feel free to pepper your writing and conversation with νή Δία! "By Zeus!"
Yes, by Zeus! Epicurus really does use this with great frequency. I started saying "nē Día!" almost as a joke in place of an interjection (in place of a "curse"). Over time "nē Día!" has become a genuine reflexive interjection.
500 years ago modern science also disagreed with Epicurus -- and now more nearly agrees with him.
sensation itself contains cognitive content
It seems to me that Epicurus coalesces mental sensation with sensation from the other sense organs -- and distinguishes all these sensations from thought.
[10.49, Bailey] For external objects could not make on us an impression of the nature of their own colour and shape by means of the air which lies between us and them, nor again by means of the rays or effluences of any sort which pass from us to them — nearly so well as if models, similar in color and shape, leave the objects and enter according to their respective size either into our sight or into our mind.
You see with your eyes with the same mechanism that you see mental images: the eidola creates both, and in the same way. And, of course, the process of the eidola contacting or entering the body is not a process that involves logic (even if we are focusing on specific contacts/sensations).
It seems to me that Epicurus thinks opinions can be true or false, and not all opinions are about sensations. Sensations don't have to confirm an opinion for the opinion to count as true. They just can't rule it out (DL 10. 51).
Absolutely. Our measure of truth can extend beyond sensation -- by reference to sensation. As Epicurus often says about his considerations of the non-visible, "none of these things are contracticed by the senses."
Thanks again!
The last line of Lucian's "The Dependent Scholar" may be a quote from Epicurus, it ends:
"Remember the words of the wise man: ‘Blame not Heaven, but your own choice.’"
And a general concept (e.g., 'horse') that serves as the starting point for investigation, doesn't that require repeated experiences
It is the repeated experiences that serve as the starting point for the investigation / formation of concepts.
Using our direct alogical sensations as tools (our measuring sticks of truth) we then use our logical functions and memory for such activities as investigation and formation of concepts.
Thank you for the conversation!
Hello Little Rocker, thank you for the question!
Our measure of truth is pre-cognitive sensation.
10.38b Ἔτι τε [1]τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντως τηρεῖν καὶ ἁπλῶς [1]τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε [1a]διανοίας εἴθ᾽ [1b]ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ [2]τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη – ὅπως ἂν καὶ [A]τὸ προσμένον καὶ [B]τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.
It is necessary to always preserve [1]the senses and simply[1]the present impressions, whether [1a]of the mind or [1b]of any of the criteria, and likewise [2]the existing feelings – so that we may also have that by which we will interpret [A]what is pending confirmation and [B]what is unseen.
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When we focus on our [1a] mental images we have a pre-cognitive sensation of that mental image -- just as when we focus our [1b] eyes on something we have pre-cognitive sensations of that thing.
With this context, we have Bailey very correctly translating "ἐννόημα" as "mental image."
10.38a: Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι – εἴπερ ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἀνάξομεν.
For it is necessary that the primary concept is seen for each word and in no way has need of proof – if we are to have that to which we will refer the inquiry, uncertainty, or belief.
[Hicks] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving, this being necessary – if we are to have [something] to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.
[Bailey] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation – if we are really to have [a standard] to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference.
Hicks definitely has the upper hand that on the rack the wise man will still cry out.
I had not fully appreciated the fact that, when his excellent edition of Diogenes Laertius was published, Hicks had already been blind for over 25 years.
Wikipedia says "Between 1898 and 1900 Robert Hicks became blind, but he nevertheless produced most of his major works after this time, aided by his wife." They even produced Latin dictionary in braille. I think his translation of the letter to Herodotus is in some ways better than Bailey's.
Hello Remus, welcome!
I am not familiar with the Memoria Press version, but I would like to recommend Hans H. Ørberg's Lingua Latina per se Illustrata series (link). Everything is in Latin from the beginning, but illustrated and simple.
two answers may be correct: 'uncountable' is set as the correct one but I don't see how 'finite' is wrong
Certainly true! I selected "uncountable" and never read to "uncountable but not infinite." At least I think that is what happened. That was my only issue -- great quiz!
42c. And of each shape: the similar ones are completely infinite ¬ but in their differences: they are not completely infinite, but only innumerable.
[Hicks] The like atoms of each shape: are absolutely infinite ¬ but the variety of shapes: though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.
[Bailey] And so in each shape: the atoms are quite infinite in number ¬ but their differences of shape: are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.
Some highlights from "Nigrinus" by Lucian (translated by Fowler).
33. There is no satisfaction to be got out of the costliest viands before consumption; and after it, a full stomach is none the better for the price it has cost to fill it. Ergo, the money is paid for the pleasure snatched in transitu.
23. Not wealth, but the envy that waits on wealth, is the object of their desire. The truth is, gold and ivory and noble mansions are of little avail to their owner, if there is no one to admire them. If we would break the power of the rich, and bring down their pretensions, we must raise up within their borders a stronghold of Indifference.
15. He whose ears must be tickled with lascivious songs, and the voluptuous notes of flute and lyre — let all such dwell here in Rome; the life will suit them. Our streets and market-places are filled with the things they love best. They may take in pleasure through every aperture, through eye and ear, nostril and palate; nor are the claims of Aphrodite forgotten. The turbid stream surges everlastingly through our streets; avarice, perjury, adultery — all tastes are represented. Under that rush of waters, modesty, virtue, uprightness, are torn from the soul; and in their stead grows the tree of perpetual thirst, whose flowers are many strange desires."
Excellent work on your website, Twentier, thank you! The only books I have on Philodemus' Rhetoric are Hubbell's translation (that Cassius shared) and Clive Chandler's work on books 1 & 2, did you use/find any other sources?
Great job guys, thank you!
Well said Joshua, at 36:50 "it is not the prolepsis that is wrong -- while the sensory input is streaming into our senses, the mind is adding it's own layer to that -- and this layer of opinion is where error comes in. In all of these cases, if you are not aware of that ongoing process, it becomes very difficult to distinguish what is true from what is not true."
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The description of the prolepsis was excellent all the way through! "The distinction, which seems very clear to us, between the senses and the mind may not have been made to the same degree among the Epicureans in the ancient world."
Well said and certainty true!
10.49a Δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομίζειν – ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν – τὰς μορφὰς ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.
It is also necessary to understand that – by something entering from the outside – we see forms and think.
[Hicks] We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them.
[Yonge] Also, one must admit that something passes from external objects into us in order to produce in us sight and the knowledge of forms.
[Bailey] Now we must suppose too that it is when something enters us from external objects that we not only see but think of their shapes.
Don, I mostly agree with your conclusion, but one issue I see is that the "faculty of discerning" would be a faculty of thought --- and not a faculty of the senses. The senses, anticipations included, are still in the "suck in all the sensory stimuli" phase.
Laertius gives (1)sensations, (2)feelings, and (x)anticipations and (3)image-based focus of the mind.
Epicurus himself says (1)sensation, (2)feelings, and (3)the whole visual focus of the mind
There is no discrepancy, but if there was, it is the anticipations that are the addition by Laertius -- because both mention (1)sensation, (2)feelings, and (3)mental focus.
there's no reason to split the term into two, and that it's best to think of there being only three categories
I don't think the fourth criterion is a mistake.
You are both correct. Fundamentally any and all sensation is our measure of truth -- we receive information from all impressions from the outside world that interact with our body.
10.51a [Hicks] For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact.
10.51a [Bailey] For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses.
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The anticipations are just as momentary as your sight -- and your use of them can improve in the same way: over time you can increase your discipline/ability to focus on what is real, as Epicurus says "through the influences entering from the surrounding environment, taking the guidances towards improvement." (P.Herc. 1191 fr. 124).
Epicurus also says, in Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43) [Sedley 20C.1] From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers. Consequently that which we develop – characteristics of this or that kind – is at first absolutely up to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us...
Although we often speak of the (1)sensations, (2)feelings, and (3)anticipations
That comes from Laertius' summary:
D.L 10.31 In The Canon, Epicurus affirms the criteria of truth are the sensations and the preconceptions and the feelings, and the Epicureans (also affirm) the image-based focus of the mind.
We also must remember:
We have Epicurus' words on the issue. Epicurus tells us exactly what the anticipations are in PD 24:
PD 24. If you simply reject any one sensation and you will not separate (A)a theory about what is still pending versus (B)what is actually present according to (1)sensation, (2)feelings, and (3)the whole visual focus of the mind: then you will disturb even the remaining senses with empty thought – as you will be rejecting the whole basis of judgment.
But this model is more in line with the common conception
I agree, Godfrey. Also, of course, given the word "conception" is appropriate here is itself an indication that this is an idea and is past the point of preconception.
And I think that "before they have seen the first example"
As you say, "adults forming conceptions" is too late to be anticipations, because it involves thinking.
"Before they see their first example" is too early to have an anticipation, as the anticipations are a sense just like the others. We cannot see anything until we have something to look at.
Our anticipation of numbers is just like our vision of numbers: just as we can see 2 apples on a table with our eyes (if they are near) we can also see 2 apples on a table with our mind (if we think about them).
Different versions of D.L. 10.38
[Hicks] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving; this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.
[Yonge] In fact, it is absolutely necessary that we should perceive directly, and without the assistance of any demonstration, the fundamental notion which every word expresses, if we wish to have any foundation to which we may refer our researches, our difficulties, and our personal judgments.
[Bailey] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference.
I believe there are only four instances of τὰ Συμβεβηκότα in Diogenes Laertius book 10, all in the letter to Herodotus.
10.40b [Sedley] Over and above these [atoms and void] nothing can be conceived, either by imagination or by analogy with what can be imagined, as things grasped in terms of complete natures, and not as what we call the "accidents " and "properties (συμβεβηκότα)"of these.
10.50b [Hicks] And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties (συμβεβηκότων), this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts.
10.68b [Hicks] Moreover, shapes and colours, magnitudes and weights, and in short all those qualities which are predicated of body, in so far as they are perpetual properties (συμβεβηκότα) either of all bodies or of visible bodies, are knowable by sensation of these very properties – these, I say, must not be supposed to exist independently by themselves (for that is inconceivable).
10.71b [Hicks] Nor, on the other hand, must we suppose the accident to have independent existence, for this is just as inconceivable in the case of accidents as in that of the permanent properties (τῶν ἀίδιον συμβεβηκότων); but, as is manifest, they should all be regarded as accidents, not as permanent concomitants, of bodies, nor yet as having the rank of independent existence. Rather they are seen to be exactly as and what sensation itself makes them individually claim to be.
We also have this, which is probably from Epicurus' book 25 On Nature:
P.Herc. 419 fr. 5: …οὔτε γὰρ ἕν̣ [τί] [ἦν] ὧς τὸ συμβεβηκ[ὸς] [κ]α̣ὶ ὧι συμβέβηκ[ε] [ῥη]τέον εἶναι – οὔτ[ε ἕτε]ρον ὡς τὸ ἀ[πό τινος δι]αστήματος [ἐπεισερχό]μενον…
Therefore we know that:
The whole natures are, and are only, the atoms and the void. Everything is either an atom or the void – or an emergent characteristic of atoms and void. Emergent characteristics are of two types:
(1) Lucretius gives examples of inseparable characteristics (τὰ Συμβεβηκότα): Weight to stone, Heat to fire, Liquidity to water, Touch to bodies.
(2) Lucretius gives examples of separable characteristics (τὰ Συμπτώματα): Slavery/Freedom, Poverty/Riches, Peace/War.
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There is more in Philodemus, but I am not sure where LSJ is getting the idea that τὰ Συμβεβηκότα "do not feature in the definition" of a thing. I would have a hard time "defining" fire without mentioning heat, and the same for the rest of Lucretius' examples.
We also must keep in mind that Epicurus and Aristotle use συμβεβηκός in different ways (Aristotle himself is inconsistent), so we have to get the Epicurean-specific idea for it. General definitions will tend to favor Aristotle, so it can be confusing (please see my last post above).
τὰ Συμβεβηκότα | Coniūncta | "Inseparable Characteristics" | "Properties" | Fundamental qualities, Inherent attributes |
τὰ Συμπτώματα | Ēventa | "Separable Characteristics" | "Accidents" "Symptoms" | Potential qualities, Incidental attributes |
This outline is specific to Epicurus. For example, Aristotle uses τὰ συμβεβηκότα, with the sense of τὰ συμπτώματα. | ||||
