Posts by wbernys

Quote from Cassius

As to the second part of your comment as to disagreeing with DeWitt on wisdom, could you make that a little more clear because I am not sure you spelled that out as clearly as the other part.

Sure, it seems like DeWitt thinks of Epicurean reason as just prudence only, knowing how to make proper decisions.

While that is an important part, I also think Epicurus count theoretical wisdom as well, like The Nature of the Gods, the nothingness of Death, and the limits of pain and our desires, if that makes sense.

Torquatus seems to make clear the necessity of theoretical knowledge beyond just prudence, especially in his call for science.

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Natural Philosophy is what Epicurus deemed all-important. This science explains to us the meaning of terms, the nature of predication, and the law of consistency and contradiction; secondly, a thorough knowledge of the facts of nature relieves us of the burden of superstition, frees us from fear of death, and shields us against the disturbing effects of ignorance, which is often in itself a cause of terrifying apprehensions; lastly, to learn what nature's real requirements are improves the moral character also. (On Ends, 1.63)

Dewitt in his "Epicurus and his Philosophy" interprets Principal Doctrine 5 "as follows.

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"It is impossible to live pleasurably without living according to reason, honor, and justice, nor to live according to reason, honor, and justice without living pleasurably."

Incidentally, it may be recalled that by reason is meant the practical reason, which guides the individual in every choice between doing and not doing a given thing; by honor is meant the unwritten law that determines the conduct of a gentleman; and by justice is meant obedience to the written laws of the country. (Pg.246)

It seems everyone I've seen agrees with this idea, at least if they have commented on it.

For my part, i actually disagree with this interpretation, largely because Epicurus gives his own definition of Justice in Principal Doctrine 37 especially, which goes beyond simple obedience to the written laws of the country, even saying some laws can be unjust. But i also softly disagree with his take on Wisdom.

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Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual association is attested to be useful, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the usefulness of mutual association, then this is no longer just. And should the usefulness which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

Furthermore, one of Epicurus own works seems to hint at a conception of Justice beyond simple obedience to the law, with the working being called "On Just Dealing" (Hicks), with some like White and Bailey going even further in translating it as "On Just Action", which i doubt is just a work that says "just obey the law" for a couple paragraphs straight if the Principal Doctrines are any indication.

With all this in mind, i would like to propose a different interpretation than DeWitt, on Justice especially.

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By Wisdom is meant making the proper choices and avoidances to live a pleasant life, as well as knowing the truth about various things in order to understand our own world and make proper choices and live pleasantly, such as Tetrapharmakos, necessity of Friendship, knowledge of Nature, the truth of our senses, etc.

By Honor is meant to character of a gentleman, as well as noble lady for our own Kalosyni, this is all the socially acceptable conduct which, even if not technically harming someone, is still seen as socially repugnant, such as a refusal to help others, being greedy, making other people take care of you via your own laziness, if you could help yourself, uncleanliness, or lying outside of harming others, along with other generally shameful practices. Obviously a lot of overlap with Justice here, just as Wisdom overlaps with all the other virtues.

By Justice is meant acting according to what is mutually beneficial for people, not murdering, cheating, stealing, or assaulting, which mostly means obedience to the law, but sometimes means changing the law so that it comes into conformity with what is mutually beneficial.

I hope you all like this, and let me know your thought.

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I presume the staples means you cut yourself (?)

If you mean intentionally than no. From what I can tell I got a small cut at work by hitting my head, than made it way worse by digging at it like an idiot. It's a little speculative though.

I would also agree with this idea. To me, similar to SillyApe, Epicurus gives me a set of ideas to keep in mind.

Likewise, I think Gratitude is the biggest improvement, I began to realize that Gratitude should be viewed like a muscle, you gotta exercise it by remembering "nature's wealth" and remembering past pleasures. I also think on death more mostly just to realize and appreciate the opportunities in life more, I just watched a DC show called "Lanterns" yesterday for example with my Dad and Step-Mom. Was really good.

Three other things.

1. I have a much less snobbish attitude towards others than I used to, I used to be critical towards others for their perceived lack of knowledge on history, but here they were enjoying their life, while I was getting worked up over historical disputes.

As Metrodorus says

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Wherefore let it never disturb you, if you know not either what side Hector was of, or the first verses in Homer's Poem, or again what is in its middle.

2. I also am more inclined to think positively in terms of Self-Sufficiency by thinking on the issues of "Am I really living according to nature, or am I allowing myself anxiety over vain ideals and desire for endless soda or a desire to sleep in". Drinking more water now. Just gotta get used to exercising.

3. I feel much less perturbed to pain than I used to, just got some staples in the back of my head, had trouble sleeping because you know...staples. But otherwise fine. The scarier part was just the medical bills lol.

Diogones Laertius records various "scandals" of Epicurus and what critics were saying about him, one particular remark is this one below.

"in another letter to Themista he thinks he preaches to her"

Pamela Mensch simply says on this passage "The text is corrupt here and no convincing restoration has been proposed."

I found this note on Attalus.Com, and was wondering if some or our better Greek experts like Bryan or Don could answer what this passage likely means. I found it translating from everything to "He wants to have his way with her" to "He tries to preach to her".

"A perplexing passage. (1) As παραινετική is for the Stoics that branch of ethics which makes personal application of moral principles, the MSS. may be right. (2) By changing αὐτῇ to αὐτήν, a little more sting is given to this tame remark: "he thinks that she preaches." (3) If this is one of the fifty scandalous letters alluded to in § 3, Froben's αὐτὴν περαίνειν, which Bignone and Apelt adopt, may be right. (4) If emend we must, a rude remark is quite as probable as a compliment, cf. § 8. Hence νομίζει αὐτὴ<ν> παρα<κ>ινεῖν, "he deems her mad," if she says or thinks so‑and‑so, would be in the master's blunt manner, and Themista (to use the language of Phaedrus, 249D) νουθετεῖται ὡς παρακινοῦσα.

CrashCourse is always a fun look. I used to watch them all the time in school.

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friendship carries obligations, why wasn't he willing to extend the same principle to the polis?

I don't entirely agree with your comment, i think Epicurus did care about the polis to some extent, even if it carried obligations, Epicurus did say we should enter politics in emergencies for example. He's largely against aiming for political power, not against helping your neighbors, in fact the Epicureans care a great deal about helping their neighbors.

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The Epicureans are up in arms, and implore the assistance of their neighbors, and many are ready to fly to their aid. (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.21)

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He (The Wise Man) treats with much care as many people as he can, and he is thankful to those who treated him kindly. (Philodemus, On Choices and Avoidances, Column 22)

My guess, at least from my own reading, is that Epicurus rightly understood that a lot of these "honorable wars" were just stupidity about Honor, Fame, Power, and Status. They were dangerous, unstable, rarely went the way people think they do, and were a massive waste of time. Trying to be a "great man" via war or power is stupid and doesn't help.

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as to achieving something that will appear great even to those who come after, it is nothing to do with the man who will not have perception or exist at all, and it comes about for very few men indeed, while the majority are killed like cattle in the battle lines. (Philodemus, On Death, Column 28)

And trying to achieve high office or join a military campaign was anxious and by in large hurt more than helped. But he would undertake duty in order to help the polis by either politics or military service if really needed.

Friendship by comparison is always pleasant if a true friendship, and is always painful to live without, this is why we would sometimes die for a friend, but only for a polis if we really need to for security.

In the Letter to Menoceus, Epicurus says "of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. (Hicks). Ironically, despite Happiness being the first one listed, most commentors I've seen find it the hardest to understand, while life and removing bodily unease are pretty easy to understand, what is necessary for happiness seems harder. I thought i would give my take.

My general understanding is as follows: Desires necessary for Happiness are those which allow us to have confidence about the future, and allow us to have confidence we can live well throughout the greatest part of our life.

With this in mind some desires i think can be thought to be necessary for Happiness are as follows.

Let's start with one generally everyone agrees on, that of Friendship

Friendship.

As the Principle Doctrines tell us.

27. Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends.

28. The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.

Here Friendship, generally agreed by everyone to be among the desires necessary for happiness is thought to be necessary because it allows unparalleled security throughout our life, and ensures happiness throughout the whole of our life.

All of our friends give us the greatest security as the Principle Doctrines above tell us, and it's really the confidence that they will help us as opposed to their actual assistance as VS34 tells us "We do not so much need the help of our friends as the confidence of their help in need.

The Virtues: Wisdom, Honor, and Justice.

As PD5 tells us "It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly."

Wisdom tells us that a god presents no fear, death no evils, the good is easy to get, and the bad is easy to endure, and guides us to all the other virtues which leads to a pleasant life. Honor allows us to make friends and be at peace with our community to avoid be despised, envied, or viewed with contempt. Justice ensures we no longer need to look over our shoulder constantly fearing discovery of when enforcers may catch us and gives us a clear conscience. As Epicurus says "For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them.

As Torquatus puts it "Epicurus explains how the Wise Man is always happy in this way: The wise man keeps his desires within bounds; he disregards death; he has a true conception of the Divine Nature, untainted by fear; and he does not hesitate to depart from life, if that would better his condition. Thus equipped, the wise man enjoys perpetual pleasure, for there is no moment when the pleasures he experiences do not outbalance his pains. The wise man remembers the past with gratitude, grasps the present with a full realization of its pleasantness, and does not rely upon the future. The wise man looks forward to the future, but finds his true enjoyment in the present. The wise man is also entirely free from the vices that I have described, and he derives considerable pleasure from comparing his own wise existence with the life of the foolish. Moreover, any pains that the Wise Man may encounter are never so severe but that he has more cause for gladness than for sorrow.

Confidence in our knowledge.

As PD22 tells us "We must take into account as the end all that really exists and all clear evidence of sense to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty and confusion." If we decide to veer off into other directions and reject the senses and go instead into useless speculation, there would be no hope of being able to have the confidence about certain matters which allow for a pleasant life.

Knowledge of how the world works.

This is needed to dispel mythology as PD 12 which says "It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a person did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures".

If we are constantly afraid of gods striking us down, with disaster or hell or other terrible punishments, we will never have true security, being no different than a criminal in terms of happiness, and all our efforts to being secured against others would be worthless as PD13 tells us "There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow humans, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.

Freedom through self-sufficiency.

Not in the American sense of electing your leaders, but rather in the sense of not being under the absolute control by others, and being able to operate freely of both empty desires and enslavement to others. As Epicurus says "Freedom is the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency."

Diogenes of Oenoanda further criticizes Military service and public speaking, on these lines saying "Military service is dangerous and one is subordinate to others. Public speaking is full of agitation and nervousness as to whether one can convince. Why then do we pursue an occupation like this, which is under control of others? I believe this is also the biggest reason Epicurus opposed getting involved in politics unless you had to.

Security from other men.

As Diogenes says above, it is not just the subordination which makes military service bad, but also the uncertainty and danger, especially when it was done for such vain reasons as "Glory" and "Honor", when in reality, most are forgotten. Don't strive for foolish glory and destroy happiness by being in constant danger for stupidity, rather have security to enjoy your pleasures of life without fear.

Hope you enjoy!

Saw this at EPCOT today. Not Epicurean but it reminded me of a a qoute by Diogenes of Oenoanda where he says

"we ought to make statues of the gods genial and smiling, so that we may smile back at them rather than be afraid of them."

I like how Mexicans do this for day of dead. Despite not being Epicurean it does feel like a good Epicurean practice.

I'm quite late to this topic. This is my short understanding, i want to know if Cassius finds this acceptable or in line with new policy.

- Kinetic and Katastematic Pleasure are not superior to one or the other (100 percent agree), I think it was a concept that Epicurus and Metrodorus said in Diogenes Laertius, but not super important. I think practically Epicurus may have focused more on things which disturb us when we rest, but he didn't think tranquility was in any way "better" than constant partying unaccompanied by any pain, as PD10 clearly says.

- This article really likes Boris Nikolsky's thesis as i see, but i personally find Diogenes quote of Metrodorus that "Pleasure can be thought of both as consisting in motion and as static" (Bailey) to be too strong to say they don't have this concept, along with Epicurus quote as a backup, and i generally find Cicero reliable, he's hostile, but i don't consider him a liar who doesn't understand Epicureanism, i don't think he would just make this up.

- In my reading, Kinetic pleasure is a kind of pleasure which comes by some kind of relief or "stimulation" of the senses, in other words a movement of the senses, such as the sudden removal of pain, but also thinks like tasty food. Katastematic Pleasure is pleasure without any "stimulation" or recent change or motion, such as Healthiness, Tranquility, etc. However, i strongly think it's not just removal of pain which counts as a kinetic pleasure, or a "replenishment" view, disagreeing with Arenson (2019), who i think has this view. I could be wrong on this though. Epicurus seems to call these "titillations of the senses," Usener 440, Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, I.40.113, see also Usener 412-414 for "titillations"

Hope this helps.

Wanted to establish this thread for more detailed discussion of this fragment.

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In his Problems, Epicurus asks himself if a Sage, knowing they will not be caught, will do anything the law forbids?

First of all, it is likely Plutarch is being typically unfair here, as i imagine right after this Epicurus may have mentioned examples like helping a friend, or acquiring food in need. But Plutarch uses this to suggest unfairly Epicurus would be okay with things like murder or sexual assault. Notice how Plutarch conveniently doesn't mention what the "anything the law forbids" actually is.

For my part, i believe the proper interpretation of this can be as follows and requires a careful reading of PD35, which is related.

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It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection. (Peter Saint Andre translation)

In this Principal Doctrine, Epicurus seems to specify that is it the agreement to neither harm each other which is genuinely impossible to have confidence in escaping. However, despite Hicks translation that "It is impossible for the man who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered," The Greek itself to indicates the "neither harm nor be harmed" being specified, so things like murder, sexual assault, terrorism, and theft done in a way which genuinely threatens or harms someone else, such as stealing their entire life's savings or hostage taking for extortion, but not just any part of the law preventing confidence in escaping.

I think it follows that Epicurus thinks there may be instances where the Sage breaking the law may be "hard to determine" for Epicurus, obvious cases being helping a friend, escaping a country if one needs to, or getting food without better options, along with other more minor things such as gambling, piracy, speeding, taxation loopholes, or other things, if unenforced or secrecy is assured, while i still believe he would generally advise against heavy use in such things for their anxiety. He considers these more "hard to determine" unlike examples of harming another person, which the Sage would say "absolutely not". It is these things which is the part of "living justly" as per Principle Doctrine 5

In short, while strictly rejecting anything which genuinely harms another as preventing serenity of the mind permanently because the nature of "harming one another" always creates fear of discovery, heavy punishment, and resentment, but other things without this nature which don't produce the same anxiety or risk, are more "hard to determine" and context dependent but generally discouraged.

This brings me to a related question which i hope someone like Bryan or Don could answer.

Philodemus, in On Choices and Avoidances Column 14, mentions a virtue called "φιλοποητικῶς" which is translated as "in a way that makes friends" or "makes friends" or "makes and keeps friends" by various translators I've seen.

Would this word more so mean make deep and connecting friendships or just generally acting friendly and affable/genial towards other people? For example is "being friendly" a good translation?

Also curious if this is related to his other word right after called "φιλανθρ]ώπως" Which is translated as "Philanthropic", I personally translate it as "Benevolence".

Quote from Cassius

with one side incorporating joy and delight along with tranquility into the wider concept of pleasure as all that is desirable,

This is a great summarization of my views, along with what I believe Epicurus believed.

Someone feeling perpetual joy or delight is not in any way inferior or superior to feeling constant Serenity or Tranquility. Both are equally Pleaseant. Kinetic and Katastematic pleasures are variations of pleasure. Pretty sure this is Austin's view and Gosling and Taylor's as well. They are variations of the same condition, Epicurus recognized this variation (Dissgreeing with Kolosky) but didn't consider it a huge deal.

This is why Tranquility is not the absolute goal, but any continuous Pleaseant state, whethe it be either constant Tranquility/Serenity or Joy/Delight.

Although I think practically Epicurus more so focused on what prevents tranquility when we rest (our fears and vices). But as he says in PD 10, if one removes these fears and vices by constant debauchery or joy, it's equally valid.

Do you agree Max DuBoff?

Quote from Max DuBoff

Epicurus, like many Greek philosophers, thinks that a good life is a perfect life (pantelēs; PD 20, 21; Pyth. 116). It's not clear to me exactly why he holds this assumption (very curious for your thoughts; I think this is one of the big puzzles of his ethics, for which we don't have extant sources).

I think this is because of the dominance of Plato, he wants to respond to the Platonic objection that the good life can't be one filled with pleasure because pleasure doesn't have a perfectly attainable limit for humans to reach. So the good must be perfect was the accepted belief.

Epicurus responds that Pleasure can be perfect (in removing all pain, often thought the neutral state) and afterwards admits only variation. Just as the Stoic sage may vary in different qualities (rich/poor, young/old, Greek/Non-Greek), but not be more wise, pleasure varies in state to state (Joy/Tranquility), but not be more perfect.

Quote from Max DuBoff

What it doesn't mean (in my view) is that tranquility feels great in the way that caviar or a beautiful view does.

I would slightly disagree, caviar and a beautiful view do feel great in the same way as tranquility, afterall pleasure reach it's limit in removing pain, it's just that tranquility (like all mental feelings) last a lot longer and are more intense because of it being affected by past, present, and future, and thus more important.

Good to hear Austin is working on something!

Quote from Don

FYI...

Epicurus: Fragments - translation

Yeah I know. I just wanted a collection of some of the best on the site so more could see them especially, i did something on reddit as well. Plus i like having more stuff on the site.

Hello Max DuBoff, sorry for not saying hi earlier but happy to have you here! Your articles look great, by the way, just read them, and match my own thoughts. Do you know (or are allowed to share) if Emily Austin has any new works on Epicurus coming out? I really enjoyed her book and hoped she would do more!

From my own understanding on the whole tranquility vs pleasure issue, i personally take naming pleasure as the highest good as an example of intellectual bravery of Epicurus, in not using terms with empty meaning, or dancing around the actual reasons people pursue things, this is what Epicurus really hated.

The funniest example of this is how the other philosophies try to justify friendship, for us it's easy, because it brings us pleasure to have someone who cares about us and we can trust, but Seneca has to dance around this, saying it's for "the purpose of practicing friendships, in order that his noble qualities may not lie dormant...he may have someone by whose sickbed he himself may sit or whom he may himself release when that person is held prisoner by hostile hands." and Aristotle says true friendship is just a "respect between two people for their virtue". Which is rather laughably ad hoc and clearly trying to find a justification for friendship in their rather unhuman ethical frameworks.

I spoke with Martin about this sort of bravery, basically that Epicurus could have used any similar term like Tranquility or flourishing, but these terms are empty if they don't grasp at what we really want from these, Pleasure.

It is the pleasure we get from tranquility and flourishing that we want from it, same with friendship, not them by themselves. So it is pleasure we want, and is the ultimate goal, not just tranquility, although it is a great pleasure.

Similar with using "Virtue" or "Honor" as an empty term, if not connected with the pleasure they bring. It's meaningless if not connectced with pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

Did Emily Austin make a mistake in entitling her book "Living For Pleasure?" Should she have titled it "Living For Ataraxia/Tranquility"?

Of course not! Like i said intellectual bravery requires naming pleasure, not just tranquility by itself, as the true goal, and am happy Epicurus does so. But she goes on the first chapter to say "Epicurus considers that stable anxiety free state the ultimate pleasure, we'll call it tranquility, although Epicurus wrote in Greek, so he called it Ataraxia"

So pleasure is clearly the absolute goal, but mostly defined the absence of distrubance, which is itself a pleasure. I don't think ultimate pleasure, but certainly a pleasure worth pursuing, like all others if not outweighted by pain.

Okay i made separate threads for each founder. Please use them for any further discussion or listing of any other quotes. Hope you all enjoy!

Please use this thread for any quotes of Metrodorus you may find. Please exclude those also mentioned in the Vatican Sayings that he likely said.

All the Good of mortals is mortal. Moral Letters to Lucilius/Book XVI, Letter 96, line 9.

There is a type of pleasure related to sadness, which we must chase after in these times (written to his sister Batis, who recently lost a young child) -Seneca, Moral Letters to Lucilius 99, line 25.

Do not seek for things to happen as you wish, rather wish for things to happen as they happen - Metrodorus. Maximus the Confessor, PG 91, section 355 end, Catholic Library website.

I have prevented you, Fortune; I have caught you, and cut off every access, so that you cannot possibly reach me. Cicero. Tusculan Disputations. book 5, chapter 9, line 27.

The source of happiness in ourselves [is] greater than that which arises from objects - Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book two, line 21.

We are not called to save the nation or get crowned by it for wisdom; what is called for, my dear Timocrates, is to eat and to drink wine, gratifying the belly without harming it.} ... It made me both happy and confident to have learned from Epicurus how to gratify the belly properly. ... {The belly, Timocrates, my man of wisdom, is the region that contains the highest end.} - Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 16, p. 1098D.

Metrodorus makes such a distinction in On Change, and says that he thinks "a compound made up of things that do not exist as numerically distinct is not only indestructible, but also is divine". Philodemus On Piety, Column 4. See Note 1.

Metrodorus, when he says “the rage of the wise man” in its true sense, shows also that he feels it “very briefly.” Philodemus On Anger, Column 45.

Metrodorus writes that, although he likes the idea that the best life is the one that is accompanied by tranquility, peace, and cares that cause minimal trouble, it does not seem that this goal is achieved at least in this way, namely, if we avoid all those things over which, if they were present, we would sometimes experience difficulties and distress. For in truth many things do cause some pain if they are present but disturb us more if they are absent. Philodemus. On Property Management, Column 12-13. Note: unclear how much of this is actually Metrodorus or Philodemus.

Note 1. Unclear meaning, related to debate on Epicurean Gods. some take it to mean that the image of a god is made of similar images but "gods" don't actually exist under the idealist interpretation, others think it means the gods take in new "parts" or "atoms" which keep it unified and everlasting even though it's not always the same entity under the realist interpretation.

Please use this thread for any lesser known quotes (Outside his extant letters, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings) for any quotes of Epicurus you may find.

Please only do direct quotations to ensure accuracy. Some "quotes" like the famous "Worthless is the word of that Philosopher which does not heal any man, just as there is no worth in medicine if it does not heal the sickness of our bodies, so too there is no use in Philosophy if it does not heal the sickness in our souls" Is a great quote which Epicurus likely used, but not a direct quotation with confident attribution.

A unnoble soul is made vain by prosperity, and struck down by misfortune - Epicurus. Maximus the Confessor, PG 91, section 316 middle bottom, Catholic Library website.

If an enemy makes a request, don't immediately reject it, just protect yourself, for they are like a a dog - Epicurus Maximus the Confessor, PG 91, section 391 end, Catholic Library website.

Don't avoid doing small favors, for you will seem like this for bigger matters. - Epicurus. Maximus the Confessor. Could not find on website but accepted by all experts, see Usener 214, Pg. 3, on Attalus.org

He who needs tomorrow the least, enjoys it the most - Epicurus. Plutarch, On Peace of Mind, 16 p. 474C

The greatest fruit of Justice is peace of mind - Epicurus. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, VI.2

Sustainability is the greatest of all riches. - Epicurus. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, VI.2, p.226.38

Cherish men of noble character, and keep him within your sight, living as if he was watching you, and doing everything as he saw your actions" - Epicurus. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 11.8

If you shape your life according to nature, you will never be poor; if you do so according to opinion, you will never be rich. - Epicurus. Letters to Lucilius, 16.7

Do everything as if Epicurus were watching you - Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 25.5

it is nobler, and more pleasant, to give help than to receive it. - Epicurus, Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power, 3, p.778E

The memory of a departed friend is pleasant in every way- Epicurus. Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 28, p.1105D.

Epicurus makes clear in his First Appellations both that the sage ‘will experience rage‘ and (will experience it) “in moderation,” Philodemus On Anger, Column 45

For in On Lifecourses Epicurus says that to pray is natural. On Piety, Column 26.

Let us sacrifice to the gods’, he Epicurus says, ‘devoutly and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matters concerning the most excellent and august of being. Moreover, let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeus, to live like Zeus, as it seems.’ Column 31.

And in his Symposium concerning the rites Epicurus says: ‘Let us celebrate the festivals’ and ‘Make fine sacrifices to a god"

And (name missing, we will assume Epicurus) says ‘Not only will the wise man sing praises of the sacrifices, but also, at the rites, of gods"

Sadly little survives of Hermarchus. Please use this thread only for any more qoutes you find. To begin I will start with the incredibly detailed and long qoutation of Hermarchus on how laws against murder and manslaughter, along with why animals are excluded from these laws below, from Topos Text website. By Porphyry in abstinence from killing animals. Translation by Thomas Taylor.

1.7 The Arguments of the Epicureans, from Hermarchus

The Epicureans, however, narrating, as it were, a long genealogy, say, that the ancient legislators, looking to the association of life, and the mutual actions of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and punished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, a certain natural alliance which exists in men towards each other, though the similitude of form and soul, is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an animal of this kind, as some of the other animals which are conceded to our use. Nevertheless, the greatest cause why manslaughter was considered as a thing grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that it did not contribute to the whole nature and condition of human life. For, from a principle of this kind, those who are capable of perceiving the advantage arising from this decree, require no other cause of being restrained from a deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a sufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude of the punishment, will abstain from readily destroying each other. For those, indeed, who survey the utility of the before-mentioned ordinance, will promptly observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the benefit with which it is attended, will obey the mandate, in consequence of fearing the threatenings of the laws; which threatenings certain persons ordained for the sake of those who could not, by a reasoning process, infer the beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that most would admit this to be evident.

Event Date: -1 GR

§ 1.8 For none of those legal institutes which were established from the [15] first, whether written or unwritten, and which still remain, and are adapted to be transmitted, [from one generation to another] became lawful through violence, but through the consent of those that used them. For those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in wisdom, and not in strength of body, and the power which subjugates the rabble. Hence, through this, some were led to a rational consideration of utility, of which they had only an irrational sensation, and which they had frequently forgotten; but others were terrified by the magnitude of the punishments. For it was not possible to use any other remedy for the ignorance of what is beneficial than the dread of the punishment ordained by law. For this alone even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and prevents them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not beneficial [to the community]. But if all men were similarly capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous, there would be no need of laws, but men would spontaneously avoid such things as are prohibited, and perform such as they were ordered to do. For a survey of what is useful and detrimental, is a sufficient incentive to the avoidance of the one and the choice of the other. But the infliction of punishment has a reference to those who do not foresee what is beneficial. For impendent punishment forcibly compels such as these to subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions, and to do that which is right.

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§ 1.9 Hence also, legislators ordained, that even involuntary manslaughter should not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might not only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds which were involuntarily performed, but also that they might prevent many things of this kind from taking place, which happen, in reality, involuntarily. For neither is this advantageous through the same causes, by which men were forbidden voluntarily to destroy each other. Since, therefore, of involuntary deeds, some proceed from a cause which is unstable, and which cannot be guarded against by human nature; but others are produced by our negligence and inattention to different circumstances; hence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence which is injurious to our neighbours, did not even leave an involuntary noxious deed without punishment, but, through the fear of penalties, prevented the commission of numerous offences of this kind. I also am of opinion, that the slaughters which are allowed by law, and which receive their accustomed expiations through certain purifications, were introduced by those ancient legislators, who first very properly instituted these things for no other reason than that they wished to prevent men as much as possible from voluntary slaughter. For the [16] vulgar everywhere require something which may impede them from promptly performing what is not advantageous [to the community]. Hence those who first perceived this to be the case, not only ordained the punishment of fines, but also excited a certain other irrational dread, though proclaiming those not to be pure who in any way whatever had slain a man, unless they used purifications after the commission of the deed. For that part of the soul which is void of intellect, being variously disciplined, acquired a becoming mildness, certain taming arts having been from the first invented for the purpose of subduing the irrational impulses of desire, by those who governed the people. And one of the precepts promulgated on this occasion was, that men should not destroy each other without discrimination.

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§ 1.10 Those, however, who first defined what we ought to do, and what we ought not, very properly did not forbid us to kill other animals. For the advantage arising from these is effected by a contrary practice, since it is not possible that men could be preserved, unless they endeavoured to defend those who are nurtured with themselves from the attacks of other animals. At that time, therefore, some of those, of the most elegant manners, recollecting that they abstained from slaughter because it was useful to the public safety, they also reminded the rest of the people in their mutual associations of what was the consequence of this abstinence; in order that, by refraining from the slaughter of their kindred, they might preserve that communion which greatly contributes to the peculiar safety of each individual. But it was not only found to be useful for men not to separate from each other, and not to do any thing injurious to those who were collected together in the same place, for the purpose of repelling the attacks of animals of another species; but also for defence against men whose design was to act nefariously. To a certain extent, therefore, they abstained from the slaughter of men, for these reasons, viz. in order that there might be a communion among them in things that are necessary, and that a certain utility might be afforded in each of the above-mentioned incommodities. In the course of time, however, when the offspring of mankind, through their intercourse with each other, became more widely extended, and animals of a different species were expelled, certain persons directed their attention in a rational way to what was useful to men in their mutual nutriment, and did not alone recall this to their memory in an irrational manner.

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§ 1.11 Hence they endeavoured still more firmly to restrain those who readily destroyed each other, and who, through an oblivion of past [17] transactions, prepared a more imbecile defence. But in attempting to effect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain in cities and nations; the multitude spontaneously assenting to them, in consequence of now perceiving, in a greater degree, the advantage arising from an association with each other. For the destruction of every thing noxious, and the preservation of that which is subservient to its extermination, similarly contribute to a fearless life. And hence it is reasonable to suppose, that one of the above-mentioned particulars was forbidden, but that the other was not prohibited. Nor must it be said, that the law allows us to destroy some animals which are not corruptive of human nature, and which are not in any other way injurious to our life. For as I may say, no animal among those which the law permits us to kill is of this kind; since, if we suffered them to increase excessively, they would become injurious to us. But through the number of them which is now preserved, certain advantages are imparted to human life. For sheep and oxen, and every such like animal, when the number of them is moderate, are beneficial to our necessary wants; but if they become redundant in the extreme, and far exceed the number which is sufficient, they then become detrimental to our life; the latter by employing their strength, in consequence of participating of this through an innate power of nature, and the former, by consuming the nutriment which springs up from the earth for our benefit alone. Hence, through this cause, the slaughter of animals of this kind is not prohibited, in order that as many of them as are sufficient for our use, and which we may be able easily to subdue, may be left. For it is not with horses, oxen, and sheep, and with all tame animals, as it is with lions and wolves, and, in short, with all such as are called savage animals, that, whether the number of them is small or great, no multitude of them can be assumed, which, if left, would alleviate the necessity of our life. And on this account, indeed, we utterly destroy some of them; but of others, we take away as many as are found to be more than commensurate to our use.

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§ 1.12 On this account, from the above-mentioned causes, it is similarly requisite to think, that what pertains to the eating of animals, was ordained by those who from the first established the laws; and that the advantageous and the disadvantageous were the causes why some animals were permitted to be eaten and others not. So that those who assert, that every thing beautiful and just subsists conformably to the peculiar opinions of men respecting those who establish the laws, are full of a certain most profound stupidity. For it is not possible that this thing can take place in any other way than that in which the other utilities of [18] life subsist, such as those that are salubrious, and an innumerable multitude of others. Erroneous opinions, however, are entertained in many particulars, both of a public and private nature. For certain persons do not perceive those legal institutes, which are similarly adapted to all men; but some, conceiving them to rank among things of an indifferent nature, omit them; while others, who are of a contrary opinion, think that such things as are not universally profitable, are every where advantageous. Hence, through this cause, they adhere to things which are inappropriate; though in certain particulars they discover what is advantageous to themselves, and what contributes to general utility. And among these are to be enumerated the eating of animals, and the legally ordained destructions which are instituted by most nations on account of the peculiarity of the region. It is not necessary, however, that these institutes should be preserved by us, because we do not dwell in the same place as those did by whom they were made. If, therefore, it was possible to make a certain compact with other animals in the same manner as with men, that we should not kill them, nor they us, and that they should not be indiscriminately destroyed by us, it would be well to extend justice as far as to this; for this extent of it would be attended with security. But since it is among things impossible, that animals which are not recipients of reason should participate with us of law, on this account, utility cannot be in a greater degree procured by security from other animals, than from inanimate natures. But we can alone obtain security from the liberty which we now possess of putting them to death. And such are the arguments of the Epicureans