Posts by Bryan

Quote from Cassius

with a belief in an elusive incorporeal power pervades the body in order to emphasize asceticism, honesty, and moral training

In Catholic/Christian thinking, "honesty" is something that a person should extend to everyone else. It seems this idea (that an "honest" person is honest to everyone), mostly survives as an expectation for the general modern individual.

Of course, other groups (with a social strategy) see honesty as something that should be extended only within their group -- and they see extending honesty beyond their group as foolish and harmful.

As Epicureans, we each organize our life to spend most of our time among our in-group -- and an Epicurean has very high incentives to be honest with a friend in all cases. Still, I cannot see why an Epicurean would be honest in all cases with someone who is not a friend (particularly if being honest may cause consequence, or if being dishonest may cause benefit).

Although not Epicurus, clearly it is a long-standing error.

Hello Eikadistes! Thank you, please feel free to use any part of my work in any way. For raw text, I just mine the p.herc section of the Digital Corpus of Literary Papyri. I'm sure you have been there, but that is my primary source.

Quote from Cassius

The mind is a real thing, but it is nothing above and beyond the atoms that constitute it.

I agree the O'Keefe model is not good. The "Sedley / anti-reductionist" argument also strikes me as the natural interpretation. We can create our own mental movement.

Many things are "greater than the sum of their parts" and have emergent qualities that absolutely exist, even if those qualities do not exist in-and-of-themselves. Although I was wondering if O'Keefe is technically correct that this viewpoint is not really "anti-reductionist."

Epikouros is a reductionist in the sense that he reduces everything to the atoms and void, but he is not a reductionist in the sense that he does accept the real existence of everything that we see and feel. Would it be more accurate and expedient to say he is a reductionist and not an elimitivist?

Quote from Cassius

Sedley seems clearly right in his broad strokes that excessive reductionism is akin to excessive skepticism and excessive determinism

I agree. Epikouros makes good use of reductionism, skepticism and determinism -- but he does so with nuance -- and he does reject the version of each that "goes all the way."

This was the angle of my interest, which we have discussed before: to what extent is it beneficial for us to employ a term for the "excessive" version of each? (as "Pyrrhonism" stands for excessive skepticism.)

I have been in the habit of saying that Epikouros is not a "full" reductionist, or not a "capital R" reductionist. The idea is good, but it may be more precise to say that Epikouros is a reductionist (he explains the operation and the existence of everything we sense by appealing to the most basic components), but he is not an eliminativist (he does not deny the reality of sensed experience or emergent properties).

Tim O'Keefe, in his article "The Reductionist and Compatibilist Argument of Epicurus' On Nature, Book 25," argues that Epikouros' explanation of autonomous mental activity in Book 25 is not antagonistic to full reductionism. From my perspective, O'Keefe's argument is based mostly in differentiating reductionism from eliminativism. I used to think he was splitting hairs, but it may be a helpful point when we read about the relationship between the movement of atoms and one's control over mental movements.

O'Keefe makes it simple when he says: "To explain something is not necessarily to explain it away."

https://www.jstor.org/stable/4182694?read-now=1#page_scan_tab_contents

On the topic of memorization (ἡ ἀπομνημόνευσις, apomnemόneusis), I wanted to share these bits side-by-side:

"...at some point, he was memorizing – or he was retaining an experience analogous to memorization – and he was occupying himself with [it], for which reason he was silent..."

"...Memory, or the experience analogous to memory..."

"...this memory of it or a movement analogous to memory..."

--Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 4.4 & col. 15

Here is the topic summarized in Aetius 1.21,22:

21. On Time

Pythagoras says that time is the sphere of that which encompasses. 

Plato says that time is a moving image of eternity, or the dimension of the motion of the cosmos.

Aristotle maintained that time is the number of the motion of the (celestial) sphere.

Eratosthenes says that time is the course of the sun.

22. On The Substance of Time

Plato says that the substance of time is the motion of the heaven.

The Stoics say that it is motion itself. 

Xenocrates says it is a measure of what is generated, and also everlasting motion.

Hestiaeus of Perinthus, the natural philosopher, says it is the motion of the heavenly bodies in relation to each other.

Strato says it is the quantitative in motion and rest.

Epicurus says it is a concomitant, that is an accompaniment of motions [or changes].

Also, breaking a word down into its morphemes goes far to establishing a general expectation of the word's meaning. For example, today I was looking at the not very common word "Epeisodos," where we get "Episode." But you can see the meaning is along the lines of "upon course into" and in context "penetration" is precisely the idea -- as Epikouros is talking about the penetration of particles into the mind.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 12 (fr. B 34)

I wanted to throw in the word's entry from the Glossarium Epicureum:

Not quite μετακόσμιος, but we have two instances of μετακοσμέω, rearrange / modify:

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 20 (fr. B 42) …πράττε[ι], ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πάντ' ἔχον οὐκ̣ [ἐξ]α̣[ι]ρ̣ούμεθα τῆς αἰτίας τὸ ἀπ̣[ογεγ]εννημένον ἀλλ' ἕν τι ποιοῦν[τες] αὐ[τ]ὸ καὶ τὴν σύστασιν [ὁμοίως κα]θαίρομεν τὸ δ' οὐ νο[υθε]τ̣οῦ̣μέν γε, πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ κατά τινας ἐθισ̣μ[ο]ὺ̣[ς] ἄνευ νοῦ λέξ̣εω̣ς μετακ[ο]σ[μ]οῦμεν… τὸ γ]ὰρ ἐξαιρού μεν̣[ο]ν̣ τῆς αἰτ̣[ίας] κατ' ἀνάγκ̣[ην]…

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 115/116 …ενέσθαι, ἀλ[λὰ κε]νὸν [καὶ] τὸ {δι' ἀνάγκην καλ[εῖ]ν προ[ὸ]ς ὧν φάτε. ἂν δὲ μ[ή] τις τοῦτο ἀποδείξει, μηδ' ἔχει ἡμῶν [τ]ι συνεργὸν μηδ' ὅρμημα ἀπο[τ]ρέπειν ὧν καλοῦντες δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν συντελοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσ[α] νῦν δι' ἡμῶν αὐ[τῶ]ν ὀνομάζοντες τὴν αἰτίαν [εἶναι διαβ]ε[βα]ιούμεθα πράττε[ιν] κατὰ χώραν ἀνάγκην προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψει.} ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ἡμῶν μετακοσμήσει, ὡσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστὶν ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμουμένους παρὰ̣ βίαν τι π[ρ]άττειν. ζητήσει δ' ἡ διάνοια εὑρεῖν τὸ ποῖον [ο]ὖν τι δεῖ νομί[ζ]ειν τὸ ἐξ ἡ[μ]ῶν αὐτῶ[ν π]ως [πρ]αττόμενον [μ]ὴ προθυμ[ουμένων πράτ]τειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλ[λο τι οὐθὲν] εἰ μὴ φά[ναι τὸ] ποῖον [κατ' ἀνάγκην] ἐσ[τὶ]…

which is also attested by Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 54) …ἀνάγκ̣ην προσαγορεύω̣ν, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψ̣ει, ἔργον δ̣' οὐθὲν ἡμῶν μετακ̣οσμήσε̣ι̣, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνορ̣ῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστιν, ἀπ̣οτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθ̣υμουμένους παρὰ βίαν τι πρ]άττειν. ζητήσει δ' ἡ διάνοια εὑρεῖν τὸ ποῖο̣[ν ο]ὖν τι δεῖ νομίζε]ιν τὸ ἐξ̣ [ἡμ]ῶν αὐτῶ[ν π]ω̣ς̣ [πρ]αττόμενον τῆ̣ προθυμ̣[ίαι τοῦ πράτ]τ̣ειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλ[λ' οὐθὲν] π̣ρ̣[άττ]ει[ν] ἢ φάν̣[α]ι̣…

Quote

The relational view of time states that time depends on the succession of physical events in the Universe

Of the three, this is certainly the closest to Epikouros.

It's a letter from Diogenes to an Antipater. It continues:

"I am therefore sending you that dialogue, Antipater, so that you may be in the same position as if you yourself were present, like Theodoridas, agreeing about some matters and making further inquiries in cases where you had doubts. The dialogue began something like this: 'Diogenes', said Theodoridas, 'the [doctrine laid down] by Epicurus on an infinite number of worlds is true...'"

So he wrote a dialogue and then had it written in stone.

I wanted to throw in this sweet little bit from Diogenes of Oinoanda, fr. 63, Smith trans.

"I am sending you, in accordance with your request, the arguments concerning an infinite number of worlds. And you have enjoyed good fortune in the matter; for, before your letter arrived, Theodoridas of Lindus, a member of our school not unknown to you, who is still a novice in philosophy, was dealing with the same doctrine. And this doctrine came to be better articulated as a result of being turned over between the two of us face to face; for our agreements and disagreements with one another, and also our questionings, rendered the inquiry into the object of our search more precise."

Quote from Cassius

It must be observed that Epicurus makes no show of his logical procedures and, like the layman, employs the enthymeme or elliptical syllogism.

At Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 9 (alt. col. 42), Epikouros uses the word "enthymematikous / ἐνθυμηματικοὺς" which LSJ defines as:

Cosmos connects well with a galaxy, To Pan with the universe. If we want other cosmoi, I'd think we only have to accept multiple galaxies. As we know, Epíkouros uses Cosmos in the plural, but not To Pan.

We do have the use of "pharmakon" by Epikouros in Peri Phýseōs, Book 14 (P.Herc. 1148 col. 24):

"This is also desirable: that one who is entirely afflicted by such over-questionings has a kind of remedy – through which it is possible that a simple condition [of life, focused] in the observation of nature will set free their innate trouble."

Adding this for some scale of a mina bar.

These are some examples of coins issued in the first two decades of the garden's existence in Athens. Both are coins by Dēmḗtrios Poliorkētḗs. When he was younger he showed himself with only horn buds, but eventually, as seen here, with full horns.

Quote from Cassius

I frequently repeat my reservations and criticisms of the "Tetrapharmakos"

Yes, the context in which Philódēmos mentions the Tetraphármakos will further support some reservations. We should remember the paragraph just before the Tetraphármakos says:

"...of those who are called Epicureans. While someone known or even described in detail by us, who also claims to be 'the authentic reader' on select writings and on a multitude of compositions – even if he performs poorly, he has selected many passages, but in individual thoughts he is the most inexperienced! In fact, for what he must do, he looks only at the main points – just like [someone] whom they say is 'a helmsman [navigating] from the book.'"

(Philódēmos, [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 3/4)

Quote from Kalosyni

At most we can state a label of the subject matter.

Yes, this seems to be the case, for example, for all of On Nature Book 10. Although only a few sentences can be formed, there are many places where the topic, at least, is clear.