Posts by Bryan

"A lot of people we talk to tend to be very benevolent and they want to think the best of other people. They want to think that nobody in their right mind is really attempting to be harmful or really is attempting to obccure, or cause confusion -- but that is not the way the world is." (Cassius Amicus)

"Ridicule is the only weapon which can be used against unintelligible propositions -- ideas must be distinct before reason can act upon them."

This quote has stuck with me. Jeferson sounds very Epicurean here. Thank you, Joshua, for highlighting those quotes -- I will not soon be forgetting the image of the holy men acting like scuttlefish.

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Although worlds come and go, there was never a time before there were any worlds. Similarly, the gods have always existed -- but unlike worlds, the gods persevere.

The gods are not inherently deathless, but they are effectively deathless by thier process of living. Living beings that are able to preserve themselves in the manner similar to a god -- but struggle or fail to do so -- no longer fit our anticipation of gods (and therefore are not properly considered to be gods).

It looks like the γεγόναμεν is taken from Plutarch, Non Posse, 27, 1104E: Ἧι καὶ προεπισφάττουσιν οἱ ταυτὶ λέγοντες " Ἂπαξ ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν – δὶς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι, δεῖ δὲ τὸν αἰῶνα μηκέτ᾽ εἶναι."

"About which also those who say these things predict in advance: 'once we humans have been born – twice it is not possible to be born, it is necessary to no longer exist for eternity.'"

Kύριος is apparently taken from Stobaeus, Florilegium 16.28 -- but I have not been able to find that section in the Florilegium yet, if by chance you are able to locate it, that would be excellent.

And obviously, when Velleius says "in which infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction of sense and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature herself could feel no impulse. "

Part of what he has in mind is that the gods have a human shape (a shape we know that can have reason), and the gods are not formless, or spherical or infinitely large (shapes that do not have reason) "but we are utterly unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any substance annexed to it."

"We have been born once – twice it is not possible to be born: it is necessary to no longer exist for eternity. But you, not being master of tomorrow, you delay joy! Life is lost by this delay – and each of us, while occupied, dies."

Γεγόναμεν ἅπαξ – δὶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι: δεῖ δὲ τὸν αἰῶνα μηκέτι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ, οὐκ ὢν τῆς αὔριον κύριος, ἀναβάλλῃ τὸ χαῖρον! ὁ δὲ βίος μελλησμῷ παραπόλλυται – καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἀσχολούμενος, ἀποθνῄσκει.

Horatius Flaccus, Carmina 1.11:

You – do not seek – it is not to be found! What to me, what to you, the Gods will give as an end, Leuconoë. Nor should you tamper with Babylonian numbers. How much better to endure whatever will be, whether Jupiter grants more winters or the last, (which now with opposing pumice weakens the Tyrrhenian sea). Be wise: you should filter the wine and in short time you should cut back long hope! While we speak, envious age will have fled: harvest the day which expects the least in tomorrow.

Tū – nē quaesíerīs – scī́re néfās! quem míhi, quem tíbī
fī́nem Dī déderint, Λευκονοή. Nec Babylṓniōs
temptā́ris númerōs. ut mélius (quídquid érit) pátī,
seu plū́rīs Híemēs seu tríbuit Iúppiter últimam,
(quae nunc oppósitīs dēbílitat pūmícibus máre
Tyrrhḗnum). Sápiās: vī́na líquēs et spátiō brévī
spem lóngam résecēs! dum lóquimur, fū́gerit ínvida
ǽtās: cárpe díem quam mínimum crḗdula pósterō.

Yes, Don, I agree, without conflicting manuscript evidence to the contrary we should not get too imaginative. It seems the thinking at the time was that, given Vat.gr.1950 itself has errors, many therefore felt more free to try to find "a more original form," in a way that would be inexcusable for the P.Hercs.

For example, as we have seen, if we compare VS10 in Vat.gr.1950 vs. the better attested Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, 5.138, we see very different versions:

^Vat.gr.1950: Remember that, being mortal by nature and having received finite time, you ascended to considerations concerning nature as far as infinity and eternity, and you have seen 'the things that exist, the things that will exist, and the things existing before.'

^{Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, 5.138:} Although Metrodorus became an Epicurean, he said these things piously: "Menestratus, remember that, having been born mortal and having received a finite life, and having ascended with your soul up until the eternity and to the infinity of circumstances, you have even seen 'the things that will exist, and the things existing before.'"

^{Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, 5.138:} Μητροδώρου τε καίτοι Ἐπικουρείου γενομένου ἐνθέως ταῦτά γε εἰρηκότος: "Μέμνησο, Μενέστρατε, διότι θνητὸςφὺς καὶ λαβὼν βίον ὡρισμένον, ἀναβὰς τῇ ψυχῇ ἕως ἐπὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων, κατεῖδες καὶ 'τά τ' ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ' ἔοντα.'"

Yes, if we take καλος substantively without an article it makes good sense. I also do not see what has led to so much agreement to throw out πλείονος. I feel like we are missing something.

For the quote referenced above by Bailey:

Aristophanes, Acharnians 1227:

CHORUS: You triumph then, brave champion; thine is the wine-skin!

DICAEOPOLIS: Follow me, singing “Triumph! Triumph!”

CHORUS: Aye! we will sing of thee, thee and thy sacred wine-skin, and we all, as we follow thee, will repeat in thine honour, “Triumph, Triumph!”

It is an interesting difference.

Here is Bailey's comment, calling Usener's change from πλείονος to παιῶνος "brilliant."

So as we know, he keeps παιῶνος:

^[Bailey] ...ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ παιῶνος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὡς [εὖ] ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

^[Bailey] …we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well.

As you said, if we keep πλείονος, we have something like:

...ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ πλείονος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὡς εὖ ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

...we shall depart from life with more [of] good, proclaiming that we have lived well.

I think the phrase "μετὰ καλοῦ πλείονος" is somewhat unusual because "καλοῦ" is an adjective, and "πλείονος" is a comparative adjective, typically modifying a noun. We might expect "μετὰ πλείονος τοῦ καλοῦ" for "with more of the good." But I agree this may not be sufficient reason to divert from the manuscript.

We may also have a connection between Leonteus and Mammarion, (the full context is not yet clear to me, it is possible that Philodemus is just mentioning these as rumored relationships).

Philódēmos, Ad Contubernales, book 1, P.Herc. 1005, col. 5: ...Nikidion was Idomeneus' beloved, and Leonteus' Mammarion, and Hermarchus' Demetria, and such was Pythocles' tutor Polyaenus...

Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἐρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαμμά[ρι]ον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημη[τρ]ία καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθο[κλ]έους π[αιδ]αγωγὸς Πολύ[αινος]…

The Glossarium finally arrived. Although most of the work was completed by Usener, he never published the work. In fact it was not published until 1977 in Rome and (as far as I can tell) never published again. Therefore it is in an unfortunate position to be written in the late 1800's but still has a copyright. This is, I suppose, one reason for it's rarity.

There are some modern edits, for example I was very pleasantly surprised to see a full equivalence table for the old listing of the P.Hercs to the one in modern use. Up to this point when I saw "VH² I f.149" in Usener I had to do some digital digging in the Digital Corpus of Literary Papyri (in some cases unsuccessfully), but now we can look at the table as see that VH² I f.149 = P.Herc. 1005!

Mostly it is a dictionary of Epicurean terms. This idea itself cannot be copyrighted, we will have to form a digital dictionary of Epicurean terms.

In an effort to reconcile (DL 10.32) "All concepts have arisen from the senses" with (DND 1.43) "...gods exist, because nature herself has impressed a notion of them on the minds of all." I am thinking:

What has "nature used to impress a notion of gods on our minds" if not the very images of the gods that come from their bodies?

We also cannot forget that Philodemus discusses the actual physical processes by which the gods exist:

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.8.205: ^[Obbink] And having written another book On Holiness, in it too he makes clear that –not only that thing which exists indestructibly – but also (that which) continually exists in perfection as one and the same entity: are termed in the common usage "[unified] entities" – some of which [entities] are perfected out of the same elements, and others from similar elements.

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.13.347: ^[Obbink] Its constitution out of things similar would obviously be a unified entity: for it is possible [for beings constituted] out of similarity for ever to have perfect happiness – since [unified] entities can be formed no less out of identical than out of similar elements ([and both kinds of entity] are recognized by Epicurus as [being] exactly the same things, for example in his book On Holiness.)

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.13.364: ^[Obbink] ...Therefore he was wont to say that nature brought all these things to completion alike – and that for the most part many things come about [when they are formed] from an aggregation of various similar particles…

Sedley is correct when he says "each of us has an innate propensity to imagine." We also have an innate ability to see -- but we have to actually look and see things to use that ability! So he goes too far by saying "By doing so, we are ipso facto giving a concrete realization to the prolepsis of god." We can give similar mental "realizations" to centaurs. The process Sedley is describing is actually how we form a hypolepsis (supposition) and unless it corresponds to an external body, it is an empty thought.

"For indeed, all concepts have arisen from the senses – according to [1] circumstance, [2] analogy, [3] similarity, or [4] synthesis – with reasoning also contributing something." (DL 10.32)

Given that all our ideas are necessarily built only from impressions of the outside world, I do not understand how the idealist interpretation is tenable. We need impressions from external physical objects to form our thoughts. By analogy to direct impressions we are able to "mentally contemplate invisible realities." (DL 10.59)

Additionally, if an idea synthesized in our mind does not accurately correspond to an external object, then it is an empty opinion.

If you imagine a centaur, you have synthesized your impressions from reality into something that no longer corresponds to reality. In this case, the centaur exists in your mind as a real impression because it moves your mind with the impression of a centaur, but that synthesis does not correspond to reality (again, an empty opinion).

DL 10.49, 50 (Mensch Trans.) "We must also believe that it is when something from the external objects enters us that we see and think of them; for external objects could not stamp in us the nature of their own color and shape through the air that is between them and us, nor by means of the rays of light or any sorts of currents that travel from us to them, but rather by the entrance into our eyes or minds (as their size determines) of certain rapidly moving outlines that have the same color and shape as the external objects themselves; the same cause explains how they present the appearance of a single, continuous object and preserve their mutual interconnection at a distance from the substratum, their corresponding impact on our senses being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the solid object from which they come."

"And whatever image we derive by focusing the mind or the sense organs, whether on the object's shape or its concomitant properties, this shape is the shape of the solid object and is due either to the continuous compacting or to the residue of the image. Falsehood and error always reside in the added opinion [when a fact is awaiting confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is subsequently not confirmed by virtue of an immovable opinion in ourselves that is linked to the imaginative impression, but distinct from it; it is this that gives rise to the falsehood]. For impressions like those received from a picture, or arising in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind, or by the other criteria, would not have resembled what we call the real and true things had it not been for certain actual things on which we had cast our eyes. Error would not have occurred unless we had experienced some other movement in ourselves that was linked to, but distinct from, the apprehension of the impression; and from this movement, if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, falsehood results; whereas if it is confirmed, or not contradicted, truth results. And to this view we must adhere, lest the criteria based on clear evidence be repudiated, or error, strengthened in the same way, throw all these things into confusion."

Do we know if Leonteus and Leontion were brother and sister? It makes sense they could be both named after their father, just as two of Epicurus' brothers took the names of his mother and father. If that is the case, then the two young Epicuruses of the next generation would have been cousins.

As a counter argument, we have Leontion called "Leontion of Athens" at DL 10.23.

Hello Julia, thank you for this input. I am almost completely ignorant regarding modern psychology. Before I read these posts again, I wanted to ask:

Given that the "changes in thinking" over the years are mostly due to cultural changes rather than physical changes -- if my forefather 2,000 years ago was raised in a similar cultural context that I grew up in (let's say we were both raised in a small, close-knit, and mostly isolated community with no television and no modern education) then it seems to me that he and I would have a strong tendency to have a similar way of thinking -- would you agree?

Yes this is not quite at Epicurus' expense, as Cicero is of course primarily attacking divination here.

Cicero, On Divination, 2.27.59: But are we simple and thoughtless enough to think it a portent for mice to gnaw something, when gnawing is their one business in life?... if my book by Epicurus On Pleasure had been eaten – should I have thought that the yearly produce in the market will be more expensive?

Nos autem ita leues atque inconsiderati sumus, ut si mures corroserint aliquid, quorum est opus hoc unum, monstrum putemus?… si Epicuri De Voluptate liber rosus esset – putarem annonam in macello cariorem fore?

Cassius, I agree with most of DeWitt's thinking regarding the gods not being inherently immortal -- although they do maintain immortality (ἡ ἀθανασία) in practice.

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.40.1138:

For the devout man preserves the immortality and the supreme blessedness of god (along with all those things connected to us) – but impious towards god is he who banishes either one. The man who deliberates without anger and without weakening of favor on [god's] preparations that [originate] from himself for both benefits and harms – this shows god to be in need of nothing from humans…

^[Obbink] For pious is the person who preserves the immortality and consummate blessedness of God (together with all the things included by us) – but impious is the person who banishes either [blessedness or immortality] where God is concerned. And the person who sees also that the good and ill (sent us by God) come without any unhealthy anger or benevolence – declares that God has no need of human things..

[ Ὅσιος ] γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀθαν[ασίαν] κα[ὶ τ]ὴν ἄκραν μακα[ριότητ]α τοῦ θ[ε]οῦ σῴ[ζων (σὺ]ν ἅπασι[ν] τ[οῖς συναπτομένοις ἡμῖν) – α]σεβὴς δὲ περ[ὶ θεό]ν ὃς ἑκά[τε]ρον [ἐξορ]ίζει μὲν. ὁ δ' [ἐπινο]ῶν χωρὶς ὀργῆ[ς καὶ] χάριτος ἀσθενούσης τὰς ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρασκε[υὰς] τῶν ἀ[γα]θῶν κα[ὶ] τῶν κακ]ῶν – ἀπο[φαί]νετ' [αὐτὸν τ]ῶν ἀνθρω[πείω]ν μηδ[ε]νὸ[ς προς]δεῖσθαι...

On subjectivity generally:

Plutarch, Against Kōlṓtēs, 1110B: Accordingly, Epicurus himself in the second book of his Reply to Theóphrastos, when he says that "colors are not intrinsic to bodies – but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye" is asserting by this reasoning that body is no more colorless than colored.

Plutarch, Against Kōlṓtēs, 1109E: Observe what, regarding the heat of the wine in the Symposium, Epicurus has [portrayed] Polýainos conversing with him, as he says "Do you deny, Epicurus, the thorough heating effect caused by wine?" (Someone interrupts) "it is not a universal fact that wine seems fully warming." (And a little later) "For the universal fact does not seem to be that 'wine is warming' – but that a certain quantity for a certain person may be said to be warming."

Quote from Julia

This might also be why the geometricians were so happy to adopt the idea of a plane of ideal forms – they might have experienced such a plane...

Good point! I wanted to add this, (DRN 4.962, Melville translation):

"And those pursuits which most we love to follow, the things in which just now we have been engaged -- the mind being thus the more intent upon them -- these are most often the substance of our dreams. Lawyers argue their cases and make laws, generals fight battles, leading troops to war, sailors pursue their struggles with the wind, and I ply my own task and seek the nature of things always, and tell them in our native tongue. All other pursuits and arts seem thus in dreams to hold the minds of men with their illusions."

Trying to bring it all together, here are my notes so far. Perhaps over-produced. Please point out any errors you notice, they are certainly there.