PD24

Ι TΙΝ EΚΒAΛEΙΣ ****AΠΛΩΣ AΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ****ΚAΙ ΜΗ ΔΙAΙΡΗΣEΙΣ ****TΟ**

**ΔΟΞAΖΟΜEΝΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟ ΠΡΟΣΜEΝΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟ ΠAΡΟΝ ΗΔΗ**

**ΚATA TΗΝ AΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ****ΚAΙ TA ΠAΘΗ ****ΚAΙ ΠAΣAΝ**

**ΦAΝTAΣTΙΚΗΝ EΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ ****TΗΣ ΔΙAΝΟΙAΣ ΣΥΝTAΡAΞEΙΣ**

**ΚAΙ TAΣ ΛΟΙΠAΣ AΙΣΘΗΣEΙΣ Tῌ ΜATAΙῼ ΔΟΞῌ ****ΩΣTE TΟ**

**ΚΡΙTΗΡΙΟΝ ****AΠAΝ EΚΒAΛEΙΣ·**** EΙ ΔE ΒEΒAΙΩΣEΙΣ ****ΚAΙ TΟ**

**ΠΡΟΣΜEΝΟΝ ****AΠAΝ EΝ TAΙΣ ΔΟΞAΣTΙΚAΙΣ EΝΝΟΙAΙΣ ****ΚAΙ**

**TΟ ΜΗ TΗΝ EΠΙΜAΡTΥΡΗΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΚΛEΙΨEΙΣ ****TΟ**

**ΔΙEΨEΥΣΜEΝΟΝ ****ΩΣT' ANῌPHKΩΣ EΣῌ ΠAΣAΝ**

**AΜΦΙΣΒΗTΗΣΙΝ ****KAI ΠAΣAΝ ΚΡΙΣΙΝ ****TΟΥ ΟΡΘΩΣ ****Η ΜΗ**

**ΟΡΘΩΣ. **

“If you simply discard a sense, and do not distinguish between the different elements of the judgment, so as to know on the one hand, the opinion which goes beyond the actual sensation, or, on the other, the actual and immediate notion, the affections, and all the conceptions of the mind which arise from the observable representation; you will be imputing trouble into the other senses, and destroying in that quarter every species of criterion. But if you allow equal authority to the ideas, which being only an opinion, require to be verified, and to those which bear about them an immediate certainty, you will not escape error; for you will be confounding doubtful opinions with those which are not doubtful, and true judgments with those of a different character.” Yonge (1853)

“If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate between that which is matter of opinion and awaits further confirmation and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feeling or in any mental apprehension, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief, so as to reject the truth altogether. If you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation in ideas based on opinion, as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be taking sides in every question involving truth and error.” Hicks (1910)

“If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion.” Hicks (1925)

“If you reject any single sensation and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion as to the appearance awaiting confirmation and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations as well with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgments. And if among the mental images created by your opinions you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.” Bailey (1926)

“If you reject any sensations, and if you fail to distinguish between conjecture based upon that which awaits confirmation and evidence given by the senses, by the feelings, and by the mental examinations of confirmed concepts, you will confuse the other sensations with unfounded conjecture and thus destroy the whole basis for judgment. If among all opinions you accept as equally valid both those that await confirmation and those that have been confirmed, you will not free yourself from error, since you will have preserved all the uncertainty about every judgment of what is true and what is not true.” Geer (1964)

“(1) If you are going to reject any sensation absolutely, and not distinguish opinions reliant on evidence yet awaited from what is already present through sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression, you will confound all your other sensations with empty opinion and consequently reject the criterion in its entirety. (2) And if you are going to treat as established both all the evidence yet awaited in your conjectural conceptions, and that which has failed to [earn] attestation, you will not exclude falsehood, so that you will have removed all debate and all discrimination between correct and incorrect.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 87 (1987)

“If you reject any sensation that you do not distinguish between the opinion based on what awaits confirmation and evidence already available based on the senses, the feelings, and every intuitive faculty of the mind, you will send the remaining sensations into a turmoil with your foolish opinions, thus driving out every standard for judging. And if, among the perceptions based on opinion, you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will fail to escape from error, since you will have retained every ground for dispute in judgment concerning right and wrong.” O'Connor (1993)

“If you reject unqualifiedly any sense-perception and do not distinguish the opinion about what awaits confirmation, and what is already present in the sense-perception, and the feelings, and every application of the intellect to presentations, you will also disturb the rest of your sense-perceptions with your pointless opinion; as a result you will reject every criterion. If, on the other hand, in your conceptions formed by opinion, you affirm everything that awaits confirmation as well as what does not, you will not avoid falsehood, so that you will be in the position of maintaining every disputable point in every decision about what is and is not correct.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If you arbitrarily reject any one sensory experience and fail to differentiate between an opinion awaiting confirmation and what is already perceived by the senses, feelings, and every intuitive faculty of mind, you will impute trouble to all other sensory experiences, thereby rejecting every criterion. And if you concurrently affirm what awaits confirmation as well as actual sensory experience, you will still blunder, because you will foster equal reasons to doubt the truth and falsehood of everything.” Anderson (2004)

“If you expel each and every sensation without qualification, and fail to draw [fitting] distinctions applying to what is opined [about sensations] as between what is present already and what is anticipated; or if you fail to draw distinctions applying to what is opined [about sensations] as to whether such opinions are according to sense perception, the passions, or some other imaginary twist of mind: you will, then, confound also the rest of your sensations [in addition to the ones you are trying to expel directly] because of this ineffective way of judging, so that you will also have expelled all criteria for judging what is true and what is false.” Makridis (2005)

“If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts, then you will throw your other perceptions into confusion because of your trifling opinions; as a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions you treat as confirmed everything that will happen and what you do not witness thereafter, then you will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and is not correct.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If you summarily rule out any single sensation and do not make a distinction between the element of belief that is superimposed on a percept that awaits verification and what is actually present in sensation or in the feelings or some percept of the mind itself, you will cast doubt on all other sensations by your unfounded interpretation and consequently abandon all the criteria of truth. On the other hand, in cases of interpreted data, if you accept as true those that need verification as well as those that do not, you will still be in error, since the whole question at issue in every judgment of what is true or not true will be left intact.” Strodach (2012)

“If you reject any sensation absolutely, and do not distinguish between an opinion that awaits confirmation and a present reality (whether of sensation, feeling, or perception), you will also throw your other sensations into confusion with your groundless belief, and in doing so will be rejecting altogether the criterion. But if, when assessing opinions, you affirm as true everything that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, [. . .] you will not escape error; for you will be preserving complete uncertainty in every judgment between right and wrong opinion.” Mensch (2018)

“If you're going to reject any particular sense-perception outright and not distinguish beliefs about anything deferred from what is already present in sense-perception or feelings or any presentational application of thought, then you're going to throw the rest of your sense-perceptions into turmoil too by this pointless belief, an you'll end up rejecting every standard. On the other hand, if you're going to affirm not only whatever is deferred in your concepts and beliefs but also what [has] no attestation, then you will not evade falsehood, and you will find yourself upholding every challenge on every decision about what is correct or incorrect.” White (2021)