, feeling that these arguments will be of value to many other persons as well, and especially to those who have but recently tasted the genuine inquiry into nature, and also to those who are involved too deeply in the business of some regular occupation.


    The letter to Menoeceus expands on this further;


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    LET no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul. And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away. Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come.


    So much for the letters. This is perhaps not the full-throated endorsement of compassion we would like to see, but the idea of the thing is beginning to take shape; Epicurus believed that in sharing his philosophy, he was helping to bring good health to the souls of all who would listen. He did not seek to convince only those in traditional philosophical circles, but to bring this 'true health' even to the commoners; scholars and working folk, young and old.


    Proceeding in good order, we turn next to the Principle Doctrines:


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    27. Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends.


    28. The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.


    There is friendship, then; the greatest pleasure, and surest path to happiness.


    Quote

    31. Natural justice is a symbol or expression of usefullness, to prevent one person from harming or being harmed by another.


    And a sense of justice, too; predicated not on morality, or Natural Law, or divine intervention--all such suppositions being either false or arbitrary--but on harm. This is the kind of justice that is blind--that protects all people, not merely the pious or the powerful.


    And in the Vatican Sayings;


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    29. To speak frankly as I study nature I would prefer to speak in oracles that which is of advantage to all men even though it be understood by none, rather than to conform to popular opinion and thus gain the constant praise that comes from the many.


    Here we begin to see a glimpse of a missionary attitude--the philosophy can bring help to anyone.


    And we may hope that the great blessings of friendship may be available to all.


    Next, we take the testimony of others; it is fitting that we start with Menander, as he and Epicurus were 'classmates'.


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    Hail, you twin-born sons of Neocles, of whom the one saved his country from slavery, the other from folly.


    And Diogenes Laertius;


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    [Epicurus] has abundance of witnesses to attest his unsurpassed goodwill to all men--his native land, which honoured him with statues in bronze ; his friends, so many in number that they could hardly be counted by whole cities, and indeed all who knew him [...] the School itself which, while nearly all the others have died out, continues for ever without interruption through numberless reigns of one scholarch after another; his gratitude to his parents, his generosity to his brothers, his gentleness to his servants, as evidenced by the terms of his will and by the fact that they were members of the School, the most eminent of them being the aforesaid Mys ; and in general, his benevolence to all mankind.


    Lucian;


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    But secondly I was still more concerned (a preference which you will be very far from resenting) to strike a blow for Epicurus, that great man whose holiness and divinity of nature were not shams, who alone had and imparted true insight into the good, and who brought deliverance to all that consorted with him.


    I'll expand on some of this tomorrow---my phone armed with more battery-life!

  • Great post! My only fine tuning on what is posted so far is this:


    There is friendship, then; the greatest pleasure, and surest path to happiness

    I think the second clause is almost exactly correct, but I would say that what Epicurus saying is that the whole the pleasure of having a friend is great, and such relationships are actually or at least virtually essential, I do not think that there is an absolute ranking of pleasures that would allow us to call friendship "the greatest pleasure."


    A fine point I easily grant, but given our focus on explaining the nature of pleasure as accurately as possible. I think an important one.


    Am I forgetting any passage that would justify exactly calling friendship "the greatest pleasure"?



    We definitely need to expand the thread and be sure we touch on the explanation for the opening of Lucretius Book Two.


    And I think we will also find more apt material on friendship in the Torquatus material in Book One of On Ends that we will tackle next week (section 65 et seq. If I recall correctly)


    And yes there is much in Diogenes of Oinoanda to incorporate, in addition to "circumstantial evidence" and "logical implications" that may not be explicit

  • Thanks for staring this thread, Joshua ! You beat me to it and I'm glad, since you did a far better job than I could have :thumbup:


    I'm pleased that we have the quotes that show that Epicurus felt and expressed concern for people generally, as opposed to just a sort of tit-for-tat kind of "concern" for "friends" (which is an idea that can come out of certain passages). As you say, what we have is somewhat indirect, not the:


    full-throated endorsement of compassion we would like to see

    Compassion is not identical with being "friendly", of course, or even being "kind" or "considerate". "Caring" comes closer but still doesn't nail it. All of these are also great attributes but I'm thinking in today's use of the term compassion we have something like a powerful "feeling with" another person, combined with a desire to alleviate suffering they have. Its often a fairly automatic response, like what one has when one sees a crying child or even a hurt animal. It's like empathy but with a motivation to reach out. It does not involve any desire of a reward for reaching out (even the reward that someone doing compassionate work under the aegis of a religious organization for example might get from knowing that are promoting their ideology). Of course, one can have an affiliation with a religious or philosophical organization and still have genuine compassion - I don't mean to suggest otherwise. But compassion is one of our natural, biological responses which can yet be cultivated (even into a strong, reliable personal pattern of feeling & behavior) - or conversely, repressed into oblivion. It is perhaps a bit "unusual" in not being directly self-advantageous to the organism feeling it and acting on it, though studies in evolutionary biology and other fields have identified it as producing social benefit. Certainly acting on compassion and eliminating another being's suffering can produce powerful feelings of pleasure, even though the initial impetus may not contain an consideration of that.


    Is there even a word in ancient Greek or Latin that captures this idea?

  • So within Epicureanism, there is the great importance of friendship, and within friendship there is the great importance of acting with compassion toward one's friends, as compassion would bring the greatest pleasure within friendship interactions.


    I think it would be good to more clearly define the word "compassion" as an active attitude rather than a passive attitude. So speaking and acting with cordiality, kindness, consideration, respect, patience, acceptance, candor, and caring.

  • I think it would be good to more clearly define the word "compassion" as an active attitude rather than a passive attitude.

    Sounds right, Kalosyni - I totally agree with you compassion should be thought of that way! Compassion tends to make people try to help. Compassion includes an urge to reach out. If there isn't this active element, you only have sympathy or empathy.

  • Quote

    Am I forgetting any passage that would justify exactly calling friendship "the greatest pleasure"?

    Your suggestion is quite right, Cassius; the formulation I used above is 'stuck in my head', as it were, and I would not be able to cite a source for it. Perhaps the answer lies in translation, or modern commentary, or my own internal phrasing. Pleasure is the good, full stop!


    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


    As we go through the above citations, it will become important to consider exactly what is meant by the term friendship. I have no opinion on that just now, but it is something to think about. On that note, we turn next to Diogenes of Oenoanda!


    Please bear in mind that the inscription (translated by Martin Ferguson Smith) is very fragmentary; Even when whole, the inscription was more "arranged" than written. Many of the passages were quotations in whole or in part from early Epicurean works. A few come from Epicurus' surviving letters; a few from Diogenes' own letters, for he was evidently active in a 'community' of Epicureans, or so it seems from the text. A great many more that appear to be quotations come from Epicurean books or maxims that have otherwise been lost to history.


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    In this way, [citizens], even though I am not engaging in public affairs, I say these things through the inscription just as if I were taking action, and in an endeavour to prove that what benefits our nature, namely freedom from disturbance, is identical for one and all.


    And so, having described the second reason for the inscription, I now go on to mention my mission and to explain its character and nature.


    Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted.

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    So (to reiterate what I was saying) observing that these people are in this predicament, I bewailed their behaviour and wept over the wasting of their lives, and I considered it the responsibility of a good man to give [benevolent] assistance, to the utmost of one's ability, to those of them who are well-constituted. [This] is the first reason [for the inscription].

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    [There are many who] pursue philosophy for the sake of [wealth and fame], with the aim of procuring these either from private individuals or from kings, by whom philosophy is deemed to be some great and precious possession.


    Well, it is not in order to gain any of the above-mentioned objectives that we have embarked upon the same undertaking, but so that we may enjoy happiness through attainment of the goal craved by nature.


    The identity of this goal and how neither wealth can furnish it, nor political fame, nor royal office, nor a life of luxury and sumptuous banquets, nor pleasures of choice love-affairs, nor anything else, while philosophy [alone can secure it], we [shall now explain after setting the whole question before you. For we have had this writing inscribed in public] not [for ourselves,] but [for you, citizens, so that we might render it available to all of you in an easily accessible form without oral instruction.] And ... you ...

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    and we contrived this in order that, even while [sitting at] home, [we might be able to exhibit] the goods of philosophy, not to all people here [indeed], but to those of them who are civil-spoken; and not least we did [this] for those who are called «foreigners,» though they are not really so. For, while the various segments of the earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire earth, and a single home, the world

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    I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

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    [So we shall not achieve wisdom universally], since not all are capable of it. But if we assume it to be possible, then truly the life of the gods will pass to men. For everything will be full of justice and mutual love, and there will come to be no need of fortifications or laws and all the things which we contrive on account of one another. As for the necessities derived from agriculture, since we shall have no slaves at that time (for indeed [we ourselves shall plough] and dig and tend [the plants] and [divert] rivers and watch over [the crops), we shall] ... such things as ... not ... time ..., and such activities, [in accordance with what is] needful, will interrupt the continuity of the [shared] study of philosophy; for [the] farming operations [will provide what our] nature wants.

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    ... [all] men [are able to save] themselves, [with the help from us and to effect a complete dispersal of misfortunes affecting the soul (?) and to do away with disturbing emotions and fears].

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    It is not nature, which is the same for all, that makes people noble or ignoble, but their actions and dispositions.

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    [I am confident, as I address the inscription to you,] my friends, [that many will become healthy in soul. Why do I say this]? What in the world are [the remedies]? The [inscription], dearest friends, [will afford help both] to us [ourselves] and [to others; for I produced it for the benefit of my fellow-citizens; and] I produced [it] above all [from a desire to help our descendants], in case [they should walk up and down this stoa, as well as showing myself benevolent towards those strangers among us [who are well constituted]. And being perfectly aware that it is through knowledge of matters, concerning both physics and the emotions, which I explained in the places below, that [tranquillity of mind comes about, I know well that I have advertised the remedies that bring salvation].


    I have underlined the salient passages; key words that it might be useful to know the Greek translations of I have put into red. It might be worth mentioning in passing that Epicurus' name in Greek means helper or ally.

  • Quote

    Compassion tends to make people try to help.

    I hope, Scott and Kalosyni, that Diogenes of Oenoanda will allay your concerns on that point!


    I have not brought Lucretius into the discussion, and probably there are other omissions as well. But, Alas! I have just received in the mail two books; one by David Sedley, and the other by Michael McOsker; so I'll be turning this evening's attention in that direction!

  • one by David Sedley, and the other by Michael McOsker;

    The Philodemus one looks interesting. I have to ask: Which Sedley book did you get? Look forward to seeing some reviews if you get the chance. Happy reading!

  • Quote

    The Philodemus one looks interesting. I have to ask: Which Sedley book did you get? Look forward to seeing some reviews if you get the chance. Happy reading!


    Ask, and you shall receive!


    The Sedley book is Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, which you might have brought to my attention. At any rate I was very impressed with him when we were finishing up the last few episodes of Lucretius on the plague.

  • On that note, we turn next to Diogenes of Oenoanda

    The Greek of the inscription is available at https://papyri.info/dclp/865216


    I'm going to attempt to find a few of the words that Joshua highlighted and see where we get...


    The first quote is from Fragment 3:

    ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀταραξία, καὶ ἑνὶ καὶ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν.

    Our old friend ataraxia is here: translated here as "freedom from disturbance"

    "for both one and all it is the same" (kai eni kai pasi...)


    I think "his mission" is being conveyed by

    τὸ κατεσπουδ̣ασμένον ἡμῶν "our earnestness" It's an interesting paraphrase there to the best of my ability right now.


    It's also getting late. Maybe get a fresh start tomorrow night.


    Thanks for the fun translation exercise! :)

  • The Sedley book is Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom

    :thumbup: :thumbup: I find that book fascinating. Especially, now again that I'm working through On Nature in Les Epicuriens. The connections between Epicurus's work and Lucretius's is very interesting. I find this doubly so (and I have source amnesia on this) that I've read Cicero was possibly using Philodemus for his Torquatus and other Epicurean material; while Lucretius had been using older texts - maybe even exclusively Epicurus's On Nature. Philodemus (and the more contemporary Epicureans) may have updated some of Epicurus's older celestial observations with more "modern" observations including the size of the sun argument. That may very well be in Sedley, so be on the lookout. I get the sense that Philodemus didn't refute Epicurus so much as update his work with more current observations.

    Look forward to hearing what you think of it.

  • Thanks, Don, and Joshua thanks for all the citations! Great work digging all that up! There is plenty to indicate the kindness of Epicurus and that of EP as a philosophy in general, perhaps especially from Diogenes of Oenoanda. Kindness and benevolence, love and help, etc. All good stuff. But I was pondering this and it occurred to me there is still something a little "different" about compassion than what we find in these citations. Some flavor. I did some etymology work on it (e.g. https://www.etymonline.com/word/compassion).


    Then I took the dog for a walk, and it struck me. Compassion deals with suffering. It calls for suffering. Pretty much requires it. That seems obvious to me in hindsight. That's what really differentiates it from benevolence and love and help and such.


    So then I thought... Buddhism, which has been a long time influence in my life, has "suffering" as a seminal concept, as we all know. And would it be any surprise then that compassion is likewise a Buddhist primary motif, which it is, especially from the Dalai Lama and other Mahayana versions, but to greater or lesser extent it pops up in most of the strands of Buddhism. Suffering is also a big deal in Christianity. The passion of Christ, etc. Perhaps Epicureanism just didn't and doesn't have suffering as such a center piece. Although certainly aware of it and concerned to address what we generally find translated as "pain" in EP materials, is it not simply the case that Epicurus put the positive in front, not the negative? His focus was more on pleasure, not on escaping pain, right?

  • His focus was more on pleasure, not on escaping pain, right?

    That's certainly my take.


    You bring up a good point, Scott . We technically dealing with 3 different things that sometimes get conflated:

    • compassion
    • sympathy
    • empathy

    Common language sometimes sees those as synonyms, but you're right to focus on the distinctions.

    I found it interesting that the LSJ specifically reference the philosophy of Epicurus in its definition of sympatheia:

    Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, συμπάθ-εια

    "in the Philosophy of Epicurus, corresponding 'affection' or quality, affinity, Ep.1p.11U. (pl.), al."

    I'm not sure what that citation to Epicurus means :(


    I seem to remember reading somewhere (a while ago!) that the predominant ethos in ancient Greece was to do everything you could for your friends and associates and do everything you could to crush your enemies. The world was divided into friends/enemies.

    That being said, Diogenes of Oenoanda's inscription was specifically designed to spread the "good news" of Epicurus to all who came in contact with it:

    καὶ νῦν̣ ̣κ̣αὶ ἀεὶ πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι κ[αὶ] βαρβάροις "both now and always for all Greeks and barbarians (non-Greeks)"

  • Compassion deals with suffering. It calls for suffering. Pretty much requires it. That seems obvious to me in hindsight. That's what really differentiates it from benevolence and love and help and such.


    You put your finger exactly on something that felt fishy about this subject. Compassion seems to be self-defeating as a virtue since it requires that others are in and remain in pain, which is not a state of affairs I prefer.

    Perhaps love or benevolence is a better word to capture the proselytising spirit in the above quoted?

    It seems more Epicurean in spirit to state the goal positively: there are many reasons to prefer people even outside my circle of friends to live according to nature and be free of unnecessary suffering. Therefore adopting an attitude that helps bring this about is appropriate. This attitude is love (or benevolence).

  • Quote from Scott

    Buddhism, which has been a long time influence in my life, has "suffering" as a seminal concept, as we all know. And would it be any surprise then that compassion is likewise a Buddhist primary motif, which it is, especially from the Dalai Lama and other Mahayana versions, but to greater or lesser extent it pops up in most of the strands of Buddhism. Suffering is also a big deal in Christianity.

    That's an astute observation Scott . In both of these religions suffering seems to be something integral to life: "original sin" and "life is suffering", to put it a little glibly. On the other hand Epicurus treats suffering as a consequence of superstition and false beliefs. If you can rid yourself of those, then pain is something that you can handle, even to the degree that you make daily choices as to whether accepting a given pain will bring you a balance of pleasure.


    This becomes pretty clear by studying the PDs. The first four are foundational, but the others continue to develop these ideas. It really is a positive philosophy.

  • Quote

    Ep.1p.11U. (pl.), al.

    This looks to me like a citation to Usener's Epicurea, no?

    That's what I thought but "Usener 11" doesn't seem to line up with anything.

    The only thing I've found do far is this Vatican Saying :

    LXVI. Let us show our feeling for our lost friends not by lamentation but by meditation.

    *LXVI. Συμπαθωμεν τοις φίλοις ου θρηνουντες αλλά φροντιζοντες.

    [Sympathōmen tois philois ou thrēnountes alla phrontizontes]

    Bailey commentary:

    "LXVI. Usener is probably right in holding that this fragment cannot refer to sympathy with living friends (θρηνουντες is against that), but to

    feeling for friends who are dead The true Epicurean will not idly lament their death, but meditate on their lives. Compare PD11."


    Συμπαθωμεν is a verb. "Let us 'sympathize'"

    θρηνουντες refers to wailing, singing a dirge, lamenting.

    φροντιζουντες connotes reflection on, giving thought to...

    Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Φ φ, , φρι_κ-ώδης , φροντ-ίζω

  • So then I thought... Buddhism, which has been a long time influence in my life, has "suffering" as a seminal concept, as we all know. And would it be any surprise then that compassion is likewise a Buddhist primary motif, which it is, especially from the Dalai Lama and other Mahayana versions, but to greater or lesser extent it pops up in most of the strands of Buddhism. Suffering is also a big deal in Christianity. The passion of Christ, etc. Perhaps Epicureanism just didn't and doesn't have suffering as such a center piece. Although certainly aware of it and concerned to address what we generally find translated as "pain" in EP materials, is it not simply the case that Epicurus put the positive in front, not the negative? His focus was more on pleasure, not on escaping pain, right?

    I agree with Don's "yes." I will also say that it is important to keep in mind that given the logical foundation of Epicurus, which characterizes the ONLY two guides given by Nature as pain and pleasure, the two terms at that "logical" level are largely interchangeable: Pursuing Pleasure IS Avoiding Pain, and vice versa. Those are the only two guides given by Nature, so if you are motivated by feeling, you are doing one or the other.


    But having made that observation, I agree that it is critical to analyze which motivation is to be followed (1) at any particular moment, or for the long term, or for any span of time or (2) in terms of significance to the individual who is feeling the pleasure or pain.


    Each person has the free will to decide which he is going to pursue, or whether to end his life and pursue neither.


    I think it is clear from the shortness of life and many sayings that focus on pleasure and point away from suicide except in extreme circumstances that Epicurus held that Nature gave us Pleasure as the thing to pursue, and so while we are alive (and if we want to look at Nature as a mother) while we can follow Nature's guide and stay alive) our prime directive is to pursue pleasure, even at the cost of some amount of pain which we find to be worthwhile. If ANY amount of pain was deemed to be intolerable, the only way to implement that kind of philosophy would be suicide.


    So whenever you're confronted with some basic unchallengeable observation like "some amount of pain is required to stay alive" then I think we have to assume that Epicurus understood that too and embraced it and worked with it, or else he would have explained why not. Instead, Epicurus was very clear that we sometimes in fact choose pain, so in my view that eliminates the possibility that Epicurus was saying to avoid all pain at all cost.


    I don't see that I clipped another quote to comment on, but I also agree with the implication of some of the above posts that worldviews that focus on suffering and the elimination of suffering are in fact depending on the continuation of suffering for their existence, and they have extremely severe foundational problems. Yes Epicurus focuses a lot on alleviation of suffering, but he does so in the context that the purpose of life is pleasure, and the two go hand in hand toward the goal of living a completely pleasurable life, which is in fact largely achievable by most people in most circumstances, and by all people to at least some degree,.



    I seem to remember reading somewhere (a while ago!) that the predominant ethos in ancient Greece was to do everything you could for your friends and associates and do everything you could to crush your enemies. The world was divided into friends/enemies.


    "No better friend, no worse enemy" is the phrase that comes to my mind in this. I actually believe that Epicurus would and did endorse that, BUT with the caveat stated in PD39 and implied in other places (the reason for this thread) that we do all we can to treat people as friends, or at least not as aliens, before we regretfully conclude that they are in the category of those who we exclude from our lives, or who are "enemies of Hellas," or who we decide are only fit for restraint rather than reformation, or we decide pursuant to PD06 that there is essentially no limit to what we can and should do to protect ourselves from such people, or who according to Diogenes Laertius are "vile."


    But to repeat for emphasis, I do think Epicurus held that there are essentially no "good" or "evil" people who are intrinsically evil, and that we can and should work to make everyone whom we can into a friend. All the while keeping a clear head that we are not always going to be successful, and that the safety and happiness of ourselves and our friends is sometimes going to require treating some people as enemies.


    You put your finger exactly on something that felt fishy about this subject. Compassion seems to be self-defeating as a virtue since it requires that others are in and remain in pain, which is not a state of affairs I prefer.

    Perhaps love or benevolence is a better word to capture the proselytising spirit in the above quoted?

    It seems more Epicurean in spirit to state the goal positively: there are many reasons to prefer people even outside my circle of friends to live according to nature and be free of unnecessary suffering. Therefore adopting an attitude that helps bring this about is appropriate. This attitude is love (or benevolence).


    Yes absolutely. The way this is worded reminds me of a topic I have always found interesting but not fully understood nearly as much as I would like. In my reading of Nietzsche I see that he took a strong position that "pity" (another word that we possibly ought to include in this analysis) is a very negative thing (it in fact "killed God" in his view). Further, Nietzsche or or others (I can't recall) took the position that Aristotle held much the same view. If Aristotle held it, this attitude toward pity may well have deep roots in the Greek viewpoint. I don't think we should dismiss this out of hand as inconsistent with compassion, I frankly don't have a good grip on exactly what the reasoning is, and I think we ought to understand it explicitly before we dismiss it.


    And to add to the complexity, I have a feeling this view of pity is related to the Greek view of "hope," which we know was among the "evils" (or sins or whatever) that had been confined into Pandora's box before she opened it and let the rest of the sins escape. Why was "hope" classified as a bad thing and in the box? Presumably that was due to a close parsing of the issues involved in "hope" and we probably ought to perform the same exercise as to "pity."


    I think we already have discussed and probably established to the satisfaction of most that even compassion has a limit, in that if we allow ourselves to be immobilized by sorrow over the condition of those who are suffering, we would never take any steps toward the alleviation of those problems. So probably there is something related to that in the analysis of pity and hope.

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