Posts by Cassius

Elli's first comment:

IMO in a "test" written in this artice, there are some thoughts who is the genuine epicurean, and how he/she thinks and acts in real life. Let's examine this "test".

"The test would be, let’s imagine that your Christmas meal accidentally burnt up in the oven, and you had to break out some rice and beans from the pantry. Would you be upset, or would you laugh about it and enjoy the rice and beans?"
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On the above question of that "test" the first thought that came in my mind was that quote by Menander:
- Γελᾷ δ' ὁ μωρός, κἄν τι μὴ γέλοιον ᾖ. Γελάει ο ανόητος και αν ακόμα δεν υπάρχει κάτι το αστείο.
In english => The fool laughs even when there's nothing funny.

(Short sayings by Menander -Sententiae Menandri).

First of all, a genuine epicurean that is doing something pleasurable and joyfull (e.g. here we see that he/she cooks for a special occasion) is prudent, and PRUDENCE - in the basis of the experiences and the right measurement among pain and pleasure - is his/her guide for being careful to not burn a festive meal, as well as a genuine epicurean is not a stoic to laugh like a fool in every occasion.

But although IF an epicurean would burn up accidentally a meal that is for a special occasion, he will be upset for a moment and then thinking clearly, he will pick up the phone to order something special from a local taverna, since the genuine epicurean is not a stingy and sociopath man like the Cynics.

Thus, in the basis of responsibility, since a genuine epicurean is responsible personality, he will spend some money more buying something special for his friends, paying for his error and at the same time is helping the local store/restaurant/taverna and his local market, in general.

For this reason, and since a genuine epicurean is friendly with the others, the owner of that local taverna, when he would hear that his friendly epicurean has burnt up the festive meal in the oven, he will offer him and a generous discount, since the owner of that taverna wants to preserve and adding some good clients.

So simply a genuine epicurean passes a "test" in real life, and that's how he preserves the social coherence!

Thanks to Nate for finding this link and posting it at the Facebook group. Given the many problems I have with this article, I didn't want to post it here without seeing some responses to here it first, but now Elli has written on it (which I will paste below too) and I have some comments too. Here's the link:

The Epicurean's guide to Christmas | Tim O'Keefe

The Epicureans would do Christmas very differently than most people assume. Sure, they were hedonists, they were all for pleasure. But for them that didn’t…

iai.tv

OK I think I have it set up and linked correctly - if you see something you prefer changed, let me know. I'd like to keep some of the major stuff, like this and Don's Menoeceus and Josh's Torquatus, easily findable from the first page since they are so valuable. I've added a link to the "Core Document" page for the PDs too.

Did we talk about whether you might extend this at some point to the Vatican Sayings? Unfortunately I am not aware of nearly so many options.

And last but not least, if you ever had the time to really flesh it out as a handbook of all the lists, there's also the list of the "Twelve Fundamentals." I am only really aware of two versions of that: DeWitt's version, and also a list by Diskin Clay in his article on Epicurus' Last Will and Testament.

But those can come later I am sure what you've done already as you stretched as it is!

This thread is being set up for discussion of Nate's tremendously valuable work in compiling various translations of each of the Principal Doctrines, which can be found here:

File

KURIAI DOXAI, a Compilation of Translations by Nathan H. Bartman (2021)

This compilation contains 150 years worth of English translations of the "Key Doctrines" of Epicurus.

Eikadistes

May 3, 2024 at 11:14 PM

For the purpose of ongoing discussion of this work, including suggestions, corrections, proposed additions, etc -- please post those comments here in this thread.

Thank you to Nate, and thanks to all who assist in this project!

Don I am going to feature this on the front page. Also OK to feature on Facebook and elsewhere, correct?

Continuing to try to think through these issues, as I reflect on our past discussions about anticipations, I currently think:

(1) That the path most likely to be productive is going to be something similar to a "pattern assembly" and/or "pattern recognition faculty, without which we would not even recognize that there are commonalities between things that upon further thinking we find similar in ways we can name.

(2) The most important question in the analysis is not about the mechanism, but the related issue of "content." If you take the position that anticipations are "true" or "false" in the same sense as we consider concepts to be true or false, then you will inevitably end up with Plato's ideal forms. You will conclude that Nature has somehow created on its own, and likely from eternity, certain "ideas" that exist in some way external to us, that we can eventually "recognize" through the rational use of our minds. So the closer you get to thinking that anticipations are fully formed ideas (in other words, you translate anticipations as "concepts" as Bailey does) then the closer you are to Plato and thinking that certain ideas are somehow created or blessed by Nature for us to recognize and adopt.

(3) I think DeWitt is correct in taking to task Diogenes Laertius' description of the formation of anticipations through repeated observations. Repeated observations can be part of the process of refining our thoughts, but they can't be the starting point. Something had to be in place previously so that the first time you saw a cow, or an ox, you had a faculty of absorbing certain parts of the observation into connections, that you then over time developed, through thinking and repeated observations, into the word "cow" or "ox." But that part of the process is the conceptual reasoning process, in which you think about the various attributes and decide what is and is not essential to your definition of "ox" and "cow." The pre-conceptual part, the part which it seems to me Epicurus is pointing to as anticipations, must involve an automatic, pre-rational, faculty (like the eyes or ears) that are turned to assemble perceptual data in certain ways, but which are not themselves pre-loaded with "ideas" to be recognized.

And that gets back to the error in my statements above. Concepts are true or false as a result of reasoning about them; we say 2 + 2 = 4 by definition, and we can say an equation is true or false due to our definitions. But a faculty like sight or hearing (or presumably anticipations) is only true or false in the sense of "how much of the full picture of all the facts are these perceptions accurately conveying to our minds?" Because neither the eyes nor the ears nor the anticipations (presumably) deliver "conclusions" to us; they just deliver raw data that we then ourselves have to evaluate is pleasurable or painful or blue or yellow or a tree or a flower or whatever.

Don this clip is what I see as the real issue, and the part underlined in red is where I think DeWitt canNOT be correct. To me he is implying that an anticipation is an idea (by calling it innate), so to me the part I poorly expressed above is this; the question is whether an anticipation is an "idea" that can be right or wrong (not that some anticipations are right and some are wrong; I stated that exactly incorrectly, as if I were taking DeWitt's position here):

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I am pretty sure DeWitt's footnote 40 there is a reference to Bailey (I will look it up and confirm) and there I agree with Bailey, and would say that innate IDEAS are incompatible -- but not innate "principles".

(Note: Yes the cite 40 is to Bailey's "Greek Atomists and Epicurus, section 557.1)

I think deWiitt is mainly just speaking loosely, as I have been guilty of myself above. His last sentence, for example "yet there is compelling...." can still be correct. just because infant behavior may be anticipatory of later experience, that doesn't mean babies have innate "ideas."

I think Haris' instincts are good; it's unfortunate that he doesn't seem to pursue some of the details with footnotes or sources and so some of it does come across as "assertions" that are needing justifications. But someone reading and looking for new avenues to pursue would likely find his views useful.

Quote from Nate

I just think his assertion lends weight to the proposition that ΠAΣAΝ ΦAΝTAΣTΙΚΗΝ EΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ TΗΣ ΔΙAΝΟΙAΣ (from KD24) is synonymous with the word ΠPOΛEΠΣIΣ.

Ok, but how do you relate the significance of that in English?

Don would you say that any anticipation of the gods or anything else can be "true" or "false'?

That is probably the starting point for us to be together on. The rest derives from clarifying that, i think.

We'll probably have a lot to discuss here, but let's first reestablish than anticipation is not true or false (so my wording is incorrect) - it is concepts that are true or false, and an anticipation precedes and is not the same as a concept:

So that first needs to be clarified in what I wrote above. It is not the "views of the gods" that are anticipations that are false, it is the conclusions that we make based on the anticipations.

The point I need to be focusing and making is that anticipations are not fully formed concepts and thus are neither true nor false -- it's opinions that are true or false.

I will look for a more definite statement of what I just wrote, but it is my understanding that that is a fair rendition of this section of the letter to Menoeceus:

We are very pleased to be able to present to you, here at the end of 2021, one of the best and most helpful audio presentations of an ancient Epicurean text available anywhere.

The "Torquatus" narrative of Epicurean Philosophy found in Book One of Cicero's "On Ends" is probably the most detailed and important summaries of Epicurean Ethics that survives from the ancient world. In important respects it is more detailed and clear than even Epicurus' own "Letter to Menoeceus." Perhaps that ought not be surprising, given that Epicurus' letter was apparently written to a younger member of his own school, who presumably already understood the basics of Epicurus' views. The Torquatus narrative, on the other hand, represents itself to be an argument sufficient to refute the opposition of one of the most educated Roman "Academic / Stoics of his time, - the highly educated Marcus Tullius Cicero, Senator and former Consul of Rome. Cicero prepared this material for us as part of his campaign against Epicurus, but in doing so he preserved for us some of the most important evidence we have of Epicurus' true viewpoints.

This audio version of Torquatus was recorded by Joshua, who is a regular panelist of the "Lucretius Today" podcast. Joshua's excerpt needs little introduction, as the subject will be immediately familiar to all students of Epicurus. Torquatus takes us deep into the rationale of Epicurus' designation of Pleasure as the goal of life, and sets forth in detail the Stoic/Platonic error of placing the highest good in "Virtue." The student of Epicurus looking for a clear and concise presentation of Epicurus' ethical doctrines can hardly find a better place to start, or to coordinate his or her more detailed studies, than this material direct from the ancient world.

Many thanks to Joshua for the effort he put into producing this for the free benefit of all students of Epicurus. You can hear more from Joshua in his regular appearances on the "Lucretius Today" podcast, and learn much more about Epicurean philosophy, at EpicureanFriends.com, where links are always available to find the podcast for free on all major podcast platforms.

This past weekend Martin and I had a chance to discuss a number of aspects of a weekly Zoom meeting, and here are a couple of our current thoughts:

1. Video preferred but optional
2. Don't record the session by video or audio, generally, unless there is a special presentation. We want the discussion to flow freely and recording can be an obstacle to that.
3. We won't push too hard to turn on video.
4. We want to be sure to make clear that there is no obligation to attend, as otherwise a weekly option can turn into a commitment that too easily becomes and obligation and then a burden.
5. Martin reminded me that there is a German word for regular gatherings of friends for a meal: stemtisch (correction: stammtisch). And of course that reminds me of the subject of one of DeWitt's essays- Epicurean Conturbernium.

Nate what do you interpret that to mean? I have a lot of respect for Haris, and don't think he gets the credit he probably deserves for his books.

But I am not sure about the use of the word "true" in that sentence you quote. If what is meant is that a concept of a thing (concept taken to be the equivalent of thoughts, musings, plans) does not correspond with the reality of a thing unless the concept is closely connected with our senses, emotions, and anticipations of that thing, then I think I agree.

But I am concerned that some of our thoughts on the subject of abstractions may not be worded as well as could be hoped. If the point is that a concept needs to correspond to reality to be true, then again, yes. But must all concepts be "true" in order for them to have significance to us? If a concept generates great pain or pleasure, it still may have significance to us, just like (maybe) the images seen in a dream.

I have probably just lost the flow of the conversation but if our subject is the meaning of anticipations, what does the observation you quote tell us? Would you take it to mean that all anticipations must be "true" to be anticipations? That is ruled out, correct, by the observation that Epicurus makes that the views of the gods are anticipations but also are false (?) I think I am concerned that we are not being clear about the nature of anticipations and when and how to consider them to be "true" -- because we don't see the data received from the feelings or the 5 senses to be "true to all the facts all the time" and I don't think we should go in that direction as to anticipations either, correct?

In other words, I think there is a strong temptation to see anticipations as "true by nature" in the sense of interpreting anticipations as ideas that we hold to be true because nature gives it to us. I think that would open up all sorts of problems if we were to interpret Epicurus as saying that, so I don't think that is what he means. Is Haris saying that in this quote?

This is such a complex subject i am mainly trying to make sure we're all clear about what we are discussing.

As I post this new comment to an old thread we're in the process of revisiting the "absence of pain" issue in several threads, and in looking at the list of old threads the title of this one caught my eye.

We didn't explore this quote at the time, but at some point in the future I would expect someone to do that. In the meantime I would particularly recommend Jefferson's "Head and Heart" letter to recent additions to our forum, especially Kalosyni and others who are exploring this topic. You have to first get your bearings on what is going on in the letter before you can fully appreciate it, but by the time you get to the end I think you'll appreciate that Jefferson does a good job of giving both sides of the "head vs heart" (a good proxy for Stoic/Platonic/Aristotelian vs Epicurean") debate.

And I think you'll agree that he comes down firmly, and for very good reasoning, on the side you would expect. (At least, the side you'd expect if you're read Jefferson's letter to William Short.)

I have not had a chance to review this recent post - it is possible there is discussion of it in the older threads.

What I recall is that Christos has done a very nice job of combining surviving text references into a coherent play for presentation.

As such, I would expect most and maybe all of it to conform to the texts - but just like the texts the message can be misunderstood when some parts are viewed in isolation. I think Christos' intent was to produce an overview of the major concepts, and no doubt he succeeds with that.

(It is interesting to compared this to "A Few Days In Athens", which targets a different audience and is much deeper.)

I gather that what is quoted above is only a part of the text. And not the whole(?). What I recall being concerned about was the effect of sections such as from th letter to Menoeceus, which as I contend regularly can be misleading to us today when read outside of the full context of the philosophy.

Those are the sections I would want to look at more closely.

You are indeed correct Godfrey. When I went back to check G&T on the "replenishment" theory I was overwhelmed (again) by the depth of the discussion.

G&T have exhaustively researched in great detail the full history of Greek philosophy's attitude toward pleasure, and their credentials are sterling, yet they are infrequently (at best) cited by the current crop of contemporary writers (no need to slam them by name - just check the list of cites in any of them for G&T and DeWitt.)

This is not accidental. It is G&T's thorough analysis of the issue that led then to first question the allegation that Epicurus emphasized the katastematic / kinetic distinction, which in turn led to Nikolsky tracking down the Carnaedes roots of that issue in DL.

I am afraid that the very depth of their research and soundness of their analysis is what has led them to being ignored - their conclusions do not fit the preferences of the "absence of pain" crowd, and the only response that crowd can take is to ignore their work. I would feel embarrassed for them but for the fact that they have no excuse for their error, given what G&T have tracked down.

Quote from Pacatus

But why are "limits" a sign of imperfection? (That 2nd quote seems to be question-begging.) It can be recognition of t

Right I think Godfrey has this correct. Though it may be counterintuitive at first glance, the Seneca/ Platonic argument is that a thing must have a limit to be perfect. - i.e. being the "best" is itself a limit, according to the argument.

And in case it's not clear, the argument is that pleasure can always be made better by adding more to it, thus it cannot ever reach the state of being "best."

Epicurus shows the fallacy of that argument. -- shows that pleasure indeed has a limit -- by pointing out that there are only two finds of feelings, and as soon as ALL OF YOUR FEELINGS are pleasurable, you have hit that limit.

Over time I am coming to see that some people think this argument is so trite and abstract that they don't think the ancients could possibly have been consumed with its importance, so they dismiss this and go back to "Epicurus must be talking about a different kind of pleasure when he refers to absence of pain."

I think those people are wrong, and in failing to see how much importance Plato placed on it, they fail to accept that this is likely the entire reason for the absence of pain discussion.

We're it not for the need to refute Plato's argument Epicurus would never have had need for the absence of pain argument and he could have stopped with "Look at the newborn of all species" and "we perceive pleasure to be desirable just as we perceive honey is sweet and snow is white."

It seems likely that this project would lend itself toward setting up a Google Doc (where multiple shared editing is easier) and the next issue would be that of setting up a format.

Just as a very quick place to brainstorm:

The Daily Epicurean

January February March April May June July August September October  November December

docs.google.com

(this is currently set to anyone with the link can comment, but if we actually get started then those who really want to work on it can be added as full editors)