If Epicurus were to weigh in, he might say:
QuotePD3 The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.
PD9 If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.
I thought it might be helpful to use Nathan's compilation of PD9 (below). There is surprising consistency among translations on this one.
I wanted to specifically address Cassius's:
there is clearly a "common denominator" among pleasures, and yet I do not think it is maintainable that all pleasures are the same in every respect - only in some respects.
My position is that the common denominator is simply that all things that result in pleasure is simply the fact that they bring pleasure. Sometimes for a short time, sometimes long, sometimes intense, sometimes subtle. But it's *always* pleasure.
My contention is that Epicurus, uses the "if" here at the beginning of PD9 like he uses it in PD10: If X was the case, then Y. But he implies that (I would argue from the Greek tenses/moods/grammar), from observation, we know Y is not the case (Y=pleasures don't differ; the life of the profligate dispels fears). So, things that bring pleasure are the same in that they bring pleasure, but there are many things that bring pleasure, and the job of the human is to make choices among those myriad pleasures that will lead to a pleasureable life... Which makes PD9 a perfect segue to PD10 come to think of it! Just realized that as I was writing. 
PS: So, those who attack Epicurus's philosophy for making pleasure the "highest good" are lumping all pleasures together. Epicurus is making the point that all pleasure is good (If you could lump all the pleasures together...) BUT, by the observable fact that pleasures differ, we have to decide which pleasures to choose and which pleasures to reject if we are to lead the most pleasureable life possible for us.
PD9
“If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.” Yonge (1853)
“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, if this had gone on not only in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man’s nature, there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now is.” Hicks (1910)
“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,—if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.” Hicks (1925)
“If every pleasure could be intensifed so that it lasted and infuenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)
“If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." (De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235; 1954)
“If every pleasure were cumulative, and if this were the case both in time and in regard to the whole or the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would not differ from each other.” Geer (1964)
“If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” (Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115; 1987)
“If every pleasure were condensed and existed for a long time throughout the entire organism or its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another.” O'Connor (1993)
“If every pleasure were condensed and were present, both in time and in the whole compound [body and soul] or in the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“If every pleasure could be prolonged to endure in both body or mind, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Anderson (2004)
“If all pleasures could be added together consecutively with respect to space and duration, and across the entire span over which they had all existed, or at least across the principal parts of human nature <which are naturally susceptible to pleasures:> then, pleasures would not be different from each other in any respect.” Makridis (2005)
“If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.” Saint-Andre (2008)
“If all pleasures could be compressed in time and intensity, and were characteristic of the whole man or his more important aspects, the various pleasures would not differ from each other.” Strodach (2012)
“If all pleasure were condensed in space and time, and pervaded the whole aggregate, or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ, one from another." Mensch (2018)
My position is that the common denominator is simply that all things that result in pleasure is simply the fact that they bring pleasure. Sometimes for a short time, sometimes long, sometimes intense, sometimes subtle. But it's *always* pleasure
I have absolutely no problem with that statement so I wonder what you think is the best way to state what it appears to you we are disagreeing about(?)
My position is that the common denominator is simply that all things that result in pleasure is simply the fact that they bring pleasure. Sometimes for a short time, sometimes long, sometimes intense, sometimes subtle. But it's *always* pleasure
I have absolutely no problem with that statement so I wonder what you think is the best way to state what it appears to you we are disagreeing about(?)
Good question 
My interpretation of what you're saying (and PLEASE correct me if I'm misinterpreting!) is that your position is that some pleasures are "better"/"greater" than others: e g., Eating chocolate candies is "better" than eating coffee candies (for you). Pleasures can be "ranked."
My position is that ranking pleasures into a hierarchy is a pointless exercise. All things which give pleasure give pleasure, period, by definition. BUT, and this is Epicurus's innovation, they also differ from each other, including importantly the context within which the pleasure is experienced. Pleasure is a common characteristic of pleasurable experiences. We are attracted by pleasure. Pleasure is a good thing. But those who denigrate pleasure try to reduce it to a monolithic hornets nest of vice and something to be shunned and mistrusted. Epicurus says, "No, pleasure is pleasurable. Duh! Why would we reject it?" BUT just because all pleasure is pleasurable, doesn't mean you have to experience EVERY pleasurable thing.
The ONLY thing that matters is the pleasure-giving experience in front of you at any given moment - or that is planned for in the future - and the choice of whether or not to pursue or reject THAT pleasure using the criteria of whether or not THAT pleasure leads to a more pleasurable life experience or not. It's contextual. This pleasure may be indulged in now here, but at another time and place it should be rejected or delayed.
PS: In just reading the De Finibus sections you've laid out for Ep. 94, I think "Torquatus" is laying out this same argument.
s that your position is that some pleasures are "better"/"greater" than others: e g., Eating chocolate candies is "better" than eating coffee candies (for you). Pleasures can be "ranked."
I think our key here is that I am distinguishing "better" from "greater." I use "better" when I mean to refer to some kind of intrinsic "nobler" or "worthier," and I am not meaning to refer to that in terms of pleasure, so I don't call one pleasure "better" than another unless I am trying to be very clear that "better" is subjective and really means something else (more intense, longer lasting, or some other feeling.)
When referring to "greater" I think that is more clear. A "greater pleasure" is to me something that has those same attributes (more intense, longer lasting, or some other feeling).
I think in regard to that distinction we are really talking subtle preferences in words.
My position is that ranking pleasures into a hierarchy is a pointless exercise. All things which give pleasure give pleasure, period, by definition.
I am pretty sure we do disagree here. Eating chocolate candy is a pleasure. Pursuing philosophy or some other hobby is a pleasure. I clearly and emphatically in my own life would rank the pleasure of pursuing philosophy or the hobby in a hiearchy such that I devote much more time and attention to it than to eating candy.
Maybe we again have a subtle word issue but I have no problem describing that process as "ranking pleasures in a hierarchy" and I would think that Epicurus is implicitly urging everyone to perform that same calculation process for themselves, just as he did in pursuing his philosophic campaign rather than lounging in the garden all day eating figs.
I think in regard to that distinction we are really talking subtle preferences in words.
Subtle but important. I think we're getting somewhere now though!
I use "better" when I mean to refer to some kind of intrinsic "nobler" or "worthier," and I am not meaning to refer to that in terms of pleasure, so I don't call one pleasure "better" than another unless I am trying to be very clear that "better" is subjective and really means something else (more intense, longer lasting, or some other feeling.)
Cool. Okay, I think I'm good with that. So, "better" is just a subjective feeling and not a value judgement. "I like to eat chocolate better than coffee candy" is a fine sentence to use in everyday life. Or even "Chocolate candy is better than coffee candy" is fine as well as a subjective emotional personal reaction to an experience. And you're using "greater" as a synonym for "better" in this narrow, subjective sense? If that's your take, we're sympatico here.
I clearly and emphatically in my own life would rank the pleasure of pursuing philosophy or the hobby in a hiearchy such that I devote much more time and attention to it than to eating candy.
Ah! Here we go! The ranking is where our two roads are diverging. Why do you insist a "ranking" is necessary? (Are you?)
You mention that the pleasure of pursuing philosophy is "higher" in your hierarchy of pleasurable activities than eating candy? As if it was predetermined or (gasp) ordained that this is so. 
I would say you've simply determined, through reasoned, prudent application of seeing the goal as the pursuit of a pleasurable life, that the pleasure of studying philosophy will lead more assuredly and more efficaciously to a pleasurable life than the mere eating of candy will. You still enjoy eating candy, right? It's still pleasurable? You are just going to devote more time to something (i.e., philosophy) that will be of more help in leading you toward the goal of having a pleasurable life than you will indulging in some candy now and then.
My point is that it doesn't matter where a specific pleasurable activity falls in some conceptual hierarchy that you might sit down and construct. I realize you haven't (I'm assuming) sat down and categorized ALL the possible pleasures in your life into a concrete, written hierarchy that you consult in making a decision. You determine, at any given minute, this is a choice I can make that will lead to a pleasurable life. The hard thing is to do this deliberately, prudently, and consciously and not be buffeted by the winds of fate and chance, pushed along mindlessly. That's where I get that Epicureanism is a philosophy of personal responsibility for one's actions and decisions.
Now, if saying the pursuit of philosophy is a "greater" pleasure than eating candy is your shorthand for that wordy paragraph, we're on the same page. 
If not, let the games continue
Now, if saying the pursuit of philosophy is a "greater" pleasure than eating candy is your shorthand for that wordy paragraph, we're on the same page.
That is EXACTLY what I am saying!
All of this in my mind is purely a relative subjective decision made by the individual under the circumstances then and there existing, with the individual reserving the right at any moment to revise and extend or completely reverse his/her viewpoint on which pleasure will please him/her more extensively. And then the appropriate decision for that person is to pursue that decision with all the energy they can muster:-)
Just throwing this into the mix for your consideration.
Excerpt from Wikipedia:
"The felicific calculus is an algorithm formulated by utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1747–1832) for calculating the degree or amount of pleasure that a specific action is likely to induce. Bentham, an ethical hedonist, believed the moral rightness or wrongness of an action to be a function of the amount of pleasure or pain that it produced. The felicific calculus could, in principle at least, determine the moral status of any considered act. The algorithm is also known as the utility calculus, the hedonistic calculus and the hedonic calculus.
To be included in this calculation are several variables (or vectors), which Bentham called "circumstances". These are:
Instead of "moral rightness or wrongness" would replace that with "joy and enjoyment vs. "pain".
So considering things for their long term pleasure...
A habit of eating candy has a high likelihood of resulting in tooth decay and a trip to the dentist (not fun!).
That is EXACTLY what I am saying!
Alright! Look at that. And it only took several days and a number of posts 
And then the appropriate decision for that person is to pursue that decision with all the energy they can muster:-)
Well, that part sounds like a lot of work. Is that the pain to endure for a "greater" pleasure?
The felicific calculus is an algorithm formulated by utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1747–1832) for calculating the degree or amount of pleasure that a specific action is likely to induce.
Bentham was definitely influenced by Epicurus's philosophy, but Bentham was not an Epicurean. I think we are talking about making a sort of "calculus" in the broad sense, but as I remember the Utilitarian felicific calculus is much more analytical and literally a calculation of adding up hedons (units of pleasure) and the pain units (word escapes me). The circumstances aren't a bad list of characteristics to consider, but I'm skeptical they can really be quantified like the Utilitarians want to.
Instead of "moral rightness or wrongness" would replace that with "joy and enjoyment vs. "pain".
I could concur with that, I think. Epicurus dealt in justice as a contract, so that morality of the Utilitarians seems problematic to me.
So considering things for their long term pleasure...
A habit of eating candy has a high likelihood of resulting in tooth decay and a trip to the dentist (not fun!).
Exactly! There's nothing "morally" wrong with getting pleasure from eating candy from time to time. You can make that "calculation" and choose that pleasure. That adds variety to your pleasure if the candy was easily gotten. If you eat candy at every meal and between, that may be pleasurable in the moment, but over time it's going to provide more pain to your life than pleasure.
Does anybody know if Epicurus ever referred to a hedonic calculus, or did Bentham come up with that? Or was it in Lucretius? I think I recall the phrase turning up in one of Epicurus' letters, but I don't know where and could be mistaken. It might be an interesting item to clarify. I'm asking just for curiosity and not to make any point.
As far as greater, better, more luscious, tastier &c pleasures.... I keep thinking that the only mechanism that Epicurus (not Cicero, the Cow) explicitly provided for ranking, prioritizing or choosing/avoiding was desires. He seems to me to keep saying that "pleasure is pleasure", a pathe. Why else would he repeatedly make the point that if all other things are equal (condensing/accumulation, duration, location in the body and so on) then pleasures would never differ from one another?
Maybe the Cow makes this point further on, but look at how much confusion he's wrought in just this brief passage! Very effective rhetoric!
GOALS:
QuotePD22 You must reflect on the fundamental goal and everything that is clear, to which opinions are referred; if you do not, all will be full of trouble and confusion.
PD25 If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.
PD15 Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire, but the riches incited by groundless opinion have no end.
PD16 Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person: for throughout the complete span of his life the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason.
DESIRES
QuoteDisplay MorePD29 Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion).
PD26 The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm.
PD30 Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the groundless opinions of humankind.
(LM127ff) One should keep in mind that among desires, some are natural and some are vain. Of those that are natural, some are necessary and some unnecessary. Of those that are necessary, some are necessary for happiness, some for health, and some for life itself. A correct view of these matters enables one to base every choice and avoidance upon whether it secures or upsets bodily comfort and peace of mind – the goal of a happy life.
(LMxxx) Third, keep in mind that some desires are natural whereas others are groundless [note]; that among the natural desires some are natural and necessary whereas others are merely natural; and that among the necessary desires some are necessary for happiness, some for physical health [note], and some for life itself. The steady contemplation of these facts enables you to understand everything that you accept or reject in terms of the health of the body and the serenity of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely happy life. Our every action is done so that we will not be in pain or fear. As soon as we achieve this, the soul is released from every storm, since an animal has no other need and must seek nothing else to complete the goodness of body and soul. Thus we need pleasure only when we are in pain caused by its absence; but when we are not in pain then we have no need of pleasure.
(LMxxx) Fourth, we hold that self-reliance is a great good — not so that we will always have only a few things but so that if we do not have much we will rejoice in the few things we have, firmly persuaded that those who need luxury the least enjoy it the most, and that everything natural is easily obtained whereas everything groundless is hard to get. So simple flavors bring just as much pleasure as a fancy diet if all pain from true need has been removed, and bread and water give the highest pleasure when someone in need partakes of them. Training yourself to live simply and without luxury brings you complete health, gives you endless energy to face the necessities of life, better prepares you for the occasional luxury, and makes you fearless no matter your fortune in life.
He seems to me to keep saying that "pleasure is pleasure", a pathe.
My mind is still open on the issue of the meaning of desire in this context, but I think all of these questions turn on subtle issues of definitions, and in the end all feelings of pleasure have the common denominator of feeling pleasurable, but I do not believe that the feeling is identical except in that strict definitional (conceptual) sense. And that's where I think we have one of these intersections of the limits of conceptual reasoning from totally capturing every aspect of reality.
