Does anybody know a Stoic to ask about this? Personally, the argument seems to me to be so absurd as to be meaningless but that's probably not the case for somebody serious about Stoicism.
Is it, in the end, just a reductio ad absurdum?
Does anybody know a Stoic to ask about this? Personally, the argument seems to me to be so absurd as to be meaningless but that's probably not the case for somebody serious about Stoicism.
Is it, in the end, just a reductio ad absurdum?
Running Chryssipus' line thru Google translate:
"Does your hand, so affected, as it is now affected, long for it?"
That final desiderat can mean desire or long for. Lack has different semantic baggage in English.
It seems to me that he's saying if pleasure is the highest good, how could your hand (or whatever body part) desire pleasure (since it's the highest good to which we're supposed to strive) if it was in a state in which it didn't desire anything. How could it be in a state where it didn't desire the highest good? Epicurus would say it's exactly that state of no pain that is pleasure itself, as opposed to the Cyrenaics who would claim that is a neutral state, neither pleasure nor pain.
IF (and I am not taking that as established) we were to conclude that the issue Chrysippus is alluding to is that the guide or the greatest good must be continuously present (for some combination of practical or philosophical reasons that we still need to clarify) ,...
I don't think it's the continuously present part he was arguing against. It seems to have been the presence of a neutral state being called pleasure.
Quote from CiceroThe inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus.
This is because the Cyrenaics didn't accept that homeostasis, balance, ataraxia was pleasure. If "the hand" was in a balanced, homeostatic state, the Cyrenaics didn't accept that as pleasure. They called that a neutral state. Epicurus didn't accept that premise. Everything for him was either pleasure or pain.
I've posted a new article in the Files section discussing the location and size of Epicurus's properties - the Garden and house - in ancient Athens. Feel free to provide comments including suggestions for improvement.
Enjoy
This also gets to the question of whether, in a purely material universe, there is a supreme good. Organisms have a highest level goal, but that's quite different from an idealized supreme good.
The "highest level goal" (τέλος telos) = "the supreme good" (summum bonum).
They're the same thing. One is simply the translation of the other.
The supreme/highest good is simply that to which all our actions point, the goal to which we strive, the answer to "why do you do what you do?"
For Epicurus, pleasure is that. Keep piling on enough answers for those why's and you end at pleasure at the top, the highest good thing in the widest sense.
For the Stoics, it's somehow "to be virtuous."
I'm going to break down this dialogue (C for Chryssipus; S for Stooge):
C: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all?
S: Certainly of nothing.
C: But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack.
S: I agree.
C: Pleasure then is not the supreme good.
For good measure, here's the Latin:
—'Numquidnam manus tua sic affecta, quem ad modum affecta nunc est, desiderat?'
—Nihil sane.
—'At, si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret.'
—Ita credo.
— “Non est igitur voluptas bonum.”
That's it. That's the whole "story." Here's my response:
Your hand doesn't "feel" anything. You may sense something with your hand, on your hand, in your hand, and so on; but your hand, in its present condition, is merely a part of your sensory apparatus. If you feel that your hand doesn't lack anything, it's in homeostasis. It is in balance. That balance is pleasurable by definition because it is not painful. You are already feeling pleasure in your hand. Chryssipus is simply not accepting Epicurus's premise that there is only pleasure and pain, and then forging ahead to make a point regardless of Epicurus's position.
That one characteristic of the supreme good is that it is always present and - if absent - that the presence would be felt immediately?
The supreme good is not always present. It is that to which all other actions aim for. We are always striving to achieve the supreme good. Chryssipus is saying that if the hand didn't "want" anything, if it didn't "want" pleasure, then pleasure can't be the supreme good because we should always strive to gain the supreme good. Epicurus would say that the feeling of freedom from pain IS pleasurable, is pleasure, and so "the hand" IS already experiencing the supreme good which is pleasure.
By the time you get to a hand it definitely feels pleasure and pain, but so do lots of other parts of the body at the same time, and you have to consider as Martin says "the total effect."
I'd point out that "the hand" doesn't feel pleasure or pain. They individual can sense pain or pleasure in different body parts, but it's not the body part that "feels" the sensation. It is our minds connected to that part. Sever the hand, the hand feels neither pleasure not pain... But the individual sure would!!
That's a pretty layout, but there are SO many things wrong with that imagined conversation!
Welcome, @PrudentPleasure . Good username
It's all myth anyway, so there are conflicting birth narratives for many deities. Everybody wanted to be associated with them. From the Theoi site:
QuotePARENTS
APHRODI′TE (Aphroditê), one of the great Olympian divinities, was, according to the popular and poetical notions of the Greeks, the goddess of love and beauty. Some traditions stated that she had sprung from the foam (aphros) of the sea, which had gathered around the mutilated parts of Uranus, that had been thrown into the sea by Kronos after he had unmanned his father. (Hesiod. Theog. 190; compare Anadyomene.) With the exception of the Homeric hymn on Aphrodite there is no trace of this legend in Homer, and according to him Aphrodite is the daughter of Zeus and Dione. (Il. v. 370, &c., xx. 105.) Later traditions call her a daughter of Kronos and Euonyme, or of Uranus and Hemera. (Cic. De Nat. Deor. iii. 23; Natal. Com. iv. 13.) ... According to Hesiod and the Homeric hymn on Aphrodite, the goddess after rising from the foam first approached the island of Cythera, and thence went to Cyprus, and as she was walking on the sea-coast flowers sprang up under her feet, and Eros and Himeros accompanied her to the assembly of the other great gods, all of whom were struck with admiration and love when she appeared, and her surpassing beauty made every one desire to have her for his wife.
Aphrodite was born of foam off Cythera, but went to Cyprus. Both islands had cultic sites dedicated to her. Athena was born from Zeus' head, but is associated also with the island of Rhodes.
For additional info...
https://www.theoi.com/Olympios/Aphrodite.html
"According to Hesiod and the Homeric hymn on Aphrodite, the goddess after rising from the foam first approached the island of Cythera, and thence went to Cyprus,..."
"ATHENE (Athena) was the Olympian goddess of wisdom and good counsel, war, the defence of towns, heroic endeavour, weaving, pottery and various other crafts."
QuoteANONYMOUS: I, THE pencil, was silver when I came from the fire, but in thy hands I have become golden likewise. So, charming Leontion, hath Athena well gifted thee with supremacy in art, and Cypris with supremacy in beauty.
Book 16 of the Planudean Anthology.
Oh! Cypris is another name for Aphrodite! So Leontion has been given art (τέχνης*) by Athena and beauty by Aphrodite! I get it now.
*
craft, skill, trade
art
cunning, wile
Epicurus also wrote a book entitled Neocles : dedicated to Themista.
Correct, the top half of the statue is not original to the base/chair/legs.
Per Pamela Gordon: According to Margherita Guarducci, lower half is 2nd c.CE Roman copy of Greek original, most of upper half is from another statue, head and arms belong to try another era, and the entire figure was "restored" in the 16th c.
I just got The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus through interlibrary loan yesterday and started with the chapter on women in the Garden. The author, within a few pages in the chapter, brought up the fact that some scholars identify a statue of St. Hippolytus in the Vatican as having originally been a statue of Themista of Lampsacus due to the obvious women's double hem and sandals and characteristic throne. The statue, as it is seen today, is pieced together from various fragments, but the throne and base are one piece.
I found one open access article that talks about this:
Or Google [Themista Hippolytus] and you'll get more resources.
I was completely unaware of this prior to The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus so I am very much looking forward to reading the book.
And along those lines, from my perspective the important distinction isn't mental and physical pleasures; it's pleasures that have their origin within ourselves (recollection, anticipation, freedom from anxiety, etc.) and those that have their origin external to ourselves (taking part in pleasurable activities)