Philodemus, PHerc 1005, column 5:8-9: Pros tous [ ... ]
DCLP/Trismegistos 62437 = LDAB 3610
...παρει̣ρ[η-]
μένο̣[ν] ἡ τετραφάρ[μα-] (tetrapharma-
κος (-kos)· 'ἄφοβον ὁ θεός, ἀν[ύ-]
10ποπτον ὁ θάνατος καὶ
τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητ̣ο̣ν̣,
τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκα[ρ-]
τέρητον.' ...
128: The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the soul’s freedom of disturbances, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness.
Keywords
the health of the body
τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν (tēn tou somatos hygieian)
the soul’s freedom of disturbances
τὴν <τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν (tēn (tēs psykhēs) ataraxian)
131: When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profilgates [...] but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.
but neither to be pained throughout the body
ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα (alla to mēte algein kata sōma)
nor to be troubled throughout the mind.
μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν·
(mēte tarattesthai kata psykhēn)
My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.
But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?
Touché! 
Back to the drawing board!
burninglights is onto something again and I think I like where he's going! 
My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.
Alberto Enrique Álvarez:
Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λέγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.
I'd like to briefly look at the first part of that VS:
Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι...
Using δεῖν, Álvarez's transcription which uses what the manuscript has: δεῖν with a final nu ν.
Using I find it interesting that there are then parallel infinitives:
δεῖν
φιλοσοφεῖν
οἰκονομεῖν
and λέγειν
Γελᾶν is also the infinitive form of γελάω "to laugh"
δεῖν carries the idea of "it behoves one to, it is necessary to, one must" but not necessarily any moral obligation which is carried but χρή which shows up in here with χρῆσθαι
So...
"At the same time, it behoves one to laugh and 'to love and practice wisdom,' and to tend to one's home life and to make proper use of one's other goods; and to never, ever speak philosophical noises vented out of anger."
Demosthenes actually uses a construction similar to VS41:
Demosthenes, Philippic 2, section 34
ὁρῶ γὰρ ὡς τὰ πόλλ᾽ ἐνίους οὐκ εἰς τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τοὺς ὑπὸ χεῖρα μάλιστα τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφιέντας.
for I observe that people vent their wrath as a rule, not on those who are to blame, but chiefly on those who are within their reach.
Onenski I'm not sure if you shared Alvarez's work before or not, but (at the risk of repeating):
EL GNOMOLOGIUM VATICANUM Y LA FILOSOFÍA DE EPICURO
Dirigida por:
JOSÉ MARÍA ZAMORA CALVO
ALBERTO ENRIQUE ÁLVAREZ
I am *always* open for digging into these translation questions! Thanks for the opportunity.
First, we return to the manuscript:
And for ease of comparison (differences in transcription underlined):
Bailey:
Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.
Alberto Enrique Álvarez:
Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λέγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.
You're right! One letter and one word difference. Now, what word is in the manuscript??
Well! Would you look at that! ... ὀργῆς !!! That third letter is *clearly* a gamma γ and not a theta θ, but Bailey et al., of course, knew what was in the scribe's mind when he wrote that. Nope! Unless there is a question of what letter is in a manuscript, I am not amenable to the idea of "correcting" texts if a plausible translation can be made from *what is actually written*!
So, I fully agree with Álvarez's transcription. This just continues to confirm to me that we absolutely HAVE TO go back to the manuscripts when they are available. And I like Álvarez's point about the juxtaposition of laughter and anger. Bailey et al. change the word to ορθης (orthes) "right, correct" (as in ortho-dox) to make it easier on themselves, I think. I'm a little unsure about the use of "maxims" in Álvarez's translation, so I'd like to break the manuscript line apart and dig into the grammar briefly...
...καὶ μηδαμῇ λέγειν "and never, ever (strong negation) to say...
...τὰς .. φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας. "the letting loose philosophical sounds"
ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς "from (or "done by" or "out of") anger"
The "maxim" of Alvarez comes from φωνας:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, φων-ή
LSJ has:
III. phrase, saying, “τὴν Σιμωνίδου φ.” Id.Prt. 341b; “ἡ τοῦ Σωκράτους φ.” Plu.2.106b, cf. 330f, etc.; of formulae, “στοιχειώματα καὶ φ.” Epicur.Ep.1p.4U., cf. Sent.Vat.41 (= Metrod. Fr.59); “αἱ σκεπτικαὶ φ.” S.E.P.1.14, cf. Jul.Or.5.162b, etc.
but I think that citation of Sent. Vat. 41 could predicated on the orthes of Bailey et al. But really all the word can mean is voice, cry, sound, etc. It's where we get out English "phone, phono-."
This text translates ἀφιέντας as "overlook":
So, I can get the clunky literalish translation:
"One must laugh and seek wisdom and tend to one's home life and use one's other goods; and never, ever let loose speaking philosophical sayings out of anger."
... or something with that idea.
It's also the name of Eros Έρως the Greek god of love and desire (Roman: Cupid)
Of Love
Περὶ ἔρωτος (erōtos)
love, mostly of the sexual passion
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἔρως
Note: I am not certain if this is the correct place for this thread, apologies if it isn't.
No need to apologize at all! This is a perfect spot for this question (and even if it wasn't, Cassius and Kalosyni are adept at moving threads around. 
)
This is a very good question. I have thoughts, but I'm not going to just write off-the-cuff on this one. I think we're going to have to think about a potential life vs the non-existence of the one that died. More later. Thank you for initiating the conversation!
1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"
While I'd say "yes" to Cassius 's question posed here, I refer the reader to my pedantic post no. 48 above.
2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or fulfilled?
It seems to me that there are only two types of pleasure, but I'd again characterize them as "action" and "rest" (with obvious more explanation needed to flesh out those two words). I may also use "change" and "stability" (NOT "static") but also something like unreliable pleasures vs. those pleasures one can be confident in having. Pleasures that depend on energeia are subject to being able to perform the actions necessary to experience them, while the other kind are available without putting forth the effort of activity. *That's* the importance of a word like aponia. It's not painlessness (as far as I can see), it's effortlessness, from ἄπονος (áponos, “without toil or trouble, effortless, painless”).
(1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *fulfilling a desire* are exactly the same thing.
Call me pedantic, but I wouldn't characterize the two kinds of pleasure in exactly that way. Both "acting toward" and "fulfilling" are action words from my perspective. Maybe "experiencing pleasure while acting on a desire" and "resting in the experience of a fulfilled desire"? But even that doesn't sound right to me. The key concepts from my perspective are action and rest. Maybe - maybe! - mirroring Aristotle's idea of energeia and dynamis although I'm still REALLY shaky on my understanding of those terms.
the source for terpsis: Warren, James (2002). Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University.
This review may be of help to is:
Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia – Bryn Mawr Classical Review
The rest of chapter 2 is an analysis of the longest surviving fragment of Democritus, B191. It begins, ” Euthymia arises in men through a moderation of joy and a good balance of life.” This confirms, says Warren, “that Democritus is no full-blooded hedonist,” since it advises that we pursue, not “the maximum amount of pleasure,” but only “a moderate amount of terpsis” And what is terpsis ? Warren translates it “joy,” and distinguishes it from “pleasure” ( hêdonê) as follows: whereas a feeling of pleasure “might or might not be beneficial,” terpsis“is a feeling we can accept as objectively good.” I find this implausible and would urge instead that Democritus’ distinction between terpsis and hêdonê anticipates Epicurus’ distinction between “joy” ( chara) and “pleasure”: joy is the mental state that has pleasure as its intentional object. (On this, see my article “Epicurus on the telos“, Phronesis 38 [1993] 281-321.)Warren cites B4: “Joy ( terpsis) and lack of joy are boundary-markers of what is and is not beneficial.” But Democritus is not saying here that joy is the feeling of pleasure that we get from what, being truly beneficial, is objectively good. He is saying that what is good (i.e., beneficial) must be measured in terms of what causes joy. And that sounds to me a lot like the moderate hedonism of Epicurus.
So, it appears Democritus uses terpsis, not Epicurus.
I would differ with the title of this thread: "Competing Greek Words for Pleasure in the Epicurean Corpus?"
I would suggest any terms are more like "Complementary Greek Words" or even "Supplementary" or maybe even "Greek Words for Varieties of Pleasure".. in the Epicurean Corpus.
On the one hand, in the case of other pursuits, the fruit comes for one only just upon complete perfection.
Don you are translating it as perfection, not completion?
I suppose I'm translating it as "complete perfection," but let's look again at the text. The key word where I'm getting "complete perfection" from is τελειωθεισιν:
τελειωθεῖσιν (teleiōtheisin) is related to τέλος (telos) as in bringing something to its ultimate goal or end, hence bringing something to perfection. So, in this case, it means something like practicing other crafts or pursuits to perfection. The thing that comes immediately to my mind (for whatever reason) is playing the guitar. Seeing YouTube videos on music theory breaking down complicated rock pieces shows how much it takes to really perfect the technique of playing guitar.
Continuing with that playing guitar metaphor. You can't really "complete" learning the guitar. You can "perfect" your technique. My use of "perfection" should in no way be interpreted as some kind of sneaking in Platonic Ideal Forms or anything like that. The word is a form of τελειόω:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, τελει-όω
which means "to make perfect, complete; of things, acts, works, time, make perfect, complete, accomplish; to be made perfect, attain perfection; bring fruit to maturity, come to maturity."
The whole idea is that for other pursuits, you have to wait for the pleasure. There is a certain goal that must be reached, something must be brought to maturity, to a certain point of perfection or completion, before the "fruit" can be obtained.
I think this might also be a play on words with connotations like picking fruit/harvest ὁ καρπὸς and maturity τελειωθεισιν coming into play.
I would say that the "fruit/harvest/καρπὸς" doesn't even *necessarily* have to refer to pleasure. It's simply the benefit (the fruit) of other pursuits. But the enjoyment of something does seem to make more sense given the context.
Quote from burninglightsCompare Epicurus's description:
“Joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.” (DL 10.136)
With the following from Lucretius:
“This will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us. For without a doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs.” (2.251ff)
From my perspective, you are spot on.
Remember, too, that "consist in motion and activity" is not technically what the Greek says. It's an instrumental dative there with "activity" being ἐνεργείᾳ which means "by (means of) 'energeia'."" It's pleasures through "kinesis" by means of "energeia." Well, that's clear as mud, right? It seems this is Epicurus again wrestling with the current philosophical debates and terms of his day, as energeia, kinesis, dynamis, etc., go back to Aristotle. And if you were a Greek philosopher in Athens *after* Aristotle, you had to contend with that environment. At its basic sense (to the best of my ability right now), Energeia is the putting into action of some potential (dynamis).
See also
Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
There seems to be in the "pleasures consisting in motion by means of 'being-at-work'" a sense of bringing about pleasure through the actual work of motion of the individual. The motion, through the work/activity/actuality of the individual, brings about the pleasure.
Look at the words in the Lucretius translation: move forward, swerve in our motions, will, gives to each one a start, movement, motions.
Those are all active working words there.
I am becoming more convinced that the banal "kinetic pleasures" translation hides SO much that Epicurus was trying to get across here.
There's no use of τερψις in Diogenes Laertius book 10.
Maybe in Philodemus? But he's not readily searchable.
Are there sources in the Greek, among the Epicurean corpus, for τέρψις and/or χᾰρᾱ́? And a distinction from Ἡδονή?
Quick response: χαρά is specifically one of the "kinetic" pleasures. I'll have to dig around about τέρψεις. That's a new one to me.
Lucrezio: immagini di manoscritti
O = Oblongus, codex Leidensis Vossianus 30, saec. IX in. (UB Leiden, VLF 30)
Q = Quadratus, codex Leidensis Vossianus 94, saec. IX ex. (UB Leiden, VLQ 94)
G = schedae Gottorpienses vel Haunienses, saec. IX (Copenhagen, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, GKS 211, 2°)
GKS 211 2°: Lucretius, De rerum natura
L = Laurentianus 35,30 Niccolanianus (Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana)
Codici Laurenziani [sigle di Flores: plut. 35,25 (D); 35,26 (E); 35,27 (H); 35,28 (R); 35,29 (S); 35,30 (L); 35,31 (F); 35,32 (T); 53,01]: cerca in Teca Digitale.
I = Monacensis Latinus 816a (codex Victorianus) ante 1475 (BSB Monaco)
https://www.e-periodica.ch/cntmng?pid=mhl-001%3A1973%3A30%3A%3A196
