Posts by Bryan

We can be sure Epicurus was aware of such distinctions, but as far as I can tell he was casual in dealing with these categories.

I fully agree with your point, Joshua, about pi. However, I am also thinking that the idea that pi goes on indefinitely seems to come close to infinite divisibility. It seems, from a physicalist perspective, pi does not show anything infinite, but could be viewed as another example of how math/geometry fails to adequately correspond to reality.

Quote from Cassius

"she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds."

"has made, does make, and will make" is probably too formulaic to be evidence either way, but we have:

PD16, "Chance falls upon the wise man briefly: for Reasoning has managed the greatest and most critical things – and for the whole time of life manages and will manage." or

SV10 "Remember that you are of mortal nature and have a limited time to live and have devoted yourself to discussions on nature for all time and eternity, and have seen “things that are now and are to come and have been."

This last line there is a quote from Hesiod's Theogony line 38. εἰρεῦσαι τά τ᾽ ἐόντα τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ᾽ ἐόντα ""declaring the things that exist, the things that will exist, and the things existing before"

Quote from Cassius

"answering" may be a better rendering of "respondeant" than Rackham's "exact match or counterpart.

For rēspondĕo, we have:

• To promise a thing in return for something else; to offer or present in return.
• To answer, reply, respond (to a question or any statement, friendly or hostile).
• To give an opinion, advice, decision, response (lawyers, priests, oracles).
• To appear before a tribunal, to answer an accusation, meet a charge.
• To answer to; to meet, agree, accord, or correspond with a thing.
• To return, make a return, yield.

"Exact match or counterpart" does seem interpretive. "Omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant" is almost poetic, we have literally "all things correspond as equals to all equal things."

This would not have been so wordy to the Roman ear, as the double use of paria/par is common for rēspondĕo:

"give as good as you get"

"return like for like"

Omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant = Everything alike corresponds to everything alike. Hard to argue against, but not packed with meaning. If tautology is ever appropriate, I suppose it would be for isonomía.

You really have made a beautiful website. It is very well organized, and it is filled only with treasures.

I really appreciate the more accurately transliterated Greek. You used "Loukianos." I think this is excellent. Calling Loukianos "Lucian" is like calling Lucretius "Loucret." But if people only know Lucretius by "Loucret" do we force the issue? -- or do we just use "Loucret" too? I have been indecisive on this point.

Does using Epíkouros add another layer of complexity, or does it get us closer to source? The answer must be that it gets us closer (even if the transition is uncomfortable).

The advice below from book 28 seems close to the point. However, of course, it is about the meanings of words, not accuracy of transliteration.

^{Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 8 col. 5 [Sedley]} It is not possible to alter many different kinds of names. It is possible to alter a few of those which entail perception – the one which we previously defined in the non-image-making manner, but which we altered when by some act of empirical reasoning we saw that they were not of this kind.

Quote from Cassius

Repeatability / regularity is a major aspect of something being "real."

I agree, continuity is key.

10.50a: "[Impressions] render the image of a single continuous object (and preserve the continuity at a distance from the original source) according to the proportional impingement [of the impressions] from that source – out of the deep vibration of the atoms in that solid object."

Quote from Twentier

example, what if I were to posit that I have experienced a prolepsis of a being "with a permanent lack of pleasure"

Interesting! Just as we look to the blissful beings as models of the good life, we look to miserable beings to foster our gratitude (DRN book 2 opening, etc). To take this to the (speculative) extreme: Comparing myself to beings that do not die but are miserable -- would, even if I were also miserable, make me grateful at least to be mortal!

Quote from Twentier

Demetrios of Lakon wrote a book entitled On the Form of the Gods (is that right?)

Yes, but of course just a little bit remains.

Quote from Julia

incorporeal entities ("software") inhabiting fancy bio-mechanical space ships ("hardware"), which repair

Although the only incorporeal entity is the void, which cannot think or do anything at all. Nothing incorporeal can act or be acted upon.

Certainly, the environment supporting gods is naturally occurring between the kosmoi by automatic infinite processes of nature (just as the environment supporting waterfalls is naturally occurring on Earth by automatic finite processes of nature).

Great topic!

It almost seems that the idea of instinct was wrapped into the idea of determinism, which loomed so large that Epicurus feels he needs to assert that we are not all instinct -- but have something in ourselves that can generally transcend instinct.

Epicurus, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43): ^[Sedley] From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers.

Epicurus, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 22 (fr. B 44): ^[Sedley] by which we never cease to be affected, the fact that we rebuke, oppose and reform each other as if the responsibility lay also in ourselves, and not just in our congenital make-up and in the accidental necessity of that which surrounds and penetrates us.

Epicurus, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 115/116: ^[Sedley] If someone won't explain this, and has no auxiliary element or impulse in us which he might dissuade from those actions which we perform, calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – but is giving the name of foolish necessity to all the things which we claim to do calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – he will merely be changing a name. He will not be modifying any of our actions in the way in which, in some cases, the man who sees what sort of actions are necessitated regularly dissuades those who desire to do something in the face of compulsion. And the mind will be inquisitive to learn what sort of action it should then consider that one to be which we perform in some way because of us ourselves but without desiring to.

Quote from TauPhi

from the gods or to the gods

Quote from Cassius

it IS true that we ourselves are giving off images too... But I wouldn't expect that our paying attention to the idea of gods in any way "focuses" the images streaming off of us to go in the direction of the intermundia

Yes, I agree all around -- films (τὰ εἴδωλα) come off every object. We can focus on films that come off other objects toward us, but we cannot direct the films that come off us toward other objects.

48b ...for there is a continuous flow from the surface of bodies – not noticeable by decrease due to replenishment – preserving the position in the solid and arrangement of atoms for a long time...

49b For external objects would not imprint their nature of color and shape through the air between us and them... without certain impressions coming to us from the objects (of the same color and of the same shape) according to the size that fits into the vision or mind, by means of swift movements.

Quote from Don

feel free to pepper your writing and conversation with νή Δία! "By Zeus!"

Yes, by Zeus! Epicurus really does use this with great frequency. I started saying "nē Día!" almost as a joke in place of an interjection (in place of a "curse"). Over time "nē Día!" has become a genuine reflexive interjection.

500 years ago modern science also disagreed with Epicurus -- and now more nearly agrees with him.

Quote from Don

(4/2b/?)

2b! But really all 1.

Quote from Little Rocker

sensation itself contains cognitive content

It seems to me that Epicurus coalesces mental sensation with sensation from the other sense organs -- and distinguishes all these sensations from thought.

^{[10.49, Bailey]} For external objects could not make on us an impression of the nature of their own colour and shape by means of the air which lies between us and them, nor again by means of the rays or effluences of any sort which pass from us to them — nearly so well as if models, similar in color and shape, leave the objects and enter according to their respective size either into our sight or into our mind.

You see with your eyes with the same mechanism that you see mental images: the eidola creates both, and in the same way. And, of course, the process of the eidola contacting or entering the body is not a process that involves logic (even if we are focusing on specific contacts/sensations).

Quote from Little Rocker

It seems to me that Epicurus thinks opinions can be true or false, and not all opinions are about sensations. Sensations don't have to confirm an opinion for the opinion to count as true. They just can't rule it out (DL 10. 51).

Absolutely. Our measure of truth can extend beyond sensation -- by reference to sensation. As Epicurus often says about his considerations of the non-visible, "none of these things are contracticed by the senses."

Thanks again!

The last line of Lucian's "The Dependent Scholar" may be a quote from Epicurus, it ends:

"Remember the words of the wise man: ‘Blame not Heaven, but your own choice.’"

Quote from Little Rocker

And a general concept (e.g., 'horse') that serves as the starting point for investigation, doesn't that require repeated experiences

It is the repeated experiences that serve as the starting point for the investigation / formation of concepts.

Using our direct alogical sensations as tools (our measuring sticks of truth) we then use our logical functions and memory for such activities as investigation and formation of concepts.

Thank you for the conversation!

Hello Little Rocker, thank you for the question!

Our measure of truth is pre-cognitive sensation.

10.38b Ἔτι τε ^[1]τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντως τηρεῖν καὶ ἁπλῶς ^[1]τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε ^[1a]διανοίας εἴθ᾽ ^[1b]ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ^[2]τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη – ὅπως ἂν καὶ ^[A]τὸ προσμένον καὶ ^[B]τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.

It is necessary to always preserve ^[1]the senses and simply^[1]the present impressions, whether ^[1a]of the mind or ^[1b]of any of the criteria, and likewise ^[2]the existing feelings – so that we may also have that by which we will interpret ^[A]what is pending confirmation and ^[B]what is unseen.

----------------

When we focus on our [1a] mental images we have a pre-cognitive sensation of that mental image -- just as when we focus our [1b] eyes on something we have pre-cognitive sensations of that thing.

With this context, we have Bailey very correctly translating "ἐννόημα" as "mental image."

10.38a: Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι – εἴπερ ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἀνάξομεν.

For it is necessary that the primary concept is seen for each word and in no way has need of proof – if we are to have that to which we will refer the inquiry, uncertainty, or belief.

^[Hicks] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving, this being necessary – if we are to have [something] to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

^[Bailey] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation – if we are really to have [a standard] to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference.

Quote from Cassius

Hicks definitely has the upper hand that on the rack the wise man will still cry out.

I had not fully appreciated the fact that, when his excellent edition of Diogenes Laertius was published, Hicks had already been blind for over 25 years.

Wikipedia says "Between 1898 and 1900 Robert Hicks became blind, but he nevertheless produced most of his major works after this time, aided by his wife." They even produced Latin dictionary in braille. I think his translation of the letter to Herodotus is in some ways better than Bailey's.

Hello Remus, welcome!

I am not familiar with the Memoria Press version, but I would like to recommend Hans H. Ørberg's Lingua Latina per se Illustrata series (link). Everything is in Latin from the beginning, but illustrated and simple.

Quote from TauPhi

two answers may be correct: 'uncountable' is set as the correct one but I don't see how 'finite' is wrong

Certainly true! I selected "uncountable" and never read to "uncountable but not infinite." At least I think that is what happened. That was my only issue -- great quiz!

42c. And of each shape: the similar ones are completely infinite ¬ but in their differences: they are not completely infinite, but only innumerable.

^[Hicks] The like atoms of each shape: are absolutely infinite ¬ but the variety of shapes: though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.

^[Bailey] And so in each shape: the atoms are quite infinite in number ¬ but their differences of shape: are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.