Posts by Pacatus

Quote from Cassius

If being certain is being used to me "I know this as well as an human can know it" then that definition of certainty is practical and usable.

So I think that's what Epicurus was talking about when he was using his canon.

Yes.

Quote from Cassius

So I think I would be concerned about granting to deductive logic or pure mathematics the status of "objective certainty" either.

Ah! Well-caught! One might say they are only "logically certain" -- in terms of the conclusions following necessarily from the premises. But not "objective" in terms of the real, empirical world (a deductive syllogism can be valid while leading to a result that is -- not logically, but empirically -- false). [Wittgenstein, for example, distinguished between what he called "logical space" and empirical space.]

Quote from Cassius

I wonder if there are any!

I probably danced around skepticism for awhile – though closer to Pyrrhonian skepticism than Academic skepticism. Never hard determinism.

I left long ago what I would call a “hard dogmatism” (in the more modern, pejorative sense) that demands a strict attitude of certainty, as opposed to a pragmatic confidence.* (DeWitt seems to veer there.) [I came to the conclusion that Sextus Empiricus simply confused Epicurus’ use of dogma with that of the Stoics and the Academics.]

As you put it in Ante Oculos: “Epicurus also saw that man’s natural fear of the unknown is seized upon as a tool by false priests, professors, and politicians who demand obedience through the call for ‘certainty.’ The call for ‘certainty’ in human action is a false standard which can never be met, and the real evil of those who call for it is that they are aware of the trap which they lay for the unthinking. The only remedy for this abomination is for men to acknowledge that their knowledge and their lives are limited to the scope to the bounds established by Nature.”

– Cassius Amicus, Ante Oculos: Epicurus and the Evidence-Based Life

We draw on senses (observations), feelings and intuition (my shorthand translation of prolepsis**) – and reasonable inference – to achieve a level of confidence that allows us to form opinions and act. Confidence is necessary, but absolute objective certainty is only available in deductive logic and pure mathematics. (Of course, sometimes we might say “I’m certain that …” as a subjective expression of high confidence; not generally a problem.)

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* Don and I discussed the changing usage of “dogma” here: RE: Philodemus of Gadara - Main Biography

** As per these definitions from Merriam-Webster:

1a: the power or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident rational thought and inference

b: immediate apprehension or cognition

2: quick and ready insight

Quote from Salisuhassan

Garum is fascinating—it's an ancient Roman condiment made from fermented fish!

I tried making garum -- it turned out awful. (Likely my fault; I can't remember what ingredients I used.) Now I just use Thai fish sauce.

Welcome Cyrano.

Peter Saint-Andre’s translation: “They must free themselves from the prison of public affairs and ordinary concerns.”

The Greek text from his site: ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικὰ δεσμωτηρίου.

Vatican Sayings, by Epicurus

Thank you for the meeting and guiding the discussion.

One of my New Year’s resolutions is not to argue, even in the kind of cordial argument that takes place here – and even recognizing the virtues of that for learning. [And I do not mean argument here in any pejorative sense: merely “to contend or disagree with words” (Merriam-Webster) – which need not be “disagreeable”.] It is just a personal intention, trying to influence my own ataraxia.

BrainToBeing I was just re-reading this older post by Elayne (who is an MD, PhD) and thought you might find it interesting. Just a thought ...

On Pain, Pleasure, and Happiness - Epicureanfriends.com

Not "absence of pain" as a full statement of the goal of life, but “the Feelings are two, pleasure and pain” and “Pleasure is the beginning and the end of a…

www.epicureanfriends.com

BTW: Happy New Year!

Re the poll: I use a laptop, never a notebook and seldom a cellphone (just for a quick look, never to participate).

Cassius

I just posted a new poem in the Epicurean poetry thread, and it all came out right. I suspect the glitch was just part of the transition to the new format.

Quote from BrainToBeing

Anyway, some other thoughts to put in the mix.

Thanks, John. Yes,

That issue of "ought"
has always been fraught.

All in all, I like the new look!

Cassius Single spaced lines all became double spaced. I copy-paste the poems here from Word, putting them in Arial font because others used to cause some issues, as I recall. I've kind of learned what works for copy-pasting -- if I have to adjust in the future, I'll figure it out. Not a big deal really.

Welcome, Tariq.

All of my poems (and those of others as well it seems) lost their formatting. I went through and fixed mine. We'll see what happens when new ones come up.

To my (likely limited) knowledge, strict libertarian free will entails that our agency (decisions/actions) are so unconstrained that, in any exact same situation, one could have always chosen differently. This implies that both exogenous circumstance and endogenous circumstances (e.g., my state of mind, education, ability to observe and analyze) are the same, and yet I could have chosen differently in any and every case. Now, if all those circumstances are strictly determinative, then the only way I could have chosen differently is if my choices are random. That is why I reject strict libertarian free will (again, as I understand it). I don’t see Epicurus as a strict free-will libertarian.

That does not mean the only alternative is strict determination. Some constraints (both exogenous and endogenous) may be determinative, others not. In some cases, in some ways, I might have been able to choose otherwise. In some cases, not. Some constraints might be sufficiently determinative as to present mitigating circumstances (ethically); others not so much.

So, I take a kind of middle ground about questions of what could be and what might have been possible.

Just thinking “out loud” here –

Assuming for the sake of discussion that we all have the same understanding of what “good” means, it seems the sort of “meta-ethical” questions are: (1) Why does one want to be good? And (2) – more to the ethical point – why ought one (anyone) want to be good? All ethics is about how one gets from an “is” to an “ought.”

From an instrumental point of view, an agent’s “good” behavior would aim at some goal: In order to achieve G, one ought (that is, one’s best course of action is) to do A. For the Hellenistic schools (e.g. the Stoics and Epicureans), following Aristotle, there is an ultimate goal (a telos, and end-value in itself) – which is eudaimonia (happy or satisfied well-being) – which all interim goals support, and toward which appropriate actions (virtues) are aimed. They disagreed on what is necessary for that telos. But both the Stoics and the Epicureans agree that some measure of social justice is entailed (I don’t think the Pyrrhonian skeptics go there).

The only non-instrumental view I am aware of is deontology: that is, moral rules are exogenously given – either in terms of some divine command theory, or some ideal categorical imperative (e.g., Kant – although that seems to be ultimately based on its own instrumentality: a universal desire to do one’s duty; but that may also be metaphysically given). But maybe there is some evolutionarily determined “given” (or givens) that dictates at least some oughts?

An Epicurean might say that any satisfaction about being/doing good (say, because one has followed Stoic virtues or obeyed some exogenous moral commands) just is (a) pleasure. And what are the grounds for suggesting that one would (or ought to) feel dissatisfied for doing so – in determining if one has acted ethically/morally? I would suggest that, from an Epicurean view, it is our evolutionary human nature that provides the guidance (in terms of pleasure/pain – both physical and mental – assessed by our sense, feelings and intuition;* and abetted by reason).

Again: All ethics is about getting from an “is” to an “ought.” And the Epicurean view (to my mind) readily includes a host of social justice considerations (consideration of “the other”) in the mix.

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OK: My brain is now a scrambled omelet.

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* I am using “intuition” here – as a translation of prolepsis – in the sense of “a: the power or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident rational thought and inference; or b: immediate apprehension or cognition” (Merriam-Webster)

Quote from Don

Their contention is that if we knew the position of every atom and the physical laws that pertained to them, it would be possible to accurately know what would happen next ad infinitum.

Would that entail that there is no randomness in the system? That every event is perfectly predictable?

Now I want to hear from Martin!

Quote from Kalosyni

Can I assume that if I were to say: "There is no such thing as free will" that this means that I am not actually choosing anything and that everything always is predetermined by forces outside of my conscious mind?

Including believing and saying “There’s no such thing as free will.” Or that there is. Or believing that Epicureanism is a better philosophy than Stoicism, and why; or vice versa.

Quote from Kalosyni

Or can we say "free will" = a individual's ability to choose.

For me, that’s just what it is -- even in the face of constraints that limit our choices and how we are able choose.

Quote from Cassius

"Your "virtue" is the handmaiden of pleasure no matter what you say, buddy!"

My favorite!

As I’ve probably noted before, I do not tend to absorb knowledge as well through listening as reading. Others are the opposite. And “concretizing” a verbal discussion into written text can have its own problems. With that said, it would be tragic had I missed this podcast (and a couple of others that I’ve listened to so far) because of my own limitations in that regard.

With that said: (1) I was reminded – especially by Dr. Glidden’s remarks on the fact that our prolepseis can be mistaken, coupled with their place in the canon – of the distinction by the Pyrrhonians between “criteria for truth” (which they found suspect – at least with regard to certain knowledge about “nonevident matters”) and “criteria for agency.” That latter may be uncertain, but can be the best evidence we have to make choices and act upon. It strikes me that, based on Dr. Glidden’s analysis, the prolepseis might fall into that second category.

And (2) the question of “cognitive” versus “noncognitive” is something that I’ve encountered in moral theory. Moral cognitivism is (at the base level I can comprehend) the idea that we can derive proper moral views via thinking and reason (as well a some sort of cognitive validation of articulated rule-based moral creeds). Moral noncognitivism is the idea that we first react emotively – for example visceral repugnance in the face of cruelty to a child. We may try to articulate cognitive reasons for that response (perhaps so that we might convince others), but it is that response itself that drives the very process.

I tend toward moral noncognitivism (again, at the base level I understand it), but it strikes me that prolepsis might explain why so many of those noncognitive (or precognitive) reactions seem to be observed across diverse cultures generally – and why people who have opposite reactions (e.g. enjoying such acts of cruelty) tend to get diagnosed as “pathological.”

Just, really, thinking “out loud” …

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Note: I take “cognitive” here to mean generally what is given as the first definition in Merriam-Webster: “1: of, relating to, being, or involving conscious intellectual activity (such as thinking, reasoning, or remembering).”