Here's a companion piece to the article that Elayne linked to, this one dealing with the Big Bang:
https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/…n-of-all-things
The author diagrams several types of "creation" scenarios, finally pointing out that knowledge of how things began is probably beyond our grasp. Although he says this shouldn't stop us from trying. Of course, I might add, only so long as it brings us pleasure!
knowledge of how things began is probably beyond our grasp
That phrasing from such an article would be an example of the problem. The implication that everything in the universe "began" at a single point in time conflicts with the observed nothing comes from nothing or goes to nothing, and therefore should not even be entertained as a valid theory since it does not incorporate all reliable evidence. And the implication that there was some mysterious "we'll never know" inflection point in time (which again conflicts with nfn/ntn) plays right into the hands of the " gnostics" who claim to possess some special revelation of the "truth").
At most, an expanding area within a total universe would appear to imply that that locality, and not the whole, had an explosive event that might then be followed by a collapse of that section - but never of the whole universe.
I believe an Epicurean plan of early education would start with premises such as "eternal universe" based on nfn / ntn to the point where the "normal" person would consider phrases such as "universe began" with the same disdain as we hear someone speaking of human sacrifices to appease the gods.
As things are, the default position is "in the beginning, god created the heaven and the earth" and that has brought a cascade of disastrous thinking.
And I don't think there is any coincidence, accident, or mistake in the rise of such terminology in religion, or in its incorporation and embrace by large parts of humanist-friendly modern society. It plays right into the hands of monotheism / absolutist thinking. See, the universe DOES have a central point from which one perspective is correct! We may be separate atoms today, but one day the universe will all come back together into one uniform homogeneous whole where we all get along with no conflicts at all.
Obviously I am saying this just for myself and not as a red line of "you're not an Epicurean if you don't believe it," but that is why I think the chain reasoning of nfn/ntn >> eternal universe >> boundless universe >> life throughout the universe was so important to Epicurus and should be so important to us.
It's acceptable as Epicurus said to maintain multiple theories that are consistent with the evidence, but anything less (a flat "we dont know") reduces our response to religion and platonism to "maybe you're right, we can't prove it because we weren't there and we'll never know because the origin of things is 'beyond our grasp.'" And this leads directly to "Your Yahweh is entitled to as much respectful consideration as my eternal universe, because we ourselves personally weren't there and therefore we can never know for sure."
It seems to me that Epicurus stands for the proposition that we can and should do better than that.
Cassius, I advise caution in saying that there would be any scientific discovery we would reject on the grounds that someone would use it to insert their god of the gaps. We are wisest to base knowledge on evidence, not worry about trying to get evidence to exclude religionists. No creator is needed for the various Big Bang scenarios, nor would one fit in. Unless, as I think Vic Stenger has said, the universe would be the same with or without said god's actions, ha ha!
If we go the direction of excluding explanations that fit observed data "on principle" instead of continuing to test those observations, then we will back ourselves into a sort of flat-earther corner if one of those explanations is correct. And we will attract mainly people who reject evidence in favor of ideology, eventually.
I feel extremely confident that the universe is material and without a basis for absolute ethics. There's really nothing in any of the current theories that would turn that upside down.
There is no way to _ever_ stop supernaturalists from misunderstanding or twisting evidence around. The New Agers do stuff like take Heisenberg's uncertainty principle as implying that we can stop the fires in Australia by concentrating on them at the same time. Or that because elements that compose our bodies are constantly interchanging with the environment-- as I think Dawkins said, there's a high chance that a glass of water today contains a molecule that once passed through Oliver Cromwell-- this proves we are all one person, tada!
That level of woo-woo ness is impossible to prevent, so it's a waste of time to even consider, IMO.
I advise caution in saying that there would be any scientific discovery we would reject on the grounds that someone would use it to insert their god of the gaps. We are wisest to base knowledge on evidence, not worry about trying to get evidence to exclude religionists.
Yes I agree but as I see it I am making a somewhat different point.
I would never suggest that we reject a "discovery" or "evidence" -- I am talking "theory."
In other words, if there is indeed evidence that everything observed so far is expanding in one or more directions, then we definitely "accept" that evidence -- but not necessarily every conclusion that someone suggests should be drawn from it.
We first and also have the firmly established observation that nothing comes from or goes to nothing. We don't throw that out the door just because we have evidence of expansion. We now have two separate sets of evidence, and the "truth" must incorporate BOTH to be valid, since we cannot throw out either.
So the point I think is valid is that we can never throw out any evidence, but we can and must throw out theories that are not consistent with ALL the observed facts. In those cases where we can't pin down a likely answer we accept all possible alternatives that ARE consistent with the facts, even when incomplete or ambiguous, and/or we follow the "wait" method.
When the intellectual universe alters, in other words, I don’t feel arrogant enough to exempt myself from self-criticism. And I am content to think that some contradictions will remain contradictory, some problems will never be resolved by the mammalian equipment of the human cerebral cortex, and some things are indefinitely unknowable. If the universe was found to be finite or infinite, either discovery would be equally stupefying and impenetrable to me. And though I have met many people much wiser and more clever than myself, I know of nobody who could be wise or intelligent enough to say differently.
-Christopher Hitchens
And I am content to think that some contradictions will remain contradictory, some problems will never be resolved by the mammalian equipment of the human cerebral cortex, and some things are indefinitely unknowable. If the universe was found to be finite or infinite, either discovery would be equally stupefying and impenetrable to me
That is an interesting quote from Hitchens and I do think it illustrates a way in which though he admired Epicurus, he was not fully Epicurean.
I think that Epicurus would go further and differently than this, because Epicurus would process the information and attempt to come to a conclusion in which he could be confident that the discovery (especially that the universe is "finite") assisted him in concluding whether to entertain the possibility of supernatural control.
Because if we DO have to entertain supernatural creation and control, then all bets are off on everything. And I do mean "bets" because it is not a matter of considering all this to be "stupefying" or "impenetrable." We have finite lives and we have no choice but to take practical positions on what to do with our time - whether to go to church and worship Allah or Yahweh or whoever, or base our decisions on Epicurean or some other philosophy.
So OF COURSE this next point is true......
And I am content to think that some contradictions will remain contradictory, some problems will never be resolved by the mammalian equipment of the human cerebral cortex, and some things are indefinitely unknowable.
The question is really what is meant by "knowable." If Hitchens is suggesting that anything less than "I am eternal myself and I have observed everything myself and therefore I KNOW the universe is infinite or finite" is required in order to say that you "know" something, then that is a false standard and never going to be satisfying to someone who thinks about ultimate issues like Epicurus did.
It's a FACT that in our lifetimes we have and will have limited evidence, just as Hitchens did in his lifetime. We have to make our decision on how to live based on what we think of the evidence before us. Everyone has to do that. Epicurus is saying that it is foolish to walk around being stupefied and thinking everything that is really important to you is impenetrable. he is saying look around, observe all the facts you can, and then live by a method that incorporates all of the observed facts and doesn't contradict any of them.
So that this allegation by Cicero from "On the Nature of the Gods" is not a "bug" in Epicurean philosophy - it's a "feature." It's because of what Epicurus would call an incorrect philosophical position that Cicero thinks he needs to attack in this way. Cicero was ultimately in bed with the skeptics such as Plato (which as Dewitt says Epicurus considered Plato to be) and denying the possibility of confidence in knowledge based on the senses:
Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! “I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortuneteller the Pronoia (which, we may render ‘Providence’) of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream.
EDIT: Stated another way, Cicero and Hitchens are implying that you can never "know" anything beyond your own lifetime based on the information provided by the senses. He is saying that you MUST either (1) intellectually disarm yourself to become a jellyfish and waffle through life, or (2) look to some other source of authority beyond the senses. So the real battlefield here is over the meaning of "to know."
And we all know (or should know) that there are LOTS of people who are happy to make these arguments against confidence in knowledge based on the senses -- because they will usher you directly into the waiting arms of religion, idealism, etc. Some people make these arguments innocently, but I don't think the people who are out there promoting them are innocent or mistaken. Someone who was innocently a skeptical jellyfish would be content to waffle around in its own corner of the ocean being a jellyfish rather than being a crusader against people who think that it is rational to have confidence in conclusions that are strongly consistent with the available evidence.
Militant jellyfishism is what we see everywhere, and it's like Diogenes of Oinoanda lamented that he saw people around him being captured by error is if like sheep.
Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted. Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep)
That's interesting, Cassius-- I don't read Hitchens' words that way at all. He was a thorough atheist. Impenetrable for him definitely did not imply the supernatural. The supernatural is ruled out. I think he was talking about the sense of wonder over nature.
In the article I linked earlier, there is mention of a possibility that some kind of "fluctuation" in a vacuum resulted in matter-- a possible beginning which would not include a god. How would it happen? I don't know, but not knowing is no reason to stick a supernatural god in it as a placeholder since there's absolutely zero evidence for one.
The universe as infinite and eternal doesn't quite fit all the data either, if I understand correctly, with the models so far. Neither does a finite universe or one with a beginning. No model yet has fit everything observed-- the "theory of everything" is the grail of physics. Doesn't mean we can never figure it out, but that's different from saying "that means supernatural gods can exist." I know it sounds related, but it isn't exactly. There's not a god-sized hole in any of the theories. Difficulties understanding the exact nature of time, for instance, don't leave room for the supernatural.
This is one of those places where either I'm different from Epicurus or he would have taken physics data he didn't have access to back then into account and said that we have at least gotten enough info to be very certain there's no supernatural and no absolute. Both of us would feel equally secure in that knowledge even if we arrived at our conclusions differently.
This is one of those places where either I'm different from Epicurus or he would have taken physics data he didn't have access to back then into account and said that we have at least gotten enough info to be very certain there's no supernatural and no absolute. Both of us would feel equally secure in that knowledge even if we arrived at our conclusions differently.
I think what's going on here in our different perspectives probably explains why Epicurus ended up on the "incorrect" side of the size of the sun issue. I suspect that Epicurus was well aware of what the calculations indicated, and that he did not reject the calculations out of hand, but he had to make what he saw as a practical decision to deal with the supernatural claims of the mathematicians who were using their calculations to bolster the argument that the sun and the stars were gods due to their huge size. My suspicion is that he defaulted to his general rule -- a theory must explain ALL the observed facts in order to be held to be correct, and he decided that his observations as to (1) things far away aren't sharp, and (2) bright things don't lose their size so quickly, and (3) maybe other "sensory" arguments, and that those could not be discounted. Since those appeared to be true, and he did not know that the huge distances and/or issues of viewing through the atmosphere would cause distortions, he refused to credit the CONCLUSION that the sun was huge. And he probably calculated that any embarrassment caused by later discovery that he was factually wrong would pale in comparison with the happiness of those who used his argument to discount the supernatural arguments of the Platonists.
And if that was his reasoning (I know I am doing a lot of speculating) I would say that he was right to take the position he did, and I would do the same thing in his place. That's pretty much what I am doing, I admit, even though I have a good degree of confidence that in this situation, there really can''t be a limit to the size of the universe, and that there is an explanation for why everything observed so far may seem to imply a big bang (if in fact it does).
But the real contextual issue is probably not the question of relative amounts of information -- I personally think the most important consideration is that you (and maybe even a majority of our self-selected group) really are different from the run-of-the-mill person who does not have nearly the scientific disposition or background that we have. And I think that this is where DeWitt is right that Epicurus was pursuing a "Philosophy for the Millions." He calculated that his philosophy was needed by everyone, and ESPECIALLY for the non-scientists, who he could not expect to handle the mental challenge of all the uncertainty that constantly engaging in speculation and uncertainty causes. I do think that he was willing to say that as to these people, it was good for them to trust "authority" that they could tell had their best interests for happy living in mind, and that for these type of people "trust" in their "teachers" was the best course for them to follow -- because they could in no way duplicate or follow the speculative sciences themselves.
I think many of us are comfortable with all the uncertainty of the speculations, and we consider that it's just fun and or even cause for wonder and amazement, as you say. But I think it is true (and was true then) the the "majority" of the people in the world are just not capable or disposed or willing to engage in that kind of constant mental challenge. They want something understandable, effective, and accessible to them that will help them live happily, which after all I think we all agree is established to be the ultimate goal.
For many of us the mental challenge of keeping everything open and juggling in our minds is enjoyable, but for people like that it is terrifying. So while we would never affirmatively lie to them, if we really care about giving them a helpful philosophy of life then we present them with one that is manageable for them, just as we simplify things when we explain difficult issues to children.
Now you may think I am taking it all back but I will say this too: I do think that this approach of requiring a theory to fit ALL observable data before it is entertained as something to give credence to is the correct approach. And that is from each person's perspective, not from an absolute standard of what one or two of the greatest minds might say. If indeed we put that kind of trust in them for good reason, then maybe so, but we are not talking about Epicurus when we talk about Lawrence Krauss or any number of nameless (to the outside world) string physicists. It's just not logical to allow any individual or group of scientists, no matter how brilliant they may be, to say "you need to believe C because my theory says A and B and that adds up to C without any ability of the rest to follow the evidence and the argument. To place that kind of blind faith in a "scientist" seems to me to be no different than a tribesman placing it in a witch doctor.
So this is where I think it comes down, and where you are exactly right speaking for yourself:
Both of us would feel equally secure in that knowledge even if we arrived at our conclusions differently.
I am thinking that that applies to you, and to many of us here, but it doesn't apply to the "millions." Given the numerous texts about Epicurus' sincere desire to show the way to happiness, I don't think that anyone should see Epicurus' scepticism to the claims of theoretical science, or his reasoning on the size of the sun, to undermine their confidence in him.
And that relates back to the complaint from Cicero about the Epicureans in his view being uneducated:
Ok, I get what you are saying. It's hard for me to put myself in the shoes of someone who would find any of the unsolved parts alarming, but it may be true.
However, then the problem remains that we have data Epicurus didn't have-- and now his model no longer fits ALL the observed data. It's not just that we are missing data, in case you thought that was the problem -- it's also that we now have data that doesn't fit. So we can no longer use it in the same way he was able to, the way you are describing. We would have to say "our model doesn't fit everything we've observed but we bet there's something amiss with the observations that don't fit, that they are illusory somehow." And that would be a disaster IMO. The stuff that doesn't fit might be misunderstood, but a theory can't survive on that basis.
That is why I think it's more helpful to tell people no matter what, there's no supernatural-- if they are on that simple of a thought process, maybe we can take Vic Stenger's stuff and simplify it. I don't know. I feel sure Epicurus could have done it but Idk if I can, lol.
That is why I think it's more helpful to tell people no matter what, there's no supernatural-- if they are on that simple of a thought process, maybe we can take Vic Stenger's stuff and simplify it. I don't know. I feel sure Epicurus could have done it but Idk if I can, lol.
I completely agree with that!
As to this:
However, then the problem remains that we have data Epicurus didn't have-- and now his model no longer fits ALL the observed data. It's not just that we are missing data, in case you thought that was the problem -- it's also that we now have data that doesn't fit.
As to that I would say that we ought to be very rigorous in requiring confirmation and explanation of any data that allegedly does not fit. For example, if someone is alleging that all that has been observed is moving away from some center or in some other way expanding, then I would rigorously demand of him whether he is maintaining that he has now observed ALL matter, or exactly what he is claiming about that which he has not observed, for obvious reasons.
So I would apply to those who assert that the universe may not be eternal a requirement that they may fully accessible in complete detail the evidence that they say supports that conclusion, along with any reservations and limitations that they themselves admit exist (in the way that when Lawrence Krauss writes a book entitled "A Universe from Nothing" he admits that he really doesn't mean "nothing") And I would not give someone who was willing to do less than that the respect that I would give to Epicurus and the nothing from nothing / nothing to nothing argument unless and until the evidence and argument could be lined up in that kind of way.
Of course I am not suggesting any kind of bright line exists today or tomorrow on what to do or what not to do. I'm really just discussing in a general way the different approaches that make sense to talk about. Unless and until someone wants to suggest a "catechism" or some set of rules for a particular organization, it's not necessary for us to come up with that kind of rigor.
Of course the reason we are typing this, or course, is that coming up with that sort of list is exactly what the "Society of Epicurus" is doing, and so it's appropriate for the Society of Epicurus to deal with those issues (and to decide whether to take a position or not) since it is in the middle of that process. Hiram can do that, and then people can decide whether they want to be part of his organization or not based on the decisions he makes. As to us, we're just discussing!
That is why I think it's more helpful to tell people no matter what, there's no supernatural-
.... Which is kind of like the approach we probably should be taking on anticipations, Epicurean gods, and maybe other subjects where there are ambiguities that are difficult or impossible to resolve due to lack of texts and other issues.
No way we can do it now or over the short term, but over time we need to explore these issues in detail, group-sourcing the effort, and try to help each other here: Nothing From Nothing / Nothing To Nothing / Eternality and Infinity of the Universe
Regarding Stenger: I've begun reading God and the Atom. He's a great source as he is coming from the Epicurean perspective. His book presents science as a 2500 year chain of theorizing, finding evidence, theorizing further, finding more evidence, etc. What this means to us laymen is that when we read a news story on the most current theory, we lack most of the building blocks leading up to it.
Which points to the difficulty of simplifying Stenger: how can you simplify this 2500 year chain?
What this means to us laymen is that when we read a news story on the most current theory, we lack most of the building blocks leading up to it.
Which reminds me of this below, as I was flipping through and find this quote from Stephen Hawking.
The part in red I do not believe for a second. Just like for the last 2500 hundred years, I think it is a dead-correct bet that for the next 2500 years we'll be doing the same thing: observing, finding new evidence, constructing new theories, and then revising them over and over in a cycle. And in the meantime each generation lives only about 80 years at most, and has to decide how to live in the interim:
This quote is from this lecture by Hawking entitled "The Origin of the Universe": http://www.hawking.org.uk/the-origin-of-the-universe.html
So call me presumptuous and arrogant to suggest that I know better than Stephen Hawking, but I don't believe for a second that we are getting close to "ultimate" answers. On this I am comfortable with Frances Wright and 2500 year old reasoning. There will always be new discoveries and new horizons and unanswered questions for science to attack.
I think it's in one of his other books that he lays out the case for no supernaturalism... not sure which. He wrote so many!
I think we can lay out the case without making cosmology assertions where Epicurus would be under reasonable challenge. I don't want to say the case rests on those things, because it doesn't. But it will take some work, for sure!
And just to be clear-- in no way would I want to make anything Epicurus didn't say a criterion. Just thinking that to follow in his footsteps, it would be nice to use current physics to show new people they definitely don't have to worry about anything supernatural. To show that not only hasn't any new observation undone his main conclusion about a material universe but that the case has been made even stronger.
I think it's important to to emphasize his view of how alternative theories that are consistent with the evidence are all acceptable, as that does appears to have been a large part of his reasoning.
I agree... I think the difference now, for cosmology in particular, is not that there's more than one theory that fits all the evidence but no theory which does explain all the existing observations. And I don't know exactly what he would do with that, because he wasn't faced with it. It's a different problem than having the luxury of multiple good theories.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/c…e-big-problems/
What I was thinking is that the arguments might be easier to communicate on the smaller scale, at the particle level, than at the cosmology level. And I think that's the tack Stenger takes, if I remember right.
I need to get around to reading Stenger, which I have not done. Over time I really hope that this is an area that we can grow and have people who are "into" specialties like this and divide up the labor to do the review and analysis of the material. If we talking about this here now get too carried away with it ourselves we won't do the more important things that need doing. In that respect a lot of these problems do seem to be exactly what Epicurus faced and talked about, which is presumably why there was this flurry of allegations that he was anti-science, which I would bet my life was not at all true.
I don't think that was true either. After all, I am positive he didn't just sit down one day and write out all his conclusions about nature, lol! He had so many observations that it would have been an extended process of observation and choosing each element. It would surely have been a dynamic, exciting process. People forget that had to have happened and see him as being static in his thought process. A person like him, who said to study nature always, would not have shut off his brain once he arrived at conclusions. Even while teaching a dogma, if new observations had conflicted with his model, he would have investigated further, not ignored it. It's possible to both have a dogma and continue to observe!
If his philosophy had been kept alive continuously, new observations could have been evaluated and either discarded or incorporated. Now we are playing catch up.
Sometimes I imagine Epicurus looking at the information we have now-- thrilled over some of it and quick to add it to his physics, and rolling his eyes where theories have far outstripped the observations. And how much fun it would be to sift through it all beside him.
We don't have him, but we have each other!
And the reason, of course, that I say one can have dogma but still make observations and be willing to adjust the dogma is that dogma is only in service of pleasure!
So if using the new information leads to technology that enhances pleasure, such as us being able to communicate from far away as we are doing now, then it needs to be included in the dogma.
If new information causes prior dogma to conflict with reality as is currently understood, allowing opponents to accuse us of inaccuracies, then this can result in people doubting the whole philosophy, if parts that needed updating were not updated. And this will result in loss of pleasure for them.
Incorporating new observations does not conflict with the philosophy-- it's required, really, by the Canon, to know what is true and what isn't, in service of making pleasurable choices.
That's why I think it's important to study 😃.
